KAYE'S AND MALLESON'S HISTORY

OF THE

INDIAN MUTINY

OF

1857-8

EDITED BY COLONEL MALLESON, C.S.I.

IN SIX VOLUMES

VOL. V.

By COLONEL MALLESON, C.S.I.



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I INSCRIBE THIS VOLUME TO THE MEMORY OF

THE LATE

SIR HENRY MARION DURAND,

K.C.S.I.

A MAN WHO COMBINED A RARE GREATNESS OF SOUL
AND A PERFECT GENIUS FOR AFFAIRS
WITH SIMPLICITY OF MANNERS, DIRECTNESS OF PURPOSE,
AND A DETESTATION OF ALL THAT IS MEAN AND FALSE.
AS WISE IN COUNSEL
AS HE WAS PROMPT AND DECIDED IN ACTION,
HE MET ALL THE STORMS OF LIFE WITH FORTITUDE,
RENDERING EVER, ALIKE BY HIS ACTION AND HIS EXAMPLE,
UNSURPASSED SERVICES TO HIS COUNTRY.

AFTER A SERVICE FULL OF HONOUR, EXTENDING OVER
FORTY-TWO YEARS,
HE DIED IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTY.
"HE LEFT A REPUTATION WITHOUT SPOT—THE BEST
INHERITANCE HE COULD BEQUEATH TO HIS CHILDREN."

PREFACE TO THE FIFTH VOLUME.

THE present volume concludes the history of the purely military events of the great Indian uprising of 1857.

The question whether that uprising was simply a military mutiny, or a revolt of which that military mutiny constituted the prominent feature, was debated keenly at the time, and is to this day as warmly contested. In the concluding chapter of this volume I have endeavoured to throw some light on the dispute, by the simple process of tracing effect to its cause. There is not a line in that chapter which will not bear the most searching analysis. The conclusion I have arrived at is that the uprising of 1857 was not primarily caused by the greased cartridges; that it was neither conceived nor designed by the Sipáhis. The mutiny was in reality the offspring of the discontent roused by the high-handed measures inaugurated, or at least largely developed, by Lord Dalhousie, and brought to a climax by the annexation of Oudh. The greased cartridge was the opportune instrument skilfully used by a band of conspirators, for the most part men of Oudh, for the purpose of rousing to action the Sipáhis, already made disaffected by consecutive breaches of contract and of faith.

Of these acts—of the attempt, as I have termed it, to disregard the silent growth of ages and to force Western ideas upon an Eastern people, and in the course of that attempt to trample upon prejudices and to disregard obligations—the mutiny was the too certain consequence. It is remarkable that the decisive points of this great uprising were at two places, famous in Indian history, in both of which we had, by force or by the moral power engendered by the possession of force, displaced the former rulers. These places were Dehlí and Lakhnao. At the one we were the besiegers, in the other we were besieged.

ehlí and Lakhnao constituted, so to speak, the wings of the bel army. Had the centre, represented by Gwáliár, gone ith the wings, it had fared badly with us. But, for the reasons have specially referred to in the concluding chapter, the ntre remained sound long enough to enable us to concentrate ıe bulk of our forces on the two decisive points of the rebel ne.

It was after Dehlí had fallen and a severe blow had been ealt at Lakhnao that we had to deal with the centre—a ntre formidable indeed, but which the loyalty of Sindhiá had eprived of much of its power and prestige. It is with the ntest with that centre, carried on by Colonel Durand, Sir ugh Rose, Sir Robert Napier, Generals Stuart, Roberts, Michel, ıd Whitlock, Brigadiers Smith, Honner, Parke, Somerset, olonel Holmes, Becher, and many others, that the military ortion of this volume mainly deals; and I venture to affirm ıat no part of this history is more remarkable for the display capacity and daring by the generals, of courage and enırance by the men. It is a page of history which every nglishman will read with pride and satisfaction—with pride ecause the deeds it records were heroic; with satisfaction ecause many of the actors survive, ready, when they are called on, to repeat their triumphs in other fields.

But, important and full of interest as are the military records this volume, the political action it relates is certainly not less . There was not a moment of more consequence to India than ıat in which Lord Elphinstone had to decide whether he ould content himself with saving his own Presidency, or, sking everything, would send every available man to the ecisive points in the endeavour to save India. Not for a second d that illustrious man hesitate. It has been to me a task no ordinary pleasure to demonstrate how the daring and enerous conduct of the Governor of Bombay vitally affected ıe interests of England at the most critical period of the ruggle.

Nor have I experienced less gratification in rendering justice the character of Lord Canning, as that character developed self, when, in the early part of 1858, he stood unshackled at llahábád. I have entered in the concluding chapter so fully to this point, and into others affecting the judgment passed on his action in the earlier part of his Indian career, that it unnecessary to allude to the matter further here.

Since the first edition of this volume was published I have received numerous letters from gentlemen who were actors in the several campaigns, and have conversed with many of them. I have enjoyed the opportunity likewise of revisiting India. The result has been that I have been able to render some share of justice to distinguished officers whose deeds were not so fully described as they deserved to be. I may add that I have likewise obtained the fullest information regarding the transactions between the Government of India and the State of Kírwí prior to 1857, and have re-written that portion of the narrative.

Although I have exerted myself to the utmost to ensure accuracy of detail in all the military operations, I am conscious that there are many other gallant deeds the details of which have not reached me, and which are therefore unnoticed. I have found it impossible, even in a work so bulky as this, to mention every individual who deserved well of his country. When a small body of men attack and defeat a large number of enemies, every man of the attacking party is necessarily a hero. There may be degrees of heroism, but it is difficult to distinguish them. Napoleon, feeling this difficulty, announced to his army after one of his great campaigns that it would be sufficient for a soldier to declare that he had belonged to the army which had fought in that campaign, for the world to recognise him as a brave man. That assurance is certainly not less applicable to the soldiers whose gallant deeds are recorded in this volume, and on whom the campaigns of Málwá, of Central India, of the southern Maráthá country, and again of Málwá and Rajpútáná, have fixed the stamp of heroes.

The appendix gives the story of Tántiá Topí's career as related by Tántiá Topí himself.

I cannot conclude without expressing the deep obligations under which I lie to the many gentlemen who have placed their journals and letters, all written at the time, at my disposal. The value of the information I have thus been able to obtain is not to be expressed in words. But especially do I desire to acknowledge the benefit I have received from the services of the gifted friend who read the first edition of this volume in proof-sheets, and whose frank and judicious criticisms greatly contributed to the clearness and accuracy of the military narrative.

I may add that there is in the press a sixth volume, which, in addition to an analytical index prepared by my friend,

Mr. Pincott, will contain a reference, taken in the order of the Governorships, Lieutenant-Governorships, and Chief-Commissionerships to which they severally belonged, to many of the civil districts throughout India. To this volume has been transferred the narrative of the five civil districts, and the chapter regarding the Indian Navy, which originally appeared in this volume. Although I have taken the greatest pains to ascertain the truth regarding the events in several of these stations, I am conscious that much has been left still to be recorded. In but few cases were journals kept; many of the actors are dead; many are old and indifferent. I trust, however, that it will be found that I have succeeded in unearthing many deeds of daring, in rescuing from oblivion more than one reputation, and generally in adding to the interest of the story of the most stupendous event that has occurred in the reign of Queen Victoria.

G. B. Malleson.

27, *West Cromwell Road*,
1st *July*, 1889.

LIST AND SHORT DESCRIPTION OF IMPORTANT PLACES MENTIONED IN THIS VOLUME, AND NOT DESCRIBED IN PREVIOUS VOLUMES.

AMJHÉRÁ, a Native State in Málwá, within an area of 581 square miles.

ÁSÍRGARH is a fortress in the Nimár district of the Central Provinces, situate on a spur of the Sátpúra range. It stands at an elevation of 850 feet, and is a place of great strength. It was once taken by Akbar, and twice by the English, to whom it now belongs. It lies 313 miles from Bombay.

AURANGÁBÁD, a city in the Haidarábád State, which derives its name from the Emperor Aurangzíb, who built here a beautiful mausoleum over the remains of his favourite daughter. It lies 215 miles from Bombay, and 690 from Madras.

BÁLÁBET, a town in the Gwáliár State, 40 miles to the north-west of Ságar.

BANDAH, chief town of district of same name, now in the Allahábád division, 95 miles south-west of Allahábád, and 190 south-east from Ágra.

BÁNPÚR, a parganah in the Lálitpúr district, Central Provinces, forming the seat of a chief who rebelled in 1857.

BELGÁON, the chief town of the district of the same name in the Southern Maráthá country, situate on the northern slopes of the Bellárí watershed, 2500 feet above the sea. It is 318 miles from Bombay.

BHOPÁWÁR, a ruinous town in the Gwáliár State; 64 miles south-west of Ujjén, and 330 south-west of Gwáliár.

BURHÁNPÚR, an ancient and famous city in the Nimár district of the Central Provinces, was for a long period the capital of Khándesh, and the chief city of the Dakhan under the Mughul emperors. It lies on the north bank of the Taptí. It was founded by Nasír Khán, of Khándesh, and was called after the renowned Shekh Burhanu'dín, of Daulatábád. It is famous for its quaint porcelain. It is two miles from the Lálbágh station of the Great India Peninsula Railway.

CHÁNDÉRÍ, a town and fortress in the Gwáliár State, described at page 104.

CHARKHÁRÍ, capital of State of same name in Central India, on the route from Gwáliár to Bandah, 41 miles south-west of the latter.

DEWÁS, a State in the Central Indian Agency, with two chiefs, one called Bábá Sáhib, the other Dádá Sáhib. The territories of the former have an area of 1378 square miles; those of the latter, 6197 square miles; yet the Bábá Sahib is the senior of the two.

DHÁR, a State in the Central Indian Agency, with an area of 2500 square miles. Its capital is also called Dhár.

DHÁRWÁR, capital of district of the same name in the Southern Maráthá country, lies 351 miles from Bombay. Is a great cotton centre.

GOBARIÁ, a village in the Gwáliár State, between Nímach and Mandesar.

HAIDARÁBAD, described in the text, page 80.

JABALPÚR, capital of district and division of the same name in the North-West Provinces. The town is an important centre of trade. It lies 700 miles from Calcutta; 202 from Allahábád; 879 from Madras, and 674 from Bombay.

JALÁUN, a town in the district of the same name in Jhánsí territory. The district has an area of 1469 square miles, and comprises the towns, Kalpí, Kúneh, Jaláun, and Urái (the capital). The chief rivers in the district are the Jamnah, the Betwá, and the Pahúj.

JÁMKHÁNDÍ, capital of State of same name in Southern Maráthá country, 70 miles north-east of Belgáon; 68 east of Kolhápúr, and 162 south-east of Puná. The chief maintains a force of 57 horse and 852 foot.

KÍRWÍ, a town, formerly capital of a principality in Bundelkhand, 45 miles from Bandah.

KOLÁPÚR, capital of a native State of the same name between the Retnagírí and Belgáon districts, distant 128 miles south-east from Puná; 64 from Satárah, and 220 from Bombay.

KULÁDGÍ, capital of the district of the same name in the Southern Maráthá country, to the north-east of Belgáon. It lies 314 miles from Bombay.

KUNCH, a town in the Jaláun district, 19 miles west of Urái, and 42 miles south-west of Kalpí.

KURUNDWÁD is the capital of two States of the same name in the Southern Maráthá country, ruled by two branches of the Patwardhan family.

LÁLITPÚR, capital of a district in the Jhánsí division, as it now is, of the North-West Provinces. The district borders on that of Ságar.

MALTHON, a town in the Ságar district, 40 miles north of Ságar.

MÁLWÁ, the name applied to the western portion of the Central Indian Agency. It is a tableland of uneven surface, rising from 1500 to 2000 feet above the level of the sea, bounded on the west by the Aravâli range; on the south by the Vindhyá chain; on the east by Bundelkhand, and on the north-east by the valley of the Ganges. It comprises the States of Gwáliár, Indúr, and Dhár.

MÁLWÁ (WESTERN) is the westernmost tract of Málwá, and constitutes a subordinate agency of the Central Indian Agency. It comprises the States Jáurá, Ratlam, Sólaná, and Sítámáu.

MANDESAR, a town in Sindhiá's dominions, on a tributary of the Chambal, 80 miles from Ujjen, 120 from Indur, and 328 from Bombay.

MEHIDPUR, a town in the Indúr State, on the right bank of the Síprá, north of Ujjén, 432 miles from Bombay. Since 1817, when Sir J. Hislop defeated Mulhar Ráo Holkar on the banks of the Síprá, it has been a cantonment for British troops.

MIRÁJ, capital of State of same name in Southern Maráthá country. The chief is a first-class Sirdár, with a military force of 597 men.

MUDHAL, capital of State of same name in Southern Marátha country, south of the Jámkhándi State. The chief maintains a military force of 700 men.

NÁGOD, town in the Uchahárá district, Central Indian Agency, on the direct route by Rewah from Ságar to Allahábád; is 48 miles from the first; 43 from the second, 180 from the third, and 110 from Jabalpúr.

NARGUND, town in the Dhárwár district, 32 miles north-east of Dhárwár. The chief lost his possessions in consequence of his conduct in 1857, related in this volume.

NARSINHPUR, a district in the Narbadá division of the Central Provinces, with an area of 1916 square miles. Its capital, also called Narsinhpúr, is on the River Singrí, a tributary of the Narbadá. It lies 60 miles to the west of Ságar.

PÚCH, a village in the Jhánsí district, on the road from Kalpí to Gúnah, 55 miles south-west of the former, and 150 north-east of the latter.

PUNÁ, the ancient Maráthá capital, is situate near the confluence of the Mutá and Mulá, in a plain 2000 feet above the sea. It is 90 miles from Bombay. Adjoining it is the artillery cantonment, Kirkí, where Colonel Burr, in 1817, defeated the Peshwá's army.

RÁHATGARH, a fortified town in a tract of the same name in the Ságar district, 25 miles to the west of the town of Ságar.

RAIPÚR, capital of the district of the same name in the Central Provinces, 177 miles to the east of Nágpúr, by the road from that place to Calcutta.

REWAH, native State in Bundelkhand, having a capital of the same name. It is bounded to the north by the Bandah, Allahábád, and Mírzápúr districts; to the east by part of the Mírzápúr district and the territories of Chutiá Nágpúr; on the south by the Chhatísgarh, Jabalpúr, and Mandlá districts; on the west by Maihir, Nágód, and the Kothí States. It has an area of 13,000 square miles. The position of the town is described in the text.

SÁGAR, capital of the district of the same name, situated on an elevated position, 1940 feet above the sea, on the north-west borders of a fine lake nearly a mile broad, whence it derives its name (Ságar, *Anglicè*, the Sea). It lies 90 miles north-west of Jabalpúr; 185 miles north of Nágpúr; 313 miles south-west of Allahábád; 224 miles north-east of Indur, and 602 from Bombay.

SÁNGLÍ, capital of the State of the same name in Southern Márátha country, the chief of which is a Sirdár of the first class, with a military force of 822 men. It is situate on the River Krishna, to the north-east of Kohlápúr.

SATÁRAH, capital of the district of the same name, lies 56 miles south of Puná, at the junction of the Krishna and the Yena. It is 163 miles from Bombay.

SÁVÁNUR, capital of State of same name in the Dhárwár district; lies 39 miles south by east of Dhárwár. The Nawáb is of Afghán descent.

SHÁHGARH, town in Ságar district, Central Provinces, 40 miles north-east of the town of Ságar.

SIHOR, a town in the Bhopál State, Central India; situate on the right bank of the Saven, on the road from Ságar to Asirgarh, 132 miles south-west from the former, and 152 north-east from the latter; 22 miles from Bhopál, and 470 from Bombay.

TAL-BAHAT, chief town of parganah of same name in Lálitpúr district, Central Provinces, stands on a hill, 26 miles north of the town of Lálitpúr.

TEHRÍ, capital of the Tehrí or Urchah estate, to the east of Lálitpúr. It is 72 miles north-west of Ságar. The Rájah is looked upon as the head of the Bundélás.

UJJÉN, a very important town—more so formerly than now—on the Síprá, in the Gwáliár State. The modern town is six miles in circumference, and surrounded by groves and gardens. The old town lies about a mile to the north of the new town. It is 1698 feet above the sea. It is 40 miles from Indur.

URCHÁH, ancient capital of State of the same name, also called Tehrí, in Bundelkhand. The State is bounded on the west by the Jhánsí and Lálitpúr districts; on the south by the Lálitpúr district and Bijáwar; on the east by Bijáwar, Charkhárí, and Garáuli. The town is on the Betwá.

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HISTORY OF THE INDIAN MUTINY.

BOOK XIII.—BOMBAY, CENTRAL INDIA, AND THE DAKHAN.

[1857.]

CHAPTER I.

LORD ELPHINSTONE, MR. SETON-KARR, AND MR. FORJETT.

1857. May. The Bombay Presidency.

THE western, or Bombay, Presidency of India comprises a long, narrow strip of country of varying breadth and irregular outline. Including the province of Sindh, the administration of which is subordinate to it, it occupies the western coast of the peninsula from the mouths of the Indus to the northernmost point of Goa, and from the south of that territory to the borders of Maisúr. It is thus bounded on the west by Balúchistán and the Arabian Sea; on the south by Maisúr; on the east by the Madras Presidency, Haidarábád, Barár, the central provinces, the states forming the central Indian agency, and Rajpútáná; on the north by Bhawalpúr, the Panjáb, and Balúchistán. The area of the British portions of the Presidency is one hundred and thirty-four thousand one hundred and thirty-five square miles, supporting fourteen millions of inhabitants; but, in subordinate political relations to it, there are, or rather there were in 1857, native states comprising seventy-one thousand three hundred and twenty square miles with six millions of inhabitants. The principal of these were Barodah, Káthiwár, Kachh, Kambháyat, Mahíkantá, Réwakántá, Kohlápúr, Sáwantwárí, and Khairpúr.

Its area and population.

The native states contained in it.

Lord Elphinstone.

In 1857 Lord Elphinstone was Governor of Bombay. A man of culture and ability, Lord Elphinstone had enjoyed more experience of India than generally falls to the lot of governors unconnected with the civil or military services. He had been Governor of Madras from 1837 to 1842; and, although the records of the Madras Presidency throughout his incumbency had marked no stirring events within its borders, yet the first Afghán war, with its early success and its later collapse, had excited the minds of the natives throughout the country, and had called for the exercise of tact and judgment on the part of the rulers.

His previous career.

These qualities Lord Elphinstone was eminently qualified to display, and he had displayed them. He was called, however, to deal principally with administrative details. The manner in which he performed these duties gained for him the confidence of the natives. His measures for improving the resources of the country, and for establishing means of communication in all directions, are spoken of to this day.

His travels in India.

Lord Elphinstone revisited India at the time of the first Sikh war, 1845–6, and marched in company with the 14th Light Dragoons, then commanded by the late Colonel William Havelock, who had been his military secretary, from Bombay, through central India, to the head-quarters of the British army before Láhor. On the transfer of Kashmír to Guláb Síngh, a proceeding following the treaty of 1846 with the Sikhs, Lord Elphinstone formed one of the party which first visited that famous valley. After a residence in it of nearly three months, he set out for Ladákh by the Husora valley, and endeavoured to proceed thence up the Gilgit valley—in those days an utterly unknown country. Forced, perhaps fortunately, by the objections of the authorities, to renounce this expedition, Lord Elphinstone crossed the Hurpo pass to Rondu on the Indus, being the first Englishman by whom that journey had been attempted.

His qualifications for his post.

It will be seen, then, that when in 1853 Lord Elphinstone was called to the post of Governor of Bombay, he brought to that office experience such as few men, not trained in the Indian services, could command. His knowledge of men, his courtesy, his genial bearing, gave effect to that experience. Up to the outbreak of the mutiny in 1857 his conduct as Governor of Bombay was

invariably marked by temper, judgment, and discretion. Calm and dignified in manner, courteous to his colleagues and to all with whom he was brought in contact, he evinced, on every occasion likely to test his action, the possession of a guiding mind, of a will not to be shaken, a resolution that went direct to its aim. The crisis of 1857 was just one of those occurrences which Lord Elphinstone was constitutionally fitted to cope with. He at once realised its difficulty and its danger, and rose equal to encounter the one and to neutralise the other. In the words of a contemporary writer, generally unfavourable to him, he displayed "the courage of the soldier who knows his enemy." *

Well fitted to encounter the crisis of the mutiny.

The truth of this judgment was proved by the action taken by Lord Elphinstone when the news reached him of the outbreak of the 10th of May at Mírath. Lord Elphinstone was at Bombay when he heard of that event. It happened that General Ashburnham, commanding the expeditionary corps on its way to China, was staying with him. So greatly did the importance of the intelligence impress the Governor, so certain did he feel that the Mírath revolt would spread, and that it should be met at once by bringing large reinforcements of European troops without delay into the country, that he urged General Ashburnham to proceed immediately to Calcutta, and to offer his services, and the services of the China expeditionary force, to the Governor-General.

Lord Elphinstone's action on hearing of the mutiny at Mírath,

with reference to General Ashburnham;

It was a fortunate circumstance that the war with Persia had just been brought to a successful conclusion. Fortunate, likewise, that the disaffection had not spread to the native army of Bombay. Lord Elphinstone thus felt himself equal to the most decisive measures. He at once authorised the Commissioner of Sindh, Mr. Frere, to transfer the 1st Bombay Fusiliers from Karáchi to the Panjáb. He arranged that the 64th and 78th regiments, then on their way from Persia, should proceed forthwith, without landing at Bombay, to Calcutta. The more speedily to carry out this object, he caused vessels to be equipped and prepared for the reception of these regiments, so that on the arrival in the Bombay harbour of the transports

to Mr. Frere;

regarding the regiments on their way from Persia;

* *The Friend of India.*

which were conveying them from Bushír they might be transhipped without loss of time. This measure was duly and effectively carried out. The men moved from the one transport into the other, and reached Calcutta in time materially to influence the campaign. But Lord Elphinstone did more. He despatched on the instant to Calcutta a company of Madras artillery which happened to be on the spot, taking the duty of the Bombay artillery, then absent in Persia. He at the same time sent instructions to the officer commanding at Dísá to hold the 83rd regiment and a troop of horse artillery at that station in readiness to march on Ajmír, on the sole condition that, in the opinion of the local authorities, the departure of the only European troops in the vicinity of Áhmadábád and Gújrát might be hazarded without the absolute certainty of an outbreak. And, still penetrated by the necessity to concentrate on the scene of the mutiny as many European troops as could be collected, Lord Elphinstone chartered, on his own responsibility, two steamers belonging to the Peninsular and Oriental Company, the *Pottinger* and the *Madras*, provided them with all necessary stores, and despatched them, under the command of Captain Griffith Jenkins of the Indian navy, to the Mauritius and the Cape, with letters to the Governors of those settlements, dwelling upon the importance of the crisis, and begging them to despatch to India any troops they could spare.

regarding the Madras Artillery in Bombay.

He prepares to assist Rajpútáná,

and sends to the Mauritius and the Cape for reinforcements.

I may here state that the result of these applications was such as might have been anticipated from the characters of the men to whom they were addressed. The Governor of the Mauritius, Sir James Higginson, embarked on board the *Pottinger* the head-quarters and as many men of the 33rd as that steamer could carry. Not content with that, he took an early opportunity to charter and despatch another transport to convey the remainder of that regiment, a battery of artillery, and as much money as could be spared from the treasury of the island.

Result of his applications to the Mauritius,

Nor was the Governor of the Cape, Sir George Grey, animated by sentiments less patriotic. It fortunately happened that an unusually large force of British regiments was, at the moment, concentrated at Cape Town. Sir George despatched, without delay, as many of them

and to the Cape.

as he could spare. The 89th and 95th he sent to Bombay; the 6th, the 1st battalion 13th, the 2nd battalion 60th, the 73rd, 80th, and 31st to Calcutta. In subsequent vessels he despatched horses in as large a quantity as he could conveniently procure.

Responsibility nobly assumed by Sir George Grey.

The despatch of Lord Elphinstone to Sir George Grey had painted the urgency of India's needs in terms so glowing that that able Governor considered himself justified to stretch his powers. He did not hesitate to direct the commanders of the transports conveying the China expeditionary army so far to divert from their course as to call at Singapor for orders. The result of this patriotic action was most happy. The intelligence which met these transports at Singapor induced their commanders, in every case, to bear up for Calcutta.

Lord Elphinstone suggests sending a special steamer to England,

To return to Bombay. So important did it appear to Lord Elphinstone that reinforcements should promptly be sent from England by the overland route—a route till then untrodden by British troops—that, telegraphic communication being open with Calcutta, he suggested to the Governor-General the propriety of sending to England a special steamer, which he had ready, with despatches, impressing upon the Home Government the urgency of the need. There can be no doubt that the suggestion was a wise one. A fast lightly-laden steamer, travelling at her highest speed, would have anticipated the ordinary mail steamer by three or four days at the least. This, too, at a time when the most important events depended on prompt and decisive action. But Lord Canning did not view matters in the same light. He refused to interfere with the ordinary mail service. The steamer, therefore, was not sent.

but Lord Canning refuses.

Effect of the precautionary measures above recorded.

Before I pass from the record of the precautionary measures taken in the early days of the revolt, to describe the actual occurrences in the various parts of the Bombay Presidency, I wish to advert for a moment to one material result which followed them. Those measures undoubtedly saved Bombay from serious outbreak. They did more. They secured an important base of operations against central India and Rajpútáná, and they preserved the line of communication between those provinces and the provinces beyond them and the seaboard. It is diffi-

cult to over-estimate the importance thus gained, solely by the exercise of timely foresight.

Lord Elphinstone meets a breach of law in Bharoch.

A rather serious breach of the law at Bharoch in the month of May, originating in a dispute between the Párśís and the Muhummadans, might have led to important consequences but for the firmness with which it was met, in the first instance, by the officer commanding on the spot, and, in the next, by the Governor. The spirit of Lord Elphinstone's action may be judged from the fact that, to prevent the spread of the riot, he despatched a hundred and fifty men of the 86th to Súrat—a movement of troops which left only three hundred and fifty European troops of all arms in Bombay itself.

He designs a policy of offensive defence;

The riot at Bharoch was, for a time, the only indication of ill feeling manifested in the western Presidency, and it was entirely unconnected with the great revolt then raging in the north-west. Lord Elphinstone, whilst carefully repressing it, did not abate a single effort to carry out the policy which he was convinced was the only sound policy—the policy of offensive defence. Almost from the very first he had designed to form, at a convenient point within the Presidency, a column to secure and hold the great line of road between Bombay and Ágra. Not only would the line thus secured form a base for ulterior operations, but a great moral advantage would be gained by its tenure. In the crisis which then afflicted India, it was not to be thought that any portion of the empire would stand still. The attitude of folded arms was an attitude to invite danger. To check the approach of evil, the surest mode was to go forth and meet it. A column marching towards the north-west would encounter the elements which, having brewed there disturbance, were eager to spread it, and, encountering, would annihilate them. The presence of such a column, marching confidently to the front, would, moreover, go far to check, perhaps even to suppress, any disloyal feelings which might have been engendered in the minds of the native princes whose states bordered on this line of communication. For these reasons, then, at a very early period of the crisis, Lord Elphinstone proposed in council, and ordered, the formation of a column, under the

to hold the line between Bombay and Ágra,

and, by advancing to meet the evil coming from outside, to prevent it entering within.

With this view forms a column under General Woodburn.

command of Major-General Woodburn, to open out communications with central India and the North-West Provinces.

The column formed in consequence, under the command of Major-General Woodburn, was but small in numbers. It consisted only of five troops of the 14th Light Dragoons, the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, Captain Woolcombe's horse-battery of artillery, and a pontoon train. It set out from Puná on the 8th of June, under orders to march with all speed to Máu, with the view to save that place while there was yet time, and to prevent the spread of the insurrection in Málwá, and along the northern frontier of the Bombay Presidency.*

Composition of the column.

June.

It is ordered to march to Máu.

The state of affairs at Máu and at Indúr was such as to demand the most prompt action on the part of General Woodburn. It was just possible that, making forced marches, he might approach so near to Indúr as to baffle the plans of the discontented. The dread that he might do so for a long time paralysed their action.† Circumstances, however, occurred which baffled the hopes expressed by Lord Elphinstone, when, acting on his own unaided judgment, he pressed upon the military authorities the necessity for General Woodburn to advance.

Possibilities before General Woodburn.

The city of Aurangábád—once the capital of the kingdom of Ahmadnagar, and, at a later period, the favourite residence of the Emperor Aurangzíb—occupies a prominent and important position in the north-western corner of the dominions of the Nizám. The corner of which it was the capital juts like a promontory into British territory. To the east and north-east it touches western Barár and the central provinces; to the south, the west, and the north-west, the northern portions of the Bombay Presidency. Beyond the northernmost part of that Presidency, and within easy distance of Aurangábád, lies Málwá.

Aurangábád.

Disaffection was known to reign in Málwá, and it was of the highest consequence that that disaffection should not spread southward to Bombay. But at Aurangábád, the capital of the small promontory I have described, almost touching Málwá on one side and running into Bombay on the other three sides,

* Lord Elphinstone's letter to General Woodburn

† *Vide* Vol. III. page 137.

ere quartered the 1st and 3rd Cavalry, the 2nd Infantry, and a battery of artillery, of the Haidarábád Contingent. These regiments, commanded by British officers, were composed chiefly of Muhammadans, and one f them—the 1st Cavalry—had, in the early part of June, isplayed symptoms of disaffection.

Garrison of Aurangábád.

Aurangábád is distant from Púná a hundred and thirty-eight iles; from Ahmadnagar, about midway between the two, ixty-eight miles. In the ordinary course of events, General Voodburn, armed with positive instructions to push on with ll speed to Máu, would not have entered the dominions of the Nizám. It happened, however, that the authors of the disaffection I have spoken of as prevailing at Aurangábád proceeded on the 13th of June to more open demonstrations, and in consequence General Voodburn received, not from Lord Elphinstone, instructions to eviate from the line urged upon him by that nobleman, and) march upon Aurangábád.

Disaffection of the Garrison.

In explanation of the open demonstrations at Aurangábád, I may state that a rumour had reached that place that the cavalry regiment stationed there would be required to join General Woodburn's column and march with him on Dehlí. The rumour was unded upon truth, for it had been intended that the regiment i question should join General Woodburn's force. But to the inds of soldiers who were not British subjects, who lived ıder the rule of the descendant of a viceroy appointed by the ughul, the idea of fighting against the King of Dehlí was ɔculiarly distasteful.* They showed their dislike on the oment. On the 13th of June the men of the 1st Cavalry ɔenly expressed their dissatisfaction, and—it was stated at the me—swore to murder their officers if pressure to march against ehlí were put upon them. Fortunately, the commanding officer, Captain Abbott, was a sensible man. He summoned the native officers to his quarters, and discussed the question with them. The native officers declared that, for their own part, they were ady to obey any lawful order, but they admitted that their en would not fight against the mutineers. Captain Abbott

Reasons of the disaffection.

Judicious conduct of Captain Abbott.

* The splendid manner in which the Haidarábád cavalry atoned for this mentary disaffection will be found recorded in subsequent pages.

then, after communicating with the Resident, resolved to adopt a conciliatory course. He gave the men assurances that they would not be required to march on Dehlí. In this way order was restored. So little confidence, however, in the stability of the compromise was felt on both sides, that the officers proceeded to barricade themselves in their mess-house, whilst the mutinous cavalry boasted over their moral victory in every quarter of the city.

Order is restored, but not confidence.

Matters were in this state when, on the morning of the 23rd of June, General Woodburn's column entered Aurangábád, marched at once to the ground occupied by the mutineers, and ordered the men to give up their arms. With the exception of one troop of the 1st Cavalry, all obeyed. The general gave the men of that troup six minutes to consider the course they would pursue. When the time elapsed, the men, instead of submitting, put on a bold front and attempted to ride away. In this attempt most of them succeeded. The next morning some three or four, convicted of attempts at assassination, were hanged, and order was restored.

Woodburn enters Aurangábád and disarms the mutineers.

General Woodburn was under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Henry Somerset. In the opinion of Lord Elphinstone, the danger at Aurangábád had not been so pressing as to necessitate the deviation of the field force from the direct road to Máu. He thought that, in the presence of two dangers, that which would result from the mutiny coming down to Bombay from central India and Málwá was greater even than the disaffection of a portion of the troops of the Nizám. Forced, however, to accept General Woodburn's action at Aurangábád, he lost not a moment in urging him to press on towards Máu. "I am persuaded," he wrote to that officer on the 22nd of June, "that the local officers greatly exaggerate the danger of a rising in our own provinces. I have no fear of anything of the sort; and, if it should happen, I trust that we should be able to put it down speedily. But I feel confident that it will not happen—at all events, for the present. If you allow the insurrection to come down to our borders without attempting to check it, we shall almost deserve our fate; but if by a rapid advance you are able to secure Máu you will also, in all probability, save Mehidpúr, Ságar, Hoshangábád," &c. Lord Elphinstone

Lord Elphinstone urges Woodburn to press on to Máu.

followed up these noble words, displaying the true conception he had formed of the situation, by a letter addressed, the same day, to Sir Henry Somerset: "I am very much obliged to you," he wrote, "for the perusal of General Woodburn's letter. I conclude that since it was written he has received his orders to continue his march to Máu with all possible expedition."

Woodburn, however, delays to try his prisoners

But General Woodburn did not move forward. In reply to the letter I have just quoted, he wrote, on the 25th, to Lord Elphinstone, urging the various reasons which, he thought, would necessitate a long stay at Aurangábád. These reasons might, in the presence of the greater danger at Máu, be justly termed trivial. They consisted in the possibility of a fresh outbreak after his departure, and in the necessity of trying some sixty-four prisoners by court-martial.

Lord Elphinstone combats his reasons and still urges him onwards.

Lord Elphinstone answered the objections to advance urged by the general in a very decided manner. "I wish you to remember," he wrote to him on the 27th of June, "that it was for the object of relieving Máu, and not for the purpose of chastising a mutinous regiment at Aurangábád, that the field force was formed. The latter is an incidental duty, which it was hoped would not interfere with the main object. I am perfectly aware that, in these times, circumstances may occur to divert your force from its original destination, but I do not think they have yet occurred." He then proceeded in a few forcible words to urge the folly of wasting unnecessary time upon trials,* and the necessity of disarming regiments which might show disaffection, instead of delaying a movement of the first importance from a fear that a revolt might take place after the departure of the British troops.

Lord Elphinstone is ordered further to diminish his strength.

This letter, I have said, was despatched to General Woodburn on the 27th of June. On the morning of the 28th Lord Elphinstone received a despatch from Calcutta, instructing him to send to Calcutta by sea the wing of the 12th Lancers then stationed at Púná. This diminution of his available European strength, already extremely small, following immediately upon the departure

* "To allow twenty days for the trial of sixty-four prisoners is out of the question in these times."

from the Presidency of General Woodburn's force, and accompanied by reports received from many district officers to the effect that rebellion was only watching its opportunity, so affected Lord Elphinstone, that for a moment he felt inclined to authorise General Woodburn to halt at Aurangábád. Indeed, on the spur of the moment he wrote that officer a letter, expressive of his deep regret and disappointment at having to request him to give up a measure which he believed to be of great importance. But the night dissipated his anxiety. In the morning he had resolved to dare all, to risk all, for the supreme advantage of saving central India. On the 29th, then, he wrote again to General Woodburn, cancelling that portion of his previous letter which had given him authority to defer the projected movement.

This order, for a moment, causes Lord Elphinstone to waver.

But only for a moment.

But before this letter could reach General Woodburn that officer had become incapacitated for command by ill-health. The Government promptly replaced him by Colonel C. S. Stuart, of the Bombay Army, then commanding the 3rd Regiment Native Infantry. Pending the arrival of that officer, the command of the field force devolved upon Major Follett, 25th Regiment Native Infantry.

Woodburn falls ill and is replaced by Major Follett.

Major Follett had a grand opportunity before him. He had only to move forward. Unfortunately, he wrote to the Commander-in-Chief a letter in which he dwelt upon the impossibility of leaving Aurangábád in the then condition of the Nizám's regiments. More unfortunately still, Major Follett's representations were strongly supported by the head of the army.

Follett inherits Woodburn's opinions.

Lord Elphinstone's reason and instincts still told him that the further delay thus proposed was the delay of red tape—the natural consequence of the absence of a clear mind and a firm will. But he was in a very difficult position. He was not a soldier. And although he would unhesitatingly have regarded the scruples of Major Follett, unsupported by higher authority, he could not treat with contempt the weighty support given to those scruples by the officer who was Commander-in-Chief of the armies serving in India. Unwillingly, then, and solely in deference to the strong opinion expressed by Sir Henry Somerset, Lord Elphinstone consented to the delay.

Difficulty of Lord Elphinstone's position.

July. Major Follett is converted to Lord Elphinstone's views.

A few days proved how true had been his judgment. On the 7th of July, Major Follett convicted himself and the chief who supported him of a hasty and premature decision. On the 7th of July that officer wrote to Lord Elphinstone,* declared that it was perfectly feasible to leave Aurangábád, and announced his intention to march for Máu on the 10th, leaving a troop of cavalry and two guns for the protection of the Aurangábád cantonment.

Lord Elphinstone promptly requested Sir Henry Somerset to confirm this change of feeling by cancelling his previous orders. This was, in effect, carried out.

Colonel Stuart comes to command the force, and sets out for Asírgarh.

The force led by Colonel C. S. Stuart of the Bombay army, who joined it on the 8th, quitted Aurangábád on the 12th, too late to prevent the mutinies at Máu and Indúr, but not too late, under the guidance of Colonel Durand, who joined it at Asírgarh, to restore British authority in central India. To the further movements of this column I shall return in a subsequent chapter. Its march beyond the Bombay frontier was due solely to Lord Elphinstone.† Had he been unfettered, and had its first commander been a man after his own heart, it

* It is probable that Major Follett's change of opinion was due to the receipt of a despatch from Colonel Durand addressed to Mr. Plowden, and sent through the officer commanding at Aurangábád. This letter contained convincing proofs of the necessity of promptly advancing.

† "I quite agree with you," wrote Lord Elphinstone to Colonel Durand, the 27th of July, "in regretting the delay which took place in the advance of the force. You cannot have written more strongly than I have upon the subject, but there was a strong counter-prejudice on the part of the officers on the spot, every one of whom declared that the departure of the column from Aurangábád would be the signal of a general rising. I from the first recommended that the mutinous troops should be disarmed and dismounted. But this was considered inexpedient. It was represented that it was not so much the troops but the whole population was against us. Mr. ——, the Deputy Commissioner in North Barár, who is reckoned a very good officer, said that there were, I am afraid to say how many, armed Musalmans in his district, who would rise the moment the column was ordered to move. Colonel ——, who commands the Madras cavalry regiment at ——, said it was utterly impossible to send half his regiment over to Aurangábád, as the people in that neighbourhood would attack the station." It is immensely to the credit of Lord Elphinstone that, in spite of these and many similar reports from district officers, and of the opposition referred to in the text, he should have persevered in urging the forward movement. He was, in fact, one of the few men in high position in India who realised how the mutiny should be met.

would have taken place in time to prevent much evil in central India.

But the despatch of Colonel Stuart's column to central India was not the only aid proffered by the Bombay Presidency for the suppression of the mutiny. I have already alluded to the splendid self-abnegation by which the province of Sindh was denuded for the benefit of the Panjáb. Again, the western Presidency was prompt to comply with the indent made upon it by Colonel G. St. P. Lawrence, the Governor-General's agent in Rajpútáná.* The greater part of the garrison of Dísá, consisting of a troop of horse artillery, one regiment and one squadron of native light cavalry, a detachment (four hundred men) of the 83rd, and a detachment of the 12th Native Infantry, was formed into a movable column, and placed at the disposal of George Lawrence, just then nominated Brigadier-General in Rajpútáná. Lord Elphinstone was prompt to confirm this arrangement—an arrangement which gave General Lawrence a power, exercised with remarkable ability and judgment, to maintain order in a country ruled over by the great Rajpút chiefs.† Further, on the 23rd of July, four companies of the 86th Regiment were sent from Málígáon to join Colonel Stuart's column on its way to Máu. Marching direct by the Bombay road, they did not join till after that column had arrived at Máu.

Lord Elphinstone places a column at the disposal of Colonel Lawrence.

Whilst Lord Elphinstone was thus actively employing a policy of aggressive defence alike to keep the evil from his own borders and to crush it in the provinces beyond them, the spirit which had worked so much mischief in the north-west suddenly raised its head on his very hearth. The first symptoms of mutiny in the Bombay Presidency broke out shortly after the march of the columns whose movements I have just recorded.

First symptoms of mutiny in the Bombay Presidency.

The southern Maráthá country comprises the territory between Satárah and the Madras Presidency to the north and south, and between the Nizám's dominions and the western ghát to the east and west. It has an area of fourteen thousand square miles and a population of about three millions, for the most part of pure Maráthá blood. Within this country are the two

The southern Maráthá country; its area,

* Vol. III. page 170.

† *Vide* pages 171 to 174, Vol. III.

collectorates, Belgáon and Dharwár, the native state Kolhápúr, and numerous small semi-independent states, each with an annual revenue rising up to, but in no case exceeding, fifty thousand pounds. In 1857 the principal of these were Sángli, Míraj, Sávanúr, Kurandwár, Jámkhandi, Nargúnd, and Mudhol.

and native states.


Of this important country the Collector and Magistrate of Belgáon, Mr. George Berkeley Seton-Karr, had political charge. Mr. Seton-Karr possessed remarkable natural abilities, and these had been developed by an education which had continued up to the date of which I am writing. He was a firm advocate for the rights of native princes, for continuing to them the power to adopt, for interfering as little as possible with their customs which, however little understood by Europeans, were harmless in themselves, and which were hallowed by the practice of ages. He was one of those men who, whilst possessed of a firm and decided character, yet preferred to try to their fullest extent the arts of persuasion before having recourse to intimidation or violence.

Character of Mr. George Berkeley Seton-Karr.

The internal condition of the southern Maráthá country when Mr. Seton-Karr assumed charge of it in May 1856, just twelve months prior to the revolt, was one of brooding discontent. The annexation by the Government of India of Barár and of Oudh had been in the one case followed, in the other preceded, by an Act known as Act XI. of 1852, under the operation of which an Inám Commission was empowered to call upon all landed proprietors to produce the title-deeds of their estates. A new tribunal had, under this Act, been invested with arbitrary jurisdiction over this vast mass of property. The holders of estates, careless and improvident, unacquainted with law, and accustomed to consider that thirty years' possession conferred an irrefragable title, had failed in many instances to preserve the most valid muniments of their estates. In some cases, indeed, no muniments had ever existed. Chiefs who, in the anarchy which prevailed in India subsequent to the death of Aurangzíb, had won their estates by the sword, had not been careful to fence them in with a paper barrier—in that age utterly valueless—but they had transmitted to their descendants the arms and the retainers who had constituted their right to possession, and with whose

Internal condition of the southern Maráthá country.

The Inám Commission.


THE
MARÂTHÂ COUNTRY
English Feet
0 50 100 150
INDIAN OCEAN
Kâtiwâr
Broâch
Dehlât
R. Nerbudda
SATPURA MTS.
Rajpeepla
R. Tapti
Raitool
Gôwalgarh
Ellichpur
NÂGPUR
Khandesh
Berar
R. Tâpi
SURAT
G. of Cambay
Mollygaon
Akôlao
Ravergaum
R. Warda (M.)
Wein Gunga R.
Damaun
Chandur
Assai
Jafirabâd
Nâsik
Trimbul
Dowlatabad
Jalnah
R. S. Pârnah
Pain Ganga R.
Mâlkâr
Manakdurg
Aurangabad
Panthan
Basseim
SALSETTE
Bombay
Junir
Wirgaon
Ahmednagar
R. Godaveri
Sirônsha
Kolâbah
Sereh
Kârdlâ
Wancal
Pulwâgh
Rejpuri
PUNAH
Ûdghir
Jinjeira
Raigarh
Sopah
Purinda
Indâpûr
Bankot
Severndroog
Sitara
Ashti
Tuljapur
Shôlapûr
Budar
Wâsôtar
Tarla
Pandarpûr
Akalkôt
Golkonda
R. Musi
Jaygarh
Kurar
Kullburgah
HAIDARÂBÂD
Ratnagiri
Vishalgarh
R. Warna
Mirâj
Tolapur
R. Bima
Rajapur
Kolhâpûr
RIJAPUR
Cherakan
R. Kistna
Kolar
Mulki
Gokak
Vingorla
Sawant Wâri
Belgâm
Râichûr
Karnal
GOA
Kittur
R. Malpurba
Dhârwar
R. Tumbhedra
Hubli
R. Hugri
Swaleshagar
Ankolah

aid they had learned to consider mere titles superfluous, as without it they were contemptible. In other cases, men who had acquired land in the general scramble which preceded the downfall of the Peshwá's Government, had transmitted their acquisitions to their children, fortified by no better titles than entries in the village account-books. To both these classes the Inám Commission had been a commission simply of confiscation. In the southern Maráthá country the titles of thirty-five thousand estates, large and small, had been called for by the new tribunal. In twenty-one thousand cases that tribunal had pronounced sentences of confiscation. Thousands of other landowners, still unevicted, looked on in dismay, tremblingly awaiting the sentence which was to add their wail of distress and resentment to that of their impoverished neighbours.* Can it be wondered at, then, that Mr. Seton-Karr, when he assumed charge under these circumstances in May 1856, found the native landowners of the Southern Maráthá country in a state of moody discontent, which was prevented from bursting into open disaffection only by a sense of the utter hopelessness of success?

The manner in which that commission affected many of the chiefs and landowners.

Their discontent.

But another cause increased, even intensified, the discontent, and, by its connection with the religious feelings of all classes, added greatly to the danger of the situation. Of all the rights devolving upon a Hindu landowner, the right to adopt is at once the most cherished and

The right of adoption,

* In writing thus of the feelings of the actual landowners, I am far from desiring to say a single word against the inquiries instituted by the Inám Commission. I wish to record only the discontent of the men who actually possessed the land when the inquiry was ordered. I admit not only that the Government was perfectly justified in ordering that inquiry, but that it was demanded by thousands who had been violently and, in some cases, fraudulently dispossessed of their hereditary áeres during the period antecedent to the fall of the Peshwá. The Inám Commission rendered substantial justice to these men. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that forty years had elapsed since the dominions of the Peshwá had been brought under British sway, and that during those years, and, in many cases, during many antecedent years, the landowners who felt aggrieved by the action of the Inám Commission had enjoyed and transmitted to their children the estates which their fathers had gained. The long possession gave them in their eyes a better right than any which could be urged by the descendants of the men who had been dispossessed. No wonder, then, from their point of view, the Inám Commission was an instrument of tyranny.

the most sacred. It is an observance enjoined upon him by his religion. Should he fail to beget a child, he is bound to provide for himself an heir by adoption. On the child so adopted he bestows all the care and the affection ordinarily lavished on the offspring of love. Taught by his religion to believe that his own happiness in the other world depends upon the transmission to the adopted son of the inheritance of his fathers, he is ever careful to instil into his mind that he actually is of the family, and will be, after his death, the representative of its traditions and its honours. The idea that he might die heirless is to the Hindu landowner not blessed with offspring an ever-present canker-worm. It is sufficient to make him moody, despairing, miserable. The prohibition to find for himself such an heir might even make him reckless.

a religious rite necessary for the Hindú.

But the Anglo-Indian Government had, in many instances, pronounced such a prohibition. The policy of absorption adopted by Lord Dalhousie had shown no respect for the principle of adoption. Under its action large states had been absorbed, and the power to adopt had been denied to lesser landowners. This refusal had been extended to the landowners of the southern Maráthá country—amongst others, to the important chief of Nargúnd. The prohibition produced consternation. The effeminate early training of the Hindu upper classes often rendered it absolutely necessary to employ the rite of adoption to prevent the extinction of a family. The custom had been hallowed by time. The prohibition of it by a paramount power, alien in race and faith, could be attributed only to greed for the land. When, then, the prohibition was extended, and the landowners saw family after family disappear, a great fear fell upon them. They felt, one and all, that their turn would come; that their names, too, would perish; that none would succeed to commemorate their deeds and the deeds of their ancestors, and to appease their *manes* by yearly celebrations. In the common despair old feuds were laid aside, hereditary enmity was forgotten. A common dread produced a common sympathy, and the indignation or alarm of each was supported and increased by the sense that it was shared by all. For the moment, indeed, the aggrieved landowners had no thought to combine against the British Government. But

The policy of Lord Dalhousie

denies the exercise of this rite to many influential chiefs.

Effect produced by this refusal.

though tranquillity prevailed, it was not the tranquillity which is based upon contentment. The landowners were tranquil simply because successful revolt seemed impossible. The British authority seemed too firmly fixed to be easily shaken. But, were it to be shaken, it was always possible, considering the intense and widespread discontent of the landowners, that their hopeless apathy might become the audacity of despair.

Such was the state of the southern Maráthá country when, in May, 1856, Mr. Seton-Karr assumed charge of it. But a few weeks elapsed before his experienced mind had mastered the causes of the discontent which he found everywhere prevailing. It was difficult, even for a man who condemned the policy of the Government and who sympathised with the native landowners, to allay it. He found, in fact, that in almost every instance the landowners had been grievously wronged. The influential chief of Nargúnd had been denied the rights of adoption in terms which—owing to the faultiness of the translation of the original English—added insult to injury. Other landowners of ancient lineage, and possessing weight in the country, were found by Mr. Seton-Karr estranged from their loyalty by the causes to which I have adverted—the Inám Commission and the withholding of the right of adoption—and plunged in moody mistrust of the Government. It was not in the power of Mr. Seton-Karr to carry out the only act which would have restored confidence — to moderate the action of the Inám Commission and to restore the right of adoption. Nor, conciliatory and sympathising as he was, was he more able to reconcile the native chiefs and landowners to the new order which had to them all the effects of a revolution. But all that an earnest and high-minded man could do he did. He visited every landowner. Their individual characters he carefully studied. To their complaints he listened with patience. He met them generally with such explanations of the policy of the Government as might remove misapprehension as to its general intention; whilst in cases of individual hardship—which he was powerless to remedy—he endeavoured to soothe the sense of hardness and injustice by kindly expressions of sympathy. In this way he won their confidence. He made the landowner

State of the southern Maráthá country in May, 1856.

Mr Seton-Karr's powers, in respect of the grievances, restricted;

but he uses all his influence to soothe the discontented.

He wins the confidence of the landowners.

feel that in the highest official in the province they had a real friend. More it was impossible for him to effect. Regard for the individual in no way obliterated resentment at the action of the Government. A sense of deep injury still continued to rankle in each breast.

Such was the state of affairs when, on the 21st of May, 1857, the news of the mutiny at Mírath and Dehlí reached Belgáon. The effect of this news, and of the worse tidings which continued to follow, upon the peoples of the southern Maráthá country, was electric. The Muhammadans were at once aroused to an intense pitch of excitement. The Hindus, on the other hand, were far more reticent, and for some time concealed their inner feelings by an impassive exterior. British authority seemed so firmly rooted in the country that they hesitated to believe that it could be suddenly destroyed.

Effect produced in the Maráthá country by the revolt at Mírath.

Mr. Seton-Karr was fully alive to the dangers of the crisis. The force at Belgáon consisted of one regiment of native infantry, the 29th, a weak battery of European artillery, and the depot of the 64th Foot, composed of about thirty men fit for duty, guarding upwards of four hundred women and children belonging to that regiment. Exclusive of the artillery, not more than a hundred Europeans fit to carry arms could be mustered in the place; whilst between Belgáon and Púná and Sholapúr there were more than two thousand native, and only a hundred and twenty European, soldiers. The defences of Belgáon consisted of a fort nearly a mile in circumference, the ramparts of which, unrepaired for years, presented breaches in several places. In a military point of view the place was, in fact, untenable, but it had, nevertheless, to be regarded as the sole refuge for the European non-combatants, consisting of some five hundred including children. Belgáon was the head-quarters of the southern division of the army, and Major-General Lester had arrived there on the 11th of May to assume that command. Mr. Seton-Karr at once placed himself in communication with that officer, and, under his direction, such improvements as in so brief a time were practicable were made to the defences.

The means at Mr. Seton-Karr's disposal totally inadequate.

General Lester.

During the week or two following, the unusual exaltation of the Muhammadans alone gave evidence of the effect produced by the bad news from

An emissary arrives from the north-west.

the north-west. But in the early part of June Mr. Seton-Karr discovered that an emissary from that part of India had arrived some days before, and that he had been in daily communication with the Muhammadan leaders. Prompt to act in the presence of real danger, as he was slow to use violence when the end could be accomplished by peaceable means, Mr. Seton-Karr caused this intruder to be arrested and confined. He did not act one minute too soon. The Sipáhis, many of them natives of Oudh, had for some days previous displayed an unaccustomed insolence. It had become hourly more and more evident that they sympathised with the action of their brethren in the north, and that they would grasp at an opportunity to follow their example. In the proportion in which their insolence displayed itself did the peril of Mr. Seton-Karr's position increase. It was still further augmented by the action of Náná Sáhib at Kánhpúr towards the end of June. To understand this it is requisite only to remember that Náná Sáhib claimed to be, and in the eyes of his countrymen actually was, the adopted heir of the last of the Peshwás; and that some of the most important estates in the southern Maráthá country—the estates of Sángli, of Jámkhandi, of Míraj, and of Kúrandwar—were held by branches of the great Patwardhan family, the most illustrious of the dependants of the Peshwá. The fact that Náná Sáhib was married to the first cousin of the chief of Sángli; that his most active lieutenant was that chief's uncle; and that the chief himself, on the verge of his majority, had evinced a taste for low and intriguing associates, did not certainly lessen the danger of the position.

He is arrested.

Relationship of many of the southern Maráthá chiefs to Náná Sáhib.

There were other chiefs whose discontent was hardly less formidable. Prominent amongst these were the Desáí of Nipáni, a small fortress built on the model of Bharatpúr, forty-five miles from Belgáon—a chieftain who had lost a large portion of his estates under the operation of the Inám Commission, who was known to be disaffected, and whose disaffection would cut off communications with Bombay; the Desáí of Jámboti—a chieftain whose family, settled for many generations amongst the forests which stretch onwards from the Ghâts, had come to be regarded as the natural lords of the wild population of the jungles, and who, in his own person,

The discontent of the Desáís of Nipáni,

of Jámboti,

had been reduced to penury by the action of the same arbitrary tribunal. The temper of this chieftain had been soured by his misfortunes. He had little to lose, everything to gain, by rebellion. It was in his power to draw after him a large portion of the jungle population, and by their means to sever the communications of the British with the sea. Not less dangerous was the adopted son of the late Desáí of Kittúr.

of Kittúr,

The retainers of this family, twenty-four years previously, had crowned a rash insurrection by a gallant defence of their fort, only twenty-six miles from Belgáon, in the siege of which a political agent of that day had fallen. The last representative of the race was then living as a pensioner upon the bounty of his father-in-law, commanding in his fallen state the sympathies of the whole Lingáyat population. He, too, had nothing to lose, everything to hope, from rebellion. His father-in-law the Desáí of Wantmúrí, though a cautious and prudent man,

and of Wantmúrí,

did not possess the strength of character to resist extraordinary pressure placed upon him by his co-religionists. Add to these the chief of Nargúnd, connected with some of the most powerful families in the

also of the chief of Nargúnd,

southern Maráthá country, and known to be thoroughly disaffected; add, moreover, that the population, naturally turbulent and warlike, had retained the arms which had all but gained empire for the Maráthás; and the reader may gather some idea

causes apprehension.

of the position which, difficult in May, became dangerous in the early part of June, and threatening as every day witnessed a closer approach to the advent of July.

For long Mr. Seton-Karr met the increasing danger from the resources suggested to him by his long experience,

Mr. Seton-Karr applies for extended powers and responsibility.

and by his thorough acquaintance with native character. But as time went on, each post bringing with it intelligence of further outbreaks in the provinces of the north-west, that gentleman deemed it at last his duty to bring the situation of the provinces under the eyes of the Government of Bombay. He did this on the 20th of June. Cognisant, however, of the great difficulties which Lord Elphinstone had to encounter, of the unselfish foresight which had induced that heroic man to denude his own Presidency that he might crush rebellion upon

its borders, Mr. Seton-Karr did not ask for aid, material or other. He merely asked that his own powers might be extended. He asked, in fact, that the entire responsibility of meeting and encountering the crisis might be cast on him alone. It was a noble request; especially noble at that crisis; especially noble considering the resources at his disposal—a native regiment in a state of veiled rebellion, a weak battery of artillery, about a hundred Europeans—to meet the rebellion which might occur at any moment. The request was complied with.

His request is complied with.

Free now to act, Mr. Seton-Karr developed his plan. The use of force was out of the question. The only possible policy was conciliation. In carrying this out Mr. Seton-Karr enjoyed advantages which would have been denied to many men. During the year immediately preceding the mutiny he had carefully cultivated friendly relations with the chiefs. Over the minds of many he had acquired an extraordinary ascendancy. This ascendancy he now tested—and in the most cases with the happiest results. Valuable information was placed at his disposal; the intercommunication of the disaffected was prevented; a vigilant watch upon their movements was secured. In this way, and by a show of confidence towards all, by impressing upon each chief the idea that his neighbour was loyal, and by the expression of a confidence, really felt, that the scare would soon pass away, leaving the British complete master of the situation, Mr. Seton-Karr succeeded in staving off the fatal day and in averting the dreaded explosion.

He gradually unfolds his plans

and retains the confidence of the chiefs.

Difficulties, however, continued to increase. On the 31st of July the 27th Native Infantry mutinied at Kolhápúr, plundered the treasury, and, after murdering such officers as fell in their way, set off for the Ghats. Kolhápúr is sixty-five miles from Belgáon. Communications between the 27th Regiment and the 29th at the latter place had been frequent. At Dharwár, forty-two miles from Belgáon in a direction opposite to that of Kolhápúr, the 28th Regiment had been for some time on the very verge of revolt. Mr. Seton-Karr was thus occupying a position between one station where the garrison had just mutinied, and another the garrison of which was on the verge of mutiny—the troops at the central point

Mutiny at Kolhápúr.

Its position with respect to Belgáon and Dharwár.

being also infected. It happened, however, that the native officer of the 29th—the regiment stationed at Belgáon—who was the secret leader of the disaffected, one Thákur Singh, was known to Mr. Seton-Karr. That gentleman at once, and before the news of the mutiny at Kolhápúr was generally known at Belgáon, entered into communication regarding this native officer with General Lester. To arrest him might have precipitated a calamity. It was more easy to devise a pretext to remove him honourably from the station. Such a pretext was soon found. Two companies of the 29th, that of Thákur Singh being one of them, were ordered on command to Badámí, a small town some ninety miles distant, near the south-western frontier of the Nizám's dominions. The two companies set out on the morning of the 2nd August, still ignorant of the mutiny at Kolhápúr. When the tidings of that mutiny reached the sipáhis left behind at Belgáon they were too disconcerted by the absence of their leader to act on the moment. The opportune seizure and the condign punishment of an emissary from Jámkhandi who had come to incite them to an immediate outbreak, awed them into still longer inaction.

August. Mr. Seton-Karr and General Lester adopt plans for preventing the spread of mutiny to Belgáon, which succeed.

The danger, however, was by no means removed. Concurrently with the events I have just related, Mr. Seton-Karr discovered a plot of the Muhammadan population of Belgáon. He soon found that this conspiracy had its ramifications at Kohlápúr, at Haidarábád, and at Púná, and that its outbreak was to be signalled by the seizure of Belgáon itself. The arrest of one of the chief conspirators at Púná seemed likely to precipitate the outbreak. Mr. Seton-Karr, therefore, no sooner received information of this event, than he secured the local leaders at Belgáon, all of whom he had carefully watched. The evidence regarding some of these proved defective, and they were discharged. But the principal conspirator was convicted on the clearest evidence, and he was blown from a gun in company with the emissary from Jámkhandi just spoken of.

Conspiracy of the Muhammadan population at Belgáon is baffled by Mr. Seton-Karr.

Three days before this execution—the 10th of August—a small detachment of European troops arrived to reassure the authorities at Belgáon. Another detachment went on to produce a similar good effect in Dharwár. General Lester at

once proceeded to repress the rising mutinous spirit of the 29th Native Infantry. Five men of that regiment were tried, one of them was condemned to death, the remainder were transported for life. Taking advantage of the good effect produced by these proceedings, Mr. Seton-Karr began the work of disarming the district, including the towns of Belgáon and Sháhpúr. On the 24th of August a further reinforcement arrived in the shape of a detachment of the 86th Foot. Its presence, combined with other precautionary measures he had taken, enabled Mr. Seton-Karr to steer his state bark through the great Muhammadan festival of the Muharram * without disturbance—and, for a time, the Europeans in the southern Maráthá country felt that they could breathe freely.

The arrival of reinforcements enables General Lester to suppress the ill-feeling in Belgáon and Dhárwár.

Mr. Seton-Karr had thus succeeded, by a combination of firmness and tact, the result of good judgment directing intimate acquaintance with the native character, in guiding the territories committed to his charge through the most dangerous crisis of the mutiny. Considering the previous discontent of the chiefs and landowners, the fact that he was supported by no force, that he had only his own energies upon which to rely, this result will ever be quoted as a marvellous instance of skilful management of men. It is not too much to say that a single false step would have produced the most fatal consequences. Not only would it have involved the southern Maráthá country in revolt, but it would have kindled a flame which would have spread throughout the dominions of the Nizám. Had Mr. Seton-Karr diverged, but for one day, from the line of vigilant forbearance which he had laid down as his policy; had he hurried the ill-disposed into open insurrection by any unguarded word of suspicion or slight; or had he encouraged their designs by supineness, a great calamity would have been inevitable. Unhappily, subsequent events proved only too truly the truth of this assertion. When in an evil moment, to be related hereafter, the charge of political affairs was removed from the hands of Mr. Seton-Karr to those

Review of the success of Mr. Seton-Karr's measures and the reason of that success.

The truth of the argument proved by subsequent events.

* The "Muharram" is the name of the first Muhammadan month, held sacred on account of the death of *Husain*, son of *Ali*, who was killed by *Yazid*, near *Kúfá*, in the pashalic of Bághdád.

of an officer distasteful, from his previous connection with the Inám Commission, to the chiefs and landowners, one month did not elapse before the rebellion, no longer controlled by good management, began its course with murder. All honour, then, to the wise and far-seeing officer who kept it within bounds when its outburst would have been far more dangerous.*

Kolhápúr.

Its previous history.

Before returning to Bombay, I must ask the reader to accompany me for a brief period to Kolhápúr. The state of this name, ruled over by the descendants of Sívájí, had up to the year 1842 suffered from continuous disorder and misrule. To such an extent had the evil proceeded, that in the year I have mentioned the British Government was forced to interfere and to nominate a minister to introduce order and good government. The efforts made in that direction by this enlightened man, a Brahman named Dájí Krishná Pandit, to deprive the corrupt party in the state of their illicit gains, provoked a rebellion. This rebellion having been suppressed, the British Government assumed the direct administration of the state during the minority of the Rájah. Within this period, which did not expire till 1862, the forts of every description were dismantled, and the system of hereditary garrison was abolished; the native

* The Government of Bombay was not insensible to Mr. Seton-Karr's great merits. On the 14th of September, 1857, he was informed that "the Right Honourable the Governor in Council considers that in a conjunction of great anxiety and danger you have displayed a calmness, an energy, and a foresight which entitle you to the thanks and commendations of Government." Again, "the judicious arrangements made by you have amply secured the future tranquillity of the southern Maráthá country." These and other commendations were repeated and confirmed by Lord Elphinstone in letters under his own hand, in which he alludes to "the marked ability and success" with which Mr. Seton-Karr had performed his duties. In his published minute on distinguished services rendered during the mutiny, Lord Elphinstone placed Mr. Seton-Karr's name third on the list of those who had deserved well of their country. The honour was the more marked, because, as Lord Canning observed, every recommendation from Lord Elphinstone carried double weight from the fact, that out of the many who had rendered important services in western India he selected only a few names for mention. Yet, strange as it may appear, when so many were decorated, Mr. Seton-Karr received neither honours nor reward. He returned to England towards the end of 1860, his proud nature suffering from the unmerited slight which had been cast upon him. In less than two years he died, conscious that he had performed a great service which his country had failed to recognise.

military force was disbanded, and a local corps, officered by three English officers, was substituted for it. These measures, especially those for the disarmament of their forts and the disbandment of their native force, though in view of the many previous rebellions absolutely necessary, had been regarded with great disfavour by the higher orders in Kolhápúr, and had tended not a little to the unpopularity of the paramount power.

Reasons for the discontent of the people.

Such was the state of affairs in the province when the mutiny broke out at Mírath. Hopes and wishes similar to those which I have described as actuating the Muhammadan population of the Belgáon district, at once took possession of the minds of their neighbours in Kolhápúr. To a people accustomed to revolt, living on the memories of plunder and corruption, and hating orderly government, the occasion seemed singularly favourable. The town of Kolhápúr is distant only sixty-five miles from Belgáon. It was garrisoned by one native regiment, the 27th, and by the local corps raised on the disbandment of the native force. There were no European troops nearer than Belgáon, and it was impossible to spare any from that place. Satárah was eighty-one miles to the north, and Púná, whence European aid was alone possible, seventy-one miles further. The political superintendent of Kolhápúr was Colonel Maughan. Major Rolland commanded the 27th Native Infantry, Captain Schneider the local corps.

Effect of the Mírath mutiny at Kolhápúr.

Garrison of Kolhápúr.

I have already stated* that communications between the 27th Native Infantry at Kolhápúr, the 29th at Belgáon, and the 28th at Dhárwár, had been frequent during the months of June and July. Supported, as they were, secretly, by discontented chiefs, almost openly by the disaffected Muhammadan populations, these three regiments had the game in their own hands. Concerted and simultaneous action was only necessary to their success. Happily on this, as on so many occasions at this eventful period, the conspirators failed in this essential particular. It would seem that they reckoned without the telegraph. Instead of deciding to rise on a settled date, they arranged that the example should be set by Kolhápúr, and followed at once by Belgáon and

The mutinous regiments at the various stations intercommunicate.

The one blot in their plan.

* Pages 21–2.

Dharwár. The 27th Native Infantry accordingly rose on the 31st of July at Kolhápúr. But for the telegraph the regiment at Belgáon would have received by express intelligence of the movement, and have followed the example. But the telegraph forestalled their express. And Mr. Seton-Karr, using his priority of news with judgment, averted, as we have seen, the calamity from that place.

Mutiny at Kolhápúr.

But the mutiny at Kolhápúr was a reality. During the night of the 31st of July the 27th rose in arms and detailed parties to attack their officers' bungalows. The native adjutant, a Jew, and a Hindu hawáldár ran to give warning only just in time to permit the ladies to escape from their houses before the Sipáhis came up and poured volleys into them. Some of the officers nobly endeavoured to bring back the rebels to their duty, but their efforts were vain. The treasury and the bazaar were plundered, and riot reigned supreme. Three officers who had escaped into the country were shot and thrown into the river. The remainder took refuge in the Residency, about a mile from the cantonment, but near the lines of the Kolhápúr local regiment, which happily remained loyal.*

Lord Elphinstone despatches Le Grand Jacob to Kolhápúr.

Character of Le Grand Jacob.

The news of this disaster reached Bombay by telegraph. Lord Elphinstone acted with promptitude and decision. It happened that Colonel G. Le Grand Jacob, a man of the old heroic type, ready in council, prompt and decisive in action, had but just returned to Bombay from a command in the Persian campaign. He was about to start for Púná under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, when the telegram from Kolhápúr was placed in the hands of the Governor.

Instructions given to him.

Lord Elphinstone at once sent for Jacob; told him all that had occurred at Kolhápúr; that he would receive orders from the Commander-in-Chief to take command of the troops in that quarter. He added that he was well aware that there were no troops to be depended upon, except perhaps the local regiments; but that he would receive special powers, and was to do the best he could.*

* *Western India before and during the Mutinies*, by Major-General Sir George Le Grand Jacob, K.C.S.I., C.B.

† The final orders to Colonel Jacob were not issued till the following day, as Lord Elphinstone wished, before their issue, to receive a reply to a telegram he had sent to Kolhápúr. As no reply came, the orders were at once issued.

Jacob sets out,

Colonel Jacob set out at once, saw the Commander-in-Chief at Púná, pushed on then to Satárah, and found there a troop of horse artillery and dragoons. The rainy season was at its height, the track between Satárah and Kolhápúr was composed of the black soil in which, during the monsoon, horses not unfrequently sank up to their girths, and wheels to their axles; there were several rivers and streams unbridged and unfordable. Still, time was everything. Colonel Jacob then pushed on two guns with double allowance of men and horses, and riding forward himself with a few men of the Southern Maráthá Horse, a loyal and capable regiment, reached Kolhápúr on the 14th of August, just before midnight.

and, despite of difficulties,

reaches Kolhápúr. The mutineers have, meanwhile, been checked by Colonel Maughan.

How, meanwhile, had matters been progressing in Kolhápúr? There, according to all probabilities, there would have been little to check the victorious progress of the rebels! Thanks to their delays and to the prompt action of Colonel Maughan, it had happened otherwise. The Sipáhis, greedy of plunder, went first to pillage the treasury and sack the station. Then, and then only, did they make their way to the town, fully expecting to find its gates open. But Colonel Maughan had closed those gates. The Sipáhis, not caring to attempt to force them, took up a rather formidable position outside, close to the gates, in a small outwork where the Rájah's horses and menagerie were kept. Here they maintained their position all night, repulsing Colonel Maughan in an attempt made by him to dislodge them.

Many return to their duty;

It would seem that from this time the greater part of the regiment returned to its allegiance. This movement was probably hastened by the knowledge, brought to the Sipáhis by some of their still recalcitrant comrades, that the passes to the coast had been occupied by Europeans landed on the coast by the splendid exertions of the Indian Navy. This is certain, that the recalcitrant Sipáhis were checked in this way; that the greater number betook

'They were," writes Sir G. Le G. Jacob, "brief and satisfactory. 'I am aware,' said Lord Elphinstone, 'that in a crisis like this, a person on the spot ought to be the best judge of any action that might be at once necessary; to wait for orders may allow events to become too strong to master. I have confidence in your judgment; do your best to meet the present emergency, and rely on my full support.'"—*Western India*, by Sir G. Le Jacob.

themselves to the jungles; whilst the minority, about forty in number, returning to Kolhápúr, reoccupied the outwork close to the town. But the garrison of the town had in the meantime been reinforced. Lieutenant Kerr, of the Southern Maráthá Horse, had marched a detachment of that regiment from Satárah—a distance of eighty-one miles—without a halt. The rebels were at once attacked, on the 10th of August, in their outwork, some of their own comrades joining in the attack. They made a desperate defence—but, a secret entrance to the outwork having been pointed out to Lieutenant Kerr, that gallant officer dashed in, followed by horsemen whom he had caused to dismount, and fought his way to the interior of the building. At the same time, Lieutenant Innes, with a party of the 27th, took the rebels in the rear. These two attacks decided the affair; but so desperate had been the defence, that of the forty rebels three only escaped wounds or death.*

the remainder are attacked and killed.

When, then, Colonel Le G. Jacob reached Kolhápúr, he found that the mutiny had been quelled. Some forty of the most rebellious men of the 27th Native Infantry had been killed in fair fight; a larger number was in the jungles; but still the great bulk of the regiment was doing its duty, and there was no evidence against any man of it.

Three days after his arrival, Colonel Jacob was reinforced by the two horse-artillery guns he had sent on from Satárah, and about a hundred men of the 2nd Europeans from the coast—the same who had so opportunely occupied the passes. With so small a force at his disposal, he felt it would be impossible to act against the insurgents unless he should decide, before acting, to disarm the regiment whose conduct had been so suspicious. On the one hand was the danger of his being attacked before his force should gather further strength, or of the mutineers marching away with their arms; on the other, the chance of the men who were still loyal, those of the local corps especially, yielding to the temptation to join their countrymen. It was a balance of risks and probabilities. Many men would have preferred to wait. But Jacob was, as I have said, a man of the old heroic type, and, feeling the

Jacob determines to disarm the 27th Native Infantry.

* Jacob's *Western India*. Lieutenant Kerr received the Victoria Cross for his conduct on this occasion.

importance of striking the first blow, he determined to disarm the men of the 27th Native Infantry.

He disarmed them on the morning of the 18th of August. Under his orders were twenty-five European gunners, with two guns and two howitzers; ninety men of the 2nd Europeans; one hundred and eighty men of the Southern Maráthá Horse; and three hundred and fifty men of the local corps. These were drawn up in a manner to command any movement tending to resistance on the part of the rebels. He disarms them.

But they made no resistance. They piled their arms in silence. The investigation which followed brought to light many hidden springs of the movement. It had been intended, it was discovered, to delay the mutiny till the 10th of August; but the action of the Jew native adjutant on the 31st of July, in sending away his family, aroused suspicion, and prompted a sudden and ill-matured rising. This premature movement ruined the plot. Acting hurriedly and without concert with their brethren at Belgáon and Dharwár, the mutineers acted without plan or settled purpose. It required, then, only energy to baffle them, and that energy was conspicuous in the conduct of all the European officers concerned, in the conduct alike of Lord Elphinstone at Bombay, of Maughan, of Kerr, of Innes, in defence and attack, and of Colonel Jacob in striking the decisive blow. Remarks on the success of the prompt action of the Bombay authorities and officers.

I ask the reader to return with me now to Bombay. Until the approach of the great Muhammadan festival of the Muharram there had been no apprehensions of an outbreak in that city. The Superintendent of Police, Mr. Forjett, a gentleman who, born and bred in India, knew the natives thoroughly, had deemed it sufficient, when the news of the massacre of Kánhpúr reached Bombay, to obtain permission to incorporate into the police a body of fifty mounted Europeans. He reasoned justly that, as the Muhammadan population of the city exceeded a hundred and fifty thousand, it would be folly to trust implicitly to the fidelity of the native police. Bombay. The police force there.

It may be fitting to describe here the officers to whom was entrusted the direction of the civil and military forces, upon whose conduct depended the safety of the important town of Bombay at this critical juncture.

General Shortt.

The commander of the military forces was Brigadier-General Shortt of the Bombay army. General Shortt was an officer of capacity and intelligence. He thoroughly understood the native soldier. He was quick to decide on an emergency and prompt to carry his decision into execution. In a word, he was an officer thoroughly to be depended upon in danger, a tower of strength to the Government in the crisis which was then impending.

Mr. Forjett.

The Superintendent of Police, Mr. C. Forjett, was * one of the most remarkable men brought to the front by the events of 1857. I have already stated that he was born and bred in India. When the mutiny broke out, he

His large acquirements,

was in the very prime of manhood. He was so thoroughly acquainted with all the dialects of all the languages of western and southern India, that it was easy for him to pass himself off as a native upon the most astute of natives. Mr. Forjett gave an extraordinary proof of

his tact, and judgment.

this talent immediately prior to his nomination to the office of Superintendent of Police. He had gained so great a reputation for ability, tact, and judgment in the performance of his duties in the southern Maráthá country, that in 1855 Lord Elphinstone

His answer to Lord Elphinstone when offered the office of Superintendent of Police.

sent for him to offer him the chief superintendence of the police in Bombay. Mr. Forjett came to the Presidency, saw Lord Elphinstone, and received the offer. He at once expressed his willingness to accept it, but requested that Lord Elphinstone would defer the nomination for a fortnight, so as to give him time to find out for himself the true character of the men he had been summoned to command. The request was at once granted. Mr. Forjett then disguised himself as a native and went to places haunted by the police, passing himself off as the son of a subahdar in search of a girl whom he loved. He so completely deceived the natives that men of the highest caste invited him to eat with them. He found out the

Mr. Forjett's experiment on the police.

character, the secret longings, of the natives, who, in a few days would be his instruments. Nor did he neglect the European police. His experience with some of them was remarkable. Of those whom he tested

* I am happy to add that the imperfect tense is used only historically. Mr. Forjett still lives in the vigour of healthy life.

not one refused the bribe he offered. At the end of the fortnight he presented himself to Lord Elphinstone, and took up the office. I leave the reader to imagine the consternation of his native subordinates when they learned who it was whom they had now to serve.

He assumes the office.

But quickness, cleverness at disguise, readiness of resource, represented but a small part of Mr. Forjett's qualities. Small in person, endowed, according to all appearance, with no great strength, he united the cool courage of a practised warrior to remarkable powers of endurance. The courage was not merely the physical courage which despises danger; it was that, and much more. It was a courage set into action by a brain cool and clear—so cool and so clear that there never was a crisis which could blind it, never a danger which it was unable to parry. I venture to describe it as the highest form of intellectual courage.

His other remarkable qualities;

his intellectual courage;

I have spoken of his powers of endurance. These were often tested in the southern Maráthá country prior to 1855. If to ride a hundred miles a day, on dismounting to partake of a rude meal of the natural products of the country, and then to lie on the ground, with a bundle of grass for a pillow, in the morning to wash in the stream or in the water drawn from the well, and pursue a similar journey in a similar manner, if to do this day after day be a test of endurance, then Mr. Forjett may claim to be a passed master in the art. If, to the qualities I have recorded, I add an upr ght mind, a lofty sense of honour, a devotion to duty, I present to the reader an accurate portrait of the Superintendent of Police of Bombay.

his powers of endurance;

his lofty character.

During the two years which had elapsed between his assumption of that office and the outbreak of the mutiny, Mr. Forjett had gained the complete confidence and esteem of Lord Elphinstone. Those who knew that high-minded nobleman are aware that he never bestowed his trust until he had assured himself by experience that the recipient was fully worthy of it.

He gains Lord Elphinstone's entire confidence.

There being thus two men so capable and in all respects so well qualified at the head of the departments regulating order, it would seem that the repressal of disturbance in Bombay would be easy. But there were two causes which

militated against such a conclusion. The first was the great disparity between the numbers of European and native troops. Whilst there were three native regiments, the 10th and 11th Native Infantry and the Marine Battalion, of the former there were but four hundred men. The other cause affected the concert between the heads of the two departments. General Shortt believed in the loyalty of his Sipáhis but mistrusted the native police. Mr. Forjett was confident that he could do what he would with the police, but mistrusted the Sipáhis. To use his own words, Mr. Forjett regarded the Sipáhis as "the only source of danger."

Difference of opinion between General Shortt and Mr. Forjett.

The festival of the Muharram was a festival of a character the most dangerous of all. It was a religious festival, lasting many days, the excitement of which increased with each day. Lord Elphinstone had confided to General Shortt the arrangements for preventing disturbance during the whole of the time it lasted. Granted one premiss—that the Sipáhis were absolutely loyal—those arrangements were perfect. Mr. Forjett, when informed of them, declined, without pledging himself to the contrary, to admit this premiss, and he informed Lord Elphinstone of his doubts. Lord Elphinstone replied that he was sorry he had not known of his objections before, but that it was now too late to alter them. I may here state that the arrangements made by General Shortt involved the division into very small bodies of the European force under the orders of Mr. Forjett. The reply made by that gentleman to Lord Elphinstone's remark just referred to is eminently characteristic. He intimated that he should, at all events, be obliged to disobey the orders of Government with respect to the police arrangements, because it was necessary for him to have them in hand in the event of a Sipáhi outbreak. "It is a very risky thing," replied Lord Elphinstone,* "to disobey orders, but I am sure you will do nothing rash." Mr. Forjett construed this tacit permission in the sense in which it was doubtless intended.

September. The Muharram festival at Bombay.

General Shortt's arrangements.

Forjett's interview with Lord Elphinstone.

* "Happy was it for Bombay, happy for western India, and happy probably for India itself," wrote Mr. Forjett, reviewing at a later period these events, "that one so noble and clear-headed as Lord Elphinstone was Governor of Bombay during the period of the mutiny."

Five days of the festival passed without disorder. The next night would see its conclusion. On the eve of that night an incident, accidental in its cause, almost produced an outbreak. A Christian drummer belonging to the 10th Regiment Native Infantry, whilst in a state of intoxication, insulted the carriers of a Hindu divinity which was being carried in procession by some townspeople, and knocked over the divinity. Two policemen, who witnessed the outrage, took the drummer into custody. It happened that the Sipáhis of the native regiments were possessed by an inner conviction that their loyalty was doubted by Forjett, and they replied to the feeling they thus imputed to him with one of hatred to himself and his subordinates. When, then, the men of the 10th heard that one of their comrades, albeit a Christian, caught in the act of offering an insult to a Hindu divinity, had been taken into custody by the police, some twenty of them turned out, broke into the lock-up, rescued the drummer, assaulted the policemen, and marched them off as prisoners to their lines. The European constable of the section at once proceeded with four native policemen to the lines, and demanded the liberation of their comrades. The demand was not only refused, but the new-comers were assaulted by the Sipáhis, and, after a conflict in which two of the assailants were left for dead, and others were wounded, they were forced to retire. The excitement in the Sipáhi lines, increasing every moment, received a further impetus from this retirement, and the Sipáhis began to turn out in such numbers that a messenger was sent at full speed to Mr. Forjett, with the information that the native regiments had broken out.

The last night but one of the Muharram.

A Christian drummer insults the Hindús. The police take him into custody.

The Sipáhis take the part of the drummer.

The police try to rescue their comrades, but fail.

Forjett is sent for.

This was the one danger which Mr. Forjett had all along dreaded, and against which he had taken every precaution possible under the circumstances, already noted, of his limited sphere of action. He had, that is to say, disobeyed orders, and massed his European policemen. On receiving the news that the Sipáhis had broken out, Mr. Forjett ordered the European police to follow him as soon as possible, and galloped down to their lines at so great a speed as to outstrip all his attendants. He found the

Forjett arrives alone.

Sipáhis in a state of tumult, endeavouring to force their way out of the lines, their European officers, with drawn swords, keeping them back. The sight of Mr. Forjett inflamed the Sipáhis still more. They called out loudly that this was the man who had wished them all to be killed, while the European officers, seeing how the presence of Mr. Forjett excited their men, begged him in earnest language to go away. The fate of Bombay at that moment hung upon the conduct, at this critical conjuncture, of Mr. Forjett. Such are Asiatics, that had that gentleman obeyed the calls of the officers, the Sipáhis would have burst the bonds of discipline and dashed forward to pursue him. He was there, alone, seated on his horse, calmly daring them. His knowledge of natives made him feel that so long as he should remain there, facing and defying them, they would not move, but that a retrograde movement on his part would be the signal for a real outbreak. In reply, then, to the shouts of the officers and men of the native regiments, Mr. Forjett called out to the former, "If your men are bent on mischief, the sooner it is over the better," and remained facing them. Two minutes later his assistant, Mr. Edington, galloped up, followed very shortly by fifty-five European policemen—the men he had kept massed in case of a disturbance. Then Mr. Forjett acted. Forming up and halting his men, he called out, "Throw open the gates; I am ready for the Sipáhis." Again was displayed that complete acquaintance with the Asiatic character which was one of the secrets of Mr. Forjett's power. The excitement of the Sipáhis subsided as if by magic and they fell back within their lines. Never had a nobler deed been more nobly done!

Fury of the Sipáhis at seeing him.

The European officers beg him to retire.

He refuses,

and crushes the incipient mutiny.

The tide now turned. The evil-disposed amongst the Sipáhis—and that many were evil-disposed subsequent revelations fully proved—were completely cowed. Nevertheless, Mr. Forjett relaxed not one of his exertions. The Muharram was not yet a thing of the past, and it was clear that an accident might yet kindle the mine. One night still remained, and Mr. Forjett, far from relaxing his precautions, bent himself to increase them. He so posted his police that the smallest movement upon the part of the Sipáhis would at once become known to the main body of his Europeans, forty-eight in number, located at

The Muharram, thanks to Mr. Forjett, is tided over.

a decisive point. His precautions were not only successful, they were the cause of success. To borrow the language, subsequently revealed, of the baffled conspirators, "it was the vigilance maintained that prevented the outbreak." The vigilance was the vigilance of the police personally directed by Mr. Forjett.*

I have already stated that, thanks to the precautions taken and to Mr. Forjett's energetic action, the festival of the Muharram had passed off quietly. The discontented men amongst the Sipáhis still, however, cherished the hope that another opportunity more favourable to the execution of their projects would soon arise. The Hindú festival of the Duálí, occurring towards the end of October, seemed to them to offer such an opportunity. During this festival the Hindus of the upper and wealthier classes are accustomed to collect all their wealth in one room of their dwelling, and, assembling, to worship it. The discontented Sipáhis resolved, in many a secret council, to break out during the Duálí, to pillage Bombay, killing all who should oppose them, and then to march out of the island. Had this

The Sipáhis hatch a new conspiracy.

* Mr. Forjett's great services were not left unacknowledged. On the 19th of June, 1858, Lord Elphinstone thus recorded his sense of their value:—"The Right Honourable the Governor in Council cannot too highly praise the devoted zeal of this excellent public servant, upon whom such grave responsibilities were imposed during last year." Referring to Mr. Forjett's "very valuable services" in the detection of the plot in Bombay in 1857, the same high authority thus wrote:—"His duties demanded great courage, great acuteness, and great judgment, all of which qualities were conspicuously displayed by Mr. Forjett at that trying period."

All classes combined to testify to the great services rendered on this occasion by Mr. Forjett. Couched in varying phraseology, every letter received from the members of the European community indicates that, in the opinion of the several writers, it was the vigilance of Mr. Forjett which saved Bombay.

I may add here that, for his services in the mutiny, the European and native communities in Bombay presented Mr. Forjett with addresses, and, with the sanction of the Government, with testimonials and purses to the value of three thousand eight hundred and fifty pounds. It was still more gratifying to him that, after he had left the service and quitted India, the native cotton merchants sent him a handsome address and a purse of fifteen hundred pounds, "in token of strong gratitude for one whose almost despotic powers and zealous energy had so quelled the explosive forces of native society, that they seem to have become permanently subdued." In addition, and likewise after he left India, the shareholders of a company, mainly composed of natives, presented Mr. Forjett with shares, which they subsequently sold on his account, for thirteen thousand five hundred and eighty pounds

plan been carried out, it is nearly certain that the contagion would have spread all over the Presidency, and have even reached Madras.

But again had the mutineers to reckon with Mr. Forjett. That gentleman was informed by a detective that suspicious meetings were being held by disaffected Sipáhis at the house of one Gangá Parshád. Attempts to introduce a confidential agent of the police into those meetings having been baffled by the precautions of the Sipáhis, Mr. Forjett had Gangá Parshád conveyed to the police-office during the night, and obtained from him a complete revelation. Fertile in disguises, Mr. Forjett subsequently became an eye-witness—by means of holes made in the wall which separated the chamber where the conspirators assembled from the ante-room — of the proceedings of the Sipáhis, a listener to their conversation. More than that, aware of the feeling prevailing amongst the officers regarding himself, he induced Major Barrow, the officer commanding the Marine battalion, to accompany him, on four different occasions, to the meetings.* The information there obtained was duly reported to General Shortt by Major Barrow, and to Lord Elphinstone, through his private secretary, by Mr. Forjett. Courts-martial were in due course convened. The proceedings resulted in sentences of death being passed and executed on two, of transportation for life on six, native soldiers of various ranks. But the projected mutiny was nipped in the bud.

October. which is discovered by Mr. Forjett, and revealed by him to Major Barrow, by which means the conspiracy is nipped in the bud.

With the story of the measures taken for the safety of Bombay closes the general sketch of events in the western Presidency up to the close of 1857. We have seen how, displaying at once a rare foresight and a remarkable self-reliance, Lord Elphinstone had denuded his own Presidency of European troops in order to crush the mutiny beyond its borders. No man in high position recognised more truly, and applied more conscientiously,

December. Recapitulation of events at Bombay.

* "Major Barrow's astonishment when he saw some of his own men in Gangá Parshád's house was remarkable. He exclaimed, 'My God, my own men! Is it possible?' And his memorable words to me at the court-martial were: 'It is well I was present and saw and heard them myself, but for which I should have been here, not as a witness for the prosecution, but as one for the defence; *such was my confidence in these men.*'"—Forjett's *Our Real Danger in India*.

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the maxim that the art of war consists in concentrating the greatest number of troops on the decisive point of the action. Now, the decisive point of the action in the early days of the revolt of 1857, was not in Bombay. To Lord Elphinstone it was clear that Dehlí could only be reached from Bengal, and that it was just possible he might save central India and Rajpútáná. Whilst, then, he sent every available European soldier to Calcutta, he formed, from the small remnant which was left, a number in reality not sufficient for his own needs—one column which should march on Máu, another which should restore order in Rajpútáná. Feeling that amidst the many dangers which threatened him the most fatal was that which would come from without, he sent to meet and to crush it before it should penetrate within. His defence of Bombay was an aggressive defence. It was a policy requiring rare courage, immense confidence in his own judgment, and great resolution. In carrying it out he exposed himself to the danger, only one degree less, of a rising within the Presidency. How nearly that was occurring I have shown in these pages. The southern Maráthá country was saved, in 1857, partly by the prudence and the judgment displayed by Mr. G. B. Seton-Karr, aided by the energy of General Lester, partly by the bungling and want of concert of the conspirators. How Bombay was saved I have just told. The reader will have seen that the danger was real, the peril imminent, that but for the unlimited confidence placed by Lord Elphinstone in Mr. Forjett—a man of his own selection—it might have culminated in disaster. That he dared that risk to avert a greater danger is one of the many proofs of Lord Elphinstone's capacity. Sufficient credit has never been given to him for his noble, his far-seeing, his self-denying policy. In the presence of the massacres of Kánhpúr and of Jhánsí, of the defence of Lakhnao, and of the siege of Dehlí, the attitude of Lord Elphinstone, less sensational though not less heroic, has been overlooked. Had there been an uprising attended with slaughter in Bombay, the story of its repression and the deeds of valour attending that repression would have circulated throughout the world. Instead of that, we see only calm judgment and self-reliance meeting one danger and defying

Lord Elphinstone's forethought, unselfishness, and decision.

His plan of aggressive defence.

Mr. Seton-Karr.

General Lester.

Mr. Forjett.

The attitude of Lord Elphinstone has never yet received its due meed of praise.

another, carefully selecting the most experienced instruments, and by their aid preventing a calamity so threatening that, if it had been met by men less tried and less worthy of confidence, it must have culminated in disaster. It is an attitude which gains from being contemplated, which impresses the student of history, in an ever-increasing degree, with admiration of the noble character of the man whose calm trust in himself made possible the success of the policy he alone inaugurated.

CHAPTER II.

CENTRAL INDIA AND DURAND.

Ásírgarh.

Ásírgarh is a very famous fortress in the Nimár district of the Central Provinces, lying two hundred and ninety miles to the north-east of Bombay, one hundred and fifty miles from Málígáon, and ninety-nine miles to the south-east of Máu. It is built on an isolated hill, detached from the Sátpúra range dividing the valley of the Taptí from that of the Narbadá. It has a history which has sent its name through the length and breadth of India. Alike in the times of the Hindu, of the Muhammadan, and of the British overlordship, it has been considered a place worth fighting for. After many changes of masters, it surrendered, on the 9th of April, 1819, after a vigorous resistance, to a British force commanded by Brigadier-General Doveton, and it has, ever since, remained in the occupation of a British garrison.

Garrison of Ásírgarh.

In 1857 that garrison consisted of a wing of the 6th Regiment Gwáliár Contingent, lent by the Bengal Presidency to replace the 19th Bombay Native Infantry, ordered on service to Persia, but which never embarked for that country. The commanding officer of the garrison was Colonel Le Mesurier, and the Fort Adjutant was Lieutenant John Gordon of the 19th Bombay Native Infantry.

Situation of the fort.

The hill on the summit of which Ásírgarh is perched rises abruptly to about five hundred feet above the jungle. Below it is a town of no real importance, inhabited by villagers mainly engaged in tending their flocks.

The men of the contingent evince symptoms of mutiny.

The men who formed the garrison of Ásírgarh belonged to a contingent which speedily asserted its right to a prominent place amongst the mutineers. The events at Nímach and at Gwáliár speedily convinced the European residents at Ásírgarh that their guardians were not to be trusted. Even before this discovery

had been made, the fort adjutant, distrusting their demeanour, had enlisted some ninety men from the villagers of the town, and had charged them with the task of watching the behaviour of the Sipáhis. These men are known as Gordon's Volunteers.

Bad news reaches the Europeans,

On the 19th of June the Europeans of the garrison heard of the mutinies at Nímach and Nasirábád. From that day almost every post brought them distressful tidings. Every precaution was taken by Lieutenant Gordon. To relieve the fort, by fair means, of a portion of its real enemies, one company of the regiment was detached to Burhánpúr, twelve miles distant. The anxieties of the ladies of the garrison were lessened about the same time by the intelligence, verified by a personal visit made by Lieutenant Gordon, that Captain Keatinge,* the political agent for that part of the country, had fortified a position fourteen miles distant from Ásírgarh.

who send one company to Burhánpúr,

From this time till the end of July good and bad news succeeded each other with great rapidity. At times the Europeans were in great danger. The company sent to Burhánpúr mutinied, marched on Ásírgarh, and was only prevented from entering it by the hawáldar-major of the regiment, whose loyalty had been appealed to, not in vain, by Lieutenant Gordon.

where it mutinies.

The following morning the four remaining companies obeyed, not without murmuring, the order given to them to march out and encamp below the fort, their places within being taken by Gordon's Volunteers. The next day a party of Bhíl infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Birch, surprised and disarmed the Burhánpúr mutineers, and carried their arms into Asírgarh. A few hours later that place was reinforced by two companies of the 19th Native Infantry under Captain Blair. The disarming of the Gwáliár men outside the fort—a work performed admirably and without bloodshed by Captain Blair and Lieutenant Gordon—completed the necessary measures to ensure the safety of the fortress pending the arrival of Colonel Stuart's column.

The remainder are disarmed.

Arrival of Stuart's column and of Durand.

That column, the earlier movements of which I have recorded in the preceding chapter, quitted Aurangábád for Ásírgarh on the 12th of July.

* Now Major-General Keatinge, V.C.

Marching rapidly, it reached Burhánpúr on the 21st and Ásírgarh on the 22nd idem. Here it was joined by Colonel Durand, who had reached Ásírgarh some days previously.

Summary of Durand's proceedings after leaving Indúr.

In another part of this history* I have shown how Durand, after the catastrophe of Máu, had fallen back on Sihor; how, staying there only one day, he had set out for Hoshangábád on the southern bank of the Narbadá in the hope of being able to communicate there with General Woodburn; how, learning at Hoshangábád of the safety of Máu he heard also of the attempts made to change the direction of Woodburn's force from the line of the Narbadá to Nágpúr; how, not content with simply protesting against such a line of conduct, he had set off for Aurangábád with the intention of enforcing his arguments there, and, if necessary, of pressing on to Bombay; how, on his road, he received the gratifying intelligence that Woodburn's column, now commanded by Stuart, was advancing towards Ásírgarh; how he had at once hurried to that place. He had the gratification of meeting that force on the 22nd of July. From the moment of his joining it, he assumed his position as the Governor-General's representative, and became likewise, in everything but in name, the real leader of the column.

He assumes the real direction of the column.

Is joined by the 3rd Regiment Cavalry, Haidarábád Contingent.

The column pushed on for Máu on the 24th with all practicable expedition. On the 28th it was joined by the 3rd Regiment Cavalry, Haidarábád Contingent, under the command of Captain S. Orr. On the 31st it ascended the Simrol pass, halted on its summit to allow the artillery to close up, and the following morning marched into Máu. The weather for the time of the year, the height of the monsoon, had been exceptionally fine; no rain had fallen to hinder the march of the guns over the sticky black soil. On the night of the 1st of August, however, the weather changed. Heavy rains set in and continued throughout August and September.

Durand arrives at Máu.

But Durand was now at Máu, within thirteen and a half miles of the capital whence the mutinous conduct of Holkar's troops had forced him to retire just one month before. He had returned to vindicate British authority, to punish the guilty, to give an example which should not be forgotten.

* Vol. III. pages 161-2.

He offers to march on Indúr and disarm Holkar's troops,

Even before he had marched into Máu, whilst he was yet halted on the top of the Simrol pass, Durand had received a message from the Indúr Durbar. Mahárájah Holkar and his minister sent to inform him that they were still in a state of alarm as to the conduct of their own troops, and to inquire whether aid could not be afforded to them. Durand replied that he was ready, if the Mahárájah wished it, to march with the entire force into Indúr instead of into Máu. Apparently, this was not the end desired by the Durbar, for the messengers at once withdrew their requisition.

but Holkar declines.

Reasons why Durand marched on Máu instead of on Indúr.

In deciding to march on Máu instead of Indúr, Durand was mainly influenced by considerations regarding the state of the surrounding districts which will be presently adverted to. At the moment, indeed, there was another consideration which he had to take into account. He had with him no European infantry.* Four companies of the 86th were indeed marching up by the Bombay road, and would join in a few days. But it was desirable, after the events which had occurred, that the Indúr rabble should see in the British force the white faces of the unvanquished foot soldiers of England. Durand marched then on Máu.

He is joined by four companies 86th.

The four companies of the 86th having joined a few days later, the propriety of marching on Indúr to punish Holkar's guilty troops and the townspeople who had abetted the revolt again became a question for Durand's consideration. It was a very difficult question. That Holkar's troops had attacked the Residency on the first of July was a fact admitted by every one. But Holkar had asserted that this act had been committed without his sanction or authority. Durand himself was never satisfied of this: to the last he regarded Holkar as a trimmer, a watcher of the atmosphere: but officers who had occupied the Máu fort in July, notably Captain Hungerford, had been penetrated with the conviction that Holkar was innocent, and, in his letters to Durand, Lord Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, had insisted on the same view. Under

Circumstances which induced Durand to defer all proceedings with respect to Holkar.

* The force consisted of five troops 14th Light Dragoons, 3rd Cavalry Haidarábád Contingent, one horse battery of European artillery, the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, and a pontoon train.

these circumstances Durand, duly weighing the difficulties presented by the case, deemed it advisable to defer all action, so far as Holkar was personally concerned, until he should become acquainted with the views of the Governor-General regarding him. He accordingly made a complete reference on the subject to Lord Canning.

Probable reasons for Holkar's conduct.

Holkar, on his part, was naturally anxious to delay Durand's action as long as he could. He knew that, in his heart, Durand had thoroughly mistrusted him. And, although it was well known that, in the excited state of native feeling throughout the country, he could not depend on the conduct of his own troops, and would have been glad to see them coerced by the British, yet, when he thought of the possible results of such action, he inclined to prefer the uncertainty of his actual condition. Could he, he felt, but stave off the critical moment for a few months, Durand would be relieved by Sir Robert Hamilton, and Sir Robert Hamilton, an old and much-regarded friend, would, he felt confident, accept explanations regarding the events of the 1st of July which Durand would utterly contemn.

Reasons why Durand determines to defer to a later period any movement against Holkar's troops.

The question of disarming Holkar's revolted troops, whilst the personal case regarding Holkar was still pending, opened out difficulties of another description. The force at the disposal of Durand was small, and, though sufficient to dispose of the revolted troops of Indúr, could these be encountered *en masse*, it was scarcely large enough to attack its several component parts in detail, holding the bulk in check whilst portion after portion should be destroyed. It must always be remembered, writing of this period, that the revolt had at that time nowhere received a serious check. The force before Dehlí was almost as much besieged as besieging. The English garrison of the Lakhnao Residency was supposed to be at its last gasp; Havelock had made no impression upon Oudh; Bihár was surging with mutineers. The disaffected in central India might, then, well be excused if, regarding all these points, they were not only hopeful, but confident, that resolute resistance on their part would serve the cause which they now regarded as the common cause of their co-religionists throughout India. Under these circumstances, it was to be apprehended that Holkar's troops, the three arms of which,

each superior in numbers to the entire British force, were located in separate cantonments, might evince a strong disinclination to be disarmed; and that, morally supported as they were by a large party in the city of Indúr, and, as I shall presently show, by a strongly aggressive party in the districts lying between Indúr and Nímach, they might offer a resistance certain to entail great loss on the attacking party, and to cripple its future movements. This will be clear to the reader when, recalling the composition of the force at the disposal of Durand,* extremely weak in infantry, he reflects that a rainy season of unusual force was at its height, that the roads could be traversed by guns only with the greatest difficulty, that the bridges in many places had been carried away, and that any military operation against the several cantonments occupied by Holkar's troops would have to be carried out on a swampy plain, on which, at that season of the year, it would be impossible for the three arms to work together.

But there were other reasons which impressed Durand with the necessity of dealing in the first instance with those rebels in the districts, of whose aggressive tendencies I have just spoken.

Mandesar

Mandesar is a large and important town on a tributary of the river Chambal, about a hundred and twenty miles from Indúr. In the month of July this place had been occupied by some of Sindhiá's revolted troops, and these had been joined, and were being constantly further strengthened, by Afghán, Mekráni, and Mewáti levies. In August

becomes a centre of insurrection,

the insurrection at Mandesar threatened not only to embrace all western Málwá, but Nímach as well. Impressed with a confidence in themselves, justified only by the prolonged immunity which had been allowed them, the rebels at this place began, in the month of August, to

aggressive in its nature,

display an aggressive temper far more dangerous than the sullen disaffection of the compromised troops of Holkar. The more active and daring of the mutineers of Holkar's army had proceeded to Gwáliár after the insurrection of the 1st of July; the less energetic mass remained, sullen, dangerous, watching events, but to a certain extent paralysed, though not controlled, by the English party in power at Holkar's court. The progress of the Mandesar

* *Vide* page 42, note.

insurrection was, however, so rapid, that to uphold British supremacy in Rajpútáná and Málwá, and to maintain the line of the Narbadá, it became absolutely necessary to check its growth with the utmost promptitude. In the presence of this new danger, the disarming of Holkar's troops became, in every sense, a matter of secondary importance. An attempt to subdue the lesser evil might have augmented the greater, whilst a decisive blow struck at the greater could not fail to affect fatally the lesser.

and requiring the most prompt attention.

Action in any shape was impossible so long as the heavy rains continued. But when, in the beginning of October, the monsoon passed away, and the country began to dry up, the Mandesar rebels began to give proof of the possession of the aggressive nature with which I have credited them.

The rains an impediment to prompt action.

The leader of the Mandesar insurgents was Firúzsháh, a Sháhzáda or prince connected with the imperial family of Dehlí. It was estimated in September that some fifteen thousand men, with sixteen or eighteen guns, had rallied round his standard, and this estimate was subsequently found to have been below the actual number. To meet these, Durand, after deducting the sick and wounded, and a sufficient number of men to guard Máu, could not bring into the field more than fifteen hundred men * and nine guns.

Composition of the Mandesar insurgents.

Durand's effective force.

Under these circumstances it was perhaps fortunate that the aggressive movement was made by the rebels. Durand expected it. Towards the very end of September he had intercepted letters from Haidarábád from Nágúr, from Súrat, from Ujjén, from Gwáliár, and from Mandesar, all telling the same tale. The tale was to the effect that, after the conclusion of the Dasahra festival,† a general rising would take place in Málwá, and that influential personages were coming

Durand learns that central India is about to rise in revolt.

* Thus composed: Artillery, one hundred and seventy; Dragoons, two hundred; 86th, two hundred and thirty; 25th Bombay Native Infantry, three hundred and fifty; 3rd Nizám's Cavalry, three hundred and fifty.

† A festival of ten days' duration, nine of which are spent in worship and religious ceremonies. The tenth day is the birthday of Gangá (the Ganges). Whoever bathes in the Ganges on that day is purified from ten sorts of sins. The festival occurs in September or October, the date varying with each year.

from Nágpúr and Haidarábád for the purpose of giving life and strength to the insurrection. The close of the Dasahra corresponded with the setting in of the dry season. The result corresponded with the information Durand had thus obtained. Early in October the Sháhzáda's troops, who had previously occupied Dhár and Amjhéra, advanced to the Bombay road and threatened to interrupt Durand's communications with Bombay, to command the line of the Narbadá along the Bombay frontier, and to attack Nímach. They sent also a pressing invitation to Holkar's troops to join them.

The rebels attempt to cut off Durand from Bombay.

Everything depended upon the rapidity with which Durand would be able to strike a blow at this enemy. Failing it, it was quite possible that Náná Sáhib, who at that time was hovering in the vicinity of Kálpí, might transfer the whole of his troops to central India, and that the Maráthá war-cry might raise the entire country formerly acknowledging the supremacy of the Peshwá. Seeing the necessity, Durand struck. On the 12th of October he detached one body of Haidarábád cavalry to defend Mandlésar on the Narbadá, threatened by the rebels, and another to the village of Gújrí to intercept them on their way. On the 14th he sent three companies of the 25th Native Infantry and some dragoons to support this last-named party, and on the 19th, with all the men who could be spared from the garrison of Máu, he marched for Dhár.

The vital importance of rapid action.

Durand strikes at Dhár.

Ánand Ráo Púár, a lad of thirteen years, had succeeded to the chiefship of Dhár on the death of his brother, cut off by cholera on the 23rd of May 1857.* His minister, Rámchandar Bápují, a shrewd and intelligent man, who, from his thorough knowledge of the English and from his large acquaintance with British officers, was supposed to be devoted to British interests, began, almost immediately after his assumption of office, to pursue a line of policy the very reverse of that which had been hoped from him. In direct opposition to the policy pursued by the Government of India ever since the settlement of Málwá, to prevent the

History of Dhár immediately previous to the events of 1857.

Disloyalty of Rámchandar Bápují.

* The formal recognition by the British Government only reached the young chief on the 28th of September, but he was acknowledged and treated as Rájah from the date stated.

employment of mercenary troops in native states, this man began to enlist large numbers of Arabs, Afgháns, and Mekránís. As soon as the news of the Indúr rising of the 1st of July reached Dhár, a party of these mercenaries, four hundred in number, joined with the mercenaries of the Rájah of Amjhéra, and plundered the stations of Bhopáur and Sirdárpúr, burning the hospitals over the heads of the sick and wounded. Returning to Dhár with their plunder, they were met and honourably received by Bhím Ráo Bhonslá, the young Rájah's uncle, and three of the guns which they had captured were placed in the Rájah's palace. On the 31st of August they were in possession of the fort of Dhár, with or without the consent of the Durbar was not certainly known. But on the 15th of October Captain Hutchinson, the political agent, reported that there was strong reason to believe that the Rájah's mother and uncle and the members of the Durbar were the instigators of the rebellion of the Dhár troops, that the conduct of the Durbar was suspicious, that its agent had purposely deceived him regarding the negotiations entered into by its members with the mutinous mercenaries and the number of men they had enlisted, and that it had received with attention and civility emissaries from Mandesar, the centre of the Muhammadan rising. It was this intelligence which decided Durand to dismiss the Dhár agent in attendance on him, with a message to the Durbar that its members would be held strictly responsible for all that had happened or that might happen,* and to despatch all his available troops to attack Dhár.

He enlists mercenaries,

whom, after their plunder of British stations, he receives with honour.

Captain Hutchinson reports the complicity of the Rájah's family, and of the Durbar.

Durand dismisses the Durbar's agent with a warning.

On the 22nd of October the British force arrived before Dhár. The Arab and Mekrání levies who garrisoned that fort gave a signal instance of the confidence engendered by the long compulsory inaction of the British by quitting the protection of their lines of defence and coming to attack them in the open. Planting three brass guns on a hill south of the fort, they extended from that point along its eastern face in skirmishing order, and advanced boldly against the British.

The British troops arrive before Dhár.

* Durand repeated this warning to the Rájah in person during the siege of the fort.

But their confidence soon vanished. The 25th Bombay Native Infantry, a splendid regiment, often to be mentioned, and always with honour, in these pages, led by their most capable commandant, Major Robertson, charged the three guns, captured them, and turned the guns on the rebels. Almost simultaneously, the four companies of the 86th and the sappers, flanked by Woollcombe's (Bombay) and Hungerford's (Bengal) batteries, advanced against the centre, whilst the cavalry threatened both flanks, the dragoons, under Captain Gall, the left, the Nizám's cavalry, under Major Orr, the right. Baffled in their advance by the action of the 25th, and the play of the British guns on their centre, the enemy made a rapid movement to their left, and attempted to turn the British right. But the dragoons, led by Gall, and the Nizám's cavalry, led by Orr and Macdonald, Deputy Quarter-master-General of the force, charged them so vigorously that they retired into the fort, leaving forty bodies of their companions on the field. On the British side three dragoons and one native trooper were wounded, a jámadar and a native trooper were killed.

The action.

Gallantry of the 25th Native Infantry,

of the British troops,

Gall and Orr and Macdonald.

The rebels are beaten.

The fort was now invested, but the British force had to wait for the siege guns, expected on the 24th. They arrived on the evening of that day; the next morning they were placed in position.

Dhár is invested.

The fort of Dhár is entirely detached from the town of the same name. Its southern angle rests on the suburbs, the road running between. It is situated on an eminence of thirty feet above the surrounding plain, and is built of red granite, in an oblong shape, conforming itself to the hill on which it stands. The walls are about thirty feet in height, and have at intervals fourteen circular and two square towers.

Description of the fort of Dhár.

On the 25th a sandbag battery, two thousand yards south of the fort, armed with one 8-inch howitzer and one 8-inch mortar, began to shell the fort. Under cover of this fire the infantry pushed on to a low ridge, about two hundred and fifty yards from the southern angle of the fort, forming a natural parallel, and took possession of it. On this the breaching battery was at once constructed. Simultaneously, strong cavalry and infantry pickets were thrown out

Investment of Dhár.

on the north and east faces of the fort, security on the west face being assured by an extensive tank or lake which could not be forded. Durand was in hopes that the rebels, seeing themselves thus surrounded, would spontaneously surrender. But although, during the six days the siege lasted, they made many efforts to obtain aid from outside, acting and writing in the name of the Durbar, under whose orders they professed to be defending the fort, they waited until, on the night of the 29th, the breach had been made so large that its practicability was only a question of a day or two, ere they sent a white flag to inquire the terms which would be granted. "An unconditional surrender," was the reply, upon which the firing continued.

The rebels ask for terms.

The reply.

At sunset on the 31st the breach was reported practicable, and that night a storming party was detailed to assault the place. Never was a task easier. The breach was easily ascended. Almost immediately afterwards firing was heard on the plain. Whilst dragoons and irregulars were despatched in that direction, the storming party entered the fort. It was empty.*

The breach practicable and the fort evacuated.

In fact the rebels, foreseeing the assault, had quitted the fort by the main gate between 9 and 11 o'clock, and escaped in the direction of the north-west. The firing heard on the plain at the moment the breach was entered was only a skirmish with the rear-guard of the retreating enemy and an outlying picket of the 3rd Nizam's cavalry. The main body had passed by them and the dragoons† wholly unobserved, and were well away before the alarm could be of any avail. Pursuit, though it could scarcely accomplish much, was attempted. It resulted, however, only in the capture of a few wretched stragglers.

Escape of the rebels.

Pursuit useless.

Durand ordered the fort of Dhár to be demolished, the State to be attached, pending the final orders of Government, and charges to be prepared against the leaders and instigators of

* Sindhiá and Dhár. *Calcutta Review.* Lowe's *Central India.* Private papers.

† It had unfortunately happened that the European pickets, which had been there for some days, and which knew the ground well, had been changed that very day. The trooper, sent by the jámadar of the native picket to give the alarm, fell with his horse on the way, and was disabled.—Lowe.

the rebellion.* The force then continued its march through western Málwá towards Mandesar, in pursuit of the rebels. These latter, however, had by no means renounced their aggressive tendencies. On the 8th of November they attacked the cantonment of Mehidpúr, garrisoned by a native contingent of the three arms, officered by English officers. Major Timmins, who commanded the contingent, imprudently permitted the rebels, without offering opposition, to take up a strong position close round his guns and infantry. The men of the contingent, on their side, displayed mingled cowardice and treachery, the majority eventually going over to the rebels. Half a troop of the cavalry behaved, however, extremely well, and, after making a gallant but ineffective charge, in which their leader, Captain Mills, was shot dead, and their native officer severely wounded, escorted the remainder of the European officers to Durand's camp, where they arrived on the 9th.

Durand demolishes the fort and marches towards Mandesar.

The rebels attack Mehidpúr,

and plunder the station.

Two other affairs, which occurred during the pursuit of the rebels to Mandesar, deserve here to be recorded. The first was the capture and destruction of the fort of Amjhéra by a small party of Haidarábád cavalry and infantry under Lieutenant Hutchinson. There was, indeed, no opposition; but the fact of the occupation was satisfactory, as it proved that Durand's rapid action had saved the line of the Narbadá, and had maintained that barrier between the blazing north and the smouldering south.

The line of the Narbadá saved.

The other action was one in which Major Orr and the Haidarábád Contingent was prominently engaged.

I have already stated* how one regiment of the Haidarábád Contingent had joined Brigadier Stuart's force on its march from Aurangábád. The remaining cavalry of the contingent and a large force of its infantry and artillery had, about the same time, been formed at Eldábád, one of the chief outlets of the Dakhan, on the high road to central India. Here they remained until the monsoon had ceased and the roads had

Reinforcements brought by the Haidarábád Contingent.

* Ultimately, owing to circumstances upon which it is unnecessary for me to enter here, they all escaped punishment. To the young Rájah himself merciful consideration was shown, and he was restored to his title and position.

† *Vide* p. 41.

begun to dry up. They then marched with all speed into Málwá, and coercing on their way the refractory zamindárs of Pípliá* and Rághugarh, reached Durand's force before Dhár.

Upon the news reaching camp of the successful action of the rebels at Mehidpúr, Major Orr, with a small force, consisting of three hundred and thirty-seven sabres drawn from the 1st, 3rd, and 4th regiments Nizam's cavalry, was sent to follow on their track. The second morning after he had left camp, Orr, having marched some sixty miles, arrived before Mehidpúr. There he learned that the rebels had left the place the same morning, carrying with them all the guns, stores, and ammunition upon which they could lay hand. Orr stopped to water and feed his horses, and whilst thus halting had the gratification to receive Mrs. Timmins, the wife of the commandant already mentioned, who had been unable to effect her escape† with her husband. Having despatched that lady under a sufficient escort to rejoin her husband, Orr followed the rebels, and, after a pursuit of twelve miles, came up with their rear-guard, about four hundred and fifty men with two guns, about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, at the village of Ráwal. They were prepared to receive him. They had taken up a very formidable position, especially calculated to resist cavalry, their right resting on the village, and their front covered by a muddy nullah or rivulet. Occupying this position, they hoped effectually to cover the retreat of their main body, conveying their stores, their ammunition, and the spoils of Mehidpúr. But they had not counted on the gallant spirit of their enemy. Orr, and his officers, Abbott, Johnstone, Clark, Murray, and Samwell, led their men forward, crossed the nullah, charged the guns, and then fought hand to hand with the enemy. The contest was desperate and continued till the sun went down. Then the rebels gave way, and all their guns, eight in number, and stores fell into the hands of the victors. The nature of the engagement may be gathered from the fact that the British lost

Major Orr pursues the Mehidpúr plunderers.

He catches them up.

Their strong position.

Orr gallantly and successfully assails it,

and carries it, though with loss.

* Called also, and more correctly, "Hath Ka Pípliá," a town in the Diwás State, twenty-eight miles east from Indúr. Rághugarh lies two short marches distant from it.

† This lady had been concealed by a faithful tailor, who frustrated all the efforts of the rebels to discover her hiding-place.

nearly a hundred men killed and wounded. Amongst the latter was Lieutenant Samwell, shot through the abdomen. The rebels lost a hundred and seventy five killed, and some seventy taken prisoners.

Satisfaction of the 14th Dragoons at Orr's success.

When the despatch containing the account of this affair reached Durand, he handed it over to Major Gall to read to the 14th Dragoons and 86th Foot. By these men it was heard with more than satisfaction, for it dissipated any doubt which might have been caused by the escape of the garrison of Dhár.

Durand reaches the Chambal.

Durand now pushed on as fast as the baggage carts and the roads would permit him, and on the 19th of November reached Hernia on the banks of the river Chambal. The crossing of this river, unopposed as it was, presented no inconsiderable difficulties. Its banks are rugged and almost perpendicular, its stream is deep and rapid, and its bed is broken by enormous boulders of basalt. The baggage of the force was carried almost entirely on carts drawn by bullocks, a few camels only having been obtainable, and to convey these carts and the artillery guns across a river presenting the difficulties I have described would, under no circumstances, have been an easy task. That the rebels, hitherto so aggressive, should have neglected the opportunity thus offered to them adds another to the many proofs in which this history abounds, that, brave as they were in fight, they understood little of the art of war. As it was, nearly two days were spent in effecting the passage, nor was this possible until the sappers had cut a road down the bank for the artillery and carts, and another up the opposite bank.*

Description of the river.

The rebels foolishly leave it undefended.

* "I never saw a more animated and beautiful picture in my life than when our brigade crossed this river. The steep, verdant, shrubby banks, covered with our varied forces, elephants, camels, horses, and bullocks; the deep flowing clear river, reaching on and on to the far east, to the soft deep-blue tufted horizon; the babble and yelling of men, the lowing of the cattle, the grunting screams of the camels, and the trumpeting of the wary, heavily-laden elephant; the rattle of our artillery down the bank, through the river, and up the opposite side; the splashing and plunging of our cavalry through the stream—neighing and eager for the green encamping ground before them; and everybody so busy and jovial, streaming up from the deep water to their respective grounds; and all this in the face, almost, of an enemy, formed a *tableau vivant* never to be forgotten."—Lowe's *Campaign in Central India.*

The column halted the afternoon of the 20th on the east bank of the Chambal, and, marching early the following morning, encamped four miles south of Mandesar, in a position covered to the front by some rising ground, flanked on the left by a little village and gardens, beyond which again were several large topes, some cultivated ground, and another village surrounded by gardens and trees. On the right of the British position were hills and villages, and between these and the rising ground in front already referred to was an extensive plateau, covered here and there with acres of uncut corn. Beyond it, again, the city of Mandesar.* A reconnaissance having indicated that all was quiet in front, the camp was pitched and the men went to their breakfasts.

Durand approaches Mandesar.

Aggressive humour of the rebels.

But the rebels were again in an aggressive humour. Rumours had been industriously spread in their ranks that the British force had been repulsed from Dhár, and, in sheer desperation, was now meditating an attack on Mandesar. The leaders knew better, but they used all their efforts to give currency to the story. Consequently, about mid-day on the 22nd, the rebels, confident that they had before them only a dispirited and beaten column, sallied forth from Mandesar, and, marching gaily, took possession of a village surrounded by trees and gardens beyond the extreme left of the British line, and, making that village their extreme right, occupied, with two considerable masses, the plateau connecting it with Mandesar.

They threaten the British force,

The men in the British camp were at their breakfasts when the news of the rebel movement reached them. Instantly they fell in, and the line formed; the dragoons on the extreme right, the Nizám's horse on the extreme left, Hungerford's and Woollcombe's batteries forming the right-centre, the bullock battery of the Haidarábád the left centre, the 86th and 25th Bombay Native Infantry the centre, and the Haidarábád infantry with the Madras Sappers on the left of the Haidarábád guns, opposite the village occupied by the rebels. The British guns at once opened fire; and Woollcombe's guns, pointed by Lieutenant Strutt, to be again mentioned in these pages, firing very

which turns out to receive them,

* Lowe

true,* the rebels wavered. An advance of the Haidarábád troops converted their wavering into flight. The cavalry then pursued and cut up a number of them. The remainder escaped into the city.

and beats them.

The next day, the 22nd, Durand crossed to the right bank of the Mandesar river, and encamped to the west of the town within two thousand yards of the suburbs. His object was to gain a position whence he could threaten Mandesar with one hand, and the rebel force which had occupied Nímach,† and which, he had learned from spies, was now hastening to the aid of their comrades, on the other. A cavalry reconnaissance showed the Nímach rebels to be in considerable force in the village of Gorariá on the high road to that place.

Durand interposes between the Mandesar and Nímach rebels.

In that direction, then, Durand moved on the 24th. After a march of three miles, he espied the rebels about a mile distant, their right resting on the village, their centre on a long hill, and their left well covered by fields of uncut grain, with broken ground and nullahs in their front, full of water and mud.

The British guns, opening on the rebels, soon overcame the fire of their five field-pieces, and forced their line to fall back. They clung, however, with great pertinacity to the village of Gorariá, and on this, retiring from the centre and left, they fell back very slowly. Whilst the British were endeavouring to drive them from this position, a strong party sallied from Mandesar and attacked their rear. The Nizám's horse and the dragoons met the assailants boldly, and, after a sharp contest, drove them back with loss. In front, however, the British could make no impression on the village. The brigadier detailed the 86th and 25th Bombay Native Infantry to carry it with the bayonet, but the fire from it was so fierce that he countermanded the order, preferring to reduce it with his guns. When night fell the rebels still

Attacks the latter at Gorariá.

Desperate conflict.

* "Lieutenant Strutt's shooting was very true. All the while this firing was going on at the village, a fine fellow, dressed in white, with a green flag, coolly walked out from the cover, and sauntered leisurely along the whole line of our guns, while round shot and shell were whizzing about him in awful proximity. He occasionally stooped down, but never attempted to run; he then quietly retraced his steps, when a shot from Lieutenant Strutt struck him just before he regained the village."—Lowe's *Central India*.

† Vol. IV. page 400.

occupied Gorariá. The British loss had been considerable, amounting to upwards of sixty officers and men killed and wounded.

At 10 o'clock next morning the 18-pounders and the 24-pounder howitzer were brought to within two hundred and fifty yards of the village, and the firing commenced. The place was shelled till it became a mere wreck; everything that could be burned in it was consumed. Still the rebels held on. At last, about mid-day, some two hundred and twenty came out and surrendered. Those that remained were Rohílahs, and they stuck to the last brick in the place. About 4 o'clock the Brigadier directed that the firing should cease: the 86th and 25th Bombay Native Infantry then stormed the battered ruins.

Gorariá is finally carried.

The stern defence of the Rohílahs did service to their cause. Whilst the British force was dealing with them the Sháhzáda and his two thousand Afghans and Mekránís evacuated Mandesar and retreated on Nángarh. The cavalry, worn out by four days of unremitting exertion, was unable to pursue them.

The gallantry of the Rohílahs allows the Sháhzáda to escape.

Pursuit, however, was scarcely necessary. The blow struck at Gorariá was a blow from which there was no rallying. The Afgháns and Mekránís, as panic-stricken as they had been bold, fled through the country, avoiding towns and villages, and endeavouring to seek refuge in the jungles. One party of them, more daring than their fellows, suddenly appeared at Partábgarh. The loyal chief of that state, summoning his Thákurs, attacked them, killed eighty of them, and drove the rest into flight. The others seemed, above all, anxious to place the Chambal between themselves and their conqueror.

The blow struck at Gorariá is decisive.

The objects which Durand had in his mind when he set out from Máu on the 14th of October had now been accomplished. With a force extremely weak in infantry, he had crushed the rebellion on the plateau of Málwá, thus saving the line of the Narbadá, and cutting off the disaffected troops of Holkar from the supports on which they had rested. The campaign, brief as it was, had proved decisive, and had vindicated to the letter the prescience of Durand when, resisting every temptation to act otherwise, he resolved to allow Holkar's troops to rest quiet until he should

The objects of the campaign achieved.

have disposed of the Dhár rebels and the mutineers of Mandesar and Nímach.

Durand marches on Indúr,

He was now at liberty to turn his arms against Holkar's troops. This he did. Leaving the Haidarábád contingent under Major Orr at Mandesar, and constituting Major Keatinge political agent for Western Málwá, he returned by Mehidpúr and Újjén, and reached the vicinity of Indúr on the 14th of December, fully prepared to encounter the troops of the Maháráj ah should they offer opposition to his entrance into the city. But the spirit which had prompted the treacherous attack on the 1st of July quailed before the sight of a British force returning from victory over traitors. The Indúr troops, held in check during Durand's campaign by the Máu garrison, had been utterly disheartened by the defeat of their sympathisers at Mandesar, and were as humble as some few weeks previously they had been boastful and defiant.

disarms Holkar's regular cavalry,

Near the ground on which Durand encamped on the 14th of December he met and disarmed Holkar's regular cavalry, and placed the men under the care of the Sikh cavalry of the late Bhopál Contingent. He sent likewise to Holkar's chief minister a letter, in which he insisted that the remainder of the troops should be promptly disarmed. Should this demand not be complied with immediately, he expressed his firm resolution to disarm them himself.

and engages Holkar to disarm the infantry.

The reply came that afternoon. The agent who brought it expressed the intention of the Durbar to disarm the infantry at once, and the request that whilst the operation was being carried into effect Durand would halt at a point one mile from the cavalry lines. Durand complied, and Holkar's infantry, sixteen hundred in number, were quietly disarmed that same evening.

Durand visits Holkar,

After the disarming had been completed, Durand, accompanied by a large body of the officers of the Máu column, called upon the Maharájah in his palace in the city of Indúr. It was the first time since the month of June that Durand had seen Holkar. Regarding him in his own mind as an accessory to the attack made upon the Residency on the 1st of July, Durand had sent a report of all the circumstances of the case to Lord Canning, and, pending a reply, had declined to renew personal relations with a prince who might possibly be adjudged by the supreme British authority in India to be a rebel. But when, after the Málwá campaign,

Holkar had acquiesced in the disarming of his cavalry and infantry, and his minister had promised that a suitable punishment should be meted out to the guilty, Durand, on the eve of being relieved by Sir Robert Hamilton, felt that the circumstances were not such as to warrant the omission of the ordinary courtesy required to be displayed on such an occasion. Holkar himself was anxious for the visit, and that it should be conducted with a ceremony and an ostentatious display of friendly intercourse such as would produce an impression on his people. Durand acceded. The visit went off well. Holkar was in good spirits, expressed himself delighted at the disarming of his troops, and a hope that the act would be regarded by the British Government as a proof of his loyalty. Durand quietly, but firmly, impressed upon him that something further was yet required—the punishment of the guilty, whether soldiers or citizens—and stated his confident belief that the British Government and the British people would expect that this remaining duty would be properly carried out. Holkar gave an assurance that a Commission, which he had previously appointed, would make full inquiries into the matter. The interview then terminated. The next day Durand was relieved by Sir Robert Hamilton.

prompted by reasons of courtesy.

Interview between Durand and Holkar.

He had completed a noble task. His personal character had been the mainstay of British authority in central India. Had Durand not been there, the result had not been accomplished. This little sentence conveys to the reader more clearly than a multitude of words the vast value of his services. He was the representative of political power, and, virtually, the general; the brain and the hand, in a most important part of India. He foresaw everything, and he provided for everything. He foresaw even—his own despatches and memoirs written at the time show it most clearly—all that was to happn in the few months that were to follow; how the pacification of the North-West Provinces would increase the pressure west of the Jamnah; the action of Náná Sáhib and his nephews; the incursion of Tántiá Topí. He saw equally clearly the line that should be, and that was, followed. "If affairs at Indúr are successfully arranged," he wrote on the 12th of December, "I shall lose no time in marching the bulk of the Máu column to Sihor with the view of concentrating Sir H.

Durand's "character created his career."

His great capacity;

his foresight.

Rose's command, and enabling him to relieve Ságar, clear Bundelkhand, and advance on Jhánsí and Gwáliár." In these lines Durand foreshadowed the course which he would himself have pursued, and which Sir Hugh Rose did pursue. But it is his actual achievements which call for special commendation.

The value of his great achievements.

In spite of his earnest entreaties, in spite of the pressure exercised by Lord Elphinstone, Woodburn had in June chosen to waste most precious moments at Aurangábád. Had that general not delayed at that Capua, it is more than probable that the insurrection of the 1st of July would never have been attempted at Indúr. But mark the conduct of Durand after that misfortune had happened. He hastens to meet Woodburn's column, now commanded by another officer; he meets it, quickens its movements, and brings it to Máu. He finds western Málwá in a state of aggressive insurrection, and the only line which had remained a barrier between the Central Provinces and Bombay—the line of the Narbadá—sorely threatened. Of all the political officers in central India he alone understands the enormous importance of that line. He finds Mr. Plowden from Nágpúr, Major Erskine from the Ságar and Narbadá territories, urging measures which would have lost it. Though pressed by many considerations to disarm Holkar's troops, he, receiving from no quarter a word of encouragement or support, risks everything to save that important line. Then what do we see? With a weak column of five hundred Europeans of all arms and eight hundred natives,* he sets out from Máu, and in five weeks takes a strong fort, fights several cavalry combats, gains three actions in the open field, takes more than forty guns, crushes the Mandesar insurrection, saves the line of the Narbadá, and, marching back to Indúr, causes the disarming of the disaffected troops of Holkar. In four months he more than counteracts the evil effected by an army of conspirators.

In spite of the incapacity and wrong-headedness of others,

he wins back in four months all that had been lost.

It was, I repeat, a noble work, nobly performed, and, like many noble works, left unrewarded. No man has been more calumniated than its author. No one more bravely fought the battle of life in face of calumny. I may add that of no man that ever

His greatness not appreciated by his contemporaries,

* Reinforced at Dhár by the Haidarábád troops.

lived will the career bear more acute and critical examination. Should the life of Henry Marion Durand be written with the fearlessness the occasion demands, * his countrymen will realise alike the worth of the man who, at a most critical period, secured a line the loss of which would have produced incalculable evils. They will learn, too, something of the nature of the smaller beings who aided in the attempt to calumniate, to insult, and to depreciate him. They will learn that it is not always the truly great man who occupies the most conspicuous position in the eyes of his contemporaries!

who were also rivals, though far below him.

Many officers distinguished themselves in this campaign. One of these, who for his daring, his gallantry, and his brain power was especially noticed by Colonel Durand, requires mention here. "Much of the success in quelling this insurrection," wrote Durand to Lord Canning at the end of November 1857, "is due to the judicious daring, the thorough gallantry with which, whenever opportunity offered, Major Gall, his officers and men, sought close conflict with the enemy—a bold one, who often fought most desperately. I feel it a duty to Major Gall and H.M.'s 14th Light Dragoons, men and officers, thus especially to beg your Lordship's influence in favour of officers and men who have merited, by conspicuous valour, everything that Her Majesty's Government may be pleased to confer. They deserve most highly." Durand also noticed with marked commendation the splendid services of Major Orr, Captain Abbott, and the officers and men of the Haidarábád Contingent and of the 25th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry. This regiment boasted a commanding officer, Major, afterwards Lieutenant-Colonel, Robertson, than whom no one rendered better service to the State. Captain Woollcombe, Lieutenants Strutt and Christie, of the Bombay Artillery, the last-named of whom was shot by a bullet in the region of the heart, † also greatly distinguished themselves. But there were many others in the same category. The list is too long.

Some of the men who served under him.

* This was written in 1879. The life has subsequently been written by his son.

† Captain Christie recovered from the wound, took part in the subsequent campaign, and was killed by a tiger some years afterwards.

CHAPTER III.

THE SÁGAR AND NARBADÁ TERRITORIES, AND NAGPUR.

The Ságar and Narbadá territories.

THE territories known as the Ságar and Narbadá territories formed an extensive tract, bounded on the north by the British districts of Bandah, Allahábád, and Mírzápúr; on the south by Nágpúr and the dominions of the Nizám; on the west by Gwáliár and Bhopál. Within these boundaries is comprehended the state of Rewah, whose Rájah recognised the overlordship of the British. The other native feudatories, the feudatories of Kótí, Maihír, Uchahárá, and Soháwal, held their lands under grants from the East India Company. Within the limits of those lands, however, they exercised a ruling authority, subject to the interference, when necessary, of the paramount power. The larger portion of the Ságar and Narbadá territories were directly British. This portion comprised the districts of Ságar, Jabalpúr, Hoshangábád, Sióní, Damoh, Narsinhpúr, Betúl, Jhánsi, Chanderi, Nagod, and Mandlah.

Sketch of the later history of those territories.

When, in 1843, the Gwáliár Durbar commenced those hostilities against the British which culminated in the battle of Maháráipúr, the chiefs and people of the Ságar and Narbadá territories, then ruled by Mr. Fraser, C.B., as Agent to the Governor-General, broke out into open rebellion. This rebellion was due partly to the great dislike felt by the people to the civil courts, and more particularly to the mode in which they were administered, and partly to the propaganda of the Gwáliár Durbar. When, however, the pride of that Durbar had been lowered by the battle of Maháraipúr, peace was restored to the Ságar and Narbadá territories. Lord Ellenborough, who, throughout his Indian career, always displayed a marked detestation of proved

abuses, inaugurated the newly gained peace by making a clean sweep of the British officials serving in the territories, and by sending one of the ablest officers in the Indian services, the late Colonel Sleeman, to administer them on a new basis. Colonel Sleeman succeeded in pacifying the chiefs and in contenting the people. When, after a rule of two of three years, he was promoted to be Resident at Lakhnao, he handed over the territories to his successor, Mr. Bushby, in perfect order. Mr. Bushby's administration for five or six years was characterised by ability and good judgment; but when, at the close of that period, he was promoted to the Residency of Haidarábád, the Ságar and Narbadá territories were joined to the North-West Provinces, then ruled by Mr. Colvin, Major Erskine* receiving the appointment of Commissioner of Jabalpúr, and becoming Mr. Colvin's representative in the territories. Subordinate to Major Erskine were, amongst others, Captain Skene, Commissioner of Jhánsi, and Captain Ternan, Deputy Commissioner of Narsinhpúr.

They fall under the rule of the Agra Board of Revenue, which proposes revolutionary changes.

With their transfer to the North-West Provinces, the Ságar and Narbadá territories came under the Sadr Board of Revenue. In accordance with its traditions, that venerable Board at once proposed changes in the administration so startling that, if carried out, they would inevitably have caused a violent rebellion. Before finally deciding in favour of the proposed changes, Mr. Colvin had the good sense to ask the opinion of the officer who had served longest in the territories, a man of remarkable sense and strength of character, Captain A. H. Ternan. Captain Ternan replied by pointing out the inapplicability of the rules of the Sadr Board of Revenue to the needs of the province, and the certain consequence which would follow any attempt to enforce them. Mr. Colvin, struck by Captain Ternan's representations, withdrew nearly the whole of the proposed changes. It is to be regretted that he did not withdraw the whole, for the few that he allowed, relating chiefly to the subdivision of properties, roused a very bad feeling, and led to many agrarian outrages.

On Captain Ternan's representation many of these are modified.

Such was the state of the territories in 1855. The temper of

* Afterwards Earl of Kellie.

the people, kindled by the cause I have mentioned, had not wholly subsided into its normal conditions of contentment. The outbreak in the North-West Provinces came inopportunely to inflame it still more.

Sufficient remains to sour the temper of the people.

The small station of Narsinhpúr on the Singrí, sixty miles to the west of Ságar, was garrisoned at the outbreak of the mutiny by four companies of the 28th Madras Native Infantry, under the command of Captain Woolley, an excellent officer. The Deputy Commissioner of the district, Captain Ternan, to whose calm and cool judgment I have already referred, had his headquarters also at Narsinhpúr. The district of which this town was the capital was largely inhabited by petty chiefs, who had gone into rebellion in 1843, and who had never submitted willingly to British jurisdiction. So early as December 1856 there were not wanting indications that some great event was looming before the eyes of these men, but no European could venture an opinion as to the form that event would take. It happened, however, that one evening, in January 1857, Captain Ternan was sitting outside his tent, smoking a cigar, when the Kotwál* of the village came running to him, bearing in his hand some small chapátis or cakes of unleavened bread. On reaching Ternan, the Kotwál, out of breath and panting, stated that the cakes were the remnant of a large quantity he had received that morning, with instructions to leave them with the watchmen of every village to be kept till called for; that he had so distributed them in the neighbouring villages, and that those which he held in his hand constituted the surplus. "What," he asked Ternan, "was he to do with them?"

Captain Ternan at Narsinhpúr.

His first experience of the chapátis in circulation.

Ternan, naturally shrewd, and that natural shrewdness sharpened by the experience of the rebellion of 1842–43, at once divined the truth. In those small unleavened cakes he saw the fiery cross sent through the land to unsettle the minds of the great mass of the people; that, distributed broadcast as the Kotwál had distributed them in his district, they would indicate a sudden danger that might come at any moment upon the people, threatening their caste and

Ternan divines the mystery,

and reports his views to Major Erskine.

* A Kotwál is generally a chief officer of police.

undermining their religion. He at once embodied thes ideas in a report, which he transmitted forthwith to h official superior, Major Erskine.

Major Erskine

Major Erskine was an officer who had written a book entitle "Forms and Tables for the Use of the Bengal Native Infantry." That book was a reflex of his mind. His mind was a mind "of forms and tables." His mental vision commanded the line of strict and forma routine. Out of that line he saw nothing, he was incapable o seeing anything. When, therefore, he received Ternan's repor and read the conclusions drawn by that officer regarding the unleavened cakes, he ridiculed them; he considered the idea far-fetched, absurd, impossible. He wrote back to Ternan to that effect, adding that it was simply a case of "a dyer's vat having gone wrong," an that the owner of the vat was propitiating the gods by th distribution of cakes.

utterly declines Ternan's view.

Subsequent events made it abundantly evident that Erskin was wrong and Ternan was right. Distributed broadly over the North-West Provinces and in Oudh, in the earlier months of 1857, these cakes were the harbingers of the coming storm. It is certain now that they originated in the brain of the Oudh conspirators, of the men made conspirators by the annexation o their country, and they were sent to every village for the very object divined by Ternan—the object of unsettling men's minds of preparing them for the unforeseen, of making them impressionable, easy to receive the ideas the conspirators wished tc promulgate.

Ternan's prescience is justified by events.

I may record here a decision of the Government promulgated in the same district a year or two prior to 1857, and of the remarkable consequence it produced after the mutiny had broken out, as illustrative of the influence which an able and conscien tious English officer can almost always bring to bear upon native chiefs. One of the most influential chieftains in the territories under Captain Ternan's supervision was the Rájah of Dilhérí, the feudal lord of all the Gónd clans. This chief had ever been loyal. For his fidelity and good conduct in the trying times of 1842–43, the Government had presented him with a gold medal. Like many of the Gónd tribe, he had been somewhat too profuse in his expenditure and had incurred debts; but, by exercising a strict economy,

The Rájah of Dilhérí

he had paid off those debts. Such was his condition in 1855, shortly after the Ságar and Narbadá territories had been brought under the government of the North-West Provinces. It had been a principle of that government, since the time when it was administered by Mr. Thomason, to discourage large landowners. One morning in that year Captain Ternan received instructions, emanating from Ágra, desiring him to inform the Rájah of Dilhérí that, inasmuch as he was unfit to hold the title of Rájah and had proved himself incapable of managing his estates he was deprived of both; that his title was abolished, and that his property would be distributed among his tenants, he receiving a percentage from the rents! When this decision was most unwillingly announced to the Rájah by Captain Ternan, the old man drew his medal from the belt in which it was habitually carried, and requested the English officer to return it to those who had bestowed it, as they were now about to disgrace him before his clan and before the whole district. With great difficulty Ternan pacified him. It was generally expected that he would break out into rebellion. He might well have done so, for every member of the clan felt insulted in his person. Ternan, fearing an outbreak, pressed on the Government the mistake they had committed and urged them to rectify it. But the Government would not listen. The order was carried out. Ternan did all in his power to save the family from ruin; but even he could do little.

falls under the displeasure of the Board of Revenue,

and is deprived of his title and estates.

He feels the insult bitterly;

but, despite Ternan's remonstrances, the decision is persisted in.

Before the mutiny broke out in May 1857, the old man had died; his son, too, had died. The next heir took the title—for, however the Government might order, the representative of the family was always Rájah to the people. Then came the mutiny of May 1857. The Narsinhpúr district felt its shock. Muhammadans from across the border invaded the district and pillaged the villages. The outlook became every day more gloomy. "Save yourselves while there is yet time," said the loyal officials to Ternan. But Ternan stayed. One morning, however, early in June, his house was surrounded by a considerable body of armed men, with lighted matchlocks. Ternan saw at a glance that they all belonged to the Dilhérí

When the mutiny breaks out, his grandson and his clansmen

clan. He at once summoned the chief and asked him what had brought him and his clansmen in such numbers and in so warlike a garb. The chief replied that he would answer if he and the other chiefs were allowed a private audience with their interlocutor Ternan admitted them into his drawing-room. The chief replied: "You behaved kindly to us and fought our battle when the title and estate were confiscated, and you were abused for so doing. Now we hear disturbances are rife, and we come to offer you our services. We will stick by you as you stuck by us. What do you wish us to do?" Ternan thanked them, accepted their offer, assured them they should be no losers by their conduct, and promised to do his utmost to see justice done them. The members of the clan remained loyal throughout the trying events of 1857–58, resisted the urgent solicitations made to them to join the rebels, and, what was of equal importance, they induced other clans to join them in rendering most valuable service to the British cause.

offer their services to Ternan, and continue loyal under every change of fortune.

I turn now to the part of the territories the chief centres in which were more purely military stations.

There were three military stations in the Ságar and Narbadá territories—the stations of Ságar, Jabalpúr, and Hoshangábád. Ságar was garrisoned by the 31st and 42nd Bengal Native Infantry, the 3rd Regiment Irregular Cavalry, and sixty-eight European gunners; Jabalpúr by the 52nd Bengal Native Infantry, and Hoshangábád by the 28th Madras Native Infantry. The commandant of the Ságar district force was Brigadier Sage, who had his head-quarters at Ságar.

Garrisons of the Ságar and Narbadá territories.

Neither the news of the mutiny at Mírath nor the tidings of the nearer and more horrible events of Jhánsí,* affected, according to all appearance, the demeanour of the native troops at Ságar. Indeed, so conspicuous was their good conduct, that, early in June, Brigadier Sage, not trusting them, yet unwilling to openly display an opposite feeling, did not hesitate to send a detachment, consisting of five hundred infantry, a hundred and twenty-five cavalry, and two 9-pounders, against a Rájah who had rebelled, promising them a reward of six thousand rupees for the capture

Brigadier Sage at Ságar.

* Vol. III. page 126.

of the said Rajah, dead or alive. A few days later, however, the brigadier had reason to feel that the policy of concealing distrust was not likely to answer better in Ságar than in the places where it had been already tried and failed. The station of Ságar was laid out in a manner which rendered it difficult for a commander with only sixty-eight European soldiers at his disposal, to exercise a general supervision over every part of it. At one end of it were the fort, the magazine, and the battering train. At the other end, distant from it three miles and a quarter, was a commanding position known as the artillery hill. Both these points could not be retained. The artillery hill, though in many respects important as a position, wanted water and storing-room for provisions. There was no question, then, in the brigadier's mind, as to the position which should be abandoned. Yet he laboured under this great difficulty, that the Sipáhis guarded the fort and the treasury, and they took care to let it be surmised that they would yield neither the one nor the other. In a word, the station seemed to be at their mercy.

The position at Ságar.

Affairs were in this position when, on the 13th of June, Brigadier Sage received an application for assistance in guns from Lálitpúr, a station in the Jhánsí territory, though bordering upon that of Ságar, garrisoned by three hundred men of the 6th Infantry of the Gwáliar Contingent. The brigadier promptly despatched two 9-pounders, escorted by one company of the 31st Native Infantry, one of the 42nd, and seventy-five troopers of the 3rd Irregulars. The detachment never reached Lálitpúr. The very evening before it left Ságar, the three companies of the Gwáliár regiment at that station had broken out into mutiny, had plundered the treasury, and had driven the European officers* to flee for protection to the Rájah of Bánpúr, who, under the pretence of being a friend, had been for some days in the vicinity of Lálitpúr, exciting the Sipáhis to mutiny.

Mutiny at Lálitpúr.

For a moment I follow the action of this Rájah. Finding that the rebel Sipáhis had taken possession of the Lálitpúr treasury, and were marching off with its contents, he attacked them, and was repulsed.

The Rájah of Bánpúr rebels.

* Captain Sale, commanding; Lieutenant Irwin, second in command, his wife and two children; Dr. O'Brien, and Lieutenant Gordon, Deputy Commissioner of Chandérí. They were made over to the Rájah of Shahgarh, by whom they were kindly treated. Ultimately they were all released.

Thus baffled, he sent off his European guests to the fort of Tehrí, there to be confined, and then marched in haste to meet the detachment coming from Ságar, with the view of inducing the Sipáhis composing it to join him.

Major Gaussen, commanding that detachment, had reached Málthon, forty miles from Ságar, when he heard of the mutiny at Lálitpúr and of the movement of the Bánpúr Rájah. He at once halted and wrote for reinforcements. Sage replied promptly by sending four hundred infantry and one hundred cavalry. The night previous to the day on which those men were ordered to set out, great commotion reigned in Ságar, and it seemed as though mutiny might break out at any moment. The danger passed, however. Brigadier Sage, though urged by many of those about him to put an end to the terrible suspense by striking a blow with the few Europeans under his orders, remained impassive. He had resolved to act only when the Sipáhis should commit themselves unmistakably to revolt.

Major Gaussen with a detachment from Ságar reaches Málthon.

The detachment marched the following morning, the 19th of June, and joined Major Gaussen on the 23rd. Gaussen then marched with his whole force against the fort of Bálábét, held by the rebels, stormed it,* and took sixteen of the garrison prisoners. The Sipáhi stormers promised these men their lives, and two days later, on the return of the detachment to Málthon, they insisted on their release. Major Gaussen being powerless to refuse the demand, they released the prisoners, and made them over to the Bánpúr Rájah. No sooner had this act been accomplished than that Rájah entered the British camp, and openly offered the Sipáhis a monthly pay of twelve rupees if they would leave their officers and go over to him with their arms and ammunition! The Sipáhis agreed, dismissed their officers, and joined the Rájah.

His men revolt.

The information brought by the returning officers to Ságar decided Sage to act promptly. He saw that, if he were to wait till the rebel Rájah should march on Ságar, he and his sixty-eight men would be surrounded and lost. Accordingly he at once, and in the most judicious manner, began his operations. He first moved the contents of the treasury into the fort; to the same

Sage prepares for a decisive movement.

* In blowing open the gate, Ensign Spens of the 31st was accidentally killed. Lieutenant Willoughby of the artillery was wounded.

place he next conveyed the contents of the expense magazine and the artillery magazine; and, last of all, he removed thither the women, the children, and the baggage of the European artillery. As soon as this had been accomplished, he took a guard of Europeans and relieved the Sipáhi guard at the fort gate. Thus, by a few decisive strokes, the one following the other with rapidity, Sage gained a place of refuge, secured the contents of the magazine, and saved the treasure.

He reasons with the native officers.

The second day after, the morning of the 30th of June, whilst the ordinary grand guard-mounting was progressing, Sage marched the Europeans and sixty cavalry, who remained loyal, into the fort. He then sent for all the native officers, and, frankly telling them the reason of his action, added that they had suffered acts of mutiny to take place without opposing them, and had forfeited their character; that there was yet one method open to them of regaining it, and that was to have the leading mutineers seized and delivered up to justice.

The 3rd Irregulars and the 42nd Native Infantry break out into mutiny: the 31st Native Infantry remains staunch.

The native officers of the three regiments, apparently very much affected, promised everything. The next morning, however, the 3rd Irregulars and the 42nd Native Infantry broke into open mutiny and plundered the bazaars and the bungalows of the officers. The 31st held aloof, professing loyalty; and on the 7th of July, one of their men having killed a trooper who had fired at him, a desperate fight ensued between the two native infantry regiments. The 31st, being unable to make much impression on the 42nd, who had two guns, sent into the fort to implore assistance. Sage despatched to their aid the sixty loyal troopers. A good deal of fighting then ensued, but, in the midst of it, forty of the 31st deserted to the 42nd. Still the bulk of the loyal regiment persevered, and, when evening fell, they sent again to the fort to implore assistance in guns. Sage replied that it was too late to send them that night, but in the morning he would bring them victory. The disclosure of this message to the two belligerent parties fixed the 31st in their loyal resolves, whilst it so dispirited their opponents that during the night they fled, pursued for some miles by the loyal Sipáhis and troopers, who captured one of the guns. When the victors returned, it was ascertained that

Battle between the loyal and disloyal Sipáhis.

Final victory of the loyal natives.

whilst the entire 31st, the forty above alluded to excepted, had remained loyal, fifty of the 42nd had followed their example, and the sixty loyal troopers had been joined by at least an equal number of the same temper from out-stations.

The brigadier now devoted himself to strengthening the mud fort. He had supplies and medical stores for six months, and a sufficiency of guns and ammunition. The able-bodied men of the Christian community were gradually drilled, and, as they numbered nearly sixty, Sage soon had at his disposal a force of a hundred and twenty-three fighting men. The number was not at all too large, for the duties were heavy; there were a hundred and ninety women and children to be guarded, and occasionally parties of Bundélá rebels, into whose hands the surrounding country had fallen, made known their presence by a sudden volley. They invariably, however, disappeared in the jungles on the first appearance of pursuit.

Life in the Ságar fort.

The districts—in close vicinity to each other—of Jabalpúr, of Ságar, of Chandérí, of Jhánsí, and of Jaláun, continued, from this time until the arrival of the relieving force under Sir Hugh Rose, to be over-run by rebels, Sipáhi and other. These harried the country, captured forts, plundered villages, for a long time with impunity. Before I narrate the manner in which they were ultimately dealt with, it will, I think, be advisable to clear the ground by recording the events passing at the other stations in this part of India.

The districts held by the natives.

Of Lálitpúr I have spoken. Jabalpúr, a hundred and eleven miles south-east from Ságar, has next to be noticed. This station was, in 1857, garrisoned by the 52nd Native Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Jamieson. It was the head-quarters likewise of Major Erskine, the chief political officer in the Ságar and Narbadá territories. For a few weeks after the news of the mutiny at Mírath had reached Jabalpúr the men of the 52nd showed no sign of disaffection, but it soon became clear that they, too, were only watching their opportunity. On the 16th of June one of the men attempted to murder the adjutant; and, though the man in question was subsequently released on the ground of insanity, the conduct of his comrades a little later proved that there had been method in his madness. They assumed the usual airs of authority, treated

Jabalpúr.

Dubious conduct of the 52nd Native Infantry.

their officers with patronising familiarity, and declared that they would only mutiny if a European regiment were sent to disarm them. The folly of retaining the ladies and children at the station—a folly which had been pointed out to Major Erskine, but upon which he had insisted—became then apparent.

For a time they do good work in the district.

The news that a native brigade was advancing on Jabalpúr from Kámthí would appear to have produced a good effect on the men of the 52nd, for in the interval between the period I have referred to and the arrival of the brigade, 2nd of August, they were usefully employed by Major Erskine in repressing disturbances in the district. The Kámthí movable column—for it was no more—consisted of the 4th Madras Light Cavalry under Captain Tottenham, the 33rd Madras Native Infantry under Colonel Millar commanding the column, a battery of Field Artillery under Captain Jones, and one company Rifles of the Nágpúr Irregular Force, under Lieutenant Pereira. This column marched into Jabalpúr on the 2nd of August. After a halt there of a few days, the larger portion of it was sent into the neighbouring districts to restore order. During its absence an old Rájah of the Gónd dynasty, Shankar Sháh, his son, and some adherents of his house were convicted, on the clearest evidence, of plotting the destruction of the English at Jabalpúr, and the plunder of the station. On the 18th of September the father and son were blown away from guns, the adherents being reserved for the following day. But little doubt was entertained that the incriminated Rájah and the incriminated son had made many efforts to seduce the men of the 52nd from their allegiance. To allay, then, the excitement which, it was apprehended, their execution might create in the minds of the rank and file, Colonel Jamieson and other officers of the regiment proceeded almost immediately to the lines, and explained to the men that the Rájah and his son had merely paid the penalty for proved misconduct. They judged, from the manner of the men, that they had removed all apprehensions from their minds. At 9 o'clock that night, however, the entire 52nd regiment marched quietly out of the station, without noise or alarm, and proceeded some twenty miles without a halt to the Tahsildárí of Patan. At that place

The Kámthí column arrives.

Rájah Shankar Shah and his son mutiny and are punished.

The 52nd Native Infantry mutiny,

was stationed a company of their own regiment commanded by Lieutenant MacGregor. MacGregor, who naturally had no intimation of the proceedings of the regiment, was surprised, and at once placed in confinement under sentries. The Sipáhis then sent in to their colonel a letter, most respectfully worded, in which they announced their intention of marching to Dehlí, and offered to release MacGregor in exchange for ten Sipáhis left behind in Jabalpúr. This offer not having been complied with, the rebels kept their prisoner till they were attacked, and then shot him.*

and kill one of their officers.

But, long before the commission of this atrocity, information of the high-handed action of the 52nd Native Infantry, and orders to return to Jabalpúr, had been conveyed to the Madras column in the district. That column, consisting of four hundred men of the 33rd Madras Native Infantry, the rifle company of the 1st Madras Native Infantry, one troop of the 4th Madras Light Cavalry, and four guns, manned by European gunners, happened to be at Damoh, sixty-five miles to the north-west of Jabalpúr. It started at once, on the 21st of September. On the night of the 25th it encamped at Sangrámpúr, about twenty-five miles from its destination. Between this place and Jabalpúr, close to a village called Katangi, flows a navigable river, the Hiran, the passage across which, it was thought possible, might be disputed by the 52nd. To secure the means of crossing it, a party, consisting of the grenadier company 33rd Madras Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Watson, and a few troopers of the 4th, under Major Jenkins, left the camp at 2 o'clock in the morning of the 26th. At daybreak, as they were nearing Katanji, Jenkins and Watson, who were riding in front of their column, were suddenly fired at, and almost immediately surrounded. How they escaped it is difficult to imagine. It is, however, a fact, that notwithstanding all the efforts made by the Sipáhis, they fought their way through them and reached their men. These were

A Madras column marches against the 52nd Native Infantry.

An advanced party meets them,

fights its way through them,

* MacGregor's body was found by the officers of the Madras column with one ball through the neck, both arms broken, and his body perforated with thirty or forty bayonet wounds. Major Erskine had previously offered eight thousand rupees for his release.

not numerous enough to take the aggressive. Jenkins, therefore, drew them up on a hill difficult to escalade, and there awaited the arrival of the main column.

and waits for the main body,

To this column, on the point of starting about 6 o'clock in the morning, information arrived, in an exaggerated form, of the events at Katangí. The two European officers were reported killed, and the rebels were said to be pressing on in force. Eager to avenge their officers and relieve their comrades, the gallant native soldiers of the coast army hurried forward. On reaching the mouth of the gorge leading to Katangí, they found the 52nd had taken up a very strong position, both flanks covered by thick jungle. Without hesitating, they opened fire from the guns, and then attacked the rebels with the bayonet and drove them before them. On reaching Katangí, they were joined by Jenkins and Watson. The pursuit was continued beyond that place. In Katangí the body of MacGregor, murdered that morning, was found. The rebels suffered severely. A hundred and twenty-five dead were actually counted on the field, and it is certain that many more were wounded. On the side of the victors one man was killed and fifty were wounded. The column then returned to Jabalpúr.

which totally defeats the rebels.

This was not by any means the only skirmish which took place in the Ságar and Narbadá territories during the autumn of 1857. In my story of the transactions at Ságar, I have alluded to the conduct of the Bánpúr Rájah. This rebel chief, still hoping to gain greatly by the downfall of the British, had, after a great deal of promiscuous plundering, taken up a position at Niráulí, about nine miles from Ságar, and had strongly intrenched it. Against this position a force was sent from the Ságar fort on the 15th of September, under the command of Lieutentant-Colonel Dalyell, 42nd Native Infantry. The expedition was not successful; for, though the rebels suffered severely from the fire of the British guns, Colonel Dalyell was killed and the loss of the attacking party in killed and wounded was very severe. The intrenchment was not stormed.

A force is sent from Ságar against the Bánpúr Rájah.

It is repulsed with the loss of its leader, Colonel Dalyell.

This affair did not increase the chances of the restoration of order. The remnant of the 52nd Native Infantry, numbering

some five hundred and thirty men, continued, after its defeat at Katangí, to ravage the country. Joining the adherents of rebel Rájahs, these men took advantage of the withdrawal of the Madras column from Damoh to plunder that place and to release the prisoners left there. They then took possession of a strong fort, about thirty miles from Ságar, called Garhákótá, situated on a tongue of land in an angle formed by the rivers Sonár and Gadhairí, and from this they constantly sallied forth to plunder and destroy. In fact, as the year drew to a close, in spite of the fall of Dehlí, the daring of the rebels increased, whilst the handful of British, shut up in the stations at long distances from each other, and powerless to interfere effectually, could do little more than hold their own. Several skirmishes, indeed, occurred, but with no decisive result. In one of those, early in November, near Jabalpúr, the Madras troops defeated the enemy, but their commander, Captain Tottenham, was killed. In others, the defeat of the rebels merely signified a disappearance from one jungle to appear immediately in another.

The country is still ravaged by the rebels.

In preceding pages of this chapter I have alluded to the conduct of Captain Ternan in the Narsinhpúr district. I must devote a few lines to the military operations in that quarter. The garrison of Narsinhpúr consisted of four companies of the 28th Madras Native Infantry under Captain Woolley. These Sipáhis, unlike the bulk of their brethren in Bengal, continued throughout the period of 1857–58 loyal and true. In November 1857, led by Woolley and accompanied by Ternan, they restored order in the disturbed parts of the district, co-operating for that purpose with a detachment sent from Ságar under Captain Roberts of the 31st Bengal N.I. and Captain Mayne of the 3rd irregular cavalry. Its action was most successful. The districts north of the Narbadá were cleared of rebels; and, in a hand-to-hand encounter with the largest body of them, the rebel leader, Ganjan Singh, a landowner of considerable consequence, was slain, and nearly all his followers were destroyed. Ternan, who had his horse shot under him in this encounter, then urged a rapid march upon Singhpúr, a place held by a noted rebel called Dalganjan.*

Military operations in the Narsinhpúr district.

Woolley.

Ternan.

Roberts.

Mayne.

* The following is the official report of this gallant operation: "On this occasion Captain Ternan took a party of the Irregular Cavalry (some of the

His advice was followed, and Dalganjan was taken and hanged. The following month another fatal blow was dealt to the insurgents near Chirápúr. When Woolley reached this place it was found evacuated. Ternan, however, pushing on a small party in search of the rebels, succeeded in surprising them, and capturing their tents, a 4-pounder gun, and many native weapons. This enterprising officer followed up the blow in January 1858 by completely defeating the invading rebels from Rátgarh and Bhopál at Madanpúr. By this vigorous stroke Ternan finally cleared Narsinhpúr district of all rebels of consequence.

Energy displayed by Ternan at Chirápúr,

and at Madanpúr.

Before describing the measures ultimately taken to reassert British authority throughout this part of India, it is necessary that I should take the reader for a moment to Nagód.

Nagód is a military station, in the Uchahárá district, distant forty-eight miles from Réwah, a hundred and eighty from Allahábád, and forty-three miles from Ságar. The garrison in 1857 consisted of the 50th Bengal N.I., commanded by Major Hampton. Up to the 27th of August this regiment had displayed no mutinous symptoms, and the men were regarded by their officers as staunch and loyal. It happened, however, that at the time that the 52nd Native Infantry decamped from Jabalpúr in the manner already described, a rumour reached Nagód that Kúnwar Singh was marching on that place. The men of the 50th were accordingly ordered to prepare to march against that warrior. They appeared delighted at the order, made all the necessary preparations with alacrity, and on the date above mentioned marched. They had not, however, reached the second milestone from Nagód when a voice from the ranks gave the order to halt. The regiment halted. Some of the men then told the officers that their services were no longer

Nagód.

The 50th Native Infantry

appear staunch and loyal,

3rd Irregular Cavalry, known as Taits' Horse, who had remained loyal) in advance of the rest of the troops, and, coming on Ganjan Singh "—of Singhpúr, also called Dalganjan Singh—"surrounded by about two hundred armed followers, charged him at once under a sharp fire. The success of the troops was most complete. Captain Ternan behaved with much distinction, and his horse was shot under him." Not a few days afterwards, as Erskine says, but then and there, being completely surrounded, Ganjan Singh and his chief followers were taken prisoners, and the chief himself and several others hanged the next day. Most of the rebels were killed during the action, however.

required, and that they had better go. Opposition was useless A few faithful men escorted the officers and their families to Mírzápúr, whilst the remainder, returning to Nagód, plundered and burned the place, and then inaugurated in the district a career similar to that of their brethren of the 52nd.

but they mutiny, and ravage the district.

Réwah, I have already stated, is a small native state, ruled by a quasi-independent Rájah, recognising the suzerainty of the British, bound to them by treaties, and having a British Resident at his court. In 1857 the resident political agent was Lieutenant Willoughby Osborne, an officer of the Madras army, possessing great strength of will, a courage that never faltered, and resolute to do his duty to the utmost. Left unfettered, Willoughby Osborne almost always did the right thing; but, like many other men conscious of their powers, he writhed under the sway of self-appreciative mediocrity. Happily, at Réwah, he was unfettered.

Réwah.

Willoughby Osborne.

The town of Réwah lies little more than midway between Allahábád and Ságar, being a hundred and thirty-one miles south-west of the former, and one hundred and eighty-two miles north-east of the latter. It is built on the banks of a small river, the Beher, a tributary of the Tons.* Around it runs a high and thick rampart, still nearly entire, flanked by towers, many of which have fallen into decay. Within this outer defence a similar rampart immediately environs the town; and still further inward a third surrounds the residence of the Rájah. It is a decaying place, and the population in 1857 scarcely exceeded six thousand.

Description of the town of Réwah.

The residence of a Rájah whose ancestors had been proud of their independence, surrounded by districts in which mutiny was rampant, lying many miles from the route of the British armies between Calcutta and the North-West, Réwah, in June and July of 1857, seemed utterly lost. Not, however, to Willoughby Osborne. The first point to which that able officer directed his efforts was to win the Rájah. His character had, indeed,

Glance at the political situation of Réwah.

* *Vide* list of places at the commencement of this volume. Of the three rivers known as the "Tons," that here mentioned is the South-Western Tons, which rises in the state of Maihar.

already gained the respect and admiration of the prince, but in such times as were then upon them it became necessary that the princes of India, especially the small Rájahs, should feel that they had everything to lose, nothing to gain, by the success of the mutineers. Osborne succeeded in instilling that feeling into the mind of the Rájah. On the 8th of June he was able to announce that the Rájah of Réwah had placed his troops at the disposal of the Government of India; that the offer had been accepted; and that eight hundred of those troops, with two guns, had been sent to Amarpatan—a place commanding the roads to Jabalpúr, Nagód, and Ságar—ready to oppose insurgents from any of those stations, and to intercept communications with the rebellious villages on the Jamnah. He despatched, about the same time, eleven hundred of the Rájah's troops and five guns to the Katrá pass, about midway to Mírzápúr, and whence a rapid advance could be made on that important commercial city, on Banáras, or on Chunár, as might be deemed advisable. A week later he obtained the Rájah's sanction to send seven hundred troops to Bandah, and he induced him to issue a proclamation promising rewards to any of his soldiers who should distinguish themselves by their gallantry and loyalty.

Tact and judgment displayed by Willoughby Osborne.

He gains the Rájah,

and sends his troops to guard the districts

The measures taken by Willoughby Osborne had a very marked influence on affairs in Bundelkhand. There, as in the adjacent territories, the smaller chieftains, mostly men of impoverished fortunes, thought the opportunity too favourable to be lost. They, too, rose in revolt. But Osborne was incessantly on the watch. By the skilful disposition of the Rájah's troops, and by the display of an energy which never tired, he baffled all the earlier efforts of the rebels. By the exercise of similar qualities he kept open the important line of road between Mírzápúr and Jabalpúr, a necessary part of the available postal route between Calcutta and Bombay. In a few weeks he was able to take an active offensive against the insurgents. He defeated them at Kanchanpúr and Zorah, then advancing on their stronghold—Maihar—he stormed that city on the 29th of December, pushed on to Jakháni, captured that place, thus opening thirty-six miles of road in the direction of Jabalpúr.

Excellent effect of these measures on Bundelkhand.

He takes the field against the insurgents,

At a date considerably later he, in the most gallant manner, captured the important fort of Bijérághúgarh. Owing solely to the indefatigable exertions of this gallant Englishman, the rebel cause not only found no footing in Bundelkhand, but it lost way in the adjacent territories. and performs wonders.

Nágpúr, till 1853 the capital of the Bhonslá dynasty, and since that period the chief town in the Central Provinces and the head-quarters of the Chief Commissioner, is a large straggling city, about seven miles in circumference, having in 1857 a population somewhat exceeding a hundred thousand. Close to the city, on its western side, is a hilly ridge running north and south, known as the Sítábaldí, possessing two summits, one at each extremity, the northern being the higher, the southern the larger, but both commanding the city. Outside of but near the city were the arsenal—containing guns, arms, ammunition, and military stores of every description—and the treasury of the province, containing a large amount of cash. To protect these and the city, the Commissioner, Mr. George Plowden, had, of European troops, one company of Madras artillery, whose head-quarters were at Kámthí, eleven miles distant. The local native troops at his disposal were thus stationed: at Kámthí or in Nágpúr itself, the head-quarters of the 1st infantry, the 1st Cavalry, and the artillery of the Nágpúr irregular force; at Chándá, eighty-five miles south of Nágpúr, were the 2nd Infantry, and a detachment of the 1st, of the same force; at Bhandárá, forty miles to the east of Nágpúr, was another detachment of the 1st Regiment; the head-quarters and greater part of the 3rd Regiment were at Ellichpur, a hundred and thirty-seven miles still further in the same direction; the remainder of that regiment was at Biláspúr on the Arpá, a town in the same division. These, I have said, were local troops. Kámthí was likewise the head-quarters of a brigade of the Madras army. The troops stationed there in 1857 were the 4th Madras Light Cavalry, the 17th, 26th, 32nd, and 33rd Native Infantry, and the European artillery already alluded to. Brigadier H. Prior commanded the Nágpúr subsidiary force.

Nágpúr. Description of its position. Mr. George Plowden. The local troops, and those of the regular army at Kámthí.

Very soon after the events of May 1857 at Mírath became known to the native population of the Central Provinces, symptoms of disloyalty began to be manifested by the troops,

especially by the cavalry portion, of the local force. In the position he occupied, ruling a large city, dependent for physical aid upon a few European gunners and five native regiments, Mr. Plowden could not afford to pass unnoticed even the symptoms of mutiny. Still less could he afford it when all the circumstances of the intended rising, to the extent even of the signal which was to set it in action,* were, on the 13th of June, revealed to him. Mr. Plowden then resolved to act, and to act promptly. He arranged with Colonel Cumberlege, who entirely trusted the men of his own regiment—the 4th Light Cavalry—that the troopers of the local regiment should be disarmed on the 17th of June. Colonel Cumberlege performed the task with skill and tact, and without bloodshed. Mr. Plowden followed up this blow by so strengthening the two peaks on the Sítábaldí hill, that they might serve as a refuge for the residents of Nágpúr in the event of an outbreak in or about the city. He at the same time converted the Residency into a barrack, in which the civil and military officers should congregate during the night.

Ill-feeling amongst the local troops.

Mr. Plowden and Colonel Cumberlege disarm the local troops.

Mr. Plowden prepares for eventualities.

These precautions were effective. Notwithstanding serious alarms, no outbreak actually occurred. The Madras soldiers remained faithful, and, when a column comprising many of them was despatched to Jabalpúr,† the departing men were replaced by others of the same army not less loyal and true. The position at Nágpúr was the more difficult in that the province of which it was the capital was isolated. No part of it was used as a high road for troops. No Europeans could be spared for it from their more pressing duties of crushing the revolt in Oudh and in the North-West Provinces. Its safety was in the hands of the Commissioner. For it he was responsible. It was his duty, with most inadequate means, to assure it. Fortunately, Mr. George Plowden, who represented the Government at Nágpúr, was a gentleman of lofty courage and imperturbable nerve. Without

Loyalty of the soldiers of the Madras army.

Isolated position of Nágpúr.

* The mutiny was to have broken out on the 13th of June; the signal to have been the ascent of three fire-balloons from the city. The confession of one of the ringleaders, caught in the act of seducing the men of the 1st local infantry, gave the first intimation of the plot.

† *Vide* page 70.

appliances, he acted as though he possessed them. Left without external resources, he regulated his conduct as though they were abundantly at his command. And he succeeded. Eventually, when the first fever-heat of mutiny had subsided, he restored their arms to the local troops. There is no truer test of a man than this capacity to meet dangers and difficulties when he is unarmed, to look them calmly in the face, to remain cool and imperturbable in their presence. If to do this thoroughly, to face disaffection boldly, and by daring self-assertion to force it to inaction, finally to submission—if this be a proof of greatness, then most assuredly Mr. George Plowden deserves to be classed amongst the great men brought to the front by the Mutiny of 1857.

Great credit due to Mr. George Plowden.

CHAPTER IV.

THE DOMINIONS OF THE NIZÁM.

It will clear the ground if, before I record the action of the British generals which restored order throughout central India, I deal with the events in a part of the country already slightly touched upon in the first chapter of this book, and upon the issue of which depended, to a very considerable extent, whether the rebellion would or would not extend throughout the length and breadth of southern and western India. I refer to the dominions of the Nizám.

Haidarábád.

Those dominions—called after the capital, Haidarábad, the abode of Haidar—occupy a portion of India south of the Vindhya range, and enclose about ninety-five thousand three hundred and thirty-seven square miles. Measuring from their extreme point in the north-east, they extend four hundred and seventy-five miles to the south-west, and in their widest part they give almost a similar measurement. On the north-east they are bounded by the central provinces, of which Nágpúr is the capital; on the south-west by portions of the Madras Presidency; on the west by the Bombay Presidency; and on the north-west by a portion of the same presidency, by the dominions of Sindhiá, and by the Ságar and Narbadá territories. A consideration of this proximity to so many inflammable points will convince the reader how dangerous would have proved a Haidarábád in arms; how essential it was that tranquillity should be maintained within her borders.

Extent and boundaries of the Nizám's dominions.

The Nizám.

When the year 1857 dawned, the Nizám was Nasir-úd-dáulah. This prince died, however, on the 18th of May, and was succeeded by his son Afzúl-úd-dáulah. The minister, Sálar Jang, nephew of his predecessor,

Súraj-úl-Mulk, had held the highest office in the state since the year 1853. He was a man of great ability, great intelligence, devoted to the interests of his country and his master. It was his pride to prove that the natives of India can be governed by natives, not only with justice, but with a regard to their habits and modes of thought, such as, he considered was impossible under alien rule. But, holding these opinions, he was, nevertheless, a sincere admirer of the British character; sensible of the absolute necessity of an overlordship, which, while interfering as little as possible with the internal affairs of a native state, should take from each the power to draw the sword against a neighbour. The British Resident at the Court of the Nizám in the early part of 1857 was Mr. Bushby. This able officer, however, died in February of that year. He was succeeded by Major Cuthbert Davidson, an officer of the Bengal army, who had at a previous period held the office temporarily, and who had then shown that he possessed all the qualifications necessary for discharging its duties in quiet times.

Sálar Jang.

Major Cuthbert Davidson.

Major Davidson took charge of the office of Resident on the 16th of April. In a very short time an opportunity offered for him to show the stuff he was made of. I have already stated that on the 18th of May the Nizám, Nasir-úd-dáulah, died. His son, Afzúl-úd-dáulah, was installed after the necessary ceremonies. But to the disaffected in Haidarábád the death of one ruler and the succession of another seemed to offer a mine of promise. The late Nizám had trusted Sálar Jang. It was quite possible that his successor might refuse his confidence to that powerful minister. At all events an attempt might be made to discover the actual lay of the situation. Accordingly, when the men of the city of Haidarábád rose on the morning of the 12th of June, they found the walls of the city covered with placards, signed or purporting to be signed by orthodox Maulavís, calling upon the faithful to enrol themselves and murder the Europeans. Major Davidson was not the last to receive the intelligence. Acting promptly and with vigour, he at once requested the general to parade his entire force in full marching order, with forty rounds of ammunition per man. This parade impressed the disaffected immensely. On the morning of the 15th a second parade, not less imposing, was ordered. At this the Resident was present, and addressed

Tumult on the accession of the new Nizám

is suppressed by Major Davidson,

the troops.* By that time it had become known that the influence of Sálar Jang was not less weighty with the new ruler than it had been with his predecessor. That loyal minister, on learning that a large mob had assembled near the mosque known as the Mekka mosque, and had hoisted there a green flag, sent down a corps of Arab mercenaries upon whom he could rely to disperse them. Subsequently he arrested the principal leaders of the movement, and for the moment the plague was stayed.

and by Sálar Jang.

Only, however, for the moment. The information which poured daily from the outer world into the city, often in an exaggerated form, made every day a deeper impression upon the minds of the more bigoted of the population. They argued that, whilst their co-religionists had risen for the faith in the north-west, it was not becoming in them to sit idle in the south. They recalled to the minds of listeners, likewise impressionable and fanatically disposed, that little more than half a century had elapsed since Dehlí, the capital of the Muhammadan world of India, had fallen into the hands of the infidel; that a supreme effort had now recovered it, and that, if that effort were supported by the entire Muhammadan community of the Dakhan, the recovery would be made complete, the gain would become permanent. These were no idle words. They sank deep into the minds of the people of Haidarábád—a people that had never known European rule, and that had never welcomed its approach to their borders. In a few weeks they produced corresponding acts.

Bad feeling produced on the population by the news from the north-west.

A little before 5 o'clock on the evening of the 17th of July, five hundred of the Rohílah troops in the service of the Nizám, supported by some four thousand of the mob of Haidarábád, rose in insurrection and marched on the Residency, demanding the release of thirteen mutineers and deserters, who, caught red-handed in revolt, had been made over by Major Davidson to Sálar Jang. That minister, who was not very well served by his agents, only heard of the outbreak just

Mutiny at Haidarábád.

Sálar Jang warns the Resident.

* The garrison at or near Haidarábád consisted of a battalion of artillery, the 7th Madras Light Cavalry; the 3rd Madras Europeans; the 1st, 22nd, 24th, 34th, 41st, 42nd, and 49th Native Infantry. The force, known as "The Haidarábád Subsidiary Force," was commanded by Brigadier, afterwards Sir Isaac Coffin.

on the eve of its occurrence. He at once sent a special messenger to warn the Resident. Major Davidson, however, in anticipation of some such movement, had improvised defences all round the Residency, had mounted guns on the newly-erected bastions, and had warned his military secretary, Major Briggs, to arrange the troops at his disposal in the manner best calculated to meet a sudden attack. Seven minutes then sufficed to send every man in the Residency to his post. The insurgents came on, in the manner of undisciplined fanatics, drunk with excitement, without order, and without leading, properly so called. A fire of grape from the ramparts sent them reeling back. They came on again, only similarly to be received, and similarly to retire. Staggered by this reception, they were beginning to recover from their mental intoxication, when a charge of the Nizám's troops decided them to flee in confusion. Many of them then took refuge in a two-storied house, at the end of a narrow street. In this place it was resolved to allow them to stay till the morning. They did not, however, avail themselves of the permission. Mining under the floor, they escaped during the night. In this attack on the Residency, several of the rebels were killed; in their flight from the Nizám's troops more were taken prisoners. Amongst the latter were the two ring-leaders, Torábáz Khán and Maulaví Alla-úd-din. The former, attempting to escape, was shot dead; the latter was tried, convicted, and transported to the Andaman Islands.

Major Davidson's previous preparations.

Repulse and defeat of the rebels.

and capture of their leaders.

The manner in which this wanton attack terminated produced a very salutary effect on the minds of the Haidarábád population. It showed them very clearly that their own rulers, men of their own faith, sided with the British. It needed but one word from Sálar Jang to rouse the entire country. Not only was that word not spoken, but the fanatical Muhammadans were made clearly to understand that, in the event of their rising, they would have to deal, not with the British only, but with their own Government as well.

Good effect produced at Haidarábád.

Still the situation grew daily more critical. The city of Haidarábád had ever been filled with military adventurers. The custom of importing Arabs from beyond the sea, and of forming of them regiments

The situation still critical

of peculiar trust, had long prevailed. But, in addition to the Arabs, there used to come from every part of India those adventurous spirits to whom the sober administration of the British gave no avocation. From Rohilkhand, from the Panjáb, from Sindh, from Dehlí, and from the border-land beyond the Indus, men of this stamp had never been wanting. To them were added, in the autumn of 1857, adventurers more dangerous still. The mutinied and disbanded Sipáhis who had been unable to reach Dehlí, or whose offers had been rejected by Sindhiá, poured in shoals into Haidarábád. Combining with the other classes I have mentioned, and who gave them a cordial welcome, they helped to swell the ranks of the disaffected and to impart to them a discipline in which the others were lacking.

by reason of the numerous adventurers

crowding into the city.

The presence of these men added not a little to the difficulties of Sálar Jang and the Nizám. Every rumour of misfortunes befalling the British arms, which reached the city, roused feelings which might at any moment prelude an outbreak. If we think of all that was happening in the North-Western provinces—of the massacre of Kánhpúr, of the long siege of Dehlí, of the leaguer of Lakhnáo, of Havelock's three retirements, of the events at Ágra, at Indúr, at Jhánsí, at Bandah—we shall understand very easily why this was so. It must be remembered, too, that rumour magnified every skirmish into a battle, every repulse of the British into a catastrophe, whilst it but faintly whispered, or whispered only to discredit, the victories gained by the foreigners. When we think of the news of these disasters coming upon an inflammable people, hating, with the intolerant hate of religion, the dominant infidel, armed to the teeth, and chafing under their forced inaction, we may well wonder how peace was, by any means, preserved.

The effect of rumours

upon an inflammable people.

But peace was preserved—mainly owing to the excellent understanding between the Government of the Nizám and the British Resident. Whilst the former used all those arts which a powerful native government has so well at command, to check the fanatical ardour of the disaffected, the Resident, acting in concert with the Nizám, applied for a larger force of European troops to overawe the same class. In

Loyalty of the Nizám.

Reinforcements arrive.

consequence of these representations Davidson received later in the year a reinforcement of a regiment of cavalry, a regiment of infantry, and some artillery.

Whilst thus securing his base, Major Davidson was not unmindful of another means for employing the trained soldiers of the Nizám—the soldiers of the Haidarábád contingent, led by English officers—in a manner which might transfer the sympathies of the great bulk of the people, from whose ranks those soldiers were drawn, to the British cause. Acting in concurrence, then, with the Nizám and Sálar Jang, and with the full approval of the Government of India, he formed towards the beginning of 1858 a brigade from the regiments of the contingent, and sent it to act in central India. This brigade was composed of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th regiments of cavalry, of the 3rd and 5th regiments of infantry, and of three field-batteries of artillery. The splendid deeds of these troops will be narrated in their proper place. But I will not wait to record that the other purpose which had suggested this action to Major Davidson was entirely accomplished. The successes obtained by these soldiers elated the relations they had left behind them, and these came, in a very brief period, to regard as their own the cause for which their kinsmen were fighting. From that time forward all anxiety ceased in Haidarábád itself. In some parts of the districts the disturbances which arose were eagerly quelled, and, with one exception, no chieftain of rank showed the smallest inclination to question the wisdom of the policy adopted by the Nizám and his minister.

Davidson suggests the employment of the troops of the Haidarábád contingent in central India.

Successful result of Davidson's policy.

That exception was the Rájah of Shorápúr.* Shorápúr is a small territory situated in the south-west angle of the Nizám's dominions. The Hindu chief who had ruled it had, fifteen years prior to 1857, fallen into pecuniary difficulties so great that he found himself unable to fulfil his obligations to his suzerain, the Nizám. Certain arrangements, unnecessary here to detail, followed, which ended, after the death of the Rájah, in the administration of the country falling for a time into the hands of the British. This arrangement lasted

Shorápúr.

Its condition antecedent to the mutiny.

* For a most interesting account of the Rájah of Shorápúr and the causes which led him to revolt, I refer the reader to the *Story of My Life*, by the late Colonel Meadows Taylor, one of the most charming of autobiographies.

till 1853, when the country was handed over to the native ruler in a very flourishing condition. The young Rájah, however, soon dissipated his resources; and, finally, became so embarrassed as to be utterly reckless. He was in this state of mind when the events of 1857 occurred. With the record of the disasters attending the British came whispers of the advantages which must accrue to him from a successful rebellion. The Rájah had not the strength of mind to resist the temptation. Intoxicated by the promises made him, he called together the men of his own clan, and began to levy Rohílah and Arab mercenaries.

Character and conduct of the Rájah of Shorápúr;

he levies troops.

Full intelligence of the doings of the Rájah was quickly conveyed to Major Davidson. Well aware that to prevent an outbreak even by an extravagant display of force was far wiser and far cheaper than to allow it to come to a head, Davidson at once took decisive measures. Acting in concert with Lord Elphinstone, who displayed on this occasion, as on every other, a far-sighted policy and a rare unselfishness, he called up, with the sanction of that nobleman, from the Bombay Presidency a force under Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm, consisting of a detachment of European troops, the Maráthá Horse, the 15th Bombay Native Infantry, and a battery of artillery. This force he located at a point equi-distant between the Shorápúr and the southern Maráthá country. At the same time he arranged that a force from the Madras Presidency, under Major Hughes, should watch the eastern frontier of Shorápúr, whilst he detached four hundred men and two guns of the Haidarábád contingent, commanded by Captain Wyndham, to occupy Linsúgúr, ready to act in concert with either of the other forces, as necessity might require.

Davidson takes decisive measures,

and surrounds the Rájah's country.

Before these preparations had been completed Cuthbert Davidson, hoping to save the Rájah from his own folly, despatched to his court, early in January 1858, one of his own most trusted assistants, Captain Rose Campbell. Campbell, however, only wasted his efforts. The Rájah had given himself to the fanatical party. Not only did he continue deaf to all entreaties, but he was, it is believed, prepared to connive at the murder of his guest. This, at least, is certain, that Captain Campbell received an intimation from the Rájah's

Despatches Rose Campbell to save him,

but fruitlessly.

own relatives and servants that his life was in imminent danger.

It would have been fruitless to temporise further. Captain Campbell proceeded to Linsúgúr and ordered Wyndham to march on Shorápúr. Wyndham started at once and reached Shorápúr on the 7th of February. As he approached, the Rájah, as is customary in such cases, sent his own servants to indicate a proper encamping-ground. The servants led Wyndham to the place selected—a narrow valley, surrounded by lofty hills and rocks. But Wyndham, though but a captain, was too old a soldier to fall into the trap. He moved on to an open plain, where he was comparatively safe from danger of surprise.

Wyndham moves on Shorápúr;

sees through and avoids a snare laid for him by the Rájah.

That night Wyndham was attacked by a force composed of the clansmen of the Rájah, of Arabs and Rohílahs, estimated at from five thousand to seven thousand strong. The attack continued all night, but its result was never doubtful. Wyndham, aided by Rose Campbell and the medical officer, Dr. Williamson, barricaded the position, and with the guns kept up a continuous fire. At 1 o'clock in the morning he was reinforced by a hundred cavalry of the Haidarábád contingent. The rebels then ceased their attack, and occupied the heights near the town.

The Rájah's troops attack Wyndham,

who repulses them.

Meanwhile, expresses had been sent to Major Hughes and Colonel Malcolm. Major Hughes, with two companies 74th Highlanders and some Madras cavalry, arrived first, early on the morning of the 8th. Joining his troops to those of Wyndham, Hughes at once attacked the rebels. A squadron of the 8th Madras cavalry, commanded by Captain Newberry, led the attack, and charged a body of Rohílahs. Unfortunately, Newberry and his subaltern, Lieutenant Stewart, better mounted than their men, dashed into the middle of the rebels before their men could follow them. Newberry was killed and Stewart was severely wounded. The enemy, however, were driven from the heights above the town. The city being very strong, the approaches to it difficult of access, and the walls and bastions crowded with defenders, Hughes thought it advisable to wait for

Hughes arrives to the rescue,

and defeats the rebels,

who retire into the city.

Colonel Malcolm's force, which was expected that night, before attempting anything further.

The Rájah flees in the night to Haidarábád, where he is taken prisoner.

But the Rájah did not wait for Malcolm. Dispirited by the failure of his attack on Wyndham, and aware that reinforcements were approaching, he gave up the game as precipitately as he had entered upon it, and, accompanied by a few horsemen, fled that night towards Haidarábád. Arriving there, with but two followers in his train, he made a fruitless attempt to gain the protection of the Arabs. Despairing of a refuge, he was found wandering in the bazaar, was apprehended, and taken to Sálar Jang, who made him over to the Resident.

Malcolm enters the town.

The departure of the Rájah led to the immediate evacuation of Shorápúr by the hostile bands. Colonel Malcolm, who arrived on the evening of the 8th, entered the town the following morning and found it almost deserted. Captain Rose Campbell assumed charge of the administration of the country.*

The tranquillity of the Dakhan assured in a great measure by

So ended the only serious attempt made to disturb the tranquillity of the Dakhan.† The preservation of that tranquillity was essential to the maintenance of the British power in India. There can be no question but that the rising of Haidarábád, headed by the Nizám, would have been a blow struck at the heart. The whole of western and southern India would have followed. Central India, the dominions of Holkar, and Rajpútáná could not have escaped; and it is more than probable that the communications between Calcutta and the North-West would have been severed. That this calamity did not occur is due to many causes. The far-sighted and generous policy of Lord Elphinstone did much; the Governor of Madras, Lord Harris, contributed all that was possible for a man in his high position to contribute. Major

Lord Elphinstone, Lord Harris, Major Davidson and the officers acting under his orders,

* The story of the Rájah's end is tragical. He was sentenced to death, but the Governor-General commuted the punishment to four years' imprisonment, after which he might be restored to his territory. The very day the Rájáh received this news he shot himself, Colonel Meadows Taylor thinks accidentally.—Vide *Story of My Life*, Vol. II.

† The literal meaning of the term "Dakhan" is "south." Hence the south of India is called "The Dakhan," *i.e.* "the south." It is often incorrectly spelt "Deccan," "Dekhan," "Dekkan."

Cuthbert Davidson displayed a skill, a tact, and an energy far above the average; he was well served by his subordinates: Colonel Malcolm, Major Hughes, Captain Wyndham, and their comrades executed with marked ability the tasks entrusted to them. But the efforts of these men, great and valuable as they were, would have been utterly unavailing had the Nizám and his minister not seconded them. For three months the fate of India was in the hands of Afzúl-úd-dáulah and Sálar Jang. Their wise policy proved that they preferred the certain position of a protected state to the doubtful chances of a resuscitation of the Dehlí monarchy under the auspices of revolted Sipáhis.

but mainly by the Nizám and Sálar Jang.

BOOK XIV.—CENTRAL INDIA, KÍRWÍ, GWÁLIÁR, AND THE SOUTHERN MARÁTHÁ COUNTRY.

CHAPTER I.

SIR HUGH ROSE AND CENTRAL INDIA.

In a previous chapter of this history * I stated that Colonel Durand had been appointed to act as agent for the Governor-General at Indúr in consequence of the departure of the agent, Sir Robert Hamilton, to Europe on leave. Sir Robert Hamilton, on hearing of the mutiny at Mírath, at once asked permission, though he had been but six weeks in England, to return and join his appointment. The application was granted, and Sir Robert arrived in Calcutta in August 1857.

Sir Robert Hamilton arrives in Calcutta.

Very soon after he had reached Calcutta, Sir Robert Hamilton was called upon by the Government to state the measures which he considered necessary for the restoration of tranquillity in central India. There were very many reasons why it was natural that the Government should be anxious to have his views on this important subject. Sir Robert Hamilton was a very eminent public servant. He had passed the greater part of his career in high official positions in central India. Not only had he traversed every inch of that territory, but he knew the exact distances between village and village throughout it, the lay of the ground, the disposition of the people, the peculiarities which constituted either a bond or a division between the several districts. Sir Robert had trained

Qualifications of Sir R. Hamilton to advise the Government regarding central India.

* Vol. III. page 135.

from his early youth the boy who, in 1857, ruled the possessions of his ancestors as Túkaji Ráo Holkar. The training and the connection—that between a guardian and a ward—had inspired both with similar feelings, feelings of the warmest regard. More than that—each thoroughly believed in the other. Each would have wagered the possession he most valued on the question of the loyalty of the other. Sir Robert Hamilton was not less acquainted with all the courtiers of his charge, with their character, their dispositions, the influences they exercised. He knew to a scarcely less degree every man of note in the country.

When, then, the Government of India applied to Sir Robert Hamilton to state the measures which he considered necessary for the restoration of order in central India, they did that which it would have been in the highest degree unwise to omit. Sir Robert Hamilton responded to the call. He drew up a memorandum, which he submitted to the Governor-General. Lord Canning passed it on to Sir Colin Campbell, who was still in Calcutta.

Hamilton submits a plan for the pacification of central India to the Government.

Sir Robert Hamilton's plan was as follows. He proposed that whilst one column, coming from the Bombay Presidency, should make Máu its base of operations, and sweep thence the country between that point and Kalpí on the Jamnah, reconquering Jhánsí in its course; another, coming from Madras, should form its base at Jabalpúr, clear the line of communication with Allahábád and Mírzápúr, and cross Bundelkhand to Bandah. Thus Kalpí and Bandah would constitute the points towards which the two columns would separately be directed.

Nature of the plan.

This plan was fully discussed between Sir Robert Hamilton, Sir Colin Campbell, and the Chief of the Staff—General Mansfield—and, in the end, was, with one slight modification in one of its details, adoptod.* Sir Robert Hamilton calculated that if no delay were to occur in the formation of the several columns, the points indicated would be reached by the 1st of May, 1858.

The plan is, with one slight modification, approved of.

* The modification was immaterial. Sir R. Hamilton had suggested that the two brigades of which the Máu column would be composed should, prior to their advance on Jhánsí, effect a junction at Síprí. Sir Colin Campbell substituted Gúnah for Síprí. Gúnah is nearer to Jhánsí by seventy miles.

This plan approved, Sir Robert Hamilton proceeded to Indúr, and arrived there on the 16th of December, 1857, and not only resumed the appointment of Governor-General's Agent for central India, but took up likewise the political functions in respect of all the chiefs in the Ságar and Narbadá territories, which, till then, had been exercised by the Commissioner of those territories.

Sir Robert relieves Durand, and assumes political charge of the country to be traversed by the British forces.

The day that witnessed the return of Sir Robert Hamilton greeted likewise the arrival of the officer who had been nominated by Lord Canning to command the force which, having its base at Máu, was to work up to the southern bank of the Jamnah. That officer was Major-General Sir Hugh Rose, K.C.B.* Sir Hugh Rose bore, even then, a high character for ability, decision, and firmness. Entering the army in 1820, he had early given proof of those qualities, and when, in 1840, the Government of the Queen decided to detach several British officers to serve in Syria with the view of checking the progress of the rebellious Pasha of Egypt, Lieutenant-Colonel Rose proceeded thither in the capacity of Deputy Adjutant-General. Here he distinguished himself no less by his judgment than by his daring courage. In a hand-to-hand encounter with the Egyptian cavalry, in which he was wounded, Colonel Rose captured with his own hand the leader of the enemy, an exploit which procured for him a sabre of honour from the Sultan and the Order of the Nishán Iftihár set in diamonds. For his conduct in Syria, too, he was decorated with the companionship of the Bath. A little later he was nominated by Lord Palmerston Consul-General of Syria.

Character and antecedents of Sir Hugh Rose

in Egypt,

When, a few years subsequently, Russia was preparing to make her bid for the inheritance of the "sick man," Colonel Rose was nominated secretary to the embassy at Constantinople. Later on, just before the storm broke, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe proceeded to England, and Colonel Rose succeeded him as *chargé d'affaires*. Holding that office, he not only penetrated the designs of Russia, but detected that the one means by which England could foil them was to put her foot down, and say, "One step further constitutes war." Impressed with this idea, when

at Constantinople,

* Afterwards Field Marshal Lord Strathnairn, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., &c.

Prince Menschikoff endeavoured to impose upon the Sultan terms which would have annihilated the independence of Turkey, and the Sultan, turning to the British *chargé d'affaires*, implored him to give a material pledge of the support of England by bringing the British fleet into Turkish waters, Colonel Rose took the responsibility upon himself, and ordered the fleet, which was then lying before Malta, to Besika Bay. The fact that such an order had been sent answered for the moment the purposes of the Sultan. Russia was checked; and, if she renewed her attack, it was because the same firmness and the same clear-sightedness were not apparent in the conduct of the British ministers who approved the admiral for refusing to comply with Colonel Rose's requisition.

Subsequently Colonel Rose served in the Crimean war. He was recommended for the Cross of the Legion of Honour for his conduct at Alma, was repeatedly mentioned for distinguished conduct in the trenches before Sebastopol, and had two horses shot under him at Inkerman. I cannot omit to add that Marshal Canrobert, then commanding the French army in the Crimea, recommended General Rose for the Victoria Cross for his gallant conduct on three different occasions, and that the claim was not preferred solely because general officers were expressly excluded from the decoration. For his services in this war General Rose received the Turkish order of the Medjidie, was nominated a Knight Commander of the Bath, and received a step in rank "for distinguished conduct in the field."

in the Crimea.

When the mutiny broke out in India, Sir Hugh Rose proceeded at once to that country. He landed in Bombay on the 19th of September, was brought on the general staff of the army from that date, and was shortly appointed to the command of the force acting in Málwá, the operations of which I have recorded in this volume.* He proceeded accordingly to Indúr in company with Sir Robert Hamilton, who had taken the only route then open, that viâ Bombay.

Sir Hugh lands in Bombay.

Simultaneously, almost, with the appointment of Sir Hugh Rose to command one of the columns indicated, Brigadier General Whitlock of the Madras army was nominated to direct the other.

General Whitlock is appointed to direct the Madras column.

* *Vide* Chapter ii. of the last Book.

The proceedings of this officer will be related in the next chapter. This will be devoted to the operationsof the Máu column.

Composition of Sir Hugh Rose's force.

The force now called the Central India Field Force, of which Sir Hugh Rose took command on the 17th of December, consisted of two brigades—the first being at Máu; the second at Sihor. The brigades were thus formed. The first, under the command of Brigadier C. S. Stuart of the Bombay army, was composed of a squadron 14th Light dragoons, a troop of the 3rd Bombay light cavalry, two regiments of cavalry Haidarábád contingent, two companies of the 86th Regiment,* the 25th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry, one regiment infantry Haidarábád contingent, three light field batteries—one belonging to the Royal Artillery, one to that of Bombay, the third to Haidarábád —and some sappers; the second, commanded by Brigadier Steuart, 14th Light Dragoons, of the head-quarters of the 14th Light Dragoons, head-quarters of the 3rd Bombay light cavalry, one regiment of cavalry Haidarábád contingent, the 3rd Bombay European Regiment,† the 24th Bombay Native Infantry, one regiment of infantry Haidarábád contingent, a battery of Horse Artillery, one light field battery, one battery Bhopál artillery, one company Madras sappers, a detachment of Bombay sappers, and a siege-train; this latter was manned, when brought into action, by draughts from the field batteries.

Antecedents of the troops composing the field force.

From the second chapter of the last book the reader will have gathered some idea of the hard work which had already devolved upon this force; he will have seen how the men composing it had triumphed over obstacles, had beaten every enemy, had proved incontestably that they were made of the stuff which required only leading to conquer. They had now once more a leader. Personally, indeed, that leader was a stranger to them, but his reputation had gone before him, and that reputation was of a nature to make the men grudge even the short period of repose which it was necessary that they should take.

A short period of repose was necessary to enable Whitlock to move in concert with it.

That repose was necessary for the perfect carrying out of the plan devised by Sir R. Hamilton with Sir Colin Campbell in Calcutta by virtue of which a second force, that to be commanded

* The remainder of the companies of this regiment joined just before the attack on Chandéri.

† Now the 2nd Battalion, Leinster Regiment

by Whitlock, should start from Jabalpúr. Until tidings of Whitlock's movements should be received, Sir Hugh was forced to halt at Máu.

The time was not thrown away. The two brigades were organized; the country immediately about them was pacified; the line of advance was marked out; the men had time to recruit themselves. The country about Máu and Indúr is peculiarly suited to be a resting-place. It abounds with the necessaries of life; there is plenty of water and of fodder; the climate at that season is most enjoyable; the country, hilly and diversified, is pleasant to the eye. The halt there was but short; it scarcely exceeded three weeks—not too long to satiate the men with their rest, yet long enough to make them glad to be once more on the move.

The period is not wasted.

On the 6th of January Sir Hugh Rose, accompanied by Sir R. Hamilton, started from Máu to join the 2nd brigade at Sihor. On the 8th the siege-train was despatched thither. It arrived on the 15th. On the following morning Sir Hugh, reinforced by about eight hundred Bhopál levies contributed by the loyal Bégam of that principality, started for Ráhatgarh, a strong fort held by the rebels. The 1st brigade left Máu on the 10th, and then marched in a line parallel with the 2nd brigade upon Chándérí, a very famous fortress in the territories of Sindhiá. I propose first to follow the fortunes of the 2nd brigade.

The force enters upon the campaign.

Ráhatgarh, distant only twenty-five miles from Ságar, is situated on the spur of a long high hill, and commands the country surrounding it. The eastern and southern faces of the fortress are almost perpendicular—the rock being scarped. Round their base runs a deep and rapid river—the Bíná—answering the purpose of a wet ditch. The north face is covered by a strong wall, facing a very thick jungle, between which and the wall is a deep ditch twenty feet wide. The western face overlooks the town and the road to Ságar, and its gateway is flanked by several bastions, round and square. Along each face and in the four angles were bastions commanding the only possible approaches. Altogether it was a most formidable position.

Ráhatgarh

Sir Hugh Rose arrived before this place on the morning of the 24th of January. He at once, with small loss, drove the enemy from the outside positions they had occupied in the town and on the banks of the

Sir Hugh disposes his forces before the place.

river, and then completely invested the place. Fronting the eastern face he posted the Bhopál troops; facing the northern, the 3rd Bombay light cavalry and the cavalry of the Haidarábád contingent. With the remainder of the force he occupied the plain across which runs the road to Ságar. He then reconnoitred the ground preparatory to selecting sites for his breaching batteries.

The rebels make an offensive defence.

The enemy, falling back as Sir Hugh advanced, had re-occupied the town. Issuing from its walls into the thick jungle already spoken of, they made thence, during the 25th, several raids on the camp-followers and baggage animals of the force, and at night even attacked the position held by the Bhopál troops. They were, however, repulsed with slight loss.

The rebels fire the jungle and force Sir Hugh to change his point of attack.

Early the following morning Sir Hugh Rose made a move forward. Crossing the Ságar road with the 3rd Europeans, followed by the 18-pounders, howitzers, and mortars, and the guns of the Haidarábád Contingent, he entered the jungle. But no sooner had he reached a point well within its thick covering, than the enemy, who had been lurking near, fired the jungle-grass on all sides. For a few moments the position was perilous, but Sir Hugh, turning back beyond the range of the flames, sent his sappers to cut a road for the guns up the height to the north of the town. This operation and the bringing up of the guns occupied the greater part of the day.

Sir Hugh gains the town.

Meanwhile the remainder of the force had occupied the town, and driven the enemy within the fort.

Sir Hugh's mortar batteries open on the fort.

At 3 o'clock the summit of the hill fronting the northern face of the fort was gained. Sir Hugh at once selected sites for his breaching batteries, and set the sappers to work. By 8 P.M. the mortar battery was ready. Whilst it was being thrown up the 6-pounders of the Haidarábád contingent maintained a constant fire of shot and shell on the fort, whilst the 3rd Europeans employed their Enfield rifles to keep down the matchlock fire of the enemy. At 11 P.M. the mortar battery opened fire, and continued it all night. The breaching batteries were completed by daybreak.

These opened fire early on the morning of the 27th, and continued it all that day and the day following. At 10 P.M. on

the 28th a large breach had been made, and two men went forward to examine it. They had just returned when a sudden rush of camp-followers and cattle-drivers from the rear gave intimation that something startling had happened. It transpired immediately that a rebel force was advancing to the relief of the place.

The breaching batteries open.

It was so indeed. The Rájah of Bánpúr, whose doings in the vicinity of Ságar I have already recorded,* was advancing on the rear of the besieging force with a considerable body of revolted Sipáhis and other levies. He came on with great boldness, his standards flying, and his men singing their national hymns. But, if his appearance at this critical juncture was a surprise to Sir Hugh Rose, it was a surprise that did not embarrass him. Instead of ceasing his fire against the fort he redoubled it. To deal with the Rájah of Bánpúr, he at the same time detached a small force, consisting of a detachment of the 14th Light Dragoons, the 3rd Bombay cavalry, the horse artillery, and the 5th Haidarábád infantry. It did not require extraordinary exertion to effect this object. The confidence of the Rájah and his followers vanished as they heard the tramping of the horses of the British and Indian cavalry. They did not wait to be charged, but, throwing away their arms and ammunition, made off with such celerity, that, though hotly pursued, a few only were cut up.

The Rájah of Bánpúr marches to relieve the place,

but vanishes on the approach of the British troops.

The attempt at relief, apparently so formidable, was really a stroke of fortune for Sir Hugh. It had been made, evidently, in concert with the rebels within the fort, and its failure so disheartened them, that they silently evacuated Ráhatgarh during the night, escaping by a path the precipitous nature of which seemed to preclude the possibility of its being used by man.† Their flight was not on the whole to be lamented, for Ráhatgarh was found

Ráhatgarh is thereupon evacuated.

* *Vide* page 66 and the pages following.

† "The most amazing thing was to see the place from whence they had escaped. To look down the precipitous path made one giddy—and yet down this place, where no possible footing could be seen, they had all gone—men and women—in the dead of the night! One or two mangled bodies lay at the bottom, attesting the difficulty of the descent. Nothing but despair could have tempted them to have chosen such a way."—Dr. Lowe's *Central India during the Rebellion of* 1857–58"—a book to which I am much indebted.

to be so strong as to make it tenable by a few resolute defenders against numbers greatly superior.

The rebels were pursued, but without much effect; they had gone too far before the evacuation of the place had been discovered. A little before noon on the 30th Sir Hugh received information that the Rájah of Bánpúr, reinforced by the garrison, had taken up a position near the village of Barodiá, about fifteen miles distant. He at once ordered out the horse artillery, two 5½-inch mortars, two guns of the reserve battery, the 3rd Europeans, the majority of the cavalry, and a section of the Madras sappers, and went in pursuit. About 4 o'clock he came upon them posted on the banks of the Biná, and prepared to dispute his passage. Sir Hugh at once attacked, and, though the rebels fought well, he forced the passage of the river. The country on the other side was thick and bushy, and the rebels took every advantage of it. From the river to Barodiá Sir Hugh had to fight his way step by step. He did not do this without loss. Two officers* were killed and six were wounded. The casualties among the men were likewise severe. In the end, however, the rebels were completely defeated, and, though the rebel Rájah was not captured, he owed his safety only to his acquaintance with the intricacies of the jungle. The force returned to Ráhatgarh about 2 o'clock in the morning. It found there a supply of provisions sent from Ságar escorted by a detachment of the 31st Regiment Native Infantry.

The rebels take up a position near Barodiá, where they are attacked and beaten by Sir Hugh.

The fall of Ráhatgarh had effected two most important objects. It had cleared the country south of Ságar of rebels, had reopened the road to Indúr, and had made it possible for the general to march to the relief of Ságar, now beleaguered for nearly eight months.

Result gained by the fall of Ráhatgarh.

The state of Ságar has been recorded in a preceding chapter of this volume. Its situation remained unaltered. Although, during the interval since we left it, the garrison had made occasional sallies, more or less successful, it may be stated generally that the rebels had retained possession of the strongholds all over the district,

Ságar, since the reader last visited it.

* One of these was Captain Neville, R.E. He had joined the force only the day before. Captain Neville had served throughout the Crimean war, in which he greatly distinguished himself.

and that, by means of these, they had possessed likewise the country. The manner in which they had used their usurped power had made the peasantry look earnestly to the time when the law-enforcing rule of the British should be restored.

That time had now arrived. Sir Hugh Rose marched from Ráhatgarh direct on Ságar. He entered that place on the morning of the 3rd of February, escorted by the Europeans, officers and others, who had held the fort, and who had gone forth to welcome their deliverers. The 31st Native Infantry was one of the very few regiments of the Bengal army which, retaining its arms, had remained faithful throughout that trying period. The greater honour to the 31st, for its companion infantry regiment had revolted, and it had been tempted on all sides.

Sir Hugh marches on Ságar, and enters it.

The 31st Native Infantry.

Some of those companions had now to be dealt with. Twenty-five miles to the east of Ságar stands, on an elevated angle of ground, the strong fort of Garhákótá. The eastern face of this fort is washed by the wide river Sonár;* the western and northern faces by the nullah Gidári, with precipitous banks; the south face possesses a strong gateway flanked by bastions, and a ditch twenty feet in depth by thirty in width. So strong are the parapets of this fort, that when, in 1818, it was attacked by Brigadier Watson with a force of eleven thousand men, he was unable, in three weeks, to effect a breach in them, and was glad to allow the garrison to evacuate the place with all the honours of war! In February 1858 it was held by the revolted Sipáhis of the 51st and 52nd Native Infantry, and other rebels, well supplied with ammunition and provisions.

The fort of Garhákótá.

Its great strength.

Sir Hugh Rose sent a small force to destroy the fort of Sanoda on the 8th, and on the 9th of February marched towards Garhákótá. He arrived within sight of it at half-past 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 11th. Whilst the men were taking up their assigned positions he made a reconnaissance, which was not concluded

Sir Hugh arrives before it and reconnoitres;

* The Sonár rises in the Ságar district at an elevation of one thousand nine hundred and fifty feet above the sea. It holds a north-eastern course of one hundred and ten miles, receiving the Bairmá on the right, and eight miles lower down falling into the Ken on its left.—THORNTON. (New Edition.)

till 8 P.M. He found that the rebels had thrown up earthworks on the road to the south, by which they had expected him to arrive, and that they were occupying a position close to the village of Basárí, near the fort, in some force. Notwithstanding the lateness of the hour, he at once drove them from the positions they held, and occupied Basárí; nor, though during the night the rebels repeatedly attacked him, could they regain the posts they had lost.

drives the rebels from the village of Basárí.

The next day Sir Hugh commenced his attack. He first caused a breaching battery to be thrown up opposite the western face. A 24-pounder howitzer working all day from this battery soon silenced the enemy's guns. Lieutenant Strutt of the Bombay artillery, already referred to in these pages, succeeded in dismounting one of the enemy's guns which had been worked very successfully against the assailants. It was this shot, "one of the many good shots made under fire by Lieutenant Strutt," which, in Sir Hugh's opinion, made the Sipáhis reflect on the casualties which might befall them. Certainly, after their experience of Strutt's correctness of aim, they lost heart. In the night they consulted, and determined to escape if they could. Unfortunately Sir Hugh Rose's force was so small, a great part having been left at Ságar, that he had been unable to place a portion of it in a position which would guard the gateway. By this gateway, then, the Sipáhis made their way into the country during the night of the 12th. They were, however, pursued early the following morning for twenty-five miles by Captains Hare, with his Haidarábád cavalry, two troops of the 14th Light Dragoons under Captains Need and Brown, and a division (two guns) of horse artillery under Lieutenant Crowe. Hare came up with the rebels at the Biás river, near the village of Biár, led his guns and cavalry across it; opened fire on the enemy; then charged and pursued them for some distance, inflicting considerable loss.

Excellent effect of Strutt's fire

impels the rebels to evacuate the place;

they are pursued by Hare and cut up.

Garhákótá was found full of supplies. Sir Hugh had its western face destroyed, and returned to Ságar on the 17th.

Jhánsí, a hundred and twenty-five miles to the north, was the next point to be aimed at. But between Ságar and Jhánsí lay the passes of Málthon and Madanpúr, the forts of Súráhí and of Maráura, the towns of

The road to Jhansí.

Sháhgarh and Bánpúr.* After overcoming the certain obstacles which these places would probably offer, Sir Hugh would have, before marching on Jhánsí, to effect a junction with his 1st brigade under Brigadier Stuart.

Considerations which demanded some delay.

Before setting out on this expedition there were other considerations demanding attention. Sir Hugh could scarcely move from Ságar until he should receive certain information that Brigadier Whitlock's column had started from Jabalpúr for that place. Meanwhile he would have time to repair damages and to store supplies. The necessity for this was the more pressing inasmuch as it had been ascertained that the districts through which the force would have to march, still occupied by rebel Sipáhis or disaffected chiefs, would supply little or nothing in the way of commissariat. The hot season, too, was setting in, and it was certain that not a blade of grass would survive a few weeks of its duration. Sir Hugh foresaw all this, and employed the enforced delay in laying up supplies. He caused to be collected sheep, goats, oxen, grain, flour, and large supplies of tea and soda water. Much of the grain was sent by the loyal Bégam of Bhopál. The sick and wounded men he transferred to the Ságar field hospital, to be sent away or to rejoin as opportunity might offer. He re-supplied the siege-train with ammunition, and strengthened it by the addition of heavy guns, howitzers, and large mortars from the Ságar arsenal. He obtained likewise an additional supply of elephants, and, what was of great consequence, he secured summer clothing for his European soldiers.

Excellent use to which the delay was put.

Hearing that Whitlock had left Jabalpúr, Sir Hugh takes the road to Jhánsí.

At length news came that Whitlock had left Jabalpúr. Sir Hugh's preparations were now as complete as they could be made. Accordingly a start was determined upon. On the evening of the 26th of February Sir Hugh detached Major Orr's column of the Haidarábád contingent to march on a route parallel with his own, and at 2 o'clock he set out with the remainder of the troops. The following day he took, after some shelling, the fort of Barodiá. Pressing forward, he found

* Maráura lies thirty-seven miles north of Ságar, and twenty-two west by north of Sháhgárh. Sháhgárh lies forty miles north-east of Ságar. Bánpúr is in the Lálitpúr district.

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himself, on the 3rd of March, in front of the pass of Málthon.

The pass of Málthon.

This pass, of great natural strength, had been fortified, and was now held in force by a mixed army of Sipáhis and local levies. A reconnaissance having convinced Sir Hugh of the great loss of life which would inevitably attend a direct attack upon it, he determined then only to feign an attack in front, whilst, with the bulk of his force, he should gain the table-land above the hills by a flank movement through the pass of Madanpúr. With this view, early on the morning of the 4th of March, he detailed a force,* under Major Scudamore, to menace the pass, whilst with the remainder, now strengthened by the junction of the Haidarábád troops, he moved on Madanpúr.

Sir Hugh decides to attempt a flank march.

Madanpúr.

The pass leading to this town forms a narrow gorge between two ranges of hills, thickly covered with jungle and brushwood, and capable of offering a solid defence. The rebels had not only crowned the heights on both sides of the gorge, and planted guns in the gorge itself, but they had sent, to a considerable distance in advance, skirmishers, who, concealed in the jungle, would be able to harass an advancing enemy. The British troops, in making the turning movement contemplated, marched for about six miles along the foot of the hills, which they then began to ascend. Almost immediately the enemy opened fire. The crests seemed alive with their infantry, whilst their guns from the gorge poured in a continuous fire. Sir Hugh sent the 3rd Europeans and the Haidarábád infantry to storm the heights, brought his guns to the front, and returned the enemy's fire.

The Madanpúr pass

is attacked by the British.

The British skirmishers drove back the rebel footmen, but as these retired another artillery fire opened from a commanding position at the further end of the pass. So galling and so heavy was this fire that for a short time the British advance was checked. Sir Hugh even ordered the guns to retire some yards. Before this could be done Sir Hugh's horse was shot under him, and the artillerymen were forced to take refuge behind the guns. Bullets fell like hailstones, and the number of killed and wounded increased every moment.

Determined defence of the rebels,

* Consisting of the 24th Bombay N.I., three guns Bhopál artillery, one howitzer, a detachment 14th light dragoons, and the 3rd Bombay cavalry.

The halt, however was only temporary. The guns of the Haidarábád contingent coming up at this conjuncture opened with shell on the enemy's masses to the left of the pass in support of the guns in action. Under cover of this combined shower, the 3rd Europeans and the Haidarábád infantry charged. Asiatics can stand anything but a charge of European infantry. They had here a splendid position, and a large force of the three arms to hold it; but the sight of the charging infantry struck awe into them. Far from awaiting, with their superior numbers, the hand-to-hand encounter offered, they fled in disorder and dismay. They were followed through the pass by their enemy, and only halted to take breath when they found themselves within the town of Mandanpúr.

but it is overcome by a charge of infantry.

That town, however, was to be no secure refuge to them. Sir Hugh Rose brought his howitzers to the front and opened fire upon it. For a few minutes the rebels replied, and then fled to the jungles behind. The cavalry, sent in pursuit, followed them to the walls of the fort of Surákí.

Sir Hugh drives them likewise from the town.

The effect of this victory was very great. It so daunted the rebels that they evacuated, without a blow, the formidable pass of Málthon, the fort of Narhat to the rear of it, the little fort of Surákí, the strong fort of Maráura, the fortified castle of Bánpúr—the residence of the rebel Rájah called after it—the almost impregnable fortress of Tál-Bahat on the heights above the lake of that name. They abandoned also the line of the Bínd and the Betwá, with the exception of the fortress of Chandérí, on the left bank of the latter river.

Great results obtained from the victory.

Leaving Sir Hugh Rose to reap the consequences of his victory at Madanpúr, I propose to return for a moment to the division of the Haidarábád contingent left at Mandesar under Majors Orr and Keatinge.

The 1st. brigade.

In a preceding page of this volume I have shewn how Durand, before marching on Indúr, had left, for the conservation of peace and order in western Málwá a detachment of the Haidarábád contingent of all arms at Mandesar under Major Orr, with Major Keatinge as political agent and military governor of the province. There they remained until the arrival at Indúr of Sir Robert Hamilton. That high official at once directed Orr and Keatinge

Orr and Keatinge re-open the Agrá road.

to march up the Ágra road, and to restore on it the postal and telegraphic communications which had been destroyed.

A more interesting march was not undertaken during the entire period of those troublous times. Keatinge and Orr were the first representatives of the British power who had been seen in that part of the country for many months. As they marched up the Ágra road huge coils of telegraph wire were brought by night, and placed on the roadside, by people who dreaded lest the wire should be found in their possession. From the centre of haystacks, likewise, postmasters recovered the mail-bags which had been left with them when the outbreak occurred at Indúr. The little force, re-establishing the wires as it pushed on, proceeded as far as Gúnah, there to await the arrival of the 1st Brigade under Stuart on its way to Chandérí.

To the proceedings of that brigade I must now invite the reader's attention.

In pursuance of the instructions of Sir Hugh Rose, Stuart had left Máu on the 10th of January, and marched upon Gúnah, the road to which had been cleared by Orr and Keatinge in the manner just described. About seventy miles to the east of Gúnah lies the important post of Chandérí. Chandérí is a very famous town. Its splendour in the prosperous times of the Mughul empire had made it notorious. "If you want to see a town whose houses are palaces, visit Chandérí," was a proverb in the time of Akbar. In the reign of that illustrious prince it was described as a city possessing fourteen thousand houses built of stone, three hundred and eighty-four markets, three hundred and sixty caravansaries, and twelve thousand mosques. Since that period, it is true, the rule of the Maráthás had worked a great change in its prosperity. In later years, too, its manufactures had suffered from competition with Manchester. But its fort still remained, strong, menacing, defiant, with a long history, testifying alike to its prestige and to the valour of its defenders. Situated on the summit of a high hill, defended by a rampart of sandstone, flanked by circular towers, the fort of Chandérí, seen by an approaching enemy, looked worthy of its reputation. To this place, in February 1858, flocked the Sipáhis beaten in the actions already detailed by Sir Hugh Rose, to join there the men who had sworn to defend it successfully or to perish.

Chandérí.

Its former splendour.

Its later decay.

Great strength of its fort.

Against it Brigadier C. S. Stuart, joined by Orr and Keatinge, marched from Gúnah. On the 5th of March he reached a place, Khúkwásás, six miles from Chandérí. Between Khúkwásás and Chandérí the road lay through a dense jungle. Stuart, therefore sent two companies of the 86th foot and the 25th Bombay Native Infantry to the front in skirmishing order. After marching three miles, he arrived at a narrow pass between two high hills —a place offering splendid capabilities for defence. To the surprise of Stuart, no defence was offered. Two miles further, however, the road was found barricaded. The engineers began to clear away the barricades; but they had not worked long before the enemy were seen to climb the hill to the left. On reaching it they opened out a musketry-fire. From this point of vantage they were soon dislodged by a small party of the 86th, and, the barricades having been removed, the artillery advanced, covered by the 86th on the right, and the 25th Native Infantry on the left. They had not gone far, however, before a very heavy fire opened upon them from the wall of an enclosure about a mile distant from the fort. The 86th dashed forward to gain this enclosure. One officer of the regiment, Lieutenant Lewis, and the political agent with the force Major Keatinge,* of the Bombay artillery, outrunning the men, gained first the top of its wall, and jumping down, followed by a few men, drove out the enemy. Stuart pursued his advantage, and did not halt till he had occupied the hills to the west of the fort.

Stuart advances against Chandérí

Opposition of the enemy.

Gallantry of Lewis and Keatinge.

The next few days were spent by Stuart in clearing the neighbouring villages, in reconnoitring, and in planting his guns in a commanding position. On the 13th the breaching batteries opened fire, and by the evening of the 16th effected a breach which was reported practicable. Stuart had with him, as I have already stated, but two companies of the 86th. The remainder were marching to join him, and on the 15th were only twenty-eight miles distant. On the afternoon of that day the officer who commanded them received a despatch from Stuart telling him

Preparations for the storm.

* The same who had accompanied Orr in the opening of the Ágra road; now General Keatinge, V.C.

that the breach would probably be practicable on the morrow, and, that if he would push on and join him on the 16th, he, Stuart, would defer the assault to the day following. The commanding officer set out at once, and his men pushed on with so much alacrity, that, though they had already marched fifteen miles that morning, they joined Stuart by 10 o'clock on the 16th.

Splendid march of the 86th.

Thus reinforced, Stuart, early on the morning of the 17th, sent his stormers, men of the 86th and of the 25th Native Infantry, to the attack. Their impetuous rush carried all before them. Major Keatinge, who accompanied the party, and who led it into the breach, was struck down, severely wounded. But his fall did not stop the stormers. The rebels hurled themselves over the parapets to avoid the rush they could not withstand, and most of them escaped. A letter which the Brigadier had sent the previous day to Captain Abbott commanding a party of cavalry, and requesting him to invest the north side of the fort, reached that officer too late. But the place was taken with all its guns.*

Keatinge again distinguishes himself.

The storm.

Sir Hugh Rose heard of the storming of Chándéri on the 18th. Informed that the garrison had escaped northwards, he sent a detachment of the Haidarábád contingent to intercept them. This force came up with a few stragglers only, but captured some camels and ponies. On the 19th he marched to Chanchanpúr, one march, fourteen miles, from Jhánsí. After a rest here of about two hours, he despatched the cavalry, horse artillery, and light field-guns of the 2nd brigade to reconnoitre and invest that place.

Sir Hugh marches on Jhánsí.

To the fall of Jhánsí Lord Canning and Lord Elphinstone attached the greatest importance. They regarded that fortress as the stronghold of rebel power in central India, the main strength of the formidable rebel force on the Jamnah. It was a place, moreover, in which the slaughter of English men and women had been accompanied by circumstances of peculiar atrocity, and where hatred to the English name had been illustrated by acts of the most wanton barbarity. Nevertheless, anxious as was Lord Canning, anxious as was Sir Colin Campbell himself, that the blow, the most effective of all to the rebel cause in

Great importance attached to the fall of Jhánsí.

* The casualties in the capture were twenty-nine, including two officers.

central India, should be struck, they were both so little appreciative of the enormous value of delivering that blow at once, whilst the success of Sir Hugh Rose's brigades was yet fresh in the minds of the rebels, that, on the very eve of the crisis, they both sent orders to defer the attack on Jhánsí, in order to divert the force elsewhere. From the dangerous consequences of their own orders they were saved by the firmness and decision of Sir Robert Hamilton.

Causes which prompted Lord Canning and Sir C. Campbell to order the diversion of the force from Jhánsí.

I have already stated that Sir Hugh had sent the cavalry and horse artillery of his 2nd brigade, on the afternoon of the 20th, to reconnoitre and invest Jhánsí. He was about, a few hours later, to follow with his infantry, when an express arrived in camp bearing two despatches. One of these was from the Governor-General to Sir Robert Hamilton, the other from the Commander-in-Chief to Sir Hugh Rose.

Sir Hugh Rose and Sir R. Hamilton receive despatches

The purport of these two despatches was identical. They represented that the Rájah of Charkhárí (in Bundelkhand), a man who, throughout the trying period of 1857–58, had shown unwavering fidelity to his British overlord, was being besieged in his fort by Tántiá Topí and the Gwáliár contingent, and they ordered Hamilton and Rose to march at once to his relief, Whitlock's force not being near enough to effect that purpose.

ordering the former to march on Charkhárí.

Charkhárí was about eighty miles from the ground on which Sir Hugh's force was encamped, on the direct road to Bandah. Jhánsí was within fourteen miles. To the mind of a soldier the idea would naturally present itself that the surest mode of saving the lesser and more distant place was to attack at once the more important and nearer fortress; that to act on the principle indicated in the despatches would be to act in defiance alike of the rules of war and of common sense. So it appeared to both Hamilton and Rose. But Sir Hugh was a soldier. He had received a positive order. Foolish though he knew that order to be, he was bound to obey it unless the means could be devised of superseding it by authority which he might deem higher and more potential.

Reasons why the order appeared devoid of sense to Hamilton and Rose.

Sir Robert Hamilton devised those means. How, I will relate in his own simple words. "Sir Hugh Rose considered the order of the Commander-in-Chief imperative: there was not anything

left to my discretion in my letter from the Governor-General; it was clear to me it would be a great political mistake to draw off from Jhánsí, which our cavalry were investing, and our force within fourteen miles; moreover, supposing the force moved on Charkhárí, it was not possible to march the eighty miles before the rebels had carried the fort, the Rájah having no provisions, and having lost the outworks, according to my intelligence. I, therefore, took on myself the responsibility of proceeding with our operations against Jhánsí, trusting to that course as the most effective to draw the enemy from Charkhárí, and so I wrote to the Governor-General." *

Sir Robert Hamilton takes upon himself the responsibility of ordering the continuance of the movement on Jhánsí.

It was a responsibility which only a strong man would take, thus to act in direct opposition to the orders of the two highest officials in the country, but under the circumstances it was a responsibility which it was necessary to assume. It gave a decided character to the campaign, and enabled Sir Hugh Rose to carry to a glorious conclusion the task which he had taken in hand at Mán.

Hamilton's determination gives a decided character to the campaign.

Freed by Sir Robert Hamilton from the necessity of pursuing the vicious course indicated by the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hugh Rose set out at 2 o'clock on the morning of the 21st for Jhánsí. He arrived before that city at 9 o'clock, and, halting his troops in the open about a mile and a half from the fortress, proceeded with his staff to reconnoitre. He did the work completely, for it had struck 6 P.M. before he returned.

Sir Hugh moves on Jhánsí.

Between the open ground on which Sir Hugh had halted and the town and fortress of Jhánsí were the ruins of bungalows occupied nine months before by Europeans, the gaol, the "Star" fort,† and the [illegible] the town were several large temples and [illegible] tamarind trees. On the right of the halting-ground, [illegible] ing to the north and east of the city, was a long belt of [illegible] through which ran the Kálpí and Urchah roads; to the left were other hills and the Datiá roads; due north was the fortress on a high granite rock, overlooking the walled-in city.‡

The lay of the ground before Jhánsí.

* Memorandum submitted by Sir Robert Hamilton to Lord Palmerston, dated the 20th of March, 1862.

† Vol. III. page 122.

‡ Lowe's *Central India*.

The great strength of the fort of Jhánsí, natural as well as artificial, and its extent, entitle it to a place among fortresses. It stands on a elevated rock, rising out of a plain, and commands the city and surrounding country. It is built of excellent and most massive masonry. The fort is difficult to breach, because composed of granite; its walls vary in thickness from sixteen to twenty feet. It has extensive and elaborate outworks of the same solid construction, with front and flanking embrasures for artillery-fire, and loop-holes, of which in some places there were five tiers, for musketry. Guns placed on the high towers of the fort commanded the country all around. On one tower, called the "white turret," then recently raised in height, waved in proud defiance the standard of the high-spirited Ráni.

Great strength of the fort of Jhánsí.

The fortress is surrounded on all sides by the city of Jhánsí, the west and part of the south face excepted.

The steepness of the rock protects the west; the fortified city wall springs from the centre of its south face, running south-east, and ends in a high mound or mamelon, which protects by a flanking fire its south face. The mound was fortified by a strong circular bastion for five guns, round part of which was drawn a ditch, twelve feet deep and fifteen broad, of solid masonry.

The city of Jhánsí is about four miles and a half in circumference. It is surrounded by a fortified and massive wall, from six to twelve feet thick, and varying in height from eighteen to thirty feet, with numerous flanking bastions armed as batteries, with ordnance, and loop-holes, and with a banquette for infantry.*

The city of Jhánsí.

The town and fortress were garrisoned by eleven thousand men, composed of rebel Sipáhis, foreign mercenaries, and local levies, and they were led by a woman who believed her cause to be just, and who, classified according to Channing's definition of greatness, was a heroine, though of the third order.

Garrison of the town and fortress.

In his long reconnaissance of the 21st of March, Sir Hugh Rose had noted all the strong points of the defence, and had examined the lay of the ground. He noted the many difficulties presented to the attack, by

Result of Sir Hugh's reconnaissance.

* Sir Hugh Rose's despatch, dated the 30th of April, 1858, from which this description is taken almost textually. Sir Hugh adds, further on: "A remarkable feature in the defence was that the enemy had no works or forts outside the city."

the fort perched on a lofty granite rock, with its three lines of works, its flanking fire, its thick and solid walls. He had discovered that it would be necessary to take the city prior to assailing the fortress, a work involving double labour and double danger. In this reconnaissance, however, he had decided on his plan of attack. That night he was joined by the cavalry of the 1st brigade. The next day he completely invested the city and fortress with his cavalry. In this investment the defenders read the determination of the English general to capture not only the place but its garrison.

Difficulties of supplies.

One of the measures taken by the Rání might under, other circumstances, have caused considerable embarrassment to the besiegers. She had made the country all about bare. Not a blade of grass was to be seen. Thanks, however, to the loyalty of Sindhiá and of the Rájah of Tehrí,* the force was throughout the operations abundantly supplied with grass, firewood, and vegetables.

The siege begins.

The cavalry having invested the city on the 22nd, the siege began on the night of that day. At 9 o'clock a detachment of Madras and Bombay sappers was sent with two 18-pounders, and a company 24th Bombay Native Infantry, to throw up a battery near the Urchah road on the east side of the town wall; other parties were detached at the same time to positions which the general had selected. Working hard that night, the next day, and the night and day which followed, they made ready on the evening of the 24th four batteries, constituting the right attack. On the morning of the 25th they opened fire. That day, too, the bulk of the 1st brigade came into line. It was at once posted south of the fort, constituting there the left attack.

Progress of the siege for seventeen days.

The siege now progressed in real earnest. For seventeen days the fire from the besieging batteries and from the walls of the city and fort was incessant. Round shot and shell were poured into the city, and the enemy's guns never ceased to reply. The labour entailed upon the small force of the besiegers was tremendous. During the period of which I have spoken the men never took off their clothes, nor were the horses unbridled except to water. Nor were the exertions of the

Labours and resolution of the besiegers

* Tehrí, also called Urchah, is a Bundélá Rajpút State, immediately to the east of the Jhánsí and Lálitpúr districts. Its Rájah is looked upon as the head of the Bundélás.

besieged less determined. Women and children were seen assisting in repairing the defences of the walls, and in carrying water and food to the troops on duty, whilst the Ráni constantly visited the troops and animated them to enthusiasm by her presence and her words.

and the besieged.

For breaching purposes Sir Hugh had been able to employ only two 18-pounders, the remainder of the guns being laid so as to employ the enemy incessantly, and to damage the buildings inside the city. The progress made by these 18-pounders was, owing to the great strength of the walls, extremely slow. But on the 29th the parapets of the mamelon bastion were levelled by the fire from the left attack, and the enemy's guns there rendered useless. The two following days the cannonading continued with great spirit. A breach had been effected, but it was barely practicable; the courage of the enemy continued unabated; danger seemed only to increase their resolution. Such was the state of affairs when a new danger arose for the besiegers. On the evening of the 31st of March intelligence reached Sir Hugh Rose that an army was advancing from the north for the relief of the fortress!

At length a breach is effected,

when an army advances to relieve the place.

This was the army of Tántiá Topí. The career of this able Maráthá leader will be told at fuller detail in a subsequent chapter. Suffice it to say that, after his victory over Windham and his subsequent defeat by Sir Colin Campbell, Tántiá had crossed the Ganges, and subsequently, in obedience to orders from Ráo Sáhib, the nephew of Náná Sáhib, had proceeded to Kálpí. Thence, complying with orders from the same quarter, he had, with a small force of nine hundred Sipáhis and four guns, moved on Charkhárí, and, on the eleventh day, had taken it, capturing twenty-four guns and three lakhs of rupees. Just at this time he received a letter from the Ráni of Jhánsí, begging him to come to her help. Again he asked for orders, and again received the full approval of his superior. His force, by this time, had been increased by the junction of five or six regiments of the Gwáliár contingent and the levies of rebel Rájahs to twenty-two thousand men and twenty-eight guns. Leading it himself, he marched on the English camp before Jhánsí.

Tántiá Topí

captures Charkhárí,

and marches to relieve Jhánsí.

Danger of Sir Hugh Rose's position.

The position of Sir Hugh Rose was perilous. Before him was an unconquered fortress, garrisoned by eleven thousand warriors, full of the ardour of battle; advancing against and close to him, an army of more than twenty thousand men led by a chieftain who hated the English, and who had twice revelled in their defeat at Káhnpúr. It was a position which required in a special degree great daring, a resolute will, the power to take responsibility. A single false step, a solitary error in judgment, might be fatal. But Sir Hugh Rose was equal to the occasion.

He resolves to maintain the siege and to meet the relieving army.

Rightly believing that to withdraw the troops then investing the fortress, for the purpose of meeting the new enemy, would give the besieged all the moral advantages of victory as well as the material advantages which they would derive from a virtual raising of the siege, the English general resolved still to press the siege with vigour, whilst at the head of all the troops not engaged in actual duty he should march against the new enemy. The extreme daring of this plan will be realised when the reader reflects that Sir Hugh was unable to assemble more than fifteen hundred men of all arms for this purpose, that of these only five hundred were British, and that the enemy numbered, according to Tántiá Topí's own admission, twenty-two thousand men. Sir Hugh's preparations* for the engagement were made on the evening of the 31st. He resolved to attack early the following morning.

Sir Hugh had drawn his covering force from both brigades, the detachment from the first being led by Brigadier C. S. Stuart, that from the 2nd by himself in person. The men slept in their clothes ready for immediate action. The precaution was necessary. At 4 o'clock in the morning of the 1st, Tántia Topí advanced towarde the British encampment. Half an hour later, the falling back of his pickets warned the English general of his approach. In a few minutes the British guns opened fire, and almost immediately those of the enemy answered. But the fire of a few guns was powerless to check the onward march of an enemy whose line overlapped that of the British on both flanks.

Sir Hugh meets Tántiá Topí.

* The preparations were witnessed with delight by the defenders of Jhánsí, who thought the English were marching to certain destruction. They shouted all night in a frenzy of joy.

Tántiá had but to move straight on to reach with his overlapping wings the troops besieging the fortress, who would thus, literally, be placed between two fires. Sir Hugh comprehended the position in an instant, and took measures to meet it. Massing his horse artillery under Captain Lightfoot on his left, and attaching to it a squadron of the 14th Light Dragoons, under Captain Prettijohn, he ordered them to attack the enemy's right, whilst he himself, on the other flank, should direct another squadron and a division of guns against their left. On the left, Crowe's division of two guns was sent forward to enfilade the enemy's right. This service was performed with great skill and gallantry, for, though one of his guns was disabled, the fire of the other was so rapid and so correct that the enemy's left was shaken.

attacks their flanks with cavalry,

The tactics of Sir Hugh were exactly adapted to the circumstances of the case. The enemy's centre, which up to that time had been advancing steadily, surprised by the double attack, first halted, and then, as the men composing it discerned a movement on the part of the British infantry, broke up into disordered masses. The movement of the British infantry is easily accounted for. Sir Hugh Rose, in the moment of charging, had sent orders to his infantry to advance as soon as the cavalry attack should be well pronounced. This order was now obeyed. The infantry sprang to their feet, advanced a few yards, then poured in a volley and charged. The result was magical. The first line of the enemy at once broke, and fled in complete disorder towards the second line, abandoning several of their guns. An opportune charge of the Dragoons, in which Prettijohn and Lightfoot, who commanded the field battery attached to the cavalry, greatly distinguished themselves, intensified that disorder.

whilst the infantry attack their centre.

The enemy's first line is defeated.

The second line, commanded by Tántiá in person, was occupying a position upon a rising ground, its front covered by jungle, about two miles in rear of the first line. Tántiá beheld in dismay the men of the latter rushing helter skelter towards him, followed by the three arms of the British in hot pursuit; but he had scarcely realised the fact when another vision on his right flank came to add to his anguish.

Meanwhile Stuart defeats a detached body of the enemy, and

Whilst Sir Hugh Rose had been engaged in the manner I have

described, Brigadier C. S. Stuart, with the detachment of 1st brigade, had moved round the hill into the plain on right of the enemy, in order to check a large body of them, were taking advantage of the battle raging in front of the to move off towards Jhánsí. Stuart attacked, defeated and drove them back, hotly following them.

threatens the second line.

close, indeed, was the pursuit, that they had time to re-form, but fled in confusion, l gun after gun in the hands of the victors numbers of their own men dead or dying on the This was the vision that came to add to the disa Tántiá Topí.

It had the effect of forcing upon him a prompt de The day, he saw, was lost, but there was yet time to sa second line and his remaining guns. I have said th ground upon which he rested was covered to the fr jungle. This jungle was dry and easily kindled.

Tántiá fires the jungle,

once set fire to it, and under cover of the and flames, commenced a retreat across the hoping to place that river between himself

pursuers.

His infantry and horsemen led the retreat, l covered it. Right gallantly and skilfully the

and flees,

and he did succeed in crossing the Betwá reserve and guns and some of the fugitives of the first l he was not the safer for the passage. The British horse and cavalry had dashed at a gallop through the

pursued across the Betwá by the British.

and they were resolved not to cease the pur they had captured every against them.

gun had

redoubled their fire.

The besiegrd, first jubilant,

the wall, they had shouted down volleys of musketry, sortie. Never, however,

* Tántiá states that four or five guns were saved, but these additional to the twenty-eight field-pieces accounted for. He followed in his flight by only two hundred Sipáhis.

ply with more vigour or with greater effect. The vision meeting the eye of those who manned the wall, moreover, did not long continue to inspire. Suddenly the yells and the shouts ceased—a sure sign that the garrison had recognised that the hour of deliverance had not arrived for them.

are afterwards discouraged.

The victorious army, returning from the pursuit, its *morale* strengthened as much as that of the enemy had deteriorated, resumed its former positions the same evening. Sir Hugh Rose determined then to take the promptest advantage of the discouragement which, he was well aware, the defeat of Tántiá Topí could not fail to produce on the minds of the garrison. He poured in, then, a heavy fire all that night and the day following. On the 2nd the breach in the city wall having been reported practicable, though only just practicable, Sir Hugh determined to storm the place the following morning. He made his preparations accordingly. His plan was to make a false attack on the west wall with a small detachment under Major Gall, 14th Light Dragoons; as soon as the sound of his guns should be heard, the main storming party was to debouch from cover, and enter the breach, whilst on the right of it attempts should be made to escalade the wall. The right attack, composed of the Madras and Bombay sappers, the 3rd Bombay Europeans, and the infantry of the Haidarábád contingent, was divided into two columns and a reserve. The right column was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Liddell, the left by Captain Robinson—both of the 3rd Europeans—the reserve by Brigadier Steuart, 14th Light Dragoons. This attack was to attempt to gain the town by escalade. The left attack, composed of the Royal Engineers, the 68th Foot, and the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, was similarly divided. Its left column, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Lowth, 86th Regiment, was to storm the breach; the right, led by Major Stuart, 86th Regiment, to escalade the rocket-tower and the low curtain immediately to the right of it. The reserve was commanded by Brigadier C. S. Stuart.

Sir Hugh pours in a heavy fire on the fort all the night, and prepares to storm.

At 3 o'clock on the morning of the 3rd of April the storming parties marched to the positions assigned to them, to await there the signal from Major Gall's party. No sooner was it given than the stormers dashed

Storming of Jhánsí.

to the front. On the left, Lieutenant Jerome, 86th, support by Captains Darby and Brockman, led the stormers of Colo Lowth's column up the breach in the most gallant man driving the enemy before him. At the same time Major S attacked the rocket-tower, and though met by a strong op tion, forced his way by it into the town. Lowth then col his men, and despatched a portion of them against that s of the rebel forces which was engaged in opposing the attack. Taking these in flank and rear, this de ment, led most gallantly by Brockman, force rebels to let go their hold on the defences, greatly facilitating the difficult task of the attack. With the remainder of his troops, Lowth prep march on the Ránf's palace.

Success of the left attack.

The right attack, on hearing the signal, had marched from their cover in three bodies. No sooner ever, had the troops composing it turned road leading towards the gate which was of their assault than the enemy's bugles sounded, heavy fire opened upon them.* Through this fire had to march upwards of two hundred yards. S pushed on, and planted the ladders in three places wall. For the moment, however, it was impos stormers to ascend. "The fire of the stronger, and amid the chaos of sounds musketry and roaring of cannon, and bursting of rockets, stink-pots, infernal machines, blocks of wood, and trees—all hurled the men wavered for a stones."†

The right attack

is momentarily checked.

position against the wall. How to state. Minutes seemed hours, when Madras Engineers, who had gone back to report affairs to the Brigadier, brought up a reinforcement

* "For a time it appeared like a sheet of fire, out of which bullets, round shot, and rockets, destined for our annihilation."—Indian.

† Lowe, *ibid.*

men of the 3rd Europeans. The stormers then rushed to the ladders, led by their engineer officers. Some were found too short, others broke down under the men; but Lieutenant Dick, Bombay Engineers, gained, by means of one of them, the summit of the wall, and, fighting against enormous odds, called upon the men to follow him. Lieutenant Meiklejohn of the same noble regiment mounted by another, and then boldly jumped down into the seething mass below. Lieutenant Bonus, also of the Bombay Engineers, reached the wall by a third. The men pressed on from behind; but before they could, in any number, join their officers, Dick had fallen from the wall, dying pierced with shot and bayonets; Bonus had been hurled down, struck in his face by a log or stone; Fox of the Madras sappers, who had also reached the wall, had been shot in the neck; Meiklejohn had been cut to pieces. But the stormers pushed on in streams from some eight ladders, and at length gained a footing on the rampart, dealing and receiving death from the enemy, who still continued fiercely to contest every point of the attack.

The ladders too short, or too weak.

Gallantry of Dick,

of Meiklejohn,

of Bonus,

of Fox.

The right attack gains a footing on the ramparts.

It was at this crisis that the stormers of the left attack, led by Brockman, who, looking along the wall from the breach which he had won, had seen the failure of the attack and resolved on the instant to do all in his power to [illegible] countrymen to repair the momentary damage, [illegible] the charge upon the flank and rear of the defenders of which I have spoken. Its effect was marvellous. The defenders relaxed their hold, the opposition ceased, and the stormers of the right attack jumped down and mingled with their comrades.

The left attack renders timely aid.

The defence having thus given way, the stormers made their way through the city to the palace, Lowth leading the way. The palace had been prepared by the rebels for a resistance in the last resort. The conflict, as the stormers forced their way through the streets, was severe. At the palace it was desperate. The houses on both sides of the street leading to it had been set on fire, and the heat was fearful. When, too, the courtyard of the palace was reached, it became apparent that the resistance had only begun.

The stormers march on the palace,

which, after a desperate contest, they gain.

Every room was savagely contested. Fruitlessly, however. From chamber to chamber the enemy were driven at the point of the bayonet. At length the palace itself was gained. The opposition, however, had not even then entirely ceased. Two hours later it was discovered that fifty men of the Rání's bodyguard still held the stables attached to the building. These men defended themselves to the last before, after a desperate encounter, they were disposed of. But the men who accomplished this task, the 86th and the 3rd Europeans, were compensated for their toil and danger by recapturing a British flag.*

Terrible scene in the stables.

This occurrence had but just happened when Sir Hugh, who had been present throughout with the left attack, received information that a body of the rebels, numbering about four hundred, driven from the town, after having vainly tried to force the pickets of one of the cavalry camps, had taken up a position on a hill to the west of the fortress, where they had been surrounded by the cavalry. Sir Hugh instantly sent against the hill the available troops of all arms under Major Gall. This gallant officer sent to storm the hill a detachment of the 24th Bombay Native Infantry. The 24th went at the rebels with a will, and killed all but about twenty, who retreated to the summit and there blew themselves up. The 24th lost an officer and several men in this attack. Another body of about fifteen hundred who had collected in one of the suburbs of the town, declaring they would defend it to the last, were driven out, about the same time, with a loss of three hundred of their number.

The rebels, driven from the town, occupy a strong position outside of it,

whence they are driven by the 24th Bombay Native Infantry;

another body is similarly treated.

All that night, and throughout the following day, desultory fighting continued, the enemy being either slaughtered or driven under the shelter of the fort guns. Sir Hugh was meanwhile engaged in organizing measures for an attack on the fortress. But the Rání saved him further trouble on that score. On the night of the 4th, despairing of a successful defence of the fortress, and, hoping that her presence at Kalpí might induce

Desultory fighting continues during the night.

* This was a Union Jack of silk, which Lord William Bentinck had given to the grandfather of the Rání's husband, with the permission to have it carried before him, as a reward for his fidelity."—Sir H. Rose's despatch.

Tántiá Topí once more to aid her, she evacuated the fortress with her remaining followers. She rode straight for Kalpí, and arrived there the very evening on which Tántiá, who had travelled more leisurely, reached that place. Sir Hugh sent a cavalry force in pursuit of her, but the start had been too great. A few of the fugitives were, however, cut up.

The Rání evacuates the fortress and rides for Kalpí.

The fortress of Jhánsí was occupied by Sir Hugh Rose on the morning of the 5th of April. The loss sustained by him during the operations against it, including the action on the Betwá, amounted to three hundred and forty-three killed and wounded, of whom thirty-six were officers. The enemy's loss was computed at five thousand. One thousand dead bodies were actually burned or buried in Jhánsí itself.

Sir Hugh occupies the fortress.

The mode by which Jhánsí was captured attests the merits of the noble soldier who planned and carried out the attack. Never was there a more complete combination of daring and skill, of foresight and resolution. The result was worthy of the plan, and of the genius which formed the plan.*

Credit due to Sir Hugh Rose.

Sir Hugh's object now was to march on Kalpí, to drive the rebels from that stronghold on the Jamnah whence they had so constantly menaced the communications of the British. Kalpí was the arsenal of the rebels, the head-quarters of the nephew of Náná Sáhib, and was extremely well provided with artillery and warlike stores. It lies on the Jamnah, a hundred and two miles to the north-east of Jhánsí, and only forty-six to the south-west of Kánhpúr. The occupation of this place would enable Sir Hugh to touch the left rear of Sir Colin Campbell's army, and, in co-operation with him, to clear the triangle, the angles of which were Jhánsí, Kalpí, and Ágra—Gwáliár being nearly midway in the line uniting Jhánsí and Ágra.

Importance of capturing Kalpí.

* The following extracts from Sir Hugh Rose's despatch attest the great strength of the town and fortress: "It was not till Jhánsí was taken that its great strength was known. There was only one part of the fortress, the south curtain, which was considered practicable for breaching. But, when inside, we saw this was a mistake, there being at some distance in rear of the curtain a massive wall fifteen or twenty feet thick, and immediately in rear of this a deep tank cut out of the live rock."

For seventeen days Sir Hugh's little army had known no repose. The halt at Jhánsí of nearly nineteen days which followed the capture of the place was, however, in no sense devoted to repose. Much had to be done in Jhánsí itself: the arrangements for a fresh campaign had to be organised, provisions had to be laid in, the magazines to be replenished. At length all was ready. Leaving at Jhánsi a small garrison consisting of the head-quarter wing of the 3rd Bombay Europeans, four companies 24th Bombay Native Infantry, the left wing 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry, a hundred troopers Haidarábád contingent, half a company Bombay sappers, and three guns Bhopál contingent—the whole under the command of Colonel Liddell, 3rd Europeans—Sir Hugh detached, on the night of the 22nd of April, a detachment under Major Gall to watch the rebel garrison of Kotá, reported to be at a place called Máu, in the neighbourhood, and set out himself with the 1st brigade at midnight on the 25th, leaving directions for the 2nd brigade to follow two days later. Major Orr had been previously detached with the bulk of the Haidarábád force to prevent the Rájáhs of Bánpúr and Sháhgarh and any other rebels from crossing the Betwá and doubling back southwards.

Sir Hugh halts at Jhánsí to arrange for a march on Kalpí.

Dispositions made by him with that object.

Leaving for a moment these several officers engaged in carrying out the orders entrusted to them, I propose to return for a moment to the Rání of Jhánsí and Tántiá Topí.

These two important personages had arrived, as I have said, at Kalpí the same day. The first act of the Rání had been to implore the nephew of Náná Sáhib, known as Ráo Sáhib, "to give her an army that she might go and fight." The following morning Ráo Sáhib ordered a parade of all the troops at his disposal. These consisted of some regiments of the Gwáliár contingent, several regiments of the regular native army recruited to nearly full strength, the contingents of various rebel Rájahs, and the remnant of the Jhánsí garrison. Ráo Sáhib reviewed these troops, addressed them, and then directed Tántiá to lead them against the English. Tántiá obeyed, and, hoping to meet them when possibly all their forces might not be reunited, marched to Kúnch, a town forty-two miles from Kalpí on the Jhánsí road, and there took up a strong position, covered by

The Rání of Jhánsí at Kalpí.

Her appeal to Ráo Sáhib,

who holds a review, and orders Tántiá Topí to march against the English.

woods and gardens, with temples at intervals between each of them, surrounded by a strong wall, and there threw up intrenchments.

Meanwhile the English force was advancing on Kúnch. Major Gall, harassed by the enemy on his march, had reached the town of Púch, fourteen miles from Kúnch, on the 1st of May. Here he was joined the same day by Sir Hugh Rose and the 1st brigade. Major Orr, on his side, had crossed the Betwá, attacked the Rájahs of Bánpúr and Sháhgarh at Kotrá, and had taken one of their guns. He had, however, found it impossible to cut them off, and they had succeeded, for the time, in escaping southwards, supplies and carriage being furnished them by the treacherous Rájah of Jigní. By Sir Hugh's direction, Major Orr then marched on Kúnch.

He marches on Kúnch. Movements of Gall, of Rose, and of Orr.

The country between Púch and Kúnch was studded with little forts, which, up to the time of which I am writing, had been occupied by the enemy. From these they could undoubtedly cause considerable annoyance to small detachments; but, in the presence of the large force now collecting at the former place, they deemed it advisable to abandon them and concentrate at Kúnch.

The rebels concentrate on Kúnch.

Sir Hugh was joined by his 2nd brigade, strengthened by the 71st Highlanders, on the 5th of May. He at once marched on Lohárí, ten miles nearer Kúnch, thence to put into action the plan of attack which he had matured. But, when he arrived at Lohárí, he was informed that the rebels were in possession of the fort of the same name close to it. He immediately detached Major Gall, with a wing of the 3rd Europeans, some artillery and dragoons, to attack it. Gall took the fort, losing two of his officers and some men; out of the garrison not one escaped. Sir Hugh, meanwhile, had matured his plans.

Sir Hugh sends Gall to capture Lohárí,

An Asiatic army, Sir Hugh was well aware, always expects a front attack. He had also noticed that nothing disturbs such an army so much as a turning movement. Instead, therefore, of sending his troops against a position which the rebels had carefully prepared, Sir Hugh resolved to make a flank march with his whole force on the 6th to a position at once

and makes a flank march to turn the rebels' position.

'acing the unfortified side of the town of Kúnch, and threatening seriously the enemy's line of retreat from that place to Kalpí.

With this view Sir Hugh broke up from his encamping-ground early on the morning of the 6th, and, making a flank march of fourteen miles, brought his force into the position contemplated. His 1st brigade, forming his left, rested its extreme left on the village of Nágupúra; his 2nd brigade, forming the centre, occupied the village of Chumair; Major Orr's Haidarábád force, forming the right, occupied the village of Umrí. This position was two miles from Kúnch.

He reaches the assigned point,

It was 7 o'clock in the morning before the troops sighted the rebels, though still invisible to them. Sir Hugh, who had marched with the 1st brigade, ordered them a dram of rum and some biscuit,* whilst he galloped to inspect the arrangements made in the centre and on the right. In an hour he returned, and ordered Major Gall, with a detachment of cavalry, to reconnoitre the wood, garden, and temples which lay between him and Kúnch, covering that advance by a fire of shot and shell. At the same time he directed the siege-guns to take up a position whence they could play upon the town.

gives his men a dram,

sends Gall to reconnoitre,

Gall soon returned with a report that the enemy had retreated through the wood to the part of it near the town, having in their rear a body of cavalry; that the siege-guns had had the effect of driving the rebels on the right of the wood into the town, but that some outworks were still occupied by them.

receives Gall's report,

Sir Hugh determined at once to clear the wood and the outworks with his infantry, and then to storm the town. Covering his left wing with a wing of the 86th, and the whole of the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, in skirmishing order, and supporting their flanks with cavalry and horse artillery, he sent them into the wood. Advancing in perfect order, the gallant Sipáhis of the 25th Native Infantry cleared the wood, temples, and walled gardens in front of them, whilst the 86th, making a circuit to

and marches to storm the town.

* The men had nothing to eat that day till 8 P.M., except the small amount of food they carried in their haversacks.

their left, carried all the obstacles in their front, and then, bringing their left shoulders forward, advanced, despite a heavy fire of artillery and musketry, through the north part of the town and took the fort. This operation, performed by the 1st brigade, drove the enemy's right on their centre.

The 1st brigade drives the rebel right on its centre,

Meanwhile, Brigadier Steuart, commanding the 2nd brigade, having observed a body of rebel infantry strongly posted in cultivated ground threatening the line of attack of his brigade, marched to dislodge them. The rebels contested their position with great valour, and it was not until the 1st brigade, establishing itself in the manner already described, threatened their flank, that they gave way. It had been intended that Brigadier Steuart should then march straight into the town, but, with the view of cutting off the rebels, he moved to the south of it and missed them.

and affords aid to the 2nd brigade.

Major Orr's force had, whilst this was going on, advanced through the wood, round the town, to the plains traversed by the road to Kalpí.

Major Orr moves to cut off the rebels.

Although the operations of which I have given an outline had taken only an hour, and the rebels in that short period had been completely defeated, they managed, nevertheless, to gain with the bulk of their forces the Kalpí road in advance of their pursuers, and on both sides of this road they were now endeavouring to restore some sort of order in their masses, so as to check by every means in their power the ardour of the pursuit. When Sir Hugh Rose, then, emerging from the narrow streets of the town, formed up his brigades for a renewed attack, he beheld the enemy retreating in a long irregular line, covered by skirmishers at close distances, the skirmishers supported by groups who acted to them as a sort of bastions.

The enemy, nevertheless, gain the Kalpí road in full retreat.

The terrific heat of the day, and the power of the sun, which had made itself felt with fatal effect on many of his European Infantry soldiers,* forbade him further to risk those soldiers in a pursuit which could not fail to entail a sacrifice of many valuable lives. He, therefore, halted them, whilst he launched in pursuit the cavalry of both

The heat of the sun forces Sir Hugh to halt his infantry, but he launches the cavalry in pursuit.

* Many of the Sipáhis were also struck down by the sun.

brigades and of Major Orr's force,* and the horse artillery and field guns.

Masterly retreat of the rebels.

Then was witnessed action on the part of the rebels which impelled admiration from their enemies. The manner in which they conducted their retreat could not be surpassed. They remembered the lessons which their European officers had well taught them. There was no hurry, no disorder, no rushing to the rear. All was orderly as on a field-day. Though their line of skirmishers was two miles in length, it never wavered in a single point. The men fired, then ran behind the relieving men, and loaded. The relieving men then fired, and ran back in their turn. They even attempted, when they thought the pursuit was too rash, to take up a position, so as to bring on it an enfilading fire. Their movement was so threatening that Sir Hugh ordered Prettijohn, 14th Light Dragoons, to charge the enfilading party, an order carried out by that most daring officer with great gallantry and success. Still, however, the rebels maintained the order of their retreat, nor was it until many of them had been killed, and all their guns had been captured, that the survivors were driven in on the main body. Then, for the first time, they lost their nerve; then they crowded into the Kalpí road, a long and helpless column of runaways. But the pursuers were completely tired; they were unable to move faster than at a walk; the cavalry horses were knocked up; and, whilst the guns could not approach near enough to fire grape, the cavalry could only pick up an occasional straggler. When, then, a few hundred yards further, broken ground, over which the rebels scattered, supervened, the pursuit came to an end. It had produced great results. The rebels lost nine guns, a quantity of ammunition and stores, and five or six hundred men in killed and wounded. The mutinous 52nd Bengal Native Infantry, which covered the retreat, was almost annihilated. The English loss was three officers and fifty-nine men killed and wounded, in addition to many struck down by the sun.

Gallantry of Prettijohn.

The rebel covering force is at last driven on the main body.

The victors, completely exhausted,

cease the pursuit.

The defeat at Kúnch sowed great mistrust among the rebels. The infantry Sipáhis taunted the cavalry troopers with having

* Except a party left to watch the Jaláun road and the rear.

abandoned them, and the men of all three arms brought the same accusation against Tántiá Topí, who had disappeared at Kúnch even more rapidly than he had galloped away from the Betwá. The Jhánsí horsemen, too, came in for their share of abuse, and, when they excused themselves on the plea that they had felt bound to escort their Ráni* to a place of safety, they were only vilified the more. To such an extent did the animosities among the several parties who constituted the rebel force proceed, that on the morrow of their reaching Kalpí, the rumour, that Sir Hugh was advancing by forced marches against that place, sufficed to induce them to disperse. It is believed that shortly after that rumour arrived there were only eleven Sipáhis left in the town and fort of Kalpí. This dispersion was, however, soon remedied in a manner to be hereafter described.

Bad effect on the rebels of the defeat at Kúnch.

The report which had so disquieted the rebels at Kalpí was not baseless. Despite the fact that his ammunition was well-nigh exhausted, Sir Hugh, determined to give the enemy no breathing time, had pushed on with all practicable speed from Kúnch. On the 15th he established himself at Guláulí, on the Jamnah, six miles from Kalpí. Guláulí is not on the direct road between Kúnch and Kalpí, but two reasons had prompted Sir Hugh to march on it in preference to taking the direct route. In the first place, he had heard from the Commander-in-Chief that Colonel G. V. Maxwell had been detached with the 88th Foot, some Sikhs, and the Camel corps, to co-operate with him; and, Maxwell having reached the left bank of the Jamnah opposite Guláulí, Sir Hugh was able to hold out his hand to him at that place. In the second, by marching on Guláulí, Sir Hugh turned the fortifications which had been thrown up to impede his advance, and threatened Kalpí from an unexpected quarter.

Sir Hugh pushes on,

and establishes himself at Guláulí, near Kalpí.

His reasons for taking that route.

Sir Hugh's march from Kúnch to Guláulí, though unopposed by the enemy, was in all respects most trying. The terrible heat, and the rays of the sun, told upon his men with deadly effect, and admissions to the hospitals and deaths increased at an alarming rate. This fact was well known to the rebels, and they did their

Trying character of the march to Guláulí.

* The Ráni fled to Kalpí after the defeat; Tántiá Topí to Chíkí, near Jaláun, the residence of his parents.

utmost to reap full advantage from it. An intercepted general order by their general-in-chief, issued about this time, directed that no attack should be made upon the European infidels before 10 o'clock in the day, as fighting in the sun either killed them or sent them to their hospitals. But in spite of the heat Guláulí was reached on the 15th, communications were opened with Maxwell, and Sir Hugh, in accordance with his invariable custom, made prompt arrangements for engaging the enemy.

The rebels are reinforced by the Nawáb of Bandah.

Who now constituted the enemy? I have related how, in the panic caused by the rumour of Sir Hugh's onward march, only eleven rebel Sipáhis had been left in the town and fort. A few days later, however, the unexpected arrival of the Nawáb of Bandah with two thousand horse, some guns, and many followers —the remnant of the force defeated by General Whitlock at Bandah, in the manner to be told in the next chapter—and his energetic exertions, backed by those of the Ráni of Jhánsí, produced one of those changes from despair to confidence which mark the Indian character.* The Sipáhis who had left returned, and, exhorted by their leaders to hold to the last Kalpí, their only arsenal, and to win their right to paradise by exterminating the infidel English,† declared their resolution to defend it to the last.

Their confidence returns.

Strong position of Kalpí.

Although as a fortification Kalpí had but little to boast of, its position was unusually strong. It was protected on all sides by ravines, to its front by five lines of defence, and to its rear by the Jamnah, from which rises the precipitous rock on which stands the fort.

Nature of the country between the British camp and Kalpí.

Between the British camp and Kalpí, indeed, existed a most extraordinary labyrinth of ravines, over which artillery and cavalry could make no progress, but which furnished an interminable cover of the most formidable description for infantry. On the, so to speak, tongues of land formed by the prolongation of the ravines, the rebels had rapidly thrown up intrenchments, and had cut trenches near to these in a manner rendering it impossible that they should be turned. Even should they be driven out of the intrenchments, it was within the power of the rebels to fall back on eighty-four temples, built, as well as the

* Sir Hugh Rose's despatch, the 24th of May, 1858.

† Intercepted letter, *idem*.

walls round them, of the most solid masonry. These temples constituted a second line of defence; the outwork of ravines a third; the town of Kalpí a fourth; another chain of ravines a fifth; and the fort the last.

On the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th, constant skirmishes occurred between the two armies, the enemy being the attacking party. On all these occasions they were repulsed, but the British suffered much from the sun, as well as from the incessant toil, anxiety, and heat. On the 19th a mortar battery, established on the right front of the British position, opened on the town. On the 20th a detachment from Colonel Maxwell's brigade, consisting of two companies of the 88th, and a hundred and twenty Sikhs, crossed the river, and joined Sir Hugh Rose. On the 21st the batteries from Maxwell's camp opened on the fort and town. On the 22nd Sir Hugh determined to deliver his long-meditated blow.

Skirmishes between the two armies.

Maxwell reinforces Sir Hugh.

Sir Hugh had, from the first, determined that, whilst Maxwell's batteries should shell Kalpí, he would clear the ravines and the other obstacles and attack the left face of the fort. Resolved to keep his men for this great blow, he had contented himself with simply repulsing the attacks I have mentioned. But when he received information that the rebels were meditating an attack on the 22nd, which should be fatal to one of the contending parties, he, now ready for them, resolved to second their views.

The British plan of attack.

The rebels had prepared a plan so skilful, that, if carried out with courage and resolution, it had many chances in its favour. Whilst their right should make, with great demonstrations, a false attack on the British left, they proposed to steal up the ravines with their main body, and try and overwhelm the right, weakened, they hoped, by detachments sent to support the left.

The rebel plan of attack.

It must be understood that the British force occupied the ground situated between the river Jamnah and the road running from Kalpí to Bandah; that its right rested on the ravines near the river; whilst its left nearly touched that road. In pursuance of their plan, the rebels marched out in masses at 10 o'clock on the 22nd along the Bandah road, and threatened the British left, opening fire simultaneously with their guns on its centre.

The rebels open the battle.

This attack, headed by the Nawáb of Bandah and by Ráo Sáhib, nephew of Náná Sáhib, though intended only as a feint, soon made itself felt, and the British left became heavily engaged. Still Sir Hugh, confident as to the real object of the enemy, did not move a man from his right. He contented himself with replying to the enemy's guns with his guns in a style which soon forced the rebels to limber up and fall back. But the attack on his left not only continued, but became very real indeed: still Sir Hugh did not move a man from his right. It was well he did not. Suddenly, as if by magic, the whole line of ravines became a mass of fire; the enemy's batteries opened, and their infantry, climbing from below, poured in an overwhelming musketry fire on the right of the British line. The suddenness of the attack, the superior numbers of those making it, and the terrible heat of the day gave the rebels a great advantage. Another point, too, was in their favour. Many of the Enfield rifles had become clogged by constant use in all weathers, and the men, after a few discharges, had found it very difficult to load them. The sun, too, had struck down an unusual number of the Europeans. When, then, the rebels, starting up in great numbers from the ravines, poured in volleys which the British reply to only feebly, when they saw that each discharge from the thin red line became weaker than that preceding it, they began to gain a confidence they had never felt before. They pressed on with loud yells, the British falling back, until they approached the British light field-guns and mortar-battery. Then it was that Brigadier C. S. Stuart, dismounting, placed himself by the guns, and bade the gunners defend them with their lives. The 86th and 25th Native Infantry, in thin extended line, disputed the advance step by step. Still the rebels pressed on,*

and attack the British left,

with great severity.

Maintaining that attack, they suddenly direct their main energies against the British right.

The confidence of the rebels increases.

Gallantry of Brigadier C. S. Stuart.

* "Well do I remember," writes to me a very gallant officer, who greatly distinguished himself throughout this campaign, "Well do I remember that day. Nearly four hundred of my regiment, 'the 86,' were *hors de combat*, the native regiment was not much better, and thousands of yelling savages were pressing on, a river in our rear. We were well-nigh beaten, when the Camel corps came up, and about one hundred and fifty fresh troops soon turned the tide, and sent the bhang-possessed enemy to the right-about again. It was the Camel corps

and it seemed as though from their very numbers they must prevail, when Sir Hugh, to whom news of the attack had been conveyed, brought up the Camel corps, which had opportunely crossed the river that very morning, at their best pace; then, dismounting the men, and leading them forward himself at the double, charged the advancing foe, then within a few yards of the British guns. For a moment the enemy stood, but only for a moment. A shout, a dash forward from the whole line, and they went headlong into the ravines below. Not only was the attack on the right repulsed, but the victory was gained! The attack on the left collapsed when it was seen that that on the right had failed, and the guns, gaining the rebels' flank, inflicted great loss on them as they fled. Sir Hugh followed them up so closely that he cut off a number of them from Kalpí. The fire from Maxwell's batteries made those who reached that fort feel that it was no secure place of refuge. They evacuated it accordingly during the night. The rest of their force, pursued by the horse artillery and cavalry, lost their formation and dispersed, losing all their guns and baggage. Even the Rání of Jhánsí, who fled with them, was compelled to sleep under a tree!

Sir Hugh brings up the Camel corps at the critical moment,

and gains the day.

The rebels evacuate Kalpí.

The position of the troops, their sufferings, the feelings that animated them, are thus graphically described by an eye-witness who, throughout its duration, took part in the campaign, and who subsequently gave to the world an eloquent record of the achievements of his comrades. "This was," writes Dr. Lowe,* "a hard day's work, and a glorious victory won over ten times our number under most trying circumstances. The position of Kalpí; the numbers of the enemy, who came on with a resolution and a display of tactics we had never before witnessed; the exhausted, weakened state of the general's force; the awful suffocating hot winds and burning sun, which the men had to endure all day, without time to take food or water, combined to render the achievement one of unsurpassed

Trials to which the English troops were subjected during this campaign.

that literally saved Sir Hugh Rose's division. The enemy were within twenty yards of our battery and outpost tents, the latter full of men down with sunstroke Another quarter of an hour and there would have been a massacre. Ever since that day I have looked upon a camel with eyes of affection."

* Lowe's *Central India during the Rebellion of* 1857-58.

difficulty. Every soul engaged in this important action suffered more or less. Officers and men fainted away, or dropped down as though struck by lightning in the delirium of a sunstroke; yet all this was endured without a murmur, and in the cool of the evening we were speculating upon the capture of Kalpí on the morrow."

Their unmurmuring endurance.

Before daybreak the following morning, Sir Hugh marched on that place. His 1st brigade, under Brigadier C. S. Stuart, he sent through the ravines, following the course of the Jamnah, whilst he led the 2nd himself,* along the Kalpí road.

Colonel Maxwell's batteries still continued to shell the fort and the villages in front of it. As the two brigades advanced, however, these villages were abandoned by the rebels, and it soon became apparent that no serious resistance was contemplated. When the two brigades, having overcome all obstacles in their path, united near the town, and advanced into it, they were not opposed; the rebels had fled, quitting for ever the arsenal which had served them so long and so well.†

The fort of Kalpí is evacuated.

The capture of Kalpí completed the plan of the campaign for the column having its base at Máu, which Sir Robert Hamilton had submitted to the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief towards the close of the preceding year. In all respects that plan had been carried out. Marching from Máu in November Sir Hugh Rose had, in five months, traversed central India, crossing its numerous rivers, storming strong forts, taking many towns, defeating armies vastly superior in numbers, led by men and by a woman whose

The capture of Kalpí completes Sir Robert Hamilton's plan.

* Brigadier C. Steuart, C.B., commanding the 2nd brigade, had reported sick after the battle of Kúnch, and the command had devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, 71st Highlanders.

† The following description, given by an eye-witness, proves how the rebels had used the position of Kalpí, and the good stead in which it had stood them. After enumerating the quantities of ammunition, lead, iron, brass, gun-carriages, gun-moulds, &c., found in the fort, Dr. Lowe adds:—"The enemy had erected houses and tents in the fort, had their smiths' shops, their carpenters' shops. Their foundries for casting shot and shell were in perfect order, clean and well constructed; the specimens of brass shell cast by them were faultless. . . . In the arsenal were about sixty thousand pounds of gunpowder, outside it were large heaps of shot and shell ranged after the fashion of our own. . . . It would appear. . . that the enemy had prepared for a long stand here."—Lowe's *Central India.*

hatred of the British name incited them to efforts not to be surpassed in the annals of the mutiny. He and his gallant comrades had accomplished these great deeds during a season the terrible heat of which far surpassed the heat of the corresponding season of previous years, and under a sun which proved scarcely less deadly than the enemy.* Yet moving steadily onwards, regarding difficulties as only obstacles to be overcome, keeping in view the goal at which he aimed, Sir Hugh had marched from victory to victory. It may be said of him that it was his character which created his success. Careless of himself, he conducted every reconnaissance, he planned every action, he was foremost in every attack, he courted danger and exposure. At the same time, no leader ever paid greater attention to the soldiers. To look after their comforts, to see, after a hard-fought action, that the wounded were attended to, and, after a long and tedious march, that provisions were abundant, was with him a sacred duty. It was this which endeared him to the troops; this that made them fight cheerily against numbers, endure the killing rays of the fierce sun. If he demanded all their energies on the battle-field, they saw that their wants were attended to when the battle was over; that he never spared himself; that, with all the cares of command upon him, he managed to find time to attend to them. It was that sympathy which evoked the enthusiasm which enabled the soldiers of Sir Hugh Rose to equal the achievements of any warriors of whom history makes record.

Summary of the campaign.

Sir Hugh Rose's "character created his success."

The campaign now appeared over. Its every object had been accomplished. Sir Colin Campbell, sharing that opinion, wrote to Sir Robert Hamilton a letter explaining the mode in which the several corps of the Central India Field Force were to be cantoned,

The campaign appears concluded.

* Dr. Lowe thus describes the condition of officers and men from the effect, of the sun, when they entered Kalpí. "Most of the officers and men were sick and the whole force needed rest. The general himself was very ill; his chief of the staff, Colonel Wetherall, C.B., was in a raving fever; his quartermasters general, Captain Macdonald, was worn out, and among the list of those going away; the chaplain of the force, the Rev. Mr. Schwabbe, had lost his reason and was apparently sinking fast; and other officers, wounded or exhausted by their long and arduous duties and disease, brought on by these and the terrible sun, had been ordered to England."

and adding, with regard to Whitlock's force, that "it would be otherwise employed as a movable division." The general who had conducted the campaign was about to dissolve the force and to proceed to a cooler climate for the recovery of his health. How all these arrangements were suddenly altered I shall tell in another chapter. Meanwhile it is my duty to record the operations of the other column, which, with Jabalpúr as its base, had been directed to move on Bandah, subduing the rebel Rájahs on its route.

CHAPTER II.

KÍRWÍ AND BANDAH.

On the 16th of November, 1857, Brigadier-General Whitlock, of the Madras army, was appointed to the command of a division for service in the Nágpúr, Ságar, and Narbadá territories. His force was to consist of an artillery brigade, composed of two troops of horse artillery and three companies of foot artillery, with two light field-batteries attached, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Miller; of a cavalry brigade composed of the 12th Lancers and the 6th and 7th Madras Light Cavalry, commanded by Colonel A. W. Lawrence; of one brigade of infantry, composed of the 3rd Madras Europeans and the 1st and 5th Madras Native Infantry, commanded by Colonel Carpenter, M.A.; of a second infantry brigade, composed of the 43rd Light Infantry and the 19th and left wing of the 50th Madras Native Infantry, commanded by Colonel McDuff, 74th Highlanders. There were also details of sappers and miners. The force was to be massed at Jabalpúr, and to march thence towards Bandah.

The composition of General Whitlock's force.

A small force, previously detached from the Madras presidency, or serving in the central provinces, was already at Jabalpúr.* This force consisted of six hundred and fifty men of the 33rd Madras Native Infantry, under Colonel Miller; a hundred and twenty men 28th Madras Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Standen; a hundred and twenty men of the 1st Nágpúr Rifles†; three hundred men 4th Madras Light Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Cumberlege; three hundred men 6th Madras Light Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Byng; a hundred and fifty men 2nd Nizám's Cavalry, under Captain Macintire;

The force at Jabalpúr is directed

* *Vide* page 70 of this volume.

† The Nágpúr local force had been rearmed by Mr. Plowden.

to halt pending Whitlock's arrival.

a total of eight hundred and ninety infantry and seven hundred and fifty cavalry. This small column had orders to halt at Jabalpúr pending the arrival of General Whitlock and his force.

General Whitlock reached Kámthí on the 10th of January. He was unable, from various causes, to leave that place till the 23rd of the same month. Setting out on that date, he arrived at Jabalpúr on the 6th of February.* Part of his 1st brigade reached on the 6th, the remainder a few days later.

Whitlock reaches Jabalpúr.

On the 17th of February General Whitlock, leaving a small garrison at Jabalpúr, soon to be increased by the arrival of Brigadier McDuff's brigade to a tolerable strength, set out for Ságar. He moved in the direction of Jakhání, with the object of overawing the mutinous landowners in the Réwah district. He reached that place, previously captured by Willoughby Osborne, on the 24th, and was there met by the loyal Rájah of Úrchah. Halting here one day, he set out on the 26th for Damoh, and arrived there on the 4th of March. It is worthy of remark that during this march of fifteen days General Whitlock, though strongly urged by Major Erskine, the political officer accompanying his force, to drive the rebels from the strong places they occupied, and from which they still continued to harass the districts between Jabalpúr and Damoh, refused to send a single detachment for that purpose from his force. He preferred, he said, to keep it massed in his hand. The result was that, although Whitlock's column secured the ground on which it encamped, scared into submission the villages through which it marched, and even recovered Damoh, it left the population of the districts still occupied by rebels astonished at the regard paid to the latter.

He sets out with part of his force for Ságar.

His movements are characterised by extreme caution.

On the 5th Whitlock rode into Ságar, accompanied by some horse artillery and cavalry. Ságar had previously been relieved by Sir Hugh Rose, but on reaching it Whitlock at once sent an express to Damoh for two hundred European and seventy native infantry to come in by forced marches; he also detached a small body of Europeans to escort treasure from Jabalpúr, whilst the remainder of the force he kept halted at Damoh under the command of Brigadier

Whitlock reaches Ságar.

* The distance is a hundred and forty-eight miles.

arpenter. He, however, returned and resumed command on
ıe 12th.

On the 17th Whitlock, still halted at Damoh, received the
overnor-General's orders to march on Nágód and
anah by way of Hattah, and to afford aid to the
yal Rájahs of Bundelkhand, notably to the Rájah
Charkhárí. Lord Canning's despatch further
rected Whitlock to communicate his movement to
r Hugh Rose, so as to enable that officer to work
concert with him.

Whitlock is ordered to march on Nágód, and to communicate with Sir Hugh Rose.

In compliance with this order, Whitlock left Damoh on the
2nd of March, and, entering Bundelkhand, arrived
Panah without molestation on the 29th. Evidently
man of extreme caution, Whitlock halted here to ob-
in information regarding the position of the enemy
ıd the practicability of the roads. The reader, if he
fer to the preceding chapter, will see that this was the precise
ɔriod when the Government would have diverted Sir Hugh
ɔse from his attack on Jhánsí in order to succour Charkhárí,
ıen besieged by Tántiá Topí; and that activity on
ıe part of General Whitlock was specially desirable.
ut no activity was displayed. The force remained
ılted at Panah till the 2nd of April. Whitlock, having by
ıat time come to a resolution, marched on it by Marwá Ghát, a
ute almost impossible for guns and vehicles. So
fficult was the road that on reaching Mándalá, at
ıe foot of the pass, Whitlock had to halt for three
ys to repair damages. Whilst thus halted, he
ceived (3rd of April) a despatch from Sir Hugh
ɔse, directing him to move with all expedition upon Jhánsí.
hitlock was unable to leave Mándalá till the 6th of April.
e then marched, by way of Chatrpúr, on Bandah, reached
ıatrpúr on the 9th, surprised the rebels the follow-
g night whilst evacuating the fort of Jhigan, then
arched on Mahoba, and thence on Bandah.

Whitlock reaches Panah, and halts to obtain information.

His extreme caution.

Proceeds by a difficult road towards Bandah, still slowly and cautiously,

and eventually reaches Bandah.

The rebel Nawáb of Bandah, was playing the part of an
dependent prince in the district which took its
me from the chief town. The Nawáb had been
ell supplied with information regarding Whitlock's
ɔvements, and, judging him to be a man of a
utious and anxious temperament, determined to
tempt to lead him into a trap. No sooner, then, had he been

The Nawáb of Bandah endeavours to draw Whitlock into a trap,

certified of the advance of the English general than he directed the troops he had stationed at Mahoba, and which consisted of eight hundred and fifty men of the mutinied 50th Bengal Native Infantry, two hundred men of the 23rd Native Infantry, the 2nd Regiment Irregular Cavalry Gwáliár contingent, and half a battery of guns, to evacuate that place and take up a position in ambush at Kabrai, whence they should fall upon English troops as they would pass it before dawn. At the same time the Nawáb took care that Whitlock should be informed that he would encounter no enemy south of Bandah.

Had the courage of his troops equalled the cleverness of the Nawáb, the plan would have succeeded. Whitlock so far fell into the trap that he believed there were no rebels before him. His troops were actually marching through Kabrai an hour before daybreak, when the enemy opened upon them a heavy fire. The surprise was but for a moment. The Horse Artillery, the Lancers, and the Haidarábád Irregulars galloped forward, and soon compelled the rebels to retreat. Unfortunately, in the pursuit which followed, the principal body of the British force took, in the dark, a wrong direction, so that but few of the enemy were cut up. The attempt, however, clearly indicated to Whitlock what was in store for him at Bandah. He pushed on, however, and on the early morning of the 19th found the rebel forces, headed by the Nawáb, occupying the plain south of the town, and barring his entrance into it. The Nawáb's forces consisted of seven thousand men, of whom rather more than one-third were regular troops. The position he had taken up was strong. The ground was very much intersected by ravines and watercourses, and of these the rebels had taken skilful advantage.

and succeeds.

The Nawáb's troops surprise the English, but the latter, soon recovering, defeat them.

The Nawáb's troops take up a strong position in front of Bandah.

Whitlock had broken up his camp at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 19th. At 5 o'clock his advance guard, commanded by Colonel Apthorp, and consisting of three companies 3rd Madras Europeans, two guns Mein's troop Horse Artillery, some Haidarábád Irregulars under Macintire, a few of the 12th Lancers, and a detachment 1st Madras Native Infantry, came upon the enemy. Apthorp was at once directed to turn the right of the rebel position, whilst the main body should threaten it in front. These orders were carried out to the letter. Apthorp's men had, however, no easy

Where he is attacked by Whitlock.

task. It was difficult to get at the rebels. When Apthorp had carried one ravine he found them in force in the next. There must have been much in the nature of the ground to screen human life, for though the fight lasted seven hours, from 5 o'clock till noon, the casualties on the British side amounted only t thirty-nine, of whom four were officers. Several deeds o heroism were performed. The coolness of Apthorp was th admiration of every one. Young Colbeck, of the 3rd European met a glorious death leading his men to the charge of the firs nullah. Captain Macintire, of the Haidarábád cavalry—whic lost twenty killed and wounded—greatly distinguished himsel as did likewise Brigadier Miller, Sergeant-Major Alford, c the Madras Artillery, and Captain Clifton, 12th Lancers. A length the position was forced, and the Nawáb fled, with two thousand followers, to Kalpí, leaving behind him seventeen guns, the town of Bandah, and a palace filled with property of great value. The rebel loss i the battle was variously estimated at from four to six hundre men. General Whitlock established his head-quarters in Bandal to wait there till the remainder of his force should join him.

Gallantry of Apthorp, Colbeck, Macintire, Miller, Alford, and Clifton.

The Nawáb completely defeated.

The second brigade, under Brigadier McDuff, reached Jabalpú on the 18th of March, and set out for Ságar on the 24th. In order, however, to prevent the mutineers from heading backwards into the Mírzápúr district, Whitlock sent instructions to this brigade to change its course and to proceed to Nagód. McDuff, therefore, onl reached Bandah on the 27th of May. He found Whitlock stil halted there.

Whitlock is joined by McDuff's brigade.

Whitlock, on being joined by McDuff's brigade, resolved t march to the assistance of Sir Hugh Rose at Kalpí, and ha indicated the 29th as the day of departure on that errand. Bu Sir Hugh Rose, as we have seen, had completely defeated th rebels before Kalpí on the 23rd, and had entered that place o the 24th of May. Information of this reached Whitlock in tim to change his plans regarding Kalpí.

The reader who has followed me through this and the pre ceding chapter, will not have failed to see how, in every particular, the action of Sir Hugh Rose had cleared the way for the action of General Whitlock. It was Sir Hugh, who at Garhákóta, and on the Betwá, had disposed of the enemies with whom, but for that,

In every particular Sir Hugh Rose had cleared the way for Whitlock

Whitlock would have had to deal. The defeat of Tántiá Topí on the Betwá alone made it possible for Whitlock to march on Bandah. Yet—extraordinary perversity of Fortune—whilst Sir Hugh and his force endured all the hardships of the campaign, and did by far the most important part of the fighting, Whitlock and his little army, up to the time of the capture of Bandah, gained all the substantial advantages. The spoils of Bandah, which would not have been gained but for the action of Sir Hugh Rose, were allotted to Whitlock's force alone!

Perversity of fortune.

The same blind goddess, not content with one perverse distribution of her favours, now set about to perpetrate another. Whitlock had but just renounced his intention to march to the assistance of Sir Hugh Rose at Kalpí, when he received orders from Lord Canning to march against the Ráo of Kírwí.

Whitlock is ordered to march on Kírwí.

Kírwí, formerly better known as Tiróha, is forty-five miles from Bandah, and seventy from Allahábád. The Ráo of Kírwí, Mádhava Ráo, had succeeded to the throne by adoption, when he was only four years old. When the mutiny broke out in 1857, he was then a boy of but nine years, under the tutelage of Rám Chandrá Rám, a man enjoying the confidence of the Government of India, and appointed by it to watch the interests of the young Ráo during his minority. The Ráo was thus, in equity, the ward of the Government of India. It has been commonly asserted that there were two Ráos of Kírwí.* This statement has no foundation. There was, indeed, a discarded relative of the immediate predecessor of Rám Chandrá Rám, to whom he, Mádhava Ráo, was required to pay a monthly stipend of two hundred rupees, and to whom the title of Ráo was granted by courtesy. But this person, Naráyan Ráo, was absolutely without position or influence, and he would not have presumed even to whisper an interference in the affairs of the state.

Sketch of Kírwí.

The situation at Kírwí, then, was simply this: that the Ráo was a minor, only nine years old, and the affairs of the principality were practically conducted by Rám Chandrá Rám, the nominee of the Government of India. But, though Rám Chandrá was the nominee of the Indian Government, and though he practically managed the state of Kírwí, the feeling amongst the landowners

* I fell into this mistake in the first edition of this work.

of the principality, great and small, was, in 1857, inimical to the British. It seems to me very natural that it should have been so. Many years before, in 1827, Amrit Ráo, the then ruler, had deposited two lakhs of rupees, at 6 per cent. interest, in the hands of the Government of India, for the perpetual maintenance of charities and temples which he had established in the holy city of Banáras. Ten years later, in 1837, the Government of India had reduced their rate of interest to 4 per cent., and Venáyak Ráo, the son and successor of Amrit Ráo, in order that neither the charities nor the temples might feel the loss, and in the view, moreover, of increasing their resources, had then deposited in the hands of the Government three additional lakhs, making a total of five lakhs, the interest of which was to be paid annually for the purposes above stated. The interest was punctually paid during the lifetime of Venáyak Ráo, and for three years after his death, when, for some reason which the Government of India has never divulged, the payment of the interest ceased.

Mádhava Ráo was then only seven years old, and no suspicion of treason, or felonious intent, attached then to the child; but his advisers, and other pious Hindus, men of blameless life and integrity of purpose, were so shocked at the sacrilegious and fraudulent withholding of the interest on sums deposited for a special purpose by the Ráos of Kírwí, that they paid the missing amount out of the estate of the principality. But a very bitter feeling was engendered throughout its broad lands. Princes, priests, and people alike felt that no faith could thenceforward be placed in the promises of the Supreme Power.

Their adviser, Rádhava Govind, stimulates their disaffection,

When, then, the mutiny broke out in the North-West Provinces; when the Raní of Jhánsí, whose cause, judged from the standard of the prescriptive rights of native princes, was eminently a just cause, broke into rebellion; when the earlier occurrences in the vicinity of Bundelkhand seemed to presage the fall of British rule, it is not surprising that Rám Chandrá Rám, noting the outraged feelings of the people, and their sympathy with the leader of the movement in the Duáb, the heir of the Peshwá, Náná Sáhib, to whom the Ráo of Kírwí, was collaterally related, should have found his task more than ordinarily difficult. But, loyal to the British overlord, he did his duty truly and zealously.

who declare for Náná Sáhib.

Causes which prompted the Ráo still to hope after Bandah had fallen.

Up to the third week of May, 1858, the young Ráo, himself innocent of mischief, for, it cannot be too often insisted, he was only nine years old, had enjoyed blissful visions of a fortunate future. He did not know that Kírwí had been placed on the list of the places to which a severe lesson was to be administered, for the discontent of his people had taken a very passive form. For a long time it was covered from danger by the Nawáb of Bandah, but, when Bandah fell on the 19th of April, the young Ráo was made to write to Sir Robert Hamilton, professing loyalty to the British, and offering to admit British troops into his capital.

On hearing that Whitlock is marching on Kírwí they ride out and surrender.

A little later, when he, Sir Hugh, unaided by Whitlock, had taken Kalpí, and when, on the 2nd of June, Whitlock left Bandah, to march on their palace, the Ráo waited till that general had reached Bharatkúp, ten miles from Kírwí, and then rode out and tendered to him the welcome only offered to those supposed to be friends.

By this act the spoils of Kírwí devolve, without fighting, on Whitlock's force.

Whitlock's march on Kírwí had been made possible by the annihilation of the forces of the Nawáb of Bandah at Kalpí. That chieftain fled from Bundelkhand, never again, during the war, to reappear within its borders. Still, the young Ráo had committed no overt act of rebellion; he was yet virtually a ward of the British Government; he had surrendered without resistance to the British general; and there was assuredly no reason why the great disaffection of his people should be punished in his person as though it had been active treason.

But, at Kírwí, there was an accumulation of treasure. The young Ráo was very rich, and it was found not difficult to trump up a case against him.

Enormous amount of treasure found at Kírwí.

For Whitlock, moving from Bandah on the 2nd of June,* had entered Kírwí without opposition on the 6th. Not a shot had been fired against him, but he resolved nevertheless to treat the young Ráo as though he had actually opposed the British forces. The reason for this perversion of honest dealing lay in the fact that in

* The very day on which, it will be seen, one of Sir Hugh's columns started to encounter more dangers at Gwáliár.

the palace of Kírwí was stored the wherewithal to compensate soldiers for many a hard fight, and many a broiling sun. In its vaults and strong rooms were specie, jewels, and diamonds of priceless value!

It was nothing that the young Ráo, to whom this wealth belonged, was himself but a lad of nine years, innocent in his own person of treason; that the Indian Government was his guardian, and, as such, responsible, during his minority for his acts; that the tutor of the young boy, Rám Chandrá Rám, who doubtless had been the interpreter of the outraged feelings of the nobles of Kírwí, had been appointed to his post by British authority. The wealth was coveted, and the wealth was taken —taken as prize money, to be squabbled over by those who took it without firing a shot.*

The right to the booty subsequently argued before the High Court of Admiralty.

The question of the proprietary right in this booty, strangely declared to be prize-money, was ultimately argued before the High Court of Admiralty. By this court the claim of Sir Hugh Rose's force to share in the prize, which had come into British possession mainly in consequence of his action, was rejected; the claims of the commanders of other co-operating but independent divisions and columns were rejected; the claims of the Commander-in-Chief in India and his staff, who were hundreds of miles from the spot, and whose action did not influence the capture, and the claims of the officers and men of General Whitlock's force, were admitted to an exclusive right in the prize of Bandah and Kírwí.

Its decision.

Possibly the reader may feel some interest as to the future of the innocent boy, Mádhava Ráo, whose property was thus unceremoniously disposed of. A treatment similar to that meted out by the Government of India to another of their wards, Dhulip Singh of the Panjáb, was extended to this boy of nine. His estates were confiscated. He was then † "pardoned in consideration of his youth, and is now being educated at Barélí as a ward of the British Government. A provision of Rs. 30,000 a year has been made for him." ‡ What became of

* *Vide* Appendix A.

† "Aitchison's Treaties," vol. iii. p. 142 (edition 1863).

‡ The proof that the Government of India were actually the trustees of the Ráo's estate is to be found in the fact that in 1857 they were actually regulating the property, making all-important appointments and authorising all the expenditure, through the Administrator-General of Bengal and his officers.

him subsequently to 1863 I have been unable to ascertain. It is to be hoped that the guardianship announced in the record from which I have quoted has been more faithfully administered than was the first.

After the capture of Kírwí, Whitlock's force was distributed so as to maintain order in the Bundelkhand and Jamnah districts. A portion was sent to Kalpí on the requisition of Sir H. Rose; one was left at Kírwí, other portions were sent to Mohába, Jaláun, Bandah, Kirka, Ságar, Damoh, and Hamirpúr. The general's headquarters were fixed at Mahóba. Here we must leave him, to return to Tántiá Topí and Sir Hugh Rose.

t is a recognised law, that the malfeasances of agents appointed by a trustee are not to be attributed to the ward.

CHAPTER III.

SIR HUGH ROSE AND GWÁLIÁR.

It has already been related that Tántiá Topí, after his defeat at Kúnch, had fled to Chirkí—about four miles from Jaláur—where his parents resided. He remained there during Sir Hugh Rose's march to Kalpí, and during the events which led to the capture of that place. Learning that Ráo Sáhib and the Rání of Jhánsí had fled, after their defeat at Galáuli, towards Gopálpúr, forty-six miles south-west of Gwáliár, Tántiá girded up his loins and joined them at that place.

Movements of Tántiá Topí, the Rání of Jhánsi, and Ráo Sáhib after the fall of Kalpí.

Their affairs seemed desperate. Not only had they lost their hold on central India, on the Ságar and Narbadá territories and on Bundelkhand, but their enemies were closing in on every side; Roberts had already detached from Rajpútáná a brigade under Colonel Smith to co-operate with Sir Hugh Rose; the force under that officer was at Kalpí, about to be distributed in the territories west of the Jamnah; Whitlock had conquered Bandah and plundered Kírwí. On three sides, then, on the south, east, and the west, they were encompassed by foes. Nor towards the north did the prospect look brighter. There lay the capital of Mahárájah Sindhiá, overlooked by a wall-girt and almost inaccessible rock. Sindhiá was not less their enemy than were the British. In the darkest hour of the fortunes of the British, at a time when hostility seemed to promise him empire, Sindhiá had remained faithful to his overlord. It was not to be thought of, nor was it thought possible, that in the mid-day of their triumph he would turn against them.

Desperate condition of their affairs.

Surrounded by enemies.

The situation then seemed desperate to the rebel chieftains. But desperate situations suggest desperate remedies; and a remedy which, on first inspection, might well seem desperate, did occur to the fertile brain of one

Desperate remedy suggested.

of the confederates. To which one it is not certainly known. But, judging the leading group of conspirators by their antecedents—Ráo Sáhib, the Nawáb of Bandah, Tántiá Topí, and the Ráni of Jhánsí—we may at once dismiss the two first from consideration. They possessed neither the character nor the genius to conceive a plan so vast and so daring. Of the two who remain, we may dismiss Tántiá Topí. Not that he was incapable of forming the design, but—we have his memoirs—and in those he takes to himself no credit for the most successful act with which his career is associated. The fourth conspirator possessed the genius, the daring, the despair necessary for the conception of great deeds. She was urged on by hatred, by desire of vengeance, by a blood-stained conscience, by a determination to strike hard whilst there was yet a chance. She could recognise the possibilities before her, she could hope even that if the first blow were successful the fortunes of the campaign might be changed; she possessed and exercised unbounded influence over one at least of her companions—the Ráo Sáhib. The conjecture, then, almost amounts to certainty that the desperate remedy which the confederates decided to execute at Gopálpúr was suggested and pressed upon her comrades by the daring Ráni of Jhánsí.

probably by the Ráni of Jhánsí.

The plan was this. To march on Gwáliár by forced marches, to appeal to the religious and national feeling of Sindhiá's troops, to take possession of his capital, by force if it were necessary, and then from the precipitous rock of the Gwáliár fortress to bid defiance to the British.

Her plan.

The scheme was no sooner accepted than acted upon. Emissaries proceeded in advance of the column to tamper with and, if possible, to gain over Sindhiá's troops; the column followed more leisurely, yet with a celerity adapted to the occasion, and reached the Morár cantonment, formerly occupied by the contingent, in close vicinity to Gwáliár, during the night of the 30th of May.

The confederates accept it, and march on Gwáliár.

Mahárájah Sindhiá was informed that night of the arrival of his dangerous visitors. Probably no prince had ever been placed in circumstances of stronger temptation than was Jaiájí Ráo Sindhiá during 1857–58. The descendant by adoption and the representative of the family of the famous Mádhájí Ráo, of the Dáolat Ráo who had fought for the possession of India with the two Wellesleys; he was still the most

Mahárájah Sindhiá.

considerable chief of the Maráthá race, and his word, if spoken for religion and race, would have found a response all over central and western India. For four months he had probably the fate of India in his hands. Had he revolted in June, the siege of Dehlí must have been raised, Ágra and Lakhnao would have fallen; it is more than probable that the Panjáb would have risen. That, under such circumstances, possessing strong military instincts and chafing under a great ambition, Sindhiá should have remained loyal, is most weighty testimony to the character of the English overlordship, and to its appreciation by the greater princes of India. That Sindhiá was greatly influenced in the course he followed by his shrewd minister, Rájah Dinkar Ráo, and by the appeals from the fort of Ágra of the able British representative at his court, Major Charters Macpherson, may be admitted. But neither Sindhiá nor Dinkar Ráo liked the English personally. Both the one and the other would have preferred an independent Gwáliár. But, though they did not like the English personally, they had great respect for the English character. Recollecting the state of north-western and central and western India prior to the rule of Marquess Wellesley, they could feel, under the English overlordship, a sense of security such as their fathers and their fathers' fathers never possessed. They had, at least, secure possession of their holdings. No one from outside would venture to molest them as their ancestors had been molested. The question, then, would rise—and it was in answering this that the influence of Major Charters Macpherson came most beneficially into play—"Granting that, by joining the mutineers, we could confine the English to Bengal, would Gwáliár gain by their expulsion? It is doubtful: there would be many competitors for supremacy, and—who knows? The King of Dehlí might, with the aid of Sipáhis, become supreme or the Sikhs of the Panjáb, or Náná Sáhib, or perhaps even Holkar. The risk is too great, for, adhering to the English, we shall be safe in the end."

His great influence.

For four months he had the fate of India in his hands.

Probable reasons for his loyalty.

In some such manner reasoned Sindhiá and Dinkar Ráo. They argued the question in the light of the interests of Sindhiá, and in that light, held ever before them by the steady hand of Charters Macpherson, they cast in their lot with the British.

But not in this manner reasoned many of the great families

The same reasons do not affect the bulk of the Maráthá people,

of Gwáliár, the bulk of the army and of the people. These men could recognise only what was passing before their eyes. Their eyes looked back with longing to the past when the empire was dangling before the Maráthá race, and they never attempted even to open the book of the future. They could only see, in 1857, the British power struck down, and an opportunity offering itself to their master such as the great Mádhájí would have given half his years to have clutched. They could not understand their Mahárájah's inaction, his attempts to befriend the British in the hour of their adversity. They had sympathised with the men of his contingent when they revolted and murdered their officers. The higher and more influential amongst them assailed Sindhiá with persuasions and entreaties; and, when they found these fail, they began even to talk of dethroning him and setting up another ruler in his place.

who, in consequence, vent their discontent on Sindhiá.

The fall of Dehlí, the British successes in Lakhnao and in north-western and central India, had by no means changed these sentiments. The irritation caused by lost opportunities had produced a state of mind eager to grasp at any chance to mend the situation or to be rid of it.

Such was the state of general feeling in Gwáliár when, on the night of the 30th of May, information was brought to the Mahárájah that Tántiá Topí, the Rání of Jhánsí, and other chieftains, with a force estimated at seven thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and twelve guns, had reached Morár. No one knew better the general state of feeling about him than the Mahárájah. But he never wavered. The conviction of the ultimate triumph of the English was never stronger within him than at this apparently inauspicious moment, and, notwithstanding the ill-concealed hostility of many of his adherents, he determined to seize the offered opportunity and do battle with the rebels.

Sindhiá hears of Tántiá Topi's arrival at Morár,

and resolves to do battle with him.

Accordingly, at daybreak on the 1st of June, he marched out and took up a position about two miles to the eastward of Morár. He had with him six thousand infantry, about fifteen hundred cavalry, his own bodyguard six hundred strong, and eight guns. These he ranged in three divisions, his guns in the centre, and waited for the attack. About 7 o'clock in the morning the rebels

He marches to meet Tántiá,

advanced, covered by mounted skirmishers, with camels carrying guns of small calibre. As they approached, Sindhiá's eight guns opened on them. But the smoke of the discharge had scarcely disappeared when the rebel skirmishers closed to their flanks, and two thousand horsemen, charging at a gallop, carried the guns. Simultaneously with their charge Sindhiá's infantry and cavalry, his bodyguard alone excepted, either joined the rebels or took up a position indicative of their intention not to fight. The rebel cavalry, pushing their advantage, then attacked the bodyguard, with which was Sindhiá himself. A portion of the guardsmen defended themselves with great gallantry, and did not cease to fight till many of their number had fallen. But, as it became more and more apparent every moment that it was useless to continue the unequal contest, Sindhiá turned and fled, accompanied by a very few of the survivors. He did not draw rein till he reached Ágra.

is completely defeated,

and flees to Ágra.

The first part of the Rání's bold plan had thus succeeded. She and her confederates delayed not a moment to carry it out to its legitimate consequences. They entered Gwáliár, took possession of the fortress, the treasury, the arsenal and the town, and began at once to form a regular government. Náná Sahib was proclaimed as Peshwá, and Ráo Sáhib as governor of Gwáliár. Plentiful largesses were distributed to the army, alike to the Gwáliár troops as to those who had come from Kálpí. Rám Ráo Govind, one of the Sindhiá's disgraced courtiers, was appointed prime minister. The royal property was declared confiscated. Four Maráthá chiefs, who had been imprisoned by Sindhiá for rebellion, were released, clothed with dresses of honour, and sent into the districts to raise troops to oppose the British in any attempts they might make to cross the Chambal. The command of the bulk of the troops, encamped outside the city, was entrusted to the Rání of Jhánsí. Those within the town obeyed the orders of Tántiá Topí. Letters were at once despatched to the rebel rájahs still in the district, notably to the Rájahs of Bánpúr and Sháhgarh, to join the new government at Gwáliár.

The rebels enter Gwáliár, and form a government there,

and prepare to hold the place and the surrounding territories.

The intelligence of the success of this audacious enterprise reached Kalpí on the 3rd of June. Before I refer to the action taken by Sir Hugh Rose, it is necessary that I should state

The story returns to Sir Hugh Rose.

the exact positions of the various portions of the force with which he had conquered Kalpí on the 24th of May.

His action after the defeat of the rebels at Kalpí.

As soon as, by the occupation of Kalpí on the 24th of May, Sir Hugh Rose had discovered the flight of the rebels, he sent out parties to discover the line they had taken. Information was soon brought to him that, whilst a few had crossed the Jamnah into the Duáb, whilst a few more had been checked in attempting the same course by Colonel Riddell,* the main body had bent their steps in almost a south-westerly direction to Gopálpúr. To pursue these latter he at once organised a column composed of the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, the 3rd Bombay light cavalry, and a hundred and fifty Haidarábád cavalry, and despatched it, under the command of Colonel Robertson, on the track of the rebels.

Robertson pushes on in pursuit of the rebels.

Robertson set out from Kalpí on the 25th of May, the rain falling heavily. This rain, which continued throughout that day and the day following, much impeded his progress. He pushed on, however, as fast as possible, and, traversing Mahona and Indúrkí, found that the rebels were but little in advance of him. At Iráwan, reached on the 29th, supplies ran short, and, as none were procurable in the district, the column had to wait till they could be sent up from Kalpí. On the 2nd of June Robertson received these and was joined by two squadrons of the 14th light dragoons, a wing of the 86th foot, and four 9-pounders. The following day he reached Mohárar, fifty-five miles from Gwáliár. Here he was startled by information of the attack made by the rebels on Gwáliár and of its result.

An express from Robertson, sent from Iráwan, and which reached Kalpí on the 1st of June, gave Sir Hugh the first in-

* Colonel Riddell, who was moving down the north bank of the Jamnah with the 3rd Bengal Europeans, Alexander's Horse, and two guns, caught sight of a body of the rebels escaping from Kalpí, a few miles above that place, on the south bank of the river, on the 25th of May. He instantly sent the 3rd Europeans across, who captured their camp equipage, the enemy not waiting to receive them. Colonel Riddell's force had previously had several skirmishes with detached parties of insurgents. A small party of his troops had proceeded to Kalpí in boats, joining there Sir Hugh Rose. On their way they were threatened by a numerous body of rebels near Bhijalpúr. Lieutenant Sherriff, who commanded the party, had at once landed 150 men, defeated the rebels, and captured four guns.

formation that the rebels had taken the road to Gwáliár. Instantly Sir Hugh despatched General Stuart with the remainder of his brigade, consisting of the other wing of the 86th foot, a wing of the 71st Highlanders, four companies of the 25th Bengal native infantry, one squadron 14th light dragoons, No. 4 light field battery, two 18-pounders, one 8-inch howitzer, and some sappers, to join Robertson and to march on Gwáliár. Stuart reached Atakóná on the 3rd—the day on which Robertson had reached Mohárar—and there he too received the first information of the startling occurrences at Gwáliár.

Sir Hugh learns that the rebels are moving on Gwáliár, and at once despatches Stuart's brigade in that direction.

The order which had sent Stuart to Gwáliár was dictated by a sound military instinct. But no one, not even Sir Hugh Rose, had imagined the height of daring to which the Rání of Jhánsí would carry her audacious plans. The rebels might march on Gwáliár, but no one believed they would carry it by a *coup-de-main*. It seemed more likely that they were marching into a trap, to be kept there till Stuart's force should fall on their rear.

No one divined that the daring of the rebels would be successful.

How the "impossible" happened has been told. The information of it reached Sir Hugh on the 4th of June, after he had resigned his command and applied for leave on medical certificate. In a moment he realised the full danger of the situation. Gwáliár had fallen into the hands of the rebels at the time of year most unfavourable for military operations. Another week and the monsoon rains would render the black soil untravérsable by guns, and would swell the rivers. Under those circumstances, the transport of siege-guns, in the absence of pontoons, which Sir Hugh did not possess, would be most difficult if not impossible. He realised, moreover, the great danger which would inevitably be caused by delay. No one could foresee the extent of evil possible if Gwáliár were not promptly wrested from rebel hands. Grant them delay, and Tántiá Topí, with the immense acquisition of political and military strength secured by the possession of Gwáliár, and with all its resources in men, money, and material at his disposal, would be able to form a new army on the fragments of that beaten at Kalpí, and to provoke a Maráthá rising throughout India. It might be possible for him, using the dexterity of which he was a master, to unfurl

The effect of its success upon Sir Hugh Rose.

He realises the enormous issues at stake.

the Peshwá's banner in the southern Maráthá districts. Those districts were denuded of troops, and a striking success in central India would probably decide their inhabitants to pronounce in favour of the cause for which their fathers had fought and bled.

Thus reasoning, Sir Hugh considered, and rightly considered, that the time for ceremony had passed. He at once resumed the command which he had laid down,* and, leaving a small garrison at Kalpí, set out on the 5th of June with a small force† to overtake Stuart's column.

He resumes his command and sets out for Gwáliár.

With a view to aid Sir Hugh in his operations against Gwáliár, the Commander-in-Chief placed at his disposal, by telegraph, Colonel Riddell's column previously referred to, and Brigadier Smith's brigade of the Rajpútáná field force. The only other troops of which it was possible for Sir Hugh to avail himself were those composing the small garrison of Jhánsí, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hicks of the artillery, and the Haidarábád contingent, commanded by Major Orr.

The Commander-in-Chief places other columns at Sir Hugh's disposal.

The Haidarábád contingent, after their hard and splendid service, had received orders to return home. They had already started; many of them, indeed, were far advanced on their road. But the moment the intelligence of the events passing at Gwáliár reached them they one and all expressed their earnest desire to take part in the operations of their old commander.

Spirited conduct of the Haidarábád contingent.

Whilst Sir Hugh Rose himself proceeded by forced marches to join Stuart, he directed Major Orr to move to Paniar, on the road between Síprí and Gwáliár, to cut off the retreat of the rebels to the south, and Brigadier Smith, who was near Chandérí, to march with his brigade direct to Kotah-ki-sarai, about five miles to the south-east of Gwáliár. To Colonel Riddell, escorting a large supply of siege-guns, he sent instructions to move with his column by the Agra and Gwáliár road. He hoped that all

Sir Hugh's plan of operations against Gwáliár.

* It is said that for this breach of red tape rules Sir Hugh was severely reprimanded by Sir C. Campbell. Undoubtedly strict routine required the previous sanction of the Commander-in-Chief. But there are circumstances which require that strict routine must be laid aside; and this was one of them.

† 1st troop Bombay horse artillery; one squadron 14th light dragoons; one squadron 3rd Bombay light cavalry; Madras sappers and miners.

the columns of operations would be at their posts by the 19tl of June.

Setting out, as I have said, on the 6th of June, and makin forced marches in spite of a heat which occasionally rose to a hundred and thirty degrees in the shade, Sir Hugh overtook Stuart at Indúrkí on the 12th, and, still pushing on, reached Bahádurpúr, five miles to the east of the Morár cantonments, on the 16th. There h was joined by Brigadier-General Robert Napier, whom he last heard of at the storm of Lakhnao, and who at once assumed command of the 2nd brigade.*

Sir Hugh overtakes Stuart and reaches Morár;

is joined by General Napier;

Sir Hugh had reached Bahádurpúr at 6 o'clock in the mornin of the 16th of June. He at once directed Captain Abbott wit his Haidarábád cavalry to reconnoitre Morár. On receiving Abbott's report that the rebels were in force in front of it, Sir Hugh galloped forward himself to examine the position. He noticed that the side of th cantonments fronting the British position was occupied b strong bodies of cavalry, flanked to the right by guns, supporte by infantry in considerable numbers.

reconnoitres the rebel position.

The position offered strong temptations to a commander wh knew the value of time and promptitude in war, and who considered that minor difficulties must give way when a chance should present itself of overcoming a great obstacle. I shall tell in his own words the effect pr duced on Sir Hugh Rose by his examination of the position c the rebels before Morár.

Reasons which decid him to attac

"My force had had a long and fatiguing march, and the su had been up for some time. Four or five miles' more march in the sun, and a combat afterwards, would be a great trial for the men's strength. On the other hand, Morár looked inviting with several good building not yet burnt; they would be good quarters for a portion c the force; if I delayed the attack until the next day, the enem were sure to burn them. A prompt attack has always mor effect on the rebels than a procrastinated one. I therefor countermanded the order for encamping and made the followin arrangements to attack the enemy." †

told in his own words.

* Only a small portion of this brigade was present, the bulk of it having bee left at Kalpí.

† Despatch of Sir Hugh Rose dated the 13th of October, 1858

He attacked them accordingly. Placing his cavalry and guns on his flanks, and the infantry in the centre, he took ground to the right, the 86th leading the way, with the view of coming upon the road leading to cantonments, and the occupation of which would have turned the left of the rebels. Sindhiá's agent, however, who had promised to lead the troops to this road, lost his way, and Rose found himself in front of a masked battery in the enemy's centre. This at once opened upon the assailants, and its fire was rapidly followed by a musketry and artillery fire from both sides of it. Sir Hugh answered with his guns, at the same time pushing forward his infantry to gain the required turning position on the right. This once gained, he formed to the front, and, reinforcing his left, which bore for a moment the whole weight of the enemy, pushed forward. The advance was decisive. The enemy limbered up and gave way on all sides. The gallant Abbott with his Haidarábád men had meanwhile galloped across the nullahs further to the right, and, dashing through the cantonments at a more northerly point, endeavoured to cut off the retreat of the rebels. But the broken ground he had had to traverse had enabled these to take their guns across the stone bridge which spans the river at the back of the cantonment on the road to the city. The main body of the enemy, driven through the cantonments, fell back on a dry nullah with high banks, running round a village, which they had also occupied. Here they maintained a desperate hand-to-hand struggle with the British. The 71st Highlanders suffered severely, Lieutenant Neave, whilst leading them, falling mortally wounded; nor was it till the nullah was nearly choked with dead that the village was carried. On this occasion Lieutenant Rose of the 25th Bombay Native Infantry greatly distinguished himself. The victory was completed by a successful pursuit of the rebels by Captain Thompson, 14th Light Dragoons, with a wing of his regiment. The wing of the rebel force which he destroyed had been turned by Abbott's advance already spoken of; Thompson, following up the rebels, caught them in the plains and made a great slaughter of them. The guns were splendidly commanded

The battle of Morár.

The guide loses his way,

and the army debouches on the wrong front;

but, by a masterly movement, gains a firm position.

The rebels fall back,

and continue the contest in a village,

which is at length carried;

and the victory is completed by a successful pursuit of the rebels.

during the day by Strutt, always to the front, and by Lightfoot.

The result, then, had justified Sir Hugh's daring. Not only had he dealt a heavy blow to the rebels, but he had gained a most important strategical point.

Result of the battle.

Sir Hugh Rose's success was speedily followed by an exploit on the part of Brigadier Smith, fruitful in important consequences. That gallant soldier, coming up from the south-east, had to make his way through the difficult and hilly ground on that side of Gwáliár before he could reach Kotah-ki-sarai. Picking up on his way the small field-force from Jhánsí, he reached Ántrí, with his brigade,* on the 14th of June, and was joined there the following day by Major Orr and his Haidarábád men. Under orders from Sir Hugh Rose, Smith marched from Ántrí early on the morning of the 17th of June, and reached Kotah-ki-sarai, five miles to the south-east of Gwáliár, at half-past seven o'clock that morning.

Brigadier-Smith advances from the south-east,

and reaches Kotah-ki-sarai;

Smith had met no opposition in marching into Kotah-ki-sarai, but on reaching that place he observed masses of the enemy's horse and foot occupying the hilly ground between himself and Gwáliár. As these masses showed a strong disposition to attack him, and as, hampered with a large quantity of baggage, Smith did not regard his position as a very secure one, he determined to take the initiative. Reconnoitring the ground in front of him, he found it very difficult, intersected with nullahs and impracticable for cavalry. He discovered, moreover, that the enemy's guns were in position about fifteen hundred yards from Kotah-ki-sarai, and that their line lay under the hills, crossing the road to Gwáliár. Notwithstanding this, Smith determined to attack. First, he sent his horse artillery to the front, and silenced the enemy's guns, which limbered up and retired. This accomplished, Smith sent his infantry across the broken ground, led by Raines of the 95th. Raines led his men, covered by skirmishers, to a point about

discovers the rebels massed between him and Gwáliár.

Difficult nature of the ground before him;

he, nevertheless, resolves to attack.

* The brigade was thus composed: a wing 8th Hussars, a wing Bombay Lancers, H. M.'s 95th Foot, the 10th Bombay Native Infantry, and a troop of Bombay Horse Artillery.

Ra nes leads the infantry to the front,

fifty yards from the enemy's works, when the skirmishers made a rush—the rebels falling back as they did so. Raines then found himself stopped

and, after overcoming many obstacles,

by a deep ditch with four feet of water, and having banks so steep that it was with difficulty the men could cross in single file. The rebels took advantage of the delay thus caused to move off with their guns and to retire up the ravines and across the hills. Raines found them so retiring when, after surmounting the difficulty I have recorded, he gained

gains the intrenchment abandoned by the enemy.

the abandoned intrenchment. Whilst he was continuing his advance across the broken and hilly ground, Smith moved his cavalry across the river

Meanwhile Smith moves forward the cavalry.

Umrah, close to Kotah-ki-sarai. He had hardly crossed when his men came under fire of a battery which till then had escaped notice. At the same time a body of the enemy threatened the baggage at Kotah-ki-sarai. Matters now looked serious. But Smith

Serious nature of the action.

sent back a detachment to defend the baggage and rear, and pushed forward with the rest of his troops. The road, before debouching from the hills between his position and Gwáliár, ran for several hundred yards through a defile along which a canal had been excavated. As he entered this defile, and during his march through it, he encountered considerable opposition. At length he bore it down, emerged from the further end,

At length Smith is victorious,

joined Raines, then, keeping his infantry halted to hold the defile, he ordered a cavalry charge. This was most gallantly executed by a squadron of the 8th Hussars, led by Colonel Hicks and Captain Heneage. The rebels, horse and foot, gave way before them. The

and drives the rebels before him.

Hussars captured two guns, and continuing the pursuit through Sindhiá's cantonment, had for a moment the rebel camp in their possession.

Amongst the fugitives in the rebel ranks was the resolute

Death of the Ráni of Jhánsi.

woman who, alike in council and on the field, was the soul of the conspirators. Clad in the attire of a man and mounted on horseback, the Ráni of Jhánsi might have been seen animating her troops throughout the day. When inch by inch the British troops pressed through the defile, and when reaching its summit Smith ordered the Hussars to charge, the Ráni of Jhánsí boldly fronted the British

horsemen. When her comrades failed her, her horse, in spite of her efforts, carried her along with the others. With them she might have escaped but that her horse, crossing the canal near the cantonment, stumbled and fell. A hussar close upon her track, ignorant of her sex and her rank, cut her down. She fell to rise no more. That night her devoted followers, determined that the English should not boast that they had captured her even dead, burned the body.

Thus died the Rání of Jhánsí. My opinion of her has been recorded in a preceding page. Whatever her faults in British eyes may have been, her countrymen will ever believe that she was driven by ill-treatment into rebellion; that her cause was a righteous cause; and that the treatment she received at the hands of Lord Dalhousie was one of the main causes of the disaffection in Bundelkhand and Central India in 1857–8. To them she will always be a heroine.*

The charge of the 8th Hussars was the last effort of Smith's force. "Upon the return of the squadron, the officers and men were so completely exhausted and prostrated from heat, fatigue, and great exertion, that they could scarcely sit in their saddles, and were, for the moment, incapable of further exertion."† But the enemy, recovering, were again threatening. Smith then determined to content himself with holding the defile, the road, and the adjoining hills for the night. He drew back his cavalry accordingly, and brought up his baggage. The enemy held their ground on the heights on the other side of the canal.

Smith falls back for the night on the head of the defile.

The position thus taken up by Brigadier Smith left much to be desired. It left his left and rear threatened, his baggage within range of the enemy's guns, and his whole force cramped. Sir Hugh, on receiving an account of the action, with characteristic promptitude despatched Colonel Robertson, with the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, three troops 14th Light Dragoons, and four guns, to reinforce him.

Dangerous nature of his position.

Sir Hugh reinforces him.

The next day Sir Hugh was reinforced, and his 2nd brigade, commanded by Robert Napier, brought to its full strength by the arrival of the Kalpí garrison. This arrival left him free to act.

The 2nd brigade joins Sir Hugh, who resolves to "finish" with the rebels.

* *Vide* pages 110, 139, of this volume, and pages 120–1 of Vol. III.

† Brigadier Smith's report.

Leaving Napier in Morár with the troops he could spare,* Rose marched in the afternoon with the rest of the force to join Smith. The distance was long, the heat terrible, the march harassing in the extreme. No less than a hundred men of the 86th were struck down by the sun.† Nevertheless, Sir Hugh pushed on, and bivouacked for the night on the rocky ground between the river and Smith's position.

Harassing nature of his march.

He opens communications with Smith.

The first thing that struck Sir Hugh on reconnoitring the following morning was the possibility of cutting off the main body of the enemy from Gwáliár by forcing their left, the next, the extremely cramped and dangerous nature of his own position. The rebels, too, showed every indication that they intended an attack, for with the early dawn they began a heavy fire from their guns, whilst masses of their infantry were seen moving to positions from which they could manœuvre with advantage against the British position. On the principle, then, that when one is disadvantageously posted an attack is often the best defence, Sir Hugh resolved to become the assailant.

Resolves to anticipate the rebels' attack and to cut them off from Gwáliár.

The rebels, as we have seen, were occupying the heights separated by the canal from those gained by Brigadier Smith. That they meant to attack was evident. They spent the early hours of the morning in strengthening their right with the view of assailing the weakest point of the British line, the left. The sun had not risen very high when Sir Hugh received an express from Sir Robert Hamilton to say that he had received certain information that the rebels certainly intended to attack him that day. There was no time for further consideration.

* These were—One troop Bombay horse artillery, three troops 14th light dragoons, three troops 3rd Bombay light cavalry, fifty men 1st Haidarábád cavalry, 3rd Haidarábád cavalry, two squadrons Meade's horse, 21st company Royal Engineers, wing 3rd Bombay Europeans, four companies 24th Bombay native infantry, three guns Haidarábád artillery.

† Of these men, Sir Hugh reports that they "were compelled by sun-sickness to fall out and go into *dolis*. These same men, the next day, unmindful of their illness, fell in with their companies, and took part in the assault of Gwáliár." These men, be it remembered, formed part of the unreformed British army, an army never surpassed by any other in the world. A "doli," generally but incorrectly spelt "dhooley"—for it is ignorant of the letter "h" and possesses but one "o" and no "y"—is an inferior kind of palanquin.

Sir Hugh at once directed Brigadier Stuart to move with the 86th regiment, supported by the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, across the canal, to crown the heights on the other side of it, and to attack the left flank of the rebels. As a diversion in favour of this attack he sent Colonel Raines with the 95th regiment from his right front, across the canal in skirmishing order over the shoulder of the hill on which a division of the rebel force was in an intrenched position, covered by guns. This movement was supported by the 10th Bombay Native Infantry. Sir Hugh at the same time ordered up the 3rd troop Bombay Horse Artillery, supported by a squadron of the 8th Hussars, to the entrance of the pass towards Gwáliár. The remainder of the force he disposed in support of the attacking columns and for the defence of the camp from the rear.

Sir Hugh sends Stuart to turn the left of the rebels,

whilst Raines makes a diversion.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lowth led the 86th, in accordance with the orders he received, against the left of the rebels. These fell back rapidly on the battery; while the 86th pressed them so hard that they made no stand even under their guns. The 86th gave them no time to rally. Brockman's company, led by that gallant officer, then only a lieutenant, dashing with a cheer at the parapet, crossed it and took the guns which defended the ridge two 6-pounders and a 9-pounder. Brockman, with great smartness, turned one of these guns on the rebels, and was engaged in turning the other, when Raines, advancing with the 95th, came up, took command, and completed the operation which Brockman* had so well begun.

Stuart's attack succeeds.

Brockman captures three guns.

Raines completes the operation.

Meanwhile the 10th Bombay Native Infantry, led by Lieutenant Roome, moving up in support of the 95th, and protecting the right of the assailing force, found itself exposed to a fire of musketry and artillery from the heights on the enemy's extreme left. Roome was equal to the occasion. Wheeling to the right, he advanced with half his regiment in

* For his splendid services, Brockman obtained his brevet majority as soon as he got his company, though not until after another officer, whose name I will not mention, had attempted to "annex" his services. The fraud was, however, discovered and rectified with the full sanction of Lord Strathnairn (Sir Hugh Rose).

Gallantry of Roome and the 10th Bombay Native Infantry.

skirmishing order, the other half in support, cleared the two nearest heights of rebel infantry, and captured two brass field-pieces and three mortars which were in the plain below.

Gwáliár lies at the feet of the British.

The day was now won, the heights were gained; Gwáliár lay, as it were, at the feet of the British. "The sight," writes Sir Hugh, "was interesting. To our right was the handsome palace of the Phúlbágh with its gardens, and the old city, surmounted by the fort, remarkable for its ancient architecture, with lines of extensive fortifications round the high and precipitous rock of Gwáliár. To our left lay the Lashkar, or new city, with its spacious houses half hidden by trees." In the plain between the heights and the city was a great portion of the rebel forces, just driven from the heights, and now, under the influence of panic, endeavouring to seek a refuge in one or other of the walled enclosures or fortified places towards which they were moving.

Sir Hugh resolves to occupy the city at once.

The sight of these men at once suggested to Sir Hugh that it would be possible to complete his work that day. "I felt convinced," he wrote in his despatch, "that I could take Gwáliár before sunset."

Orders a general advance.

He at once, then, ordered a general advance. Covering his extreme right with the 3rd troop Bombay Horse Artillery and a troop of the 8th Hussars, he ordered Colonel Owen, with the 1st Bombay Lancers, to descend the heights to the rear, make his way into the road which led through the hills to the south, and thence attack the grand parade and the new city. Covering his advance, then, with No. 4 Light field-battery, and two troops 14th Light Dragoons, he moved forward his infantry from the left, the 86th leading from that flank, the 95th forming the right.

This prompt advance completely paralysed the rebels. Their guns, indeed, opened fire, but the main object of their infantry seemed to be to escape. The British infantry were approaching the plain, when Owen's Lancers, who had gained the point indicated, charged across the grand parade, and, carried away by their ardour, followed the rebels into the Lashkar. In this charge a gallant officer, Lieutenant Mills, was shot through the heart. Raines followed up this charge with a dash on to the parade-ground with two companies of the 59th, and took two 18-pounders and

The British carry the Lashkar.

two small pieces. The British line pushing on, the rebels retreated through the town. Before sunset, as Sir Hugh had divined, the Lashkar, or new city, was completely in his possession. That night, too, Sir Hugh rested in the regained palace of Sindhiá.

Meanwhile, Brigadier Smith had taken the garden palace, the Phúlbágh, killing great numbers of the rebels. He then, in pursuance of orders, followed up the retreating enemy, and continued the pursuit long after dark, inflicting great loss on them and capturing most of their guns.

Smith takes the palace of Phúlbágh.

As soon as it was clear the day was won, Sir Hugh sent an express to General Robert Napier, directing him to pursue the rebels as far and as closely as he could. How this order was carried out I shall have to relate presently.

Sir Hugh sends an express to Napier to pursue,

The Lashkar and palace occupied, Sir Hugh, ever careful even of the vanquished, made arrangements for the security of the city. This task he found comparatively easy, for the shopkeeping class had always been on the side of its best paymaster, the British.

and then arranges for the security of the city.

Thus, on the night of the 19th of June, Sir Hugh had, with a loss of eighty-seven men killed and wounded, regained all Gwáliár, the formidable fortress alone excepted. But the exception was a grave one. The rock fortress, completely isolated, having a length of a mile and a half, and a breadth at its broadest part of three hundred yards, its face presenting a perpendicular precipice, might, if well defended, still give some trouble. The guns from its ramparts had maintained, during the operations of the 19th, a continuous, though not very effective, fire on the British troops. The fire recommenced on the morning of the 20th. It was then, early on that morning, that two officers of the Indian army and their Bombay Sipáhis performed a deed of unsurpassed daring.

The rock fortress defies him.

On the morning of the 20th, Lieutenant Rose, 25th Bombay Native Infantry, was in command, with a detachment of his regiment, of the Kotwáli, or police-station, not far from the main gateway of the rock fort. As the guns from its ramparts continued to fire, Rose proposed to a brother officer, Lieutenant Waller, who commanded a small party of the same regiment near him, that

Daring feat of Lieutenants Rose and Waller,

y should attempt to capture the fortress with their joint ties, urging that, if the risk was great, the honour would be still greater. Waller cheerfully assented, and the two officers set off with their men and a blacksmith, whom, not unwilling, they had engaged for the service. They crept up to the first gateway unseen, n the blacksmith, a powerful man, forced it open, and so with the other five gates that opposed their progress. By the time the sixth gate had been forced the alarm was given, and, when the assailants reached the archway beyond the last gate, they were met by fire of a gun which had been brought to bear on them. hing onwards, unscathed by the fire, they were speedily aged in a hand-to-hand contest with the garrison. The t was desperate, and many men fell on both sides; but the antry of Rose and Waller and their men carried all before them. Rose especially distinguished himself. Just in the hour of victory, however, as he was inciting men to make the final charge, which proved successful, a musket was fired at him from behind the wall. The man who had fired the shot, a mutineer from Barélí, then rushed out and cut him across the knee and wrist with a sword. Waller came up and despatched rebel; too late, however, to save his friend.* But the rock ress was gained.

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success immed he death ose.

have said that when Sir Hugh saw that success was certain sent a despatch to Brigadier-General Robert Napier re- sting him to pursue the rebels as far and as closely as he d.

apier started on this service at 9 o'clock on the morning of 20th with about five hundred and sixty cavalry, of whom

Sir Hugh Rose, in his despatch, thus alludes to this officer: "But the nt leader, Lieutenant Rose, who has been twice specially mentioned by or good and gallant conduct, fell in the fort, mortally wounded, closing arly career by taking the fort of Gwáliár by force of arms."

s brigadier, Brigadier C. S. Stuart, thus referred to him in his brigade s: "Brigadier Stuart has received with the deepest regret, a report of the n of Lieutenant Rose, 25th Bombay Native Infantry, who was mortally nded yesterday, on entering the fort of Gwáliár, on duty with his men. brigadier feels assured that the whole brigade unite with him in deploring arly death of this gallant officer, whose many sterling qualities none who r him could fail to appreciate."

sixty were dragoons, and Lightfoot's battery of artillery, and, pursuing the rebels rapidly, came up with them, about twelve thousand strong, at Jáurá-Álipúr, shortly after sunrise on the 21st. Napier, reconnoitring, found them drawn up in two lines. The first, consisting of infantry and a bullock battery of six guns, had its right resting upon Álipúr; the second, composed of cavalry and horse and field artillery, rested on a village in rear of the front line. They were the entire remnants of the Kalpí army, with additions picked up at Gwáliár.

Napier, receiving Sir Hugh's order to pursue,

pursues, and finds the rebels at Jáurá-Álipúr.

Finding the ground to his right open, Napier directed Captain Lightfoot to take up a position on the left flank of the enemy, about three hundred yards from them, and to enfilade them. He then ranged his cavalry behind a rising ground, which afforded partial concealment, ready to act as soon as the fire from Lightfoot's guns should be felt.

His guns rake their line.

This soon happened. Lightfoot's horse artillery, escorted by Abbott's cavalry, dashed at a gallop towards the enemy's left, and opened fire at the distance indicated by Napier. After a few discharges the ranks of the rebels wavered, then they began perceptibly to thin. Then Lightfoot limbered up and again pushed on at a gallop, whilst the 14th Light Dragoons, led by Prettijohn, and the Haidarábád cavalry, led by Abbott, dashed into their ranks.

The fire causes them to waver,

The result was decisive. Prettijohn's distinguished valour and Abbott's gallant leading were especially conspicuous. The dash of Lightfoot's horse artillery was superb to look at. "You cannot imagine," writes an eye-witness, a cavalry officer, "the dash of the artillery: it was wonderful. We could scarcely keep up with them" But, in fact, every man behaved like a hero: each vied with his comrade. After a brief resistance the rebels broke and fled, hotly pursued.* They lost twenty-five guns,

and when charged, break and flee.

* An officer who served with great distinction throughout this campaign writes me: "The courage of General Napier in ordering this attack, and the dash and vigour with which it was delivered, so surprised the enemy, that, as we afterwards ascertained, they believed us to be but the advanced guard of a strong force coming up. Just after the action General Napier received a despatch from Sir Hugh Rose ordering him not to attack in consequence of the strength of the enemy."

all their ammunition, elephants, tents, carts, and baggage, and had three to four hundred men killed. Never was a rout more complete.*

Close of the campaign

The capture of Gwáliár and the dispersion of the rebel army closed the campaign which will for ever be associated with the name of Sir Hugh Rose. In a previous chapter I have alluded to the personal character, strong and firm as iron, and yet singularly sympathetic, which had chained success to all the incidents of that most eventful campaign. I may be pardoned if I briefly recapitulate here all that had been accomplished in a period falling somewhat short of six months. On the 6th of January, 1858, Sir Hugh Rose had left Indúr; on the 24th he laid siege to Ráhatgarh; on the 28th he defeated in the field the Rájah of Bánpúr; on the 29th he took Ráhatgarh; on the 3rd of February he relieved Ságar; on the 13th he took the strong fort of Garhákóta; on the 4th of March he forced the pass of Madanpúr; on the 17th his 1st brigade stormed the fort of Chandérí; on the 22nd he invested Jhánsí; on the 31st he defeated Tántiá Topí on the Betwá; on the 3rd of April he stormed Jhánsí; on the 6th of May he defeated Tántiá Topí and the Rání of Jhánsí at Kúnch; on the 23rd he beat the rebels at Galáulí, near Kalpí, and occupied that fort the following day. In this chapter I have told how, roused from a bed of sickness by the news of the capture of Gwáliár by the rebels, he pursued them with unremitting vigour, and stayed not his hand till he had recovered all that they had temporarily gained. In every undertaking he was successful, and he was successful, because, careless of himself, he thought of the great end he had in view, and spared no means to attain it.

Recapitulation of its results,


real cause of his success.

After the victory at Gwáliár, Sir Hugh Rose proceeded to Bombay to assume command of the army of that Presidency † The force with which he had won so many victories was, to a great extent, broken up.

Sir Hugh proceeds to Bombay,

* Tántiá Topí, who was present on this occasion, thus describes the affair: "We reached Jáná-Alipúr and remained there during the night. The next morning we were attacked and fought for an hour and a half. We fired five shots and the English army fired four shots, and we then ran off, leaving all our guns."

† The following farewell order was issued on this occasion by Sir Hugh Rose: "The Major-General commanding, being on the point of resigning the command


MAP TO
ILLUSTRATE THE CAMPAIGNS
OF
MALWA & CENTRAL INDIA
English Miles
0 20 40 60 80
MALWA
GAIKAWAR DOMINIONS
KHANDESH
NAGPUR
BARODAH
AHMADNAGAR
Typo. Etching Co. Sc

The 95th regiment was ordered to occupy the rock fortress. The 71st Highlanders, the 86th regiment, and the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, with detachments of cavalry and artillery, remained at Morár. The 3rd Bombay Europeans, the 24th Bombay Native Infantry, with cavalry and artillery, were sent to Jhánsí. Of these troops the command devolved upon Brigadier-General Robert Napier. Brigadier Smith's brigade was distributed in three portions, respectively at Gwáliár, at Síprí, and at Gúnah. It seemed as though they were about to enjoy the rest they had so gloriously earned. But appearances were deceitful. Though one bitter enemy, the Ráni of Jhánsí, had disappeared, there had escaped another, not less implacable, perhaps even more fertile in resources than that resolute lady. Though beaten at all points, that other adversary had never despaired. Not many weeks elapsed before the cities, the villages, and the jungles of Central India once more resounded with the name of Tántiá Topí.

and the regiments of the force are distributed.

The prospects of peace are illusive.

of the Puná division of the Bombay army, bids farewell to the Central India Field Force; and at the same time expresses the pleasure he feels that he commanded them when they gained one more laurel at Gwáliár. The Major-General witnessed with satisfaction how the troops and their gallant comrades in arms—the Rajpútáná brigade under General Smith—stormed height after height, and gun after gun, under the fire of a numerous field and siege artillery, taking finally by assault two 18-pounders at Gwáliár. Not a man in these forces enjoyed his natural health or strength; an Indian sun and months of marching and broken rest had told on the strongest; but the moment they were told to take Gwáliár for their Queen and country they thought of nothing but victory. They gained it, restoring England's true and brave ally to his throne, putting to rout the rebel army, killing many of them, and taking from them in the field, exclusive of those in the fort, fifty-two pieces of artillery, all their stores and ammunition, and capturing the city and fort of Gwáliár, reckoned the strongest in India. The Major-General thanks sincerely Brigadier-General Napier, C.B., Brigadier Stuart, C.B., and Brigadier Smith, commanding brigades in the field, for the very efficient and able assistance which they gave him, and to which he attributes the success of the day. He bids them and their brave soldiers once more a kind farewell. He cannot do so under better auspices than those of the victory of Gwáliár."

CHAPTER IV.

THE SOUTHERN MARÁTHÁ COUNTRY AND LE GRAND JACOB.

The southern Maráthá country.

In the first chapter of this volume I have brought the record of affairs in the southern Maráthá country up to the spring of 1858. In Belgáon and the neighbouring districts the crisis had passed away. It needed only the continuance of the same firm and conciliatory rule to ensure that it should never return.

Mr. Seton-Karr, applying to be relieved of a portion of his duties,

It happened, however, at this period (March and April 1858) that Mr. G. B. Seton-Karr, exhausted by the double labours which had devolved upon him, applied to the Government of Bombay to be relieved of a portion of his overwhelming duties. Mr. Seton-Karr had, unquestionably, reason to believe that the Government, should it accede to his request, would grant him an option in the matter, or, at all events, would relieve him of the less important routine duties appertaining to the administration. But he was mistaken. The Government, in sanctioning Mr. Seton-Karr's request, desired him to retain in his own hands the civil administration of the territory, and to transfer the charge of the political agency to his assistant, Mr. Charles Manson.

is directed to transfer the political agency to Mr. Manson.

Character of Mr Manson.

Than Mr. Manson there was not a more high-minded, a more generous, or a more earnest officer in the Bombay Civil Service. He was devoted to his profession, he gave to it his whole soul and his undivided energies. He was in the prime of life, intelligent, energetic, decided. But—he had been employed on the detested Inám Commission—and he belonged to a school of politics differing in one essential point from that of which Mr. Seton-Karr was a leader. The reader will have already discovered the title of that school. Mr. Seton-Karr was strongly in favour of the maintenance of the native

School to which Mr. Seton-Karr belonged.

aristocracy, an upholder of the rights and customs held and enjoyed by native landowners at the time they came under British rule. He believed that, so long as the British respected those rights and customs, it would never be necessary to employ force; that persuasion and management would effect the required end. How he had tried, and tried successfully, that policy I have already shown. The success had proved to him its efficacy. Mr. Manson belonged to a more modern school. In one of the letters which Mr. Seton-Karr addressed to him before the transfer of the political duties, he is jestingly referred to as "an admirer of Lord Dalhousie." This, at least, is certain, that in a crisis such as that which was then prevailing, he gave his preference to measures stronger than those which Mr. Seton-Karr deemed suited to the occasion.

School of which Mr. Manson was a partisan.

Mr. Seton-Karr was greatly disappointed by the decision of the Government, but the reason adduced by that Government was one to which he could take no exception. Lord Elphinstone desired that the whole of the southern Maráthá country should be placed under the control of one officer as Commissioner, and, in the circumstances of the time, he deemed it further advisable that that officer should be a soldier. Now Colonel Le Grand Jacob already exercised political authority in one part of the territory. On the 6th of December he had suppressed a mutiny in Kolhápúr, and had, by his firmness and strength of character, impressed the Bombay Government with the conviction that he was peculiarly qualified to wield political power in troublous times. Lord Elphinstone, then, transferred to him in the new arrangement a similar authority in the other part, with Mr. Manson as political agent under him. If, however, the reason for the transfer was sufficient in that it cast no slur upon Mr. Seton-Karr, it did not the less cause considerable misgivings to that gentleman, for, knowing as he did the native chieftains, he felt that a change would create suspicion in their minds, a change more especially which transferred political action from himself to an officer who had been engaged in the Inám Commission, and that, if that change were followed by a tension of the tie which bound them to the suzerain power, it might even produce a catastrophe.

Reasons adduced by the Bombay Government for the change.

Colonel Le G. Jacob is appointed supreme political agent for the entire territory.

Reasons why Mr. Seton-Karr augured ill of the change.

Previous to the assumption of the charge of the political duties of the Belgáon districts, Mr. Seton-Karr had been gradually engaged in disarming the country—a work in which he had been most ably assisted by Colonel George Malcolm, commanding the Southern Maráthá Horse, and holding military charge of the southern Maráthá territory. It would be difficult to over-estimate the services rendered by this able and gallant officer. His regiment mainly preserved order in that excitable country. In a previous chapter I have referred to his services at Shorápúr. Prior to that event, on the 29th of November, 1857, he had led his cavalry, supported by one company 28th Native Infantry, against the fortified village of Halgalli, which had become the head-quarters of the disaffected. For some days previously these men had been held in check by detachments of the horse, first under Kerr, subsequently reinforced by La Touche, of the same regiment. These officers had, by spirited charges, driven the enemy into the town, and were struggling with them desperately in the streets when Malcolm, with a fresh party, arrived. His men at once dismounted, and assisted by the Sipáhis of the 28th Native Infantry, scrambled over the flat-roofed houses of the village, dashed upon the rebels, and decided the victory. The country, however was still uneasy. Both above and below the ghát British authority had met with resistance, but, except that in some cases the guns and the arms had not been entirely delivered up, the danger from such disturbances was considered to have passed away when Colonel Jacob took charge. Within a very short time of that event, however, a new peril appeared in another quarter.

Colonel George Malcolm.

Kerr and La Touche attack Halgalli.

Malcolm arrives and the place is stormed.

State of the country generally.

Of the chief of Nárgúnd I have spoken in the first chapter of this volume.* That this chief was thoroughly disaffected there can be no doubt. Mr. Seton-Karr had even suspected him of treasonable correspondence with the chief of Shorápúr.† But up to May 1858 he had been managed. He had even, under the gentle pressure exercised by Mr. Seton-Karr, sent in a correct list of the guns and ammunition he possessed, and somewhat later, urged by Mr. Manson, had even begun

Nárgúnd.

Pressure exercised upon its chief by Seton-Karr and Manson.

* *Vide* pages 16 to 28.

† *Vide* page 86.

) despatch them to Dhárwár. Those who are aware of the)verence and affection with which a native chief regards his uns will realise the sacrifice which the Rájah made to meet ıe expressed wishes of the Government.

Matters were thus progressing, the chief doubtless secretly isaffected, yet complying under gentle pressure ith the orders of the Bombay Government, when,)out the 25th of May, intelligence reached him ıat Mr. Seton-Karr had been removed from the)litical charge of his country, and that Mr. Manson ıd been gazetted his successor.

The chief hears that Seton-Karr has been replaced by Manson.

This intelligence changed all the good dispositions of the ıief of Nárgúnd. Although he did not personally slike Mr. Manson, he regarded him as the living)presentative of the hated system of Inám exnination—a system which, as I have said, had orked with most disastrous effects on the chiefs of ıe Southern Maráthá country. At that moment, too, Mr. anson was specially obnoxious to him, for, only a few weeks eviously, whilst still serving under Mr. Seton-Karr, he had rested and carried off as a prisoner his own dearest friend, the ıief of Jámkhándí.* The conviction at once took possession of m that the change was aimed against himself, that he was to be rested, as his friend had been arrested, and thrown to a dungeon.† In his fear and trepidation, the chief nt a confidential agent to Dhárwár to inquire of ıe magistrate the meaning of the portentous change.

Reasons why the chief of Nárgúnd dreaded Mr Manson

He fears to be arrested.

But, before he could receive an answer, those about him had gun to work on a nature constitutionally timid ıd nervous. His habitual advisers and companions ıd not even then despaired of receiving a summons join the victorious standard of the heir of Peshwá. ll seemed yet possible. Tántiá Topí was confronting the ritish in Bundelkhand, Kalpí was yet held, and one good ctory might give them all they desired. These men took lvantage of the consternation caused in the chief's mind by r. Manson's appointment to inspire him to resist, to cast

Influences which work on the chief of Nárgúnd.

* Only a short time previously the Rájah of Nárgúnd had met Mr. Manson at e chief of Jámkhándí's house, visiting him apparently on friendly terms.

† So penetrated was he with this idea, that he despatched that day a letter to s half-brother at Rámdrúg, in which occurs the passage: "I had rather die ın be arrested as Jámkhándí was."

defiance in the teeth of the foreigners who had persecuted themselves and their brethren.

These men were not alone in their endeavours. The chief's wife, a lady of great personal attractions, and twenty years younger than he was, had renounced all hopes of a natural heir. She loved power, and the chance of her possessing power after her husband's death rested on the prospect of her becoming the adoptive mother of a reigning boy. And, the British Government having refused to the chief the right to adopt, this prospect was possible only in the event of the British rule being supplanted by that of the Maráthá. This favoured counsellor added, then, her entreaties to those of the chief's companions.

The greatest influence of all, produced by the refusal of the Government to allow the chief to adopt an heir

The chief of Nárgúnd gave way. That day he recalled the guns which had progressed only a few miles on the road to Dhárwár, began to store provisions, and on the 27th of May, possessing only three obsolete rusty cannon and a swivel gun, declared war, with all the formalities used by the Maráthás, against the British Government!

The chief of Nárgúnd submits to those influences and revolts.

Mr. Manson had taken up his duties as political agent on the 16th of May. From that date till the 26th he had remained with Colonel Jacob at Kohlapúr, transacting business with him. On the 26th he set out for the northern states of the territory, with the view of judging for himself of the state of the country, and of using his influence with the chiefs. Four hours after he had set out, Jacob received a telegram from General Lester, commanding at Belgáon, stating that an insurrection had broken out near to Dhárwár, and that the Nárgúnd chief was believed to be supporting it, as he had recalled some of his guns on their way to be given up. Jacob at once sent a horseman with this news to Manson, informing him also that he had telegraphed to the general to send, if the report were true, a sufficient force to Nárgúnd, and recommending him to return to Kohlapúr.

Manson has set out for the northern districts,

when Jacob hears of the revolt.

He sends to warn Manson.

Jacob's messenger reached Manson at Kúrúndwád. Englishmen in India are so accustomed to authority, and to all the incense which waits on authority, that, except in rare cases, they judge men and affairs, not as they are, but as, to their

complacent minds, they wish them to be. Now, Manson had always been on the most friendly terms with the chief of Nárgúnd. He had no adequate conception of the depth of bitterness and the dread his connection with the Inám Commission had roused in the mind of that Maráthá noble. It was not possible, then, that he should imagine for a moment that his nomination to the control of political affairs, in place of Mr. Seton-Karr, would rouse the chief to madness. Still believing, then, in the friendly professions of the Rájah, and in the persuasive power of his influence over him, he sent back word to Jacob that from Kúrúndwád he could reach Nárgúnd by a cross road; that he would arrive there in time to prevent, probably, the development of the intended mischief; but that, if too late to prevent such development, he was confident of being able to prevent the chief's half-brother, the lord of Rámdrúg, from joining the rebellion. Having despatched this reply, Manson posted horses along the road to Rámdrúg, and sent off by a horseman a letter to Colonel George Malcolm, commanding at Kaládjí, requesting him to push on to Rámdrúg with a body of his regiment, the Southern Maráthá Horse.

Manson, confident in himself,

determines to push on to Nárgúnd,

and sends to Malcolm for military aid.

But, before this missive reached Malcolm, that able and daring officer had taken the field with two hundred and fifty horsemen to attack the insurgents, who had already plundered the treasury of one of the district stations of Dhárwár. Mr. Manson, then, though he rode hard, reached Rámdrúg to find it unoccupied. He had with him the twelve troopers who had accompanied him from Kohlapúr, and these were as fatigued as he himself was. There he learned from the chief the treason of his half-brother; he read the compromising letters from the latter, urging the Rámdrúg chief to follow his example; and, entreated by that chief not to pursue his journey to Nárgúnd, he resolved to join the force in the field under Malcolm.

Malcolm, meanwhile, had taken the field.

Manson reaches Rámdrúg,

and resolves to endeavour to join Malcolm.

Tired as he was, Manson set out in a palanquin, escorted by his troopers, that evening. Better had he taken his rest at Rámdrúg and made the journey to Malcolm in one day, for, exhausted by the long day's work, he and his followers stopped about 10 o'clock at a temple near a little village on the way and slept.

He sets out that evening

and, tired, stops, near a temple, to sleep

A report of all Manson's movements had been duly carried to the chief of Nárgúnd. When the news reached him of the halt at the temple, he reasoned as an untutored Asiatic will always reason. His enemy was in his power; he would slay him.* He conceived that, having declared war against the British, he had a perfect right to destroy the members of that nation wherever he might find them. Accordingly, about midnight, he sallied forth with some hundreds of followers, and, approaching the spot, poured in a volley, which killed the sentry, and then sent in his men to finish the work with the sword. Manson, roused from his sleep, fired his revolver at his assailants, but he was immediately overpowered, his head was cut off, and his body thrown in the fire, still burning, which had been kindled by his followers. Having killed as many of these as he could find, the chief returned with Manson's head to Nárgúnd, and suspended the bloody trophy over a gateway.†

The chief of Nárgúnd is made acquainted with Manson's movements,

and has him murdered.

Meanwhile, the insurgents who had plundered the treasury, had marched southwards and joined Bhím Ráo, the chief of Kopuldrúg. There they were attacked by a Madras force from Ballárí, under Colonel Hughes, already mentioned for his soldier-like conduct at Shorápúr, and who, in daring and manly qualities, in the capacity to manage men and to direct operations, yielded to none who came to the front in the mutiny. This gallant soldier pushed forward with an energy surpassing that of the rebels, caught them, as I have said, at Kopuldrúg, and stormed the place, killing Bhím Ráo, the chief of Hémbaji, and many of the defenders.

One body of the insurgents marches to Kopuldrúg,

where they are attacked and beaten by Hughes.

Malcolm, on his side, had no sooner heard that Nárgúnd was in revolt than he felt that a moment's delay would provoke the rising of the entire Maráthá country. With only two hundred and fifty cavalry at his disposal he marched, then, immediately against the

Malcolm hurries towards Nárgúnd.

* It was the reasoning of Jael, wife of Heber the Kenite, whose conduct was infinitely more treacherous.

† Read also Sir George Le Grand Jacob's *Western India before and during the Mutinies*. The account of the suspension of the head over a gateway rests entirely on native testimony. When the place was taken it was found floating in a well.

place, assisted by the wily Brahman officials, who believed he was marching on destruction.

At the same time he wrote to Belgáon, asking for some infantry and some guns. The authorities there sent him two companies of Europeans, one of native infantry, and two guns under Captain Paget. Riding on with these, only five days after the insensate declaration of war, Malcolm appeared before Nárgúnd. He had scarcely dismounted before news reached him that the rebels were marching to attack him. His heart bounded with joy. "I have them now," he said. Mounting his troopers as quickly as possible, he went to the front. It was true, they were advancing. But when they saw Malcolm and his horsemen they hesitated, then halted, and, in the manner of natives, began to close in on their centre. Then, wavering, they fell back. By this time Malcolm had collected his men. Riding at their head, he charged, overthrew the rebels—who, however, fought well in groups—drove them back, followed them up into the town, and forced the surviving combatants to take refuge in the fort.

He is reinforced by infantry and guns.

The rebels march to attack him.

Malcolm charges and defeats them,

and captures the town.

There remained now only the fort, a very strong one, so strong, that, if defended, it would have defied the efforts of the small assailing force. But Malcolm knew the natives well. "Give them a quiet night," he said, "and they will save us the trouble." He was right. On the morning of the 2nd of June the strongest fort in the southern Maráthá country was found deserted.

The rebels evacuate the fort in the night.

The chief, accompanied by six of his principal advisers, attempted, in the guise of a pilgrim, to escape the fate he had provoked. Every possible ruse was had recourse to by the fugitives to baffle the pursuit which, they soon learned, had been instituted after them. The man who had been deputed for that task, Mr. Frank Souter,* possessed qualities which did not permit him to be easily baffled. He met ruse with ruse, and after a hot pursuit, captured the chief on the night of the 3rd.†

The chief attempts to escape in disguise,

but is captured by Frank Souter.

* Afterwards Sir Frank Souter, Superintendent of Police in Bombay. He died in 1887.

† The chief of Nárgúnd was tried at Belgáon on the 11th of June. He

Colonel Jacob controls the country.

On learning of Mr. Manson's death, Colonel Jacob had taken the promptest measures to control the northern states of the territory. He forced the chief of Miraj, the best fortified town in the country, to give a pledge of his fidelity by surrendering his ammunition. Shortly afterwards, the death of General Lester led to the nomination of Colonel Jacob as Brigadier-General in military command in the southern Maráthá country.

Measures taken by him for its pacification,

Under General Jacob's firm rule the country above the ghâts soon subsided into quiescence, but below the mountains, along the Goa frontier, the Sáwant rebels still continued to keep a large number of Madras, Bombay, and Portuguese troops, regular and irregular, in the field. Want of concert, however, naturally resulted from the action of troops serving under commanders independent one of the other. Eventually, in November, the Portuguese Viceroy, at a conference with General Jacob, consented to place the whole of his field detachments under the command of the officer who should unite that of the Bombay troops. Under this agreement Brigadier-General Fitzgerald of the Madras army took command of the united forces, and an organised plan was arranged. This was to hem in the tract occupied by the rebels, and to inform them that unless they surrendered by the 20th November they would be hunted down without mercy. On that date the band had dwindled to the number of eighty persons. These surrendered to the Portuguese commander on the night of that day, and their ringleaders were subsequently transported to the Portuguese possessions in Taimor.

in concert with the Viceroy of Goa,

are eminently successful.

Thenceforward the peace of the Southern Maráthá country was assured.

pleaded guilty, and in his plea stated that it was the fear of arrest that had caused him to commit the bloody deed. He was executed, in the presence of all the troops and of a large number of natives, on the 12th. It remains only to add that the bodies of the wife of whom I have spoken and the chief's mother were found in the Málparba river on the night of the 3rd. Sir G. Le Grand Jacob states, in the work already referred to, that they drowned themselves, unable to bear up against the disgrace.

BOOK XV.—THE PACIFICATION OF OUDH AND THE NORTH-WEST. REPRESSION OF OUTBREAKS IN THE PANJÁB.

CHAPTER I.

LORD CANNING'S OUDH PROCLAMATION.

In the preceding volume * I referred to the proclamation issued by Lord Canning regarding the tálúkdárs of Oudh, and of its reception in the victorious camp of Sir Colin Campbell; and I promised to deal with the subject more fully later on. I proceed now to redeem that promise. Oudh.

The Oudh proclamation, despatched by Lord Canning to Sir James Outram in his capacity of Chief Commissioner of Oudh, with a letter bearing date the 3rd of March, 1858, directing that it should not be published until Lakhnáo should have fallen, or, at least, until that city should lie at the mercy of the British commander, was at once a sentence, a warning, and a threat addressed to the inhabitants of the rebellious province. That proclamation announced that Lakhnao, after defying and resisting the power of the British for nine months, now lay at the mercy of the conqueror; that in that defiance and resistance the mutinous soldiery who had begun the revolt had been greatly aided by the inhabitants of the city and the province, even by those who owed their prosperity to the British Government; but that the hour of retribution had now arrived. Acting on the principle that, before pronouncing sentence on the guilty, it was just and proper to reward the innocent, the proclamation proceeded to name six men—three of whom were rájahs, two zamindárs, Purport of Lord Canning's Oudh proclamation.

* Vol. IV. pages 285–7

Rewards it promises to the innocent,

and one a tálúkdár—who had remained faithful amid great temptations, and who were not only declared "the sole hereditary proprietors of the lands which they held when Oudh came under British rule," but were promised additional rewards. Rewards and honours in proportionate measure were likewise promised to others in whose favour similar claims should be established to the satisfaction of the Government. But, with these exceptions, the proprietary right in the soil of the province was confiscated to the British Government, which would dispose of that right in such manner as might seem fitting. To the chiefs, tálúkdárs, and landowners, however, who should make immediate submission, surrendering their arms and obeying the orders of the Chief Commissioner, the proclamation promised the safety of their lives and of their honour, provided that their hands were "unstained with English blood murderously shed." For any further indulgence, the proclamation added, and with regard to the condition in which such men might thereafter be placed, "they must throw themselves upon the justice and mercy of the British Government." The proclamation promised, in conclusion, that to those amongst the classes referred to who should come forward promptly and give the Chief Commissioner their support in the restoration of peace and order, the indulgence would be large, and that the Governor-General would be ready to view liberally the claims which they might thus acquire to the restoration of their former rights. Further, that while participation in the murder of Englishmen and Englishwomen would exclude those who had participated in it from all mercy, those, on the other hand, who had protected English lives would be specially entitled to consideration and leniency.

punishment to the remainder.

Conditions of commutation of punishment.

Participation in the murder of Englishmen and Englishwomen to exclude from mercy.

In the letter to which I have referred as accompanying the proclamation the Foreign Secretary, Mr. G. F. Edmonstone, was, as I have already stated, careful to lay down that it should not be published until Lakhnao should have been conquered or should lie at the mercy of the conqueror. It further prescribed that, when published, the proclamation was to be addressed only to the non-military inhabitants of the province, and in no sense to the mutinous Sipáhis. It expressed likewise the conviction of

Mr Edmonstone's accompanying letter

Lord Canning that the tone of apparent severity which characterised the proclamation was necessary, inasmuch as the announcement in such a state paper of a liberal and forgiving spirit would be open to misconstruction, and it added that, in reality, the spirit of the proclamation was merciful and even lenient, in that it promised exemption, almost general, from the penalties of death and imprisonment to the rájahs, tálúkdárs, and zamindárs, who had fought and conspired against the Government; that even the confiscation of estates was rather a merciful commutation of a severer punishment than a harsh measure of justice. The letter concluded with suggestions to Sir James Outram regarding the manner in which it might be requisite for him to deal with mutineers of varying grades of guilt.

fully explains the mercy that underlies the apparent severity of the terms of the proclamation.

Sir James Outram received the letter and the proclamation on the 5th of March. Reading the latter by the light of its actual contents, apart from the commentary furnished by the letter, he arrived at a conclusion regarding it the very reverse of that which Lord Canning had endeavoured to impress upon him. Lord Canning, when sending him the proclamation, had said in so many words, by the mouth of his Foreign Secretary, "Do not judge the proclamation simply by itself, as a paper dealing out stern justice to conquered revolters. Rather, looking at the measure of punishment which those revolters have brought upon themselves, see whether the proclamation does not in every case, except the case of atrocious murder, pronounce a mitigation of punishment, capable of still further mitigation." But Outram, disregarding this exhortation, looked at the proclamation without sufficient reference to the circumstances which had made it necessary, and condemned it. In a letter to the Foreign Secretary, dated the 8th of March, he declared his belief that there were not a dozen landowners in Oudh who had not, in some way or other, assisted the rebels, and that, therefore, there would be but few exceptions to the sweeping confiscations proposed by the Governor-General; he expressed his conviction that as soon as the proclamation should be made public nearly all the chiefs and tálúkdárs would retire to their domains and prepare for a desperate resistance. He proceeded even to

Outram reads the proclamation in a sense different to that intended by Lord Canning,

and condemns it.

Embodies his views in a letter.

urge extenuating circumstances for those who had revolted, by declaring his opinion—which, it must be admitted, was founded on fact—that the landowners had been very unjustly treated in the land-settlement after the annexation; that, apart from this, their sympathy with the rebels had been, in the actual circumstances, only natural; that it was not until the British rule in Oudh had been brought to a virtual end by the mutineers that the rájahs and tálúkdárs had sided against the Government; that they ought to be treated rather as honourable enemies than as rebels; that they would be converted into relentless enemies if their lands were confiscated, maintaining a guerilla war, which would "involve the loss of thousands of Europeans by battle, disease, and exposure"; but that, if their lands were secured to them, they would at once aid in restoring order, and would so co-operate with the paramount power as, before long, to render unnecessary the further presence of the large army then occupying Oudh.

Lord Canning's first reply

To this letter Lord Canning replied, on the 10th, in a brief despatch, the nature of which renders still clearer the really merciful intentions of his proclamation. Referring to the promise of safety of life and honour to the tálúkdárs, chiefs, and landholders, unstained with English blood murderously shed, who should surrender at once and obey the orders of the Chief Commissioner, Lord Canning authorised Sir James to amplify it by an addition which, if not very wide in itself, intimated as clearly as possible the merciful intentions of the Governor-General.

renders his merciful intentions still clearer.

"To those amongst them," ran this addition, "who shall promptly come forward and give to the Chief Commissioner their support in the restoration of peace and order, this indulgence will be large, and the Governor-General will be willing to view liberally the claims which they may thus acquire to a restitution of their former rights."

His second and more elaborate letter

Three weeks later Lord Canning replied at greater length to Outram's remarks. In Mr. Edmonstone's despatch, dated the 31st of March, Lord Canning admitted that the people of Oudh occupied a position, with respect to their allegiance to the British Government, differing widely from that of the inhabitants of the provinces which had been longer under British rule. But, in the Governor-General's opinion, that difference constituted no valid ground

for treating the chiefs and tálúkdárs in the lenient manner suggested by Outram. Arguing in the spirit of the letter of the 3rd of March, he again insisted that, in the presence of a great crime, exemption from death, transportation, and imprisonment were great boons, and that to have offered more lenient terms would have been to treat the rebels—not, as Outram contended, as honourable enemies—but as enemies who had won the day. With respect to Outram's contention that the injustice of the land-settlement after the annexation had impelled the landowners to rebel, Lord Canning simply declined to recognise the hypothesis. Admitting that the policy of introducing into Oudh a system of village settlement in place of the old settlement under tálúkdárs might not have been altogether wise, Lord Canning declined to believe that the conduct of the landowners was in any respect the consequence of that policy. He attributed that conduct rather to the repugnance they had felt to suffer any restraint of the arbitrary powers they had till then exercised; to a diminution of their importance by being brought under equal laws; and to the obligation of disbanding their armed followers and of living a peaceful and orderly life. For these reasons Lord Canning adhered to his proclamation.

gives ample reasons

for adhering to the proclamation.

That Sir James Outram did not at once realise the statesmanlike nature and the really merciful tendencies of Lord Canning's proclamation may at once be admitted. The end of the two men was really the same; the difference was in the manner by which that end should be attained. Sir James would have carried leniency to a point at which leniency would have missed its aim. Lord Canning, maintaining the right to be severe, was prepared to be as merciful as Outram whenever the exercise of mercy should be politically desirable.

Real similarity in the objects at which Lord Canning and Outram alike aimed.

The real character of Lord Canning's statesmanship at this period might have remained long generally unknown but for the action taken with respect to the proclamation by the then President of the Board of Control, the Earl of Ellenborough. That nobleman had but recently taken over the seals of that office from his predecessor, a member of the Whig Cabinet, Mr. Vernon Smith. In due course he received, about the 20th of March, a copy of Lord Canning's proclamation, unaccom-

Lord Ellenborough receives Lord Canning's proclamation

panied by any explanatory document. In point of fact, Lord Canning, in transmitting the proclamation, had written to Mr. Vernon Smith, a member of his own party, and who, in his belief, still held the office of President of the Board of Control, a letter in which he stated that the proclamation required an explanatory despatch which he had not had time to prepare. Unfortunately, Mr. Vernon Smith neglected to pass on that letter to his successor. He thus allowed Lord Ellenborough to believe that the proclamation stood alone, that it required no interpretation, and was to be judged on its merits as an act of policy.

without the letter addressed to his predecessor,

explanatory of the reasons which justified it.

It is not surprising that, reading the proclamation in this way, Lord Ellenborough arrived at a conclusion not very dissimilar to that with which Sir James Outram, possessing all the advantages of proximity to, and personal communication with, Lord Canning, had been impressed. He condemned it as likely to raise such a ferment in Oudh as would make pacification almost impossible. In accord with Outram, of whose views, however, he was ignorant, Lord Ellenborough believed that the mode of settling the land tenure when the British took possession of Oudh had been in many ways unjust, and had been the chief cause of the general and national character of the disaffection in that province. He concluded—agreeing in this also with Outram—that the people of Oudh would view with dismay a proclamation which cut them off, as a nation, from the ownership of land so long cherished by them, and would deem it righteous to battle still more energetically than before against a government which could adopt such a course of policy. Lord Ellenborough embodied these views in a despatch to be transmitted to Lord Canning in the name of the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, added to them an argument—also an argument of Sir James Outram—to the effect that the people of Oudh ought to be regarded as legitimate enemies rather than as rebels, and concluded it with these stinging words: "Other conquerors, when they have succeeded in overcoming resistance, have excepted a few persons as still deserving of punishment, but have, with a generous policy, extended their clemency to the great body of the people. You have acted on a different

Lord Ellenborough arrives at a conclusion similar to that formed by Outram,

and embodies his views in a despatch.

Concluding paragraphs of this despatch.

principle. You have reserved a few as deserving of special favour, and you have struck with what they will feel as the severest of punishment the mass of the inhabitants of the country.

"We cannot but think that the precedents from which you have departed will appear to have been conceived in a spirit of wisdom superior to that which appears in the precedent you have made. We desire, therefore, that you will mitigate in practice the stringent severity of the decree of confiscation you have issued against the landowners of Oudh. We desire to see British authority in India rest upon the willing obedience of a contented people: there cannot be contentment where there is general confiscation.

"Government cannot long be maintained by any force in a country where the whole people is rendered hostile by a sense of wrong; and, if it were possible so to maintain it, it would not be a consummation to be desired."

Lord Ellenborough submitted this despatch to the Cabinet of which he was a member. It received an approval which was unanimous. Three weeks later he showed it to Mr. Bright with the view of its contents being made known to the House of Commons.

This action, when known, compels Lord Ellenborough to resign.

So far as Lord Ellenborough was concerned, the mistakes he committed—the penning of an acrimonious despatch without waiting for an explanation, and the disclosure of its contents to Mr. Bright with a view to its being presented to the House of Commons—were fatal to his tenure of office. The matter having come under the cognizance of the House of Commons, and having become the subject of a debate which at the outset seemed likely to terminate the existence of the Government, Lord Ellenborough took upon himself the sole responsibility of the despatch, and resigned his office.

Effect produced by the despatch on Lord Canning.

Far different was the effect produced by the receipt of the despatch upon Lord Canning. He received it at Allahábád on the 13th of June. Before its contents became known, rumours circulated that the Government of Lord Derby had written a disagreeable letter to the Governor-General. "I asked him," wrote, at the time, one deeply in his confidence, "if it was true that he had received something disagreeable. He said, almost indifferently, that it was impertinent; but he

did not care much; he would answer what they wrote." He then entered into a conversation regarding his Oudh policy. The next day, when the despatch had been read by others, the prevailing feeling regarding it was that it was offensively impertinent, with a look of epigrammatic point in the concluding sentences—those which I have quoted—of which the writer was evidently proud. But, above all, there arose a feeling of indignation that a despatch so insulting should have been published for the benefit of the natives, many of them still in revolt, as well as of the Anglo-Indians.

Indignation it causes in the minds of his colleagues.

But Lord Canning had, at this crisis, a support not less grateful than the confidence of the friends about him. The same mail brought him a copy of a resolution of the Court of Directors expressing continued confidence in their Governor-General. Letters were received from Mr. Sidney Herbert, from Lord Granville, from Lord Aberdeen, and from many other leading men, expressing sympathy and regard. In almost all these Lord Canning was urged not to resign, but to carry on his own policy calmly, and to leave to the Government the odium of recalling him. Lord Canning never thought of resigning. He regarded Lord Ellenborough's despatch as Achilles would have regarded a javelin "hurled by the feeble hand of Priam," and, far from allowing it to disturb his equanimity, he sat down coolly and calmly to pen a vindication of his policy.

Lord Canning is urged from England not to resign.

He had no thought of doing so.

Curiously enough, ten days after that vindication had been drafted and despatched—on the 27th of June—Lord Canning received a long private letter from Lord Derby himself on the subject of the point of difference. In this letter Lord Derby expressed a general confidence in Lord Canning's policy; he attributed Lord Ellenborough's despatch to the conduct of Mr. Vernon Smith in withholding the covering private letter which accompanied the Oudh proclamation, and which gave the only intimation that further explanations would be forwarded. Lord Derby concluded by virtually asking, almost pressing, Lord Canning to stay on, and spoke of the probability of Lord Stanley going to the Board of Control. To one in Lord Canning's position such a letter from the chief of the cabinet of which Lord Ellenborough had been a

He receives a letter from Lord Derby.

virtually asking him to stay on.

member was most satisfactory. It might almost be said that his policy was vindicated by his enemies.

Lord Canning's own vindication was dated the 18th of June. It began by alluding in a dignified manner to the fact that the despatch censuring himself had been made public in England three weeks before it reached his hands, and that in a few days it would be read in every station in Hindustan. Dwelling then upon the pain which the censure of his conduct by the Court of Directors would cause him, and upon the manner in which the publication of it would increase his difficulties, he declared that no taunts or sarcasms, come from what quarter they might, would turn him from the path which he believed to be that of public duty. Expressing, then, his conviction that a change in the government of India at that time, taking place under circumstances which would indicate a repudiation of the policy pursued towards the Oudh rebels, would seriously retard the pacification of the country, he proceeded to declare his belief that that policy had been from the first merciful without weakness, and indulgent without compromise of the dignity of the Government; that it had made manifest to the people of reconquered districts all over India, including Oudh, that the indulgence to those who should submit and who should be free from atrocious crime, would be large; and that the Oudh proclamation, thoroughly consistent with that policy, offered the best and earliest prospect of restoring peace to that province on a stable footing.

Lord Canning's reply to the despatch.

Preliminary.

Stating, then, in dignified language, that although in a time of unexampled difficulty, danger, and toil, he would not lay down of his own act the high trust which he had the honour to hold, yet that if, after reading the vindication of his policy, the Court of Directors should see fit to withhold their confidence from him, he then preferred his respectful yet urgent request that he might be relieved from the office of Governor-General, Lord Canning proceeded to reply to Lord Ellenborough's strictures, and to assert the grounds upon which his convictions of the soundness of his policy rested.

Preliminary.

With respect to the former, Lord Canning referred to the extraordinary manner in which Lord Ellenborough's despatch had almost justified the people of Oudh, as if they were fighting in a righteous cause—a manner quite legitimate in a member of the legislature, but

Retorts upon Lord Ellenborough.

quite unjustifiable in a minister of the Queen of England, who herself was actually Queen of Oudh also. He declined to discuss the policy which, in 1855–56, had dictated the annexation; it was not his act, nor had he ever been empowered to undo it. But he felt it incumbent upon him to point out the disastrous results which might follow, should the people of Oudh be encouraged, by such reasoning as that contained in the despatch, to continue their resistance. At the actual moment, the chiefs of the various sections of rebels in Oudh were united neither by a common plan nor by a common sympathy, but, he added, if it should become manifest that the British Government shrank from a declaration of its right to possess Oudh, the Begam, as the representative in the field of the late reigning family, would draw to herself all the sympathies of the country, and all the other factions would merge in hers.

and points out the mischief his despatch might have caused in India.

Lord Canning prefaced the defence of his proclamation by stating that he had early in the year proceeded to Allahábád chiefly that he might be able to investigate the state of Oudh; that he soon determined to make a difference in the measures to be adopted for the pacification of the country, between the mutinied Sipáhis and the Oudh rebels; that the latter should not be put to death for appearing in arms against the authorities, unless they had committed actual murder; that the general punishment for rebellion in Oudh should be confiscation of estates, a punishment recognised by Native States as the fitting consequence of the offence, and one which in no way affected caste, nor the honour of the most sensitive Bráhman or Rajpút; a punishment which admitted of every gradation according to the severity or lightness of the offence; which would enable the Government to reward friendly tálúkdárs and zamindárs, and which, in point of fact, would, in many cases, constitute a kind of retributive justice—many of the tálúkdárs having acquired their estates by spoliation of the village communities; that, as a matter of abstract justice, it would only be right to restore those estates to the village communities; but that, as there would be insuperable difficulties to such a course, it would be better to take the forfeited estates of the rebellious tálúkdárs as Government property, out of which faithful villages and individuals might be rewarded.

Def-nce of his proclamation.

With this vindication ended practically the crisis caused by Lord Ellenborough's hasty act. The result was to seat Lord Canning, in the presence of a ministry of an opposite party, more firmly in the saddle, and to give him greater strength to carry out the policy which he believed to be adapted to the circumstances. In another way his hands had been strengthened at this crisis.

Final result on Lord Canning of the Ellenborough letter.

The nomination of Sir James Outram to the Supreme Council enabled Lord Canning to place at the head of the Oudh province a man who, imbued with his own views, was certain to carry out his policy with the vigour arising from conviction.

The new Chief Commissioner of Oudh was Mr. Robert Montgomery.* Mr. Montgomery was a man who, with a thorough acquaintance with administrative duties, combined great decision of character, a sound judgment, and a thorough knowledge of native character. He had been the right hand of Sir John Lawrence in the Panjáb, had been the firm advocate of those resolute measures which made the fall of Dehlí possible, and, in the earlier stages of the mutiny, when Sir John Lawrence was absent from Láhor, had himself directed the measures for disarming the native troops, which, carried out in time, had unquestionably saved the province. In questions of administrative policy, Mr. Montgomery, as I have said, agreed in principle with Lord Canning.

Mr. Robert Montgomery.

His character and antecedents.

Such was the man to whom, in the month May 1858, Lord Canning entrusted the carrying out of the policy towards Oudh embodied in his famous proclamation. Mr. Montgomery, without ignoring the proclamation, did not put it into rough action. He used it rather as a lever, by the judicious employment of which he could bring about the results at which the Governor-General professedly aimed. The situation was, for the first three months of his tenure of office, in many respects remarkable. The larger number of the relations, adherents, and dependants of the deposed royal family had their dwellings in, or belonged, by family association extending over many years, to the

Mr. Montgomery's action regarding the proclamation.

The situation in Oudh.

* Afterwards Sir Robert Montgomery, K.C.S.I., and till recently a member of the Council of India. He died in 1887.

Lakhnao. city of Lakhnao. Considering the part which that city, and more especially the classes of its inhabitants to which I have referred, had played in the rebellion, it was especially necessary to exercise over it a strict supervision. In the provinces an entirely different feeling prevailed. There the rule of the king of Oudh had planted no seeds of loyalty or devotion. Alien in religion and in race to the great bulk of the people of Oudh, the king and his courtiers had been tolerated, first, because they were there, and, secondly, because they had exercised no strict supervising power, but had been content to be the nominal rulers of the great landowners, permitted to carry on, very much in accordance with their own wishes, their feudal rule. The central power, as exercised by the kings of Oudh, had interfered to put a stop to rapine and oppression only when that rapine and oppression had attained a magnitude so great that to ignore the evil would have produced a national rising. The sentiment felt, then, by the great body of landholders towards the royal family of Oudh was not loyalty; it was not affection; it was not sympathy; it was scarcely contentment. Perhaps the term that best describes it is the term toleration. They had been content to tolerate that family as exercising a kind of normal suzerainty which permitted them to do just as they liked.

The provinces.

Feeling of the people towards the king.

Towards the British rule, exercised as it had been by the civilians who had immediately preceded Sir Henry Lawrence, they entertained a different feeling. In strong contrast with the selfish sway of the Muhammadan kings of Oudh, the British rule had made itself felt in every corner of the province. The reforms it had introduced, the inquiries which it made, had been so sweeping, that an almost universal feeling had risen amongst the landowners that it was not to be endured. If the King of Oudh had been King Log, the British rule was the rule of King Stork. The landowners of Oudh, then, had hailed the mutiny, not from affection towards the deposed dynasty, but from hatred of its successor. Indifferent as they were to the persons and the race of their Muhammadan kings, they would have gladly ejected the British to restore them.

Their feeling regarding British rule

very hostile.

When, then, Lakhnao had fallen, the tálúkdárs and the landowners generally were as far as they had ever been from submission to the British authority. Could the Begam show a

strong front, they might yet combine with her for the restoration of the ancient dynasty in the person of one of its members. But, as there did not appear in the field any force sufficiently strong to rally round, the landowners and other rebel leaders fought each for himself, each hoping that some great benefit would accrue to him out of the general turmoil.

But they have no central rallying point.

This disunion greatly diminished the difficulties which Montgomery might otherwise have had to encounter had there been one fixed purpose and concentration of action among the malcontents. But still the task before him was no light one. He met it with all the skill, the temper, and the judgment which might have been expected from so experienced a ruler of men. He exhausted every means of persuasion at the same time that he brought clearly to the view of the landowners the fixed determination of the British Government. He was thus able to restore in some few districts the lapsed British authority. To reorganise that authority in those deaf to his persuasions, he was content to wait until the forcible measures inaugurated by his military coadjutor, Sir Hope Grant, should produce their natural results.

This fact diminishes Montgomery's difficulties, which are, nevertheless, great.

He meets them;

restores British authority in some districts.

What those measures were I shall relate in the next chapter

CHAPTER II.

THE PACIFICATION OF OUDH.

Hope Grant

WHEN I last referred to General Hope Grant,* he was marching to the fort of Jalálábád near Lakhnao. The date was the 16th of May. Leaving his force to enter that place, the general, just then nominated a Knight Commander of the Bath for his services in the field, rode into Lakhnao to consult with Mr. Montgomery, the recently appointed Chief Commissioner. Montgomery informed him that the Kánhpúr road was again endangered by Béni Mádhu, an influential tálúkdár, who had likewise caused proclamations to be distributed in Lakhnao, warning the inhabitants to quit that city, as it was to be attacked. On receiving this information, Hope Grant, taking with him the 53rd Foot instead of the 38th, and substituting Mackinnon's battery for Olpherts's, returned to Jalálábád, and started thence in pursuit of Béni Mádhu on the 25th of May.

follows up Béni Mádhu.


For some time Béni Mádhu was invisible. Hope Grant followed him to Jasandá, eight miles from Banní, where he had been reported to be "with a force of eighty-five thousand men"; but the tálúkdár and his men had vanished. On the 4th of June the Sikh Rájah of Kapúrthalá joined Sir Hope with nine hundred Sikhs and three brass 6-pounders.

Then, leaving the pursuit, marches against a rebel force at Nawábganj.

Hope Grant posted this reinforcement at the Banní bridge, and, leaving the pursuit of Béni Mádhu, marched against a body of rebels, less fabulously numerous, but more really formidable—being fifteen thousand strong—who had taken up a strong position at Nawábganj, on the Faizábád road, eighteen miles from Lakhnao. Grant's division was tolerably strong.† Leaving, then, a small force at the other Nawábganj,

* Vol. IV. page 349.

† It consisted of the 1st and 2nd battalions Rifle Brigade, the 5th Panjáb


Simlah
Mayur
Dayahrí
Kásauli
NIPÁL
Lower Slopes
HIMÁLAYA MOUNTAINS
Naini Tál
Bálawal
GURI
Gandhak R.
Ambalá
Patiálá
Kurrie
Hindun R.
Dhab Canal
CIS-SATLAJ STATES
Karnale
Jamna R.
Canal
Panipat
Rájpipla
Mirath
Ghází ud Din Nagar
Ganges R.
Balandshahr
Alígarh
Mainpúrie
RÁJPUTÁNA
Agra
Etawah
Jamna R.
GWÁLIÁR
Banda
ROHILKHAND
Rámpúr
Pinraino
Bará Ranganga
Kántho
Shahábád
Sitápúr
Khairábád
Nimkhár
Dhaurahra
Kheri
Kurrea
Bahráich
Chhoiárá R.
Ghágrá R.
Chandarpúr
Turkipúr
Bijnaur
Bijnaur R.
Barguján
Buthí
Hiranpúr R.
Bichhar
Balrámpúr
Rámpúr Thámá
Gorákhpúr
GORÁKHPUR
Bankatá
Gondá
Bangáon
Machhlípáon
Amorah
Tándá
Jalálpur
Azamgarh
Sarayú R.
Ghumti R.
Jaunpúr
Hamírpúr
Jáonpur
Chanlá
Sultanpúr
BANÁRAS
Ganges R.
Allahabad
Fathpúr
Chhátas
Surájpur
Kálpi
Jamna R.
Banda
DOAB DISTRICT
Farrakhábád
Fathgarh
Kanauj
Mainpúrie
Etáwa
Shikohábád
Firozábád
Mitrawlí
Bhúrar
Jalesar
Mangalawar
Sirsí
Kálpi
Kúnch
Kálinjar
Rájpúr
Banswárá
Bánda
Kirwí
Nayar
Kung
Sarsaul
Bhognipur
Jhinjhak
Rasúlábád
Akbarpur
Sikandra Rao
Kanpur
Sandílah
Lakhnao
Ram Bágh
Faizábád
Banthará
Jagdíspur
Gurgaiganj
Sultanganj
Mánjhgáon
Bangarpur
Mánjhí
Bánni
Yasinda
Amethí
Rái Barélí
Parsidanpur
Ramnagar
Partábgarh
Mánjhí
Bánkí
Pirthipur
Parwah
Unao
Mohán
Ghát
Bastrajpur
Jhinjhak
Rasúlábád
Akbarpur
Sikandra Rao
Kanpur
Sandílah
Lakhnao
Ram Bágh
Faizábád
Banthará
Jagdíspur
Gurgaiganj
Sultanganj
Mánjhgáon
Bangarpur
Mánjhí
Bánni
Yasinda
Amethí
Rái Barélí
Parsidanpur
Ramnagar
Partábgarh
Mánjhí
Bánkí
Pirthipur
Parwah
Unao
Mohán
Ghát
Bastrajpur
MAP OF THE
NORTH-WEST PROVINCES
INCLUDING THE TERRITORY
OF
OUDH
Scale of English Miles
0 10 20 40 60 80

the Kánhpúr road, he marched on Chinhat There l
nd another column, twelve hundred strong, under Colon
nnell. Placing his baggage under charge of that office
quitted Chinhat at 11 o'clock on the night of the 12t
June to march against the rebels

These latter had taken up a position exceptionally strong
ney occupied a large plateau, covered on three
les by a stream crossed by a bridge at a little
stance from the town On the fourth side was
ngle.

Strong position of the rebels

Hope Grant, having with him a trustworthy
nde, led his force across the complicated country
etween Chinhat and the plateau during the night, and reache
e bridge mentioned about half an hour before daybreak H
alted his column to allow his men to rest and get them breal
st, and then marched on the rebels His plan was to tu
eir right and interpose between them and the jungle H
en would do the rest

Grant halts near the rebels,

At daybreak Hope Grant crossed the bridge and fell on t
bels He took them completely by surprise Their
rces, divided into four parts, each commanded by
separate leader, had no time to concentrate, and
d made no plan to act with unanimity Hope Grant h
ruck at their centre, and this move had greatly contribut
their confusion. Still, they fought very gallantly. "A lar
dy of fine daring zamindárí men," wrote Sir Hope in h
rnal,* "brought two guns into the open and attacked us
ar I have seen many battles in India, and many
have follows fighting with a determination to
nquer or die, but I never witnessed anything
ore magnificent than the conduct of these zamindárís" Th
.acked Hodson's Horse, who could not face them, and by th
nsteadiness imperilled the two guns attached to their regimen
ant at once ordered up the 7th Hussars, and directed one
e batteries to open on the zamindárís. The fire from fo

and surpris them

Gallantry o the rebels,

fantry, five hundred Hodson's Horse under Lieutenant-Colonel Daly, c
undred and fifty Wale's Horse, under Prendergast, two hundred and fi
race's Horse Police, under Hill, the 7th Hussars, under Colonel Sir Will
ussell; two squadrons Queen's Bays; Mackinnon's Horse Artillery; a
ibbon's and Carleton's batteries. The whole of the cavalry was commanded
olonel Hagart

* *Incidents of the Sepoy War*, by Sir Hope Grant and Captain Knollys.

guns of this battery mowed them down with terrible effect, l did not force them to retire After the guns l played upon them some time, the 7th Hussars ca up, and, charging through them twice, forced th to give way. The fact that round the two gı of Hodson's Horse there lay, after the combat was ovei hundred and twenty-five rebel corpses, testifies to the valour these gallant levies After thiee hours' fighting, the rebels f back, leaving on the field six guns and about six hundred dee The British lost sixty-seven in killed and wounded In additic thirty-three men died from sunstroke, and two hundied a fifty were taken into hospital

who, after a desperate contest, are defeated,

This victory had very important iesults The rebels h from all sides been flocking to Nawábganj to swı the formidable column already there But Ho Grant struck dismay all around The defeat was so crushi that the fugitives left the vicinity of Lakhnao, each of the fo parties taking a different direction The concentiating mov ment was thus effectually stopped

and disperse.

Sir Hope left his force at Nawábganj and returned to Lak nao to consult with Montgomery, whom this victoı had allowed for the first time to breathe freel From Lakhnao he was ordered by Sir Colin Camj bell, in the third week of July, to march to th ielief of Mán Sing, a famous Rájah,* who, having at one tin taken part with the iebels, had listened to the advice of M Montgomery, and returned to his allegiance For this he ha been denounced by his former associates, and at the momer was attacked in his fort by a body of them twenty thousan strong with twenty guns.

Sir Hope is sent to relieve Mán Singh

It being of great importance to retain the adheience of s powerful a chieftain, Hope Grant at once despatche the 90th regiment, the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, Bra syer's Sikhs, Mackinnon's tioop of horse artillery and four hundred cavalry to Nawábganj to supply the place of the tioops he should take on thence, and with thes latteı† he set out on the 22nd of July

Hope Grant starts to carry out the order

* Vol. III page 267

† The 1st Madras Europeans, the 2nd battalion Rifle Brigade, the 1s Panjáb Infantry, the 7th Hussars, five hundred Hodson's Horse, twelve ligh guns, and a train of heavy guns.

Before starting with Sir Hope on this expedition it may be nvenient to the reader to realise as far as possible e exact position at the moment of the several rebel rties in Oudh. Of these, counting as one the rces of the Begam and her alleged paramour, amú Khán, there were nine of great and many of smaller mensions. The nine greater divisions disposed at the time of xty or seventy thousand armed men, with forty or fifty guns ore than half of these were said to have their head-quarters nder the command of the Begam and Mamú Khán at Chaukí hát, on the Gághrá, not far from Faizábád, but a considerable dy of them were besieging Mán Singh. The remainder—led y such men as Rámbakhsh, Bahúnáth Singh, Chandábakhsh, uláb Singh, Narpat Singh of Rúiyá notoriety, Bhopál Singh, d Firúzsháh—were scattered all over the province, never long the same place, hoping that a chance blow might give them ctory or plunder.

The position of the rebel parties in Oudh

Hope Grant, urged by letters from Mán Singh to the effect at, unless speedily relieved, he could not answer the consequences, pushed on rapidly, so rapidly, deed, that the rumour of his advance had all, or most all, the effect of the advance itself When thin a few days' journey of Mán Singh's stronghold of Sháhganj, he learned that the besieging ce had melted away!

The rebels abandon the leaguer of Sháhganj on Sir Hope's approach,

It was perfectly true. On hearing that the English army as advancing by rapid marches, the besiegers took ght, and broke up into three divisions One of ese fled towards Gondah, a second to Sultánpúr, the Gúmtí, a third to Tándá on the Ghágrá

and break up into three divisions.

Hope Grant moved then, not the less rapidly, on Faizábád, ence he proceeded to the ghát of Ajúdhiá, and und a considerable body of rebels pushing forth in oats to the opposite side of the river He opened these and sank all but one The crews for the ost part escaped The next day he had an interview with ájah Mán Singh

Hope Grant moves on to Faizábád,

But he did not rest idle at Faizábád. Sultánpúr having been dicated to him as the next point of attack, Hope rant detached thither a column composed of the t Madras Fusiliers, the 5th Panjáb Rifles, a detachent of 7th Hussars, three hundred Hodson's Horse,

and sends Horsford to Sultanpúr

d a troop of Horse Artillery under the command of Brigadier orsford. Horsford was delayed by heavy rain, but at last, on e 7th of August, he set out, and on the 12th arrived within ur miles of the town, separated from it by the river Sái Horsford, having ascertained by means of a reconnaissance that the enemy were in force, that the river was peculiarly favourable for defence, and that his passage would be disputed, reported that state of affairs to Hope Grant Almost simultaneously with the arrival of that report, Hope Grant received a telegram om the Commander-in-Chief informing him that the Sultán- r rebels numbered fourteen thousand men, that they had teen guns, and that it was advisable that he should reinforce orsford with the Rifle Brigade

ope Grant ains the rength of e rebels at ultanpur,

Nothing loth, Hope Grant ordered up the 53rd from Darya-ábád, and, taking the Rifles with him, pressed forward to reinforce Horsford He reached that officer on the 24th of August, and, at once changing the position of the British camp, resolved to cross the lowing morning The remainder of that day he employed making rafts. On these, early on the morning of the 25th, sent over the 1st Madras Fusiliers and the 5th Panjáb infantry, then, though with great difficulty and after one or two ishaps, he landed on the opposite bank two 9-pounder guns onel Galwey, who commanded, then gallantly attacked and ied two villages in his front, at a point where the river ns a bend and where the rebels had a picket The Rifles e sent over in support of this advanced party.

d pushes to aid orsford

It was not till the 27th of August that the main body had completed the passage of the river, and even then the heavy guns, artillery park, hospital, and a wing of the 53rd were left on the further bank Nor did the British force even then attack On the evening of the 28th, however, the rebels became the assailants, but, after a sharp fight, they were repulsed and fled, abandoning Sultánpúr he conqueror

er sing the r,

a series ombats, rebels idon anpur

, is difficult to follow the Oudh rebels in their continuous marches and counter-marches But few of the old Sipáhis, the men who had been the backbone of the mutiny, were now among them. Their fluctuating numbers were composed almost entirely of the ad-

marches counter- ches of ebels

ants and vassals of the tálúkdárs and landowners of the vince, aided by the scum of the population, the refuse of the ls. Their movements were extremely irregular One day y appeared to retire into Ámethi, a fort twenty-five miles n Sultánpúr, seven miles in circumference, composed of mud ls and surrounded by a jungle, the residence of Lál Madhu gh, a young chief determined in his hostility to the British n they were heard of near Muzaffarnagar, then Rámpúr Kasiá It became evident to Sir Hope t nothing would drive them to submission but e, and he had full instructions to use it The ion, however, was unhealthy, and, when he en- d Sultánpúr, he resolved, with the concurrence ir Colin Campbell, to postpone further operations the middle of October

Sir Hope Grant determines to postpone further operations till after the rainy season

Whilst the gallant soldiers of Sir Hope Grant's force are ting with anxious hearts for the period of re- ved action, it may not be inopportune to take a id glance at the events which had been occurring the meanwhile in other parts of the disturbed vince.

The story returns to Rohilkhand

n the last volume* I recorded the close of the Rohilkhand paign and the death of the Maulaví, the daring Ahmad a of Faizábád, but, although the campaign was terminated, ie time elapsed before the border lands of Oudh and of Rohil- and were completely pacified. Many landowners on both es of the border resented the conduct of the Rájah of Powáin, l took up arms to punish, if they could, an act which they arded as treachery in its basest form. It soon appeared, vever, that the rebels could not agree amongst themselves, l they soon began to act independently of each other One ler, named Nizám Ali Khán, with a considerable owing, threatened the station of Pílíbhit Then re appeared in the field the whilom pseudo-vice- of the province, the treacherous pensioner Khán Bahádur án, with about four thousand followers, the wáb of Farrukhábád with five thousand, and uláyat Sháh with about three thousand The horities, however, were on their guard. They t a small force, including the cavalry com-

Nizám Ali Khán

Khán Bahadur Khán, the Farrukhábad, Nawáb

* Vol IV pages 380-7.

ílláyat
ıdh.

manded by the gallant De Kantzow, to protect Powáin, and they urged the corpulent Rájah of that ıce to keep his levies, two thousand strong, in constant ıining. This measure saved Powáin; but in other parts of hilkhand it was found difficult to put down disorder Tords the end of August, indeed, Álı Khán Mewátí, acting in concert with the Nizám Álı Khán above alluded to, approached so near Pílíbhıt as to menace Núrıah, a large village ten miles only from that British military post.

ıe rebels
ınace
ırıah.

The force at Pílíbhít was commanded by Captain Robert ıkins, 17th Panjáb infantry. It consisted of the 2nd Panjáb alry under Captain Sam Browne,* the 17th Panjáb infan- † under Captain Larkins, the 24th Panjáb pioneers‡ under sign Chalmers, and a detachment of Kumáun levies under Lieutenant Cunliffe. Both Captain Larkins and the chief civil officer, Mı Malcolm Low, considered that the occupation of Núrıah by the rebels was at all hazards to be prevented. Larkins accordingly detached a hundred men of the 24th pioneers and one hundred 2nd Panjáb cavalry, under Lieutenant ıgıe, to hold that village, Mı Low accompanying the party Craigie—who, as senior officer, commanded—reached Núrıah he 28th of August On the following morning the rebel chiefs I have named came down with three guns, three hundred infantry, and a hundred cavalry to attack the place Craigie made excellent dispositions to meet them outside the town, and checked them ance. So well did the rebels fight, however, that, when teen of their cavalry met in a hand-to-hand encounter a y of the 2nd Panjáb cavalry under Risáldár Hakdád Khán, fourteen of the nineteen were killed fighting. This occurred on the left flank On the right flank Craigie repulsed them in person They then fell back on Supúrah, three miles distant.

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rebels,

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to fall

arkins, hearing at Pílíbhít the enemy's fire, thought it sable to reinforce Craigie. Accordingly he directed a lred and fifty 2nd Panjáb cavalry, and a hundred

* Now Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel Browne, V.C, K C B.
† Now the 25th Native Infantry
‡ Now the 32nd Native Infantry.

áun levies to proceed at once, under the orders
aptain Sam Browne, to Núriah. Browne set
t once, and reached Núriah at 4 o'clock that
ing.

Browne is sent to reinforce Craigie.

e at once reconnoitred the rebel position. It was on a rising
nd or mound, amid the *débris* of the ruined
ge of Sirpúrah, separated from Núriah by an
dated tract of country nearly a mile in width,
nundating water varying from one to two feet From that
Browne saw that it was impossible to attack.
as possible, however, to assail the position from
other side. The energetic magistrate, Mr
olm Low, having procured him guides in the
ns of an old woman and a boy, Browne started
idnight to make the *détour* necessary for the success of
lan

Browne reconnoitres, and resolves to make a detour and attack the rebels

king with him two hundred and thirty Panjáb cavalry, a
ied and fifty 17th Native Infantry, a hundred
pioneers, and a hundred Kumáun levies,
me worked round the enemy's right flank,
by daybreak reached a position on his left rear
ably adapted for his purpose The fatigue had
great, and Browne halted for a few minutes to
sh men and horses. Whilst so halting the rebels discovered
and at once made preparations to resist him, bringing
9-pounders to bear on his advance, and posting
on their proper right flank. There was no
foi further rest, so Browne at once moved
and

He gains a position on the left rear of the rebels, when he is discovered.

He then advances

vering his front with skirmishers, and giving them strict
s not to fire, but to use the bayonet only, Browne pushed
nfantry forward through some grass jungle which served
reon their movements Very soon, however,
enemy's guns began to play on his cavalry on
left, which were marching on the open road
me, who was with that cavalry, seeing the
t which one of them, fired with grape at eighty yards, was
ucing, galloped up to it, accompanied only by an orderly,
t once engaged in a desperate hand-to-hand encounter with
gunners, hoping to prevent them working their piece till
skirmishers should come up. Surrounded by the enemy,
attacked him with great fierceness, Browne attained his

The enemy's gun annoying the advance,

object He did prevent the working of the gu
Browne charges the gunners, until the skirmishers came up and relieved him. the fight, however, he was first wounded on the kne immediately afterwards his left arm was severe at the shoulder As he received this terrible wound, his hors struck in the face, reared up and fell back on him Just th the Wardi-major of his regiment, followed by two or thr
and is severely wounded, but gains his point. others, rushed in, and, though the former w severely wounded, they kept the rebels at ba and saved their commanding officer. Immediate afterwards the infantry came up, bayoneted t gunners, and secured the gun which Browne h captured *

To go back for a moment Whilst Browne was thus engagi the gunners, the skirmishers had advanced steadi
Meanwhile, the infantry push on without firing a shot until close to the positio when a body of the enemy's infantry lying in t grass jumped up and fired. On this the skirmisher firing a volley, dashed on, secured the gun, and, aided by t supports and reserve, carried the position

The cavalry on the right, meanwhile, pushing on, ha simultaneously with their comrades on the le
Complete defeat of the rebels attacked the enemy's flank, and captured one gu This completed their discomfiture They brol and fled into the jungle, followed, as far as it w possible to follow them, by the victorious horsemen. Their lo had been heavy, amounting to three hundred men kille their four guns, their ammunition, and their stores The tv rebel leaders escaped, though one of them, Nizam Ali Khá had been wounded

In eastern Oudh, near Allahábád, there were about this tin

* Few more gallant deeds than this were performed during the war M Malcolm Low, who was near Browne at the time, considered the daring act prowess to have been the means of preventing the rebel gunners reloading a firing upon the infantry at the most critical period of the whole action. S William Mansfield stated that in his opinion and in that of Sir Colin, the aff was "very brilliant," and as "quite one of the best things we have seen of t sort, the attack by you having been made in a most soldierly manner a *secundum artem*" Captain Browne received the Victoria Cross for his darin The reputation of this gallant officer as a man of great ability and conduct h already been made, and he had subsequently shown himself as qualified conduct large operations in the field as he was willing to risk his life in t cause of duty

Eastern Oud

many bold and daring tálúkdárs, the men who had already caused trouble to Longden at Ázamgarh, and who were at this time exerting themselves to the utmost t stimulate opposition to the British They went so far, indeed s to threaten with condign punishment any member of thei lass who should submit to or accept the friendship of th ommon enemy On these threats they acted Bábú Rámpar hád Singh, a tálúkdár of Suráon who had displayed Britis sympathies, was attacked by some of these con- federated rebels, who burned his house, sacked the own, and took himself and his family prisoners. On the intelligence of this outrage reaching Allahá- bád Lord Canning hastily organised a small force, to be de signated the Suráon field force, composed of two hundred and sixty of the 32nd foot, eighty of the 84th foot, the 7th Panjáb infantry, seventy men Brasyer's Sikhs, fifty-two troopers 6th Madras light cavalry, sixty sabres Láhor light horse, detachments of horse and foot artillery, and nine guns and mortars, and placed them under the command of Brigadie Berkeley, C B, with directions to reassert British authority i that part of the country

Suráon is sacked by the rebels

A British force is sent under Berkeley to clear the district

Berkeley crossed the Ganges on the 12th of July, and on th 14th came in sight of a body of rebels at Daháin Daháin was not properly a fort It was rather a large area of jungle surrounded by a dilapidated earthen wal and ditch, and fenced with a thorny abattis In the centre c the enclosure was a square brick house. On Berkeley's approac the rebels retired within the enclosure, allowing the British t occupy the village and the jungle outside without opposition Berkeley awaited for the arrival of his heavy guns, and the opened fire, but the result, owing to the dense nature of th jungle, not being satisfactory, he sent on his infantry to storm The result was entirely successful. About two hundred and fifty rebels were killed in the ditch alone, as many more, chased through the jungle, were cut down by the cavalry and the horse artillery.

Daháin

is captured by Berkeley

Resting on the 15th, Berkeley proceeded on the 16th to th fort of Tirúl, seven miles north of Suráon He found this fort in the middle of an impenetrable thorny jungle, through which a few paths were cut in directions onl known to the natives of the place, and it had walls, bastion

Description of Surjon

es, escarps, like a miniature fortress, with a stronghold in entre, into which the garrison could retire on being closely ed There were only three guns on the bastions, but the were loop-holed for musketry. So thick was the jungle around that Berkeley could scarcely gain a view of the fort, he therefore deemed it prudent to employ his mortars and a 24-pounder before sending infantry This plan succeeded The enemy evacuated the place during the night, leaving behind them their three guns and their gun-ammunition The fort was then destroyed

a somewhat similar train of operations, Berkeley captured lestroyed a fort at Bhaupúr Having thus completed the work entrusted to him, he returned with his field force to Allahábád. After a brief interval, he was again sent out to demolish other forts in Oudh at distances accessible from Allahábád. In this manner he extended his force as far as Partábgarh Pushing on, then, to Sultánpúr, he touched Hope Grant's force, and they united the line of posts direct from Allahábád to Lakhnao

The force under Rowcroft, and the *Pearl* brigade acting with it under Captain Sotheby, whom we left at Ámórha at the end of April, had fallen back on Captainganj In the interval there was occasional sharp fighting.

On the 9th of June a detachment of both services, y Major Cox, the sailors commanded by Lieutenant Turnour, some twenty marines by Lieutenant Pym, marched on ha, where, it had been ascertained, Muhammad Husén had ed in force Cox divided his detachments into two parts, led by himself, the other—to which were attached the s and marines—by Major J F Richardson. Setting out at lock in the morning, and arriving at daybreak within a mile of Ámórha, they were suddenly met by a heavy fire from skirmishers thrown out by the rebels. Pym and the marines drove these in Cox then opened fire with his guns. Then, foiling an attempt to outflank him, he drove the rebels out of the place.

ne days later a larger detachment of Rowcroft's force again attacked the same rebel leader at the head of four thousand men at Harhá, and inflicted on him a t so crushing that he fled from that part of the country.

ttle later Rowcroft moved with his force to Hír, ıe Gorákpúr district, to guard the frontier until ıdvance of Sir Hope Grant in force should sweep listricts below him

Rowcroft then falls back on Hír

olated actions in the more western part of the province uced results not less beneficial. It happened on the 7th of August a rebel band, the advance he force of the rebel Firuzsháh, attacked the on of Mohan, on the river Sái, seventeen miles ı Lakhnao on the road to Fathgarh Mohan was one of the es in which British rule had been re-established, and was at time the head-quarters of the Deputy Commissioner of the ict, Mr. Pat Carnegy, already mentioned in these pages * Mr. Carnegy's disposal was a native police battalion The r Sái, close to Mohan, was traversed by a bridge On the ning of the 7th of August the rebel band referred to, numng two hundred infantry and a hundred and fifty cavalry—advance guard of a larger force—drove in the police pickets, sed the bridge, and made every preparation to attack the n the following morning

The rebels attack Mohan

ıformation of this attack reached Colonel Evelegh, C B., manding at Nawábganj, at 5 o'clock on the ning of the 8th. An hour later Evelegh set off ı three hundred Sikh cavalry under Godby, two ıe-artillery guns, twenty-five gunners mounted to port the guns, and twelve rank and file of the 20th foot, nted on limbers, and reached a point three miles from ıan. Conceiving that were he to continue his direct advance rebels would acquire information of his approach, Evelegh ıed off from that point to the village of Húsénganj—a village veen Mohan and Rasúlábád, the general headquarters of ız-sháh, and the occupation of which would cut the rebels' of retreat. His foresight was justified, for, on coming ın a mile of Húsénganj, he perceived the rebels falling back that place from Mohan. He immediately pur- them with his small force, but, finding that his s could not travel fast enough to overtake them, ushed forward his cavalry under Godby. The result was sfactory. Godby laid low forty-five of the rebels and cap-

Evelegh marches against them,

and defeats them

* Vol IV page 237

ıed their only gun, a brass 3-pounder, together with one ɜphant and two camels *

Nearer to Lakhnao, between the Rohilkhand fiontier and that ɣ, a gallant deed perſormed by the Kavanagh whose immortal ıoism was recorded in the last volume,† tended greatly to the cification of the distıict in which it occurıed

avanagh ıd Dawson ıpture ındelá

Of the distıict of Málíábád, twelve miles noıth-west of the capital, Mı. Kavanagh was Assistant Commissioneı. Eighteen miles furtheı to the north-west, lay the town of Sandélá, occupied chiefly by Patháns, possessing many brick-built houses and a small mud fort, and uated in a level plaın. The Patháns of this place had disıyed a deteımined hostility to the Bıitish, and had lost no portunity to threaten their posts and to intercept their comınications. It occurıed to Kavanagh, a daıing man, fertile resources and full of the love of adventure, that it would be ssible to put an end to these excesses by the capture of the wn. He proposed, therefoıe, to Captaın Dawson, commanding e of the new police levies, to attack Sandélá Dawson ɹeeing, they stormed the place on the 30th of July, and drove t the rebels Thencefoıward the town ıemained in the ɔupation of the Bıitish. Kavanagh displayed gıeat daıing on ıs occasion Noı was his tact inferior to his couıage. By a ıdy display of that quality, he won over several zamındárs the Bıitish cause, and even engaged them to maintaın number of matchlockmen at their own expense foı its pport.

ıe Oudh nks of the ınges

The banks of the Ganges in Oudh, even so fɹr down as Allahábád, required duıing these three monıths of July, August, September, very close watching They were infested by bands of rebels, some of whom pillaged the villages in Oudh, others, crossing the ɾer, attacked and plundered those in Bıitish terıitory. To nedy this evil, ıiver steamers were employed duıing the ny season, when the ıiver was navigable On one occasion, ɯaıds the end of July, information having reached the auɔrıties that the rebels had collected many boats, ready, ıenever a favourable opportunity should offeı, to cıoss into

This action had the effect of clearing the rebels from many of the districts Jnáo and Maláun

Vol IV page 116

tish territory, a force of a hundred and twenty Sikhs and
guns were despatched in a steamer to destroy the boats
y did destroy some twenty boats, but the forts which the
els occupied were too well armed and too strong to be attacked
expedition against these was deferred, but on several oc-
ons in August and September small detachments were sent
the river to check the predatory instincts of the rebels, and
most cases this object was accomplished.

At the period at which we have arrived, the end of September
8, the position occupied by the British in Oudh
s very peculiar They held a belt of country
ht across the centre of the province, from east to
st, whilst the districts north and south of that
t were either held by the rebels or were greatly troubled by
m. North of the belt were the Begam, Mamú Khán, Firuz-
h, Narpat Singh, and leaders less notorious, with their
lowers, south of it were Béni Mádhú, Hanmant Singh,
richand, and others Besides these, in the north-eastern
ner of the province, near the Nipál frontier, Náná Sáhib and
adherents were believed to be actively intriguing.

Position in Oudh occupied by the rebels

In October the cessation of the rains made the movement of
ops again possible The rebels were the first to
ze advantage of the change of season On the
1d of October Harichand, with six thousand men
d eight guns, crossed the Gúmtí ten miles north
Sandélá His force, increased by the junction of several
nindárs and their following to twelve thousand men and
elve guns, arrived within three miles of that post on the
rning of the 4th Sandélá was occupied by the Captain
wson already spoken of, with his newly-raised
lice battalions and other infantry levies, fourteen
ndred strong, and five hundred irregular cavalry
ries. On the approach of the rebels in such over-
helming force, Dawson placed his infantry in the small mud
t, and sent his cavalry to Málíábád He kept the rebels at
y till the 6th, when Major Maynard, with a
tachment of the 88th foot, two 9-pounder guns,
o 2½-inch mortars, two hundred and fifty police
valry, and six hundred police foot, joined him, taking up the
e hundred cavalry on the way Maynard at once attacked
e rebels and drove them to Panú, about four miles distant,
here they took up a very strong position. On the evening of

The rebels attack Sandelá,

are held in check by Dawson,

driven back by Maynard,

e 7th, Brigadier Barker reached Sandélá with a strong lumn,* attacked the rebels on the morning of the 8th, and, ,ei a desperate battle, completely defeated them His loss, however, was severe, being eighty-two of all ranks killed and wounded Major Seymour, Queen's Bays, Major Maynard, whose charger was hacked to death with talwárs when in the thick of the fight, and Lieutenant Green, of the Rifle Brigade, who received thirteen wounds, including the loss of his left arm and the thumb of his right hand, greatly distinguished themselves on this occasion The rebels t a large number of men, especially in the pursuit, which mptly followed on the victory A few days later, after a rd day's fight, accompanied by many casualties, the victors rmed the fort of Birwah

id com- etely feated by Barker

allantry of ymour, Maynard, Green

About the same time, the 5th of October, Brigadier Evelegh defeated the rebels at Mángani, between Lakhnao and Kánhpúr, took two guns, and placed about two hundred of them *hors de combat*, and on the 8th Sir Thomas Seaton added to his former laurels by orcepting a large body of the rebels on the frontier near áhjahánpúr, killing three hundred of them and taking three ns The same day an attack upon Powáin was repulsed by Rájah of that place, with trifling loss

ccesses of elegh d Seaton

These were the small actions which indicated the re-opening of the campaign. The comprehensive plan which the Commander-in-Chief, now become Lord Clyde, had drawn up during his stay at Allaháhád, came into operation only on the 15th of October. This n was devised on the principle of acting by columns in all districts simultaneously, so that, driven out of one district, rebels might not be able, as they had previously, to take ige in another Thus, by Lord Clyde's plan, one column s drawn from Rohilkhand for operations in the north-west of Oudh, clearing Mohamdí, Náurangábád, and similar places of importance, and proceeding then to establish itself at Sitápúr. For operations in the Baiswára country, r brigades were detailed Another column was posted to

rd Clyde's in of ification

eneral

Two field batteries, two squadrons Queen's Bays, six hundred and seventy e cavalry sabres, two hundred and fifty 88th Foot, one hundred 3rd battalion Brigade, nine hundred police battalion.

ard the Duáb; another to guard the Kánhpúr road; whilst ıer smaller columns, startıng from Lakhnao, Nawábganj, Daı-bád, and Faızábád, were ordered to be kept movable

The reader will at once conceıve the general purport of the ın The brıgades detailed for duty ın the Baıs-ıra country would occupy the whole of the Faızá- d dıstrıct between the Ganges and the Ghághrá ıshıng theı northward, they would reconquer the untry betweeu the Ghághrá and the Ráptí, holdıng out a nd to Rowcroft's force, on their rıght, ın the Gorákhpúr ıstrıct Simultaneously the Rohılkhand force would reconquer tápúr and the places ın the Khaırábád dıvısıon Then, with ı rıght fırmly fixed, as a pıvot, at Balıámpúr and a point yond the Raptí, Lord Clyde would wheel hıs maın force round the rıght tıll ıts left point should touch the Rohılkhand lumn, when the whole, sweepıng onwaıds, would cleaı the rthernmost parts of the provınce, and drive the surıvıvıng bels, who should refuse to surrender, ınto the jungles of the ngdom of Nıpál

The plan more in detail

On the 23rd of October Lord Clyde despatched instructions the same spırıt to Sır Hope Grant. That officer ıs directed, ın co-operatıon wıth Brıgadıers Pınck- y and Wetherall, to make a cırcuit, movıng up the ımtí as far as Jagdíspúr, then, turnıng sharp to hıs ft and movıng southwaıd by Jáıs, place hımself between Par-adápúr and Ámethí, dıspersıng any rebels on hıs way. The ıgadıers mentıoned ıeceıved at the same tıme detailed in-ructıons as to theır actıon, so as to make ıt co-operate wıth r Hope's movement, and thus ensure the success of the general an

Instructions sent to Hope Grant

Hope Grant, in obedıence to these ınstructıons, staı ted ım-edıately, arrangıng wıth Brıgadıer Wetherall, ho was marchıng up from Sarıám to joın hım on e 4th of November, and attack the fort of Rámpúr ısıá, held by an actıve partısan named Rám húlám Sıngh But Wetheı all, ıeachıng the vıcınıty of ímpúı Kasıá on the mornıng of the 3rd, resolved, despıte of e oıders he had ıeceıved to waıt for Sır Hope, to assaıl the ace at once Fortune gıeatly favouıed hım Rámpúr Kasıa ıs ın very deed a stronghold Its outer fortıfıcatıons, formed mud ramparts, had a cırcumference of three mıles Wıthın ıs area, surrounded up to the outer works by a dense jungle,

Wetherall marches on Rampúr Kasıá.

is another fort, and within this again a stone building
escription f the place
So much for the interior But beyond, and surrounding the outer ramparts, there was again a dense jungle in every direction save in that of the rth-west, and beyond the ramparts was a formidable abattis ie ditch was deep but narrow, and there were rifle pits in the rt which, in fortification, would correspond to the berme* happened, however, that on one side the ditch and ramparts had not, for a very small space, been completed, and
Wetherall ghts upon n unguarded oint and kes the lace.
it fortunately happened that Wetherall lighted on this particular spot At any other point he would certainly have been repulsed, but at this he effected an entrance, and carried the place and its twenty-three guns, with a loss of seventy-eight men killed d wounded The rebels lost about three hundred men
Hope Grant first heard of Wetherall's success on the afternoon the 3rd. He at once joined him at Rámpúr Kasiá Thence, in pursuance of his instructions, he proceeded to
Ámethí urrounded y the ritish,
Ámethí. This fort likewise was almost covered by jungle It was garrisoned by four thousand men, fifteen hundred of them Sipáhis, and thirty guns. rant arrived within two miles of its north-eastern face at o'clock on the afternoon of the 7th of November A reconnaissance, promptly made, assured him that the rebels were nt on resistance. On returning from this reconnaissance he und a messenger from Lord Clyde, stating that he was encamped three miles to the east of the fort The
urrenders o Lord lyde
Commander-in-Chief, in effect, having failed to induce the Rájah of Ámethí to come to terms, had marched from Partábgarh on the 6th, to bring him reason This active measure succeeded. The Rájah rode to camp on the morning of the 8th, and tendered his submission, yielding his stronghold.
Ámethí taken, Grant, carrying out the orders of Lord Clyde, proceeded to Shankarpúr to attack it from the north,
hankarpúr , invested n three ides.
whilst Wetherall and Pinckney should invest it on the east and south, and Evelegh on the west. In performing his part of the combined movement, velegh was delayed by the bad roads and the opposition of ie rebels He defeated these on the 8th at Moramáu, and on

* Sir Hope Grant's *Incidents in the Sepoy War.*

ne 9th he took the fort of Simrí, but these operations so delayed im that he was unable to arrive in time to take up a position o cut off the retreat of the chief of Shankarpúr and his ollowers

The chief was no other than Béni Mádhu, and he had with im a following estimated at fifteen thousand men. The Commander-in-Chief, anxious to avoid bloodshed, had offered him very favourable terms if he would surrender Béni Mádhu had returned the proud reply hat he would yield his fort as he could not defend , but that he would not yield himself as he elonged to his King! That night he and his ollowers evacuated the fort by its uninvested face fot, however, with the freedom from molestation ney had hoped for Fleeing hastily to Dúndia héra, they were encountered on the way by Evelegh, nd defeated, with the loss of three of their guns

The fort surrenders,

but Beni Madhu escapes,

and is encountered and beaten by Evelegh on his retreat

Shankarpúr was at once occupied by Grant, who then marched n the Ghághrá, which he crossed in face of the ebels, led by the Rájah of Gondah and Méhndi Húsen, on the 27th of November, pursued the enemy wenty-four miles, and captured four guns Marching thence towards Rái Báréli, he beat the rebels again a Nachhlígáon on the 4th of December, taking two guns, reached he fort of Banhasiá, whence he extracted five guns, on the 5th Gondah on the 9th, and Balrámpúr on the 16th Lord Clyde meanwhile, having learned the direction taken by Béni Mádhu, took Evelegh's brigade with him, marched on Dúndiá Khérá, and attacked and completely defeated hat chief on the 24th of November, taking all his guns Béni Mádhu, however, escaped. The other columns had by this time formed a complete cordon round the circumference of eastern Oudh They now closed in, and marching from their different points of departure, and on a common centre, traversed the whole territory, demolishing forts and strongholds, and re-establishing the civil power as they advanced.

Converging marches of Grant,

Lord Clyde,

and the other columns.

Whilst the east was being thus pacified, the Baréli column commanded by Colin Troup, employed all its efforts to bring about a similar result on the western side Crossing the Rohilkhand frontier in the end of October, Troup advanced on Sitápúr, dispersed the tálúkdárs

The column from Bareli

ıkes up its
osition in
ıe converg-
ıg line,

who attempted to oppose him in the vicinity of that place, captured Mithául on the 8th, and gave a final defeat to the rebels at Méhndí on the 18th of November Columns, meanwhile, under Gordon,

nd sweeps
ıefs
efore it

Carmichael, and Horsford, were engaged in clearing the country south of the Ghághrá, and before these the irreconcilable chiefs, men of the stamp of Béni ádhu, and Béni Mádhu himself, fell back

Hope Grant, I have said, had reached Balrámpúr on the 16th of December There he learned that Bálá Ráo,

ope Grant
ıches
owcroft,

brother of Náná Sáhib, had taken refuge in the fort of Túlsípúr, twelve miles distant, with a number of followers and eight guns, and that he had been ned there by Muhammad Húsén and his adherents Grant once directed Rowcroft to move from his position at Hír, l, reinforcing him with the 53rd, directed him to attack lsípúr. Rowcroft obeyed orders, found the enemy drawn to receive him, beat them after a feeble resistance, but could t pursue them from want of cavalry Hope Grant, fearing t the rebels should escape into the Gorákhpúr country, then took up the pursuit himself, and, cutting off Bálá

d sweeps
ı rebels
o Nipál.

Ráo from Gorákhpúr, ascertained that he had retreated with six thousand men and fifteen guns along the margins of the jungle to a place near ndakót, where there was a half-ruined fort at the confluence wo rivers Manœuvring with great skill, and placing his ıns in a position so that escape to any other quarter but ál was impossible, Grant moved against them on the 4th of uary, 1859, and drove them across the border, taking all ır guns

Whilst Grant was thus engaged, Lord Clyde, sending Evelegh he west to join Troup, was engaged in sweeping the country

his side,

from the points occupied by his troops, towards the Nipál frontier Moving on to Sikrorá, with Grant's e forming his right, touching, as we have seen, Rowcroft's e on the extreme right, and which formed, as it were, the pivot, Lord Clyde drove the Begam and Náná Sáhib

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ál.

before him from Bondí and Bahraitch, then advancing on Nanpárá, cleared the country between it and the Ghághrá; then marching on Bánki, close to the Nipál frontier, he surprised the camp of the els, defeated them with great slaughter, and drove them

to Nipál. This action and that of Hope Grant at Túlsípúr, ferred to in the preceding paragraph, cleared Oudh of the st remnants of the rebels Sir William Mansfield rote that he considered the mutiny crushed out, id Lord Clyde, sharing that opinion, left the ovince under the military care of Sir Hope Grant, structing him to keep the frontier of the border Nipál closely shut up, so as to prevent, if possible, the escape of any rebels into the lower country.

Considering the mutiny crushed, he makes over command to Hope Grant and leaves

The spirit, however, which had animated the rebel ieftains to sustain against the British a struggle hich, during six months at least, had offered not single ray of success, was not entirely extinguished

The spirit of the rebels is not, however, extinguished

Sir Hope Grant, taking leave of the Commander-in-Chief, oceeded to join Brigadier Horsford's force on the Ráptí. An cident had occurred just before his arrival, which lowed the great care required in attempting to rd Indian rivers Horsford had driven a strong bel force across that river, and, in fording it in irsuit of them, many men of the 7th Hussars and the 1st anjáb cavalry had been swept away by the force of the current id lost Amongst these was Major Home, of the 7th Hussars. fter some search his body was drawn out of a deep hole, his ands having a fast grip of two of the rebels, whilst the bodies two troopers who perished with him were found, each with s hands clutching a rebel sawár ! *

Danger of fording Indian rivers

From one side only, from the side of Nipál, was further nger to be apprehended On this side the frontier id a length of about a hundred miles, formed of ixed hill and jungle, and with such a frontier it as always possible that, despite the best dispositions on both des, the strictest precautions would be evaded

The Nipál frontier

At this crisis the real ruler of Nipál, the Maháráját Jang ahádur, behaved with the loyalty that had roughout characterised his dealings with the ritish Not only did he inform the armed rebels ho had crossed the border that he would afford em no protection, but he allowed British troops to cross the rder to disarm any considerable body there assembled Under

Loyalty of Jang Bahadur

* Grant's *Incidents in the Sepoy War*

s permission, Brigadier Horsford, early in the year, entered Sonar valley, and, crossing the Ráptí at Sidonia Ghát, came on a body of rebels and captured fourteen guns, and, later on, Colonel Kelly, of the 34th, caused the surrender of six guns, after having chased the rebels with great loss under the hills Under the pressure thus reised, a moiety of the fifty thousand who had crossed into pál, one by one threw away their arms, and returned to their ies, trusting they would be allowed to settle down unested

dual persion of rebels.

few, more hardened in crime, and therefore more hopeless of mercy, still continued to hold out, and some of these—the regiments which had perpetrated the Káhnpúr massacre, the 1st, the 53rd, and the 56th ive Infantry, led by Gújádar Singh, a rebel whose hate to British had not been lessened by the loss of an arm when ting against them—succeeded in crossing the border, in marching on Sikiorá, and filching thence two elephants, and finally, when pursued from that e by Colonel Walker and the Queen's Bays, with two guns, iking up a position at Bangáon, a small dilapidated fort on river Nadí, at the entrance of the Ghúngló jungles. There, at the end of April 1859, Colonel Walker, reinforced by four hundred men of the 53rd, and sixty of the 1st Sikh cavalry, attacked and completely defeated them

w more ined

de Oudh

ire ted

otwithstanding that the hot weather had set in, Sir Hope Grant deemed it of pressing importance to drive the remainder of the rebels from the jungles. Learning that the last remnant of their disorganised forces was at the Serwá pass, Grant moved against them in person, dislodged them by a turning movement, and then pursued them across the hills The pursuit gave ample evidence of the state of exhaustion to which the rebels had been reduced Without food and without arms, without money and without artillery—for they lost here their last two guns—they were thenceforth powerless. Pursuit ceased, Grant contented himself with posting troops at different s along the frontier as a precautionary measure His only t now was that Náná Sáhib and his brother Bálá Ráo ound refuge in Nipál. To the very last the former had been

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ant and daring as became his assumed position. Bálá Ráo, he other hand, had expressed penitence, and denied partici- on in the Kánhpúr massacre

t last, then, Oudh was at peace. The province had become ish by a right far more solid and defensible than pretext under which it had been seized in 1856. Oudh finally becomes British n, the country of the ruler who had ever been to his British overlord was, in disregard of ty, seized in the dead of the night, against the wishes alike he sovereign and the people Fifteen months' erience of British rule, administered by doctrin- Defect of the first title s who preferred the enforcement of their own ples to considerations of justice and policy, far n reconciling the people to their new master, had caused n to regret the sovereigns whom the British had expelled ause of their misgovernment of that very people They ed, then, the opportunity, ingeniously fomented the more influential of their countrymen, which Its consequences ned to promise them a relief from regulations ch perplexed and from changes which irritated them. They ed in the revolt inaugurated by their brethren the Sipáhis he majority of them Oudh men—and fought for independence. w pertinaciously they waged the contest has been told in se pages. No other part of India gave an example of a stance so determined, so prolonged, as did Oudh Through- the struggle, the sense of the injustice perpetrated in 1856 led the hearts of its people and strengthened their resolution on some occasion they too precipitately fled, it was in the e of renewing the struggle with some chance of success ther day When, finally, the sweep made over Oudh by d Clyde forced the remnant of the fighting class to take ige in the jungles of Nipál, the survivors often preferred vation to surrender * The agricultural popu- on, the tálúkdárs, the landowners, the traders, The title of 1859 better, epted the defeat when, after that long struggle, y felt that it was final. Thenceforward Great Britain

"Further on," wrote Sir Hope Grant, describing his last pursuit, "we dis- red two of the rebels in a state of helpless exhaustion, dying from their nds and from starvation It was sad to see many of the poor wives of the his, who had accompanied their husbands, deserted and left to die on the ground," and more to the same effect

sessed Oudh by a title far sounder than that which she had up in 1856, the title of conquest. She holds it now on a basis even stronger, on the basis of the affections of a people whom she has conciliated, and of a territorial aristocracy whose rights, whilst defining, and in some instances curtailing, she had made inalienable.

of the mutiny d the f all.

CHAPTER III.

THE PANJÁB AND THE NORTH-WEST.

ORE proceeding to recount the other great military measure
h which the story of the mutiny fitly closes, it is necessary
t I should ask the reader to accompany me to the
jáb to see how the fall of Dehlí, made possible by
noble self-denial of Sir John Lawrence, affected that border
vince. From the Panjáb the reader will return through the
ified provinces of the north-west to Ágra, in close vicinity
that Gwáliár but just reconquered by Sir Hugh Rose. In
succeeding book I shall record the most romantic episode
the history—the pursuit, from many starting points and by
ny independent columns, of the famous Tántiá Topí.

The Panjáb

The decision at which Sir John Lawrence had arrived at the
l of July 1857 to denude the Panjáb of troops in
er to reinforce General Wilson's army before
hlí, had not been formed without most serious
l anxious consideration. On the one side, he had
l before him General Wilson's letter announcing
t unless he were reinforced from the Panjáb he
uld not be able to maintain his position, still less to assault
city, and the inner certainty that if General Wilson were
raise the siege of Dehlí the Panjáb would rise in insurrection
the other, he had the knowledge that the effective force of
ropeans at his disposal, including the sick and convalescent,
t not including the force under Nicholson, did not exceed
r thousand men, and that these were not more than sufficient
maintain order in the Panjáb, even whilst the general feeling
the Panjábís should remain loyal; most insufficient should a
iking reverse of fortune, such as the raising of the siege of
hlí, turn the Punjábís against him. He had before him, in
t, a choice of two risks—the risk of a general rising in the
njáb, caused by the effect which would certainly be produced
the minds of the Panjábís by a retreat from Dehlí, and the

Sir John Lawrence's position early in September 1857

risk of rebellion induced by the knowledge that the Panjáb ha been denuded of British

Comparison of the two risks, one of which he was obliged to run

Of the two risks, the second was undoubtedly really th lesser To a nervous man, to a man fearing re sponsibility, however, the second risk would presen dangers affecting to such a degree his position, tha he would certainly shrink from incurring them A man of that stamp, charged with maintaining Britis rule beyond the Satlaj, would have argued that hi primary duty was to protect the Panjáb, and that he dare not for the sake of the uncertain chance of conquering Dehlí, risk the safety of that province "True," he would have said, "tru it is that, if the march of Nicholson's column enable Wilson t take Dehlí, our situation will be ameliorated But Wilso might be repulsed, Wilson himself thinks it is quite a toss-u whether he will succeed or whether he will fail And, if h fail, the situation of the Panjáb without Nicholson's colum will be a thousand times worse than if I were to retain it

Reasons for his decision in favour of the bolder policy

Everything, then, depends upon a very doubtful 'if' and, responsible for the Panjáb as I am, I dare not incur the risk" But Sir John was not a nervous man and he had no fear of responsibility He saw clearly that the one chance of preventing the further spread of the mutiny was to strike a blow at its heart That heart palpitated at Dehlí. Every risk, then, which strengthened the blow to be struck at Dehlí was a prelude to safety.

How Nicholson's column successfully worked out the great result aimed at has been already recorded in these pages. Dehlí fell But in the interval Sir John Lawrence had to meet the other risk of which I have spoken Nicholson's departure at the end of July had left in the Panjáb about four thousand European troops, including those sick and convalescent Of these, three regiments were in the Pesháwar valley, but so reduced by sickness, that for the active work of a campaign they could not muster more than a thousand bayonets; one regiment, the 24th, held Láhor, one, sent from Sindh, held Multán and Firuzpúr, another furnished detachments to hold Ráwalpindí, Amritsar, and Jálandhar Sir John at once made preparations to meet the new situation He first formed a movable column. For this purpose he drew from the 24th Foot from

The Panjáb when Nicholson left it at the end of July

How Sir John prepared to encounter the possible fall.

ı to thıee hundred men, and joined with them four hundred
ıjáb ınfantry and a few horsemen. The other troops alluded
)eıng reqıured for the purpose of watchıng, as at Pesháwaı,
fıontıer, and elsewhere, the dısaı med natıve troops, eıghteen
usand stıong, thıs column really constıtuted the only force
ıch could be used ın the event of an ınsurrectıon pıovoked by
hopes which the march of Nicholson's column mıght ınspıre
.he mınds of the dısaffected

'he doubts whıch Sır John Lawrence had entei tained re-
dıng a prolonged contınuatıon of the loyalty of Panjábís were quıckly justıfied. Nıcholson had ıssed the Satlaj on the 30th of July Early ın ıtember ıt was dıscovered that the ınhabıtants of lower Hazárah country had conspıred to revolt Mostly hammadans, the people of that tıact and of the adjoınıng s had been tempted by the long successful resıstance of ılí to plot the downfall of their Englısh masters They had dently been close obseı vers of the state of affaırs, for they l arranged that theıı contınued loyalty should depend on turn affaırs should take at Dehlí. If that royal cıty uld not fall before the 10th of September, on that day y would revolt

Dısaffectıon ın the lower Hazárah country

ı thıs case to be foıewaı ned was sufficıent. Lady Lawrence, o was then at the hıll statıon at Marrí, receıved first ıntımatıon of the ıntended revolt She ckly enteıed into communıcatıon wıth Mı ward Thornton, Commıssıoner of Ráwalpındí. at gentleman concerted at once wıth the other officials to le the conspırators In a few houıs theır leadeıs weıe ested, and the plot was thus nıpped ın the bud

Theır plot is dıscovered and baffled

ı few weeks later, a conspıracy of a sımılar nature actually ıe to a head ın the country between Láhor and ltán. On the evenıng of the 14th of September, very day on which the assault of Dehlí was ıveıed, a Muhammadan offıcial of the postal de- tment arrıved at Láhor from Gughaıra, and, kıng hıs way to Sir John Lawrence, reported "wıth some- at of a malıcıous twınkle of the eye,"* that all the wıld)es ınhabıtıng the jungle country betwcen Láhor and Multán l rısen. Questıoned further, he declaıed that the ınsurgents

Rısıng ın the country between Láhor and Múltan

* *Pánjab Military Report*, page 16

mbered a hundred and twenty-five thousand. Though Sir hn knew this number to be greatly exaggerated, yet, well are of the wild and reckless character of the tribes, to whom e tale referred, he felt certain that a rising of a formidable aracter had taken place, and that it was a case to meet which was necessary to take prompt and decided action Within three hours, then, of the receipt of the message, he had despatched one company of European infantry, two hundred Sikh cavalry, and three guns to the adquarters of the insurgents. Small though the force was, ally inadequate to deal with any large body of rebels, the erity with which it had been organised and despatched mpensated for every disadvantage. The very rumour of its advance struck terror into the insurgents. They at once took refuge in the almost impenetrable jungles which formed their normal habitation Their re- at did not in the least relax Sir John's endeavours to crush m. He sent reinforcement after reinforcement to his small umn, and very speedily ensured the submission of the dis- ected tribes

r John eets

d sup- esses it

This was the last attempt made by any portion of the population of the Panjáb to rise in revolt. The fall of Dehlí occurred about the same time to convince even the most disaffected that the star of England was still in the ascendant. The occurrences that lowed seemed to add daily confirmation to this opinion. The ief of Lakhnao, the capture of that place, followed by the onquest of Rohilkhand, and accompanied, almost, by Sir gh Rose's splendid campaign in Central India, came as proof on proof that the power which had won India was resolved to maintain it In the latter half of the year 1858 one or two disturbances occurred which, by their exception to the general rule and by their easy pression, served to prove the real tranquillity of the province. n July 1858 a portion of the 18th Panjáb infantry, stationed at Derá Ishmáil Khán on the Indus, planned a mutiny The portion referred to was composed of Sikhs, known as the Malwáí Sikhs, and numbered about a hundred For some cause unknown they proposed, it was said, to murder their officers, seize the magazine and the fort, and to re-arm the 39th nent native infantry, which had been disarmed some time

enceforth, ler ughout Panjáb

isturbed slightly

st at á Ishmáil án

eviously. Fortunately, on the 20th of July, the plot was
scovered Major Gardiner of the 18th Panjáb native
fantry, and Captain Smith of the artillery, pro- Suppressed by Major Gardiner
eded at 10 o'clock in the evening of that day,
the lines of the regiment and summoned two of
e Malwáis. One, a Sipáhi, came out at once, when Major
ardiner ordered him to be confined. On hearing the order he
n off, pursued by the guard. Just as the foremost men of the
ard had reached him a Malwái Jámadar rushed out, cut down
e man and wounded another, and fled with the Sipáhi A
w days later they were captured, and the revolt, of which
ey had been the ringleaders, was suppressed.

At Multán an attempt made, the following month, to dispose
iietly and peaceably of some of the disbanded Multán
giments, terminated in bloodshed At that station
ere were the 62nd and 69th native infantry and a native
oop of horse artillery These men were a source of great
nbarrassment to the authorities, for it was con- Embarrassment caused to the authorities there by the disarmed regiments,
dered unsafe to re-arm them, whilst, disarmed,
ey required European troops to guard them. It
as resolved, as a middle course, to disband them by
actions, and allow them to depart quietly to their
omes The Sipáhis acquiesced in the decision when
he decision was made known to them Subsequently, however
hey conceived the impression that it was intended to attack and
estroy them piecemeal on their way home Imbued with this
lea, they rose in revolt. When the mid-day gun fired on the 31st
f August, they seized clubs and whatever else they
ould find in the shape of weapons, and rushed to the men of which, under the impression that they are about to be massacred, rise in revolt.
ttack the European and Sikh troops Those troops
onsisted of a hundred and seventy artillerymen, a
ving of the 1st Bombay Fusiliers, the 11th Panjáb
nfantry, and the 1st Irregular Cavalry. The men
f this small force who happened to be on guard
were taken by surprise, and five of their number were beaten to
leath with clubs Lieutenant Miles, Adjutant of the Bombay
Fusiliers, who came up at the moment, was dragged from his
horse and killed in the same manner As soon, however, as the
bulk of the Europeans and Panjábis realised the Suppression of the revolt
state of affairs, they came up in strength, and
showed no mercy to the assailants. The 11th
Panjábis were especially furious at the unprovoked attack

f the thirteen hundred men who made it, few lived to return their native land.

he reader raverses e loyal is-Satlaj ates

Passing downwards through the territories of the loyal chieftains of the Cis-Satlaj states—of the Rájah of Patiálá, who, at the very outset, cast in his lot with the British, protected the stations of Ambálah and Karnál when the British army marched on Dehlí, guarded the grand trunk road from Karnál to Phillaur, -operated with Van Cortlandt in Hisár, and maintained a ntingent of five thousand troops for service with the British, of the Rájah of Jhínd, who, emulating his brother

d the hif stricts,

Rájah in loyalty, left his own country undefended to march against Dehlí, and in many other ways rendered assistance to the good cause, and of the jah of Nabhá, who aided in holding Lodiáná, supplied an ort for the siege-train, gallantly opposed the Jálandhar tineers, and performed various other excellent services—the reader will traverse the pacified Dehlí territory till he reaches the district of Itáwah. Here he will ke a short sojourn before proceeding to Ágra.

Itáwah

he Itáwah district had, in common with other districts in the Jamnah Duáb, been included in the brigade command assigned to Sir Thomas Seaton.* The attention of that gallant soldier was, however, more stantly directed to the side of Rohilkhand than to the more eful districts to the south of him. In those districts he restored order and had generally re-established the civil inistration. The only chance of a renewal of disturbance hem arose from the possibility of some fugitive rebel from country west of the Jamnah endeavouring to restore the mes of his followers by a raid into a settled but little- ded country. It was this possibility which occurred in the ah district

'position táwah

he defeat of Sindhiá's rebellious troops at Gwáliár by Sir Hugh Rose had let loose on the country a number of turbulent partisans, who, escaping from the battle, had sought refuge in the ravines of the Jamnah. Prominent among these was an adventurer d Rúp Singh. This man, followed by a few soldiers of the ar Gwáliár contingent, a certain number of the fugitives

dated bels across amnah

* Vol IV. page 218

f Sindhiá's army, and other rabble, crossed the Jamnah and ıade his appearance at Ájítmal, twenty-five miles from Itáwah, ı the month of July Though he was routed by a force sent ıom Itáwah and forced to flee, he did not abandon the district ınd, what was of more consequence, other adventurers, animated ›y similar aims, sprang up about the same time, and rivalled ıim in his endeavours to harass and plunder the newly pacified eiritories Amongst all these marauders, however, Rúp Singh maintained the pre-eminence. Often Rúp Singh
›eaten, he always managed to elude his pursuers During long ›eriods he was not heard of. But during those periods daily ccounts of robberies and stoppage of traffic on the Jamnal eached the authorities It was then discovered
hat Rúp Singh had taken possession of a fort at Barhí, near the junction of the Chambal with the Jamnah, and that from this place he levied contri- ›utions on travellers by land and water
and his river piracy

The exactions of this adventurer and of others like him eached at last so great a height that, in the month ›f August, a small force, five hundred and fifty men of all arms,* was despatched from Itáwah to destroy or disperse them This force, commanded by Lieu- tenant Lachlan Forbes, of the 2nd Grenadier N. I, accompanie by Lieutenant Gordon of the Madras Engineers, in comman of his sappers, and by Mr. Lance, the able and energeti magistrate of the district, embarked in boats, and proceede down the river towards Barhí It had reached Garhá Kúdúr, fortified village three miles from that place, and was still in th boats, when Rúp Singh attacked it Gordon's men at once dis embarked, in spite of opposition, drove away the rebels, re embarked, dropped down to Barhí, and took the place.
A force proceeds against him from Itawah

After destroying three of the bastions of the fort and rendering it generally indefensible, Lance pushed on to Chakarnagar, the resort of another rebel chief, com pletely defeated the rebels there, and fixed that place as the headquarters of a small detachment to control the country In these operations Lance was greatly assisted by Lieutenant Forbes. This
destroys Barhí,
and occupies Chakar- nagar

* During 1858-9, the force at Itáwah commanded by Lieutenant Lachl Forbes, consisted of six companies of infantry, three troops of cavalry, and thr guns, called "the Itáwah Yeomanry Levy", also four companies of infant and one troop of cavalry, styled "the Itáwah Military Police Battalion."

energetic officer raised, drilled, and led the local levies, and o more than one occasion during the trip down the Jamuah, whe the fire was most severe, he landed with a few of his men, drov off the rebels, and thus enabled Lieutenant Gordon and hi Madras sappers to pass unscathed. Mr James Collett, a engineer on the East India Railway, and who volunteered t work a gun on board Lance's boat, displayed likewise grea courage and great skill. He was badly wounded. The opera tions thus gallantly carried on for a time pacified the districts But in October Rúp Singh reappeared on the Kúárí* with ollowing of four hundred men, and attacked a British picke on the Itáwah side of that river Captain Allan, u command of a few levies—a hundred and forty infantry and twenty-five sawárs—happened to be a the moment at Sahson, not very far from the poin f Rúp Singh's action. He at once went in pursuit of him caught him near the village of Kúárí, completely defeated him, and captured all his camels and pack-cattle. The band of the rebel leader ther dispersed, and from that time the Itáwah distric vas undisturbed

Allan beats Rúp Singh on the Kúárí,

when the band disperses.

In Ágra, since the relief of that place by Greathed, matters had remained fairly tranquil. In the early part of 1858 Brigadier Showers had been sent to command the district and to perform in its vicinity the work which he had so successfully accomplished in the Dehlí districts fter the capture of the imperial city.† One of Showers's first cts was to work vengeance on some local rebels who had lundered the town of Báh and murdered the authorities. This vas done on the 20th of March. Showers, making a long ight-march, surprised the rebels at Kachrú and captured the ringleaders. But the task allotted to him and to the civil authorities in the fort was long and difficult Not only were the districts swarming with small bands of insurgents, but the whole of the

Showers at Ágra.

Disturbed state of the districts

* The Kúárí rises about sixty miles to the north-west of the fort of Gwáliár, ows first to the north-west, subsequently east, and finally south-east Its ourse is semicircular in its general outline and has a length of one hundred and ghty-five miles The route from Agrá to Gwáliár crosses it at Hingona, and at from Itáwah to Gwáliár, near a village also called Kúárí, forty-five miles ove its mouth

† Vol IV p 75.

ıntry west of the Jamnah was in a state of complete ınsuı-
ɔtıon. Gwálıár lies but sıxty-five miles from Ágra, and ıt
no exaggeıatıon to state that, until the capture of Gwálıár by
r Hugh Rose ın June 1858, the influence of Mahárájah Sındhıá
er hıs own people was not to be counted upon, and that Ágra
ıs at any moment lıable to an attack ın force fıom any
mber of ıebels

Apprehensions at Ágra.

Thıs sıtuatıon was entirely appreciated in Ágra. The guns
the fort remained pointed at the native town—
e *focus* of a ıebellıon which mıght at any moment
eak out Every precautıon was, indeed, taken to
event, or rather to ward off, such an event, but
e fact that no European lıvıng beyond the range of the guns
the foıt felt hıs life secuıe for a moment shows how deep
as the ımpressıon that a revolt was a mere question of oppor-
nıty. The slightest event mıght brıng ıt on. The news of a
saster in the Duáb or in central Indıa, the appearance on the
ımnah of a mutınıed contıngent or of Tántıá Topí—any
ıe of these eventualıtıes would most certaınly precıpıtate a
tastıophe.

Colonel Fraser and Mr E. A Reade

Throughout this crısıs the cıvil authorıtıes at Ágra—Colonel
raser, Mr. E A. Reade, and theır colleagues—
splayed a coolness of judgment and a readıness of
source whıch left nothıng to be desıred. The
lf-denyıng energy wıth whıch they devoted them-
lves to the task of reorganısıng where reorganısatıon was
ɔssible, of meetıng great and pressıng wants from exhausted
sources, of provıdıng all the mılıtary and cıvıl requirements
ıy by day, and of infusıng theır own brave spırıt ınto those
hose fortunes were at the lowest, deserve a far
ngeı and a fulleı notıce than I am able to give
ıem in these pages The hıstory of the occupants
Ágra ıs the hıstoıy of men who, deprıved of the stımulus o
ɔtıon, of the excıtement of the camp, of the joyous sound o
ıe clash of arms, devoted all theır eneıgıes to theır country, anc
eserved fully the credıt and the glory always assigned to deed
ıore showy but not more meıtorious.

Their great deserts

Amongst the useful measures carrıed out duııng the period o
hıch I am wrıtıng was the raısıng of a corps of
ıvalry, subsequently known as Meade's Horse. At
ıe end of the year 1857 the want of native troopers
nd mounted orderlıes at Ágra had been greatly felt, and a

Meade's Horse

there were in the fort officers whom the mutiny had depr of their employment, it was considered advisable to rai regiment on a military footing. The task of raising it wa December 1857, committed to Captain R. J. Meade

This officer, who will occupy a conspicuous figure tow the close of the next chapter, had been for s

Captain R. J. Meade

years brigade-major of the Gwáliár contingent, in that office had won the confidence of the off under whom he had served. He possessed a thorough acqu ance with the language of the people, and he invariably all his energies to the duties confided to him. It would been impossible for a general in command to have had u his orders an officer who would more resolutely carry execution the orders he received

A body of a hundred Sikhs and Panjábí Muhammadans for the nucleus of this new regiment To them M

Process of formation of Meade's Horse

added some forty odd Eurasians and native C tians, chiefly drummers and bandsmen, taken the disbanded native regiments These were mately increased to eighty-five, and were formed into a Chris troop As none of these men had ever previously crosse horse, some of Meade's difficulties may be imagined.

At the end of January 1858 Meade obtained an accessio forty-five mounted Játs, sent from Rohtak under a Jámada good family by Mr J. Campbell, collector of that district, a little later the new commandant induced Baldéo S. Thákur of Jhárá to raise, from men of his class in the ne bourhood of the Chambal, a troop of seventy horsemen this manner the regiment was formed, and Meade was, short time, able to form it into six class troops.* The la of drilling the men and teaching many of them to ride ma imagined when it is considered that none of the men had se in the cavalry or as soldiers at all. Working incessa himself, and aided by such men as Sergeant Hartigan, V.C the 9th Lancers, and who subsequently gained a commissio the 16th; by Cockburn, whose gallantry has been referre in a previous volume; and by others, Meade

The regiment is formed,

able, by the beginning of March, to show a proportion of his regiment fit for service. Briga

* 1 Sikhs, 2 Panjábi-Muhammadans; 3, Játs, 4 Christians, 5 Gu Thákurs, 6. Mixed

owers, who inspected them duiing that month, expressed mself well satisfied alike with men and horses.

From this time up to the beginning of June Meade's Horse ›re constantly employed in maintaining order in e neighbourhood of Ágra, and it would be difficult exaggerate the services they rendered in this spect to the administrative and military autho- ›ies in the place

and renders good service in the vicinity of Ágra

But in June the aspect of Ágra suddenly changed. How on e 1st of that month Mahárájah Sindhiá was attacked and ›ven to flight by the rebels under Tántiá Topí, I have re- ›ded in a previous chapter The Mahárájah, abandoned by l but a few faithful men, fled to Dholpúr, intending to push to Ágra The news of his misfortune had, however, preceded m Showers instantly despatched a squadron of eade's Horse to escort the fleeing sovereign with honour into the capital of the north-west provinces ›e Mahárájah, who reached Ágra on the 2nd of ›ne, remained there till the 14th, and left it that day escorted ' two squadrons of Meade's Horse to Dholpúr, thence to proceed join Sir Hugh Rose, expected to reach Morár on the 16th. ›ws of Sir Hugh's arrival on that day having reached the ahárájah, he set out on the morning of the 17th, still escorted ' the two squadrons, and made the march, fully sixty-five les, within twenty-four hours The events which followed ›ve been recorded in the preceding book.

Sindhia, after his defeat, is escorted to Ágra

Returning to Ágra, I have only to record the fact that on the feat of Tántiá Topí on the 17th and 19th of June, at Morár d at Gwáliár, Brigadier Showers sent out a tachment, consisting of the 3rd Europeans and battery of guns, to cover Bharatpúr, upon which ace he believed the rebels to be marching The ›monstration was successful, inasmuch as the esence of the detachment induced Tántiá Topí bend his steps southwards As soon as his march in that rection was definitely known, the detachment returned by ay of Fathpúr Síkrí to Ágra Thenceforward that ty and the districts east of the Jamnah experienced e full relief caused by the crushing defeat, at a ›int so close to the British districts, of the one ›eftain whose name up to that time had been a beacon of ›pe to the marauder.

Showers moves to prevent Tántia Topi from fleeing northward

Relief felt at Ágra by the recovery of Gwáliár

Tántiá Topí had fled from Sir Hugh Rose at Gwáliár; he
d from Napier at Jáorá Alipúr; but whither? All that w
own was that when he had fled from the last-named battl
ld he had taken a southerly direction Who could say ho
ng he would maintain that direction? It is time now th
e should follow him, and recount in some detail the measur
lopted by his pursuers to overtake him.

BOOK XVI.—TÁNTIÁ TOPÍ AND THE QUEEN'S PROCLAMATION.

CHAPTER I.

THE PURSUIT OF TÁNTIÁ TOPÍ.

ıiÁ Topí, accompanied by Ráo Sáhib and the Nawáb of lah, had fled from the field of Júrá Alipúr on 22nd of June. The information which had ced Brigadier Showers to send a detachment to r Bhaiatpúr was perfectly correct, for Tántiá, oon as he had ascertained he was no longer pursued, had ed his steps north-westwards. On reaching Sarmathurá, ever, he learned the dispositions made by wers. Foiled on one side, he pushed on directly twards, hoping to gain Jaipúr, in which city he oved a strong party was prepared to rise in favour.

Tántiá Topí, baffled by Showers,

pushes towards Jaipúr

n this route I propose to leave him, whilst I trace the tions taken up by the several British columns upon which pursuit of him was to devolve

have already shown how on the 29th of June Sir Hugh e made over the command of his force to Brigadier-General ert Napier, and proceeded to Bombay to assume command he army of that presidency. The season for active military rations on the black and spongy soil of central ia had now passed away, and Napier hoped ore the country should harden he would be able afford some rest to his overworked soldiers. With s object he made arrangements for comfortably housing a tion of them at Gwáliár itself. Here he quartered three adrons of the 14th Light Dragoons, Meade's Horse, a wing the 71st Highlanders, the 86th Foot, the 25th Bombay

Napier can tons his force at Gwáliár,

Native Infantry, a company of Bombay Artillery, a compa
of the Royal Engineers, and a Light Field Battery. To rest
and to hold Jhánsí he detached a squadron of t
and at Jhánsí 14th Light Dragoons, a wing of the 3rd Bomb
Cavalry, the 3rd Bombay Europeans, the 24
Bombay Native Infantry, a company of Bombay Sappers, a
three guns of the late Bhopál Contingent Brigad
Smith's brigade occupies Síprí and Gúnah Smith's brigade—which, it will be remembered, to
an active part in the operations against Gwáliár
consisting of two squadrons of the 8th Hussars, t
of the 1st Bombay Lancers, the 95th Foot, t
10th Bombay Native Infantry, and a troop of Bombay Hor
Artillery, marched to occupy Síprí, whilst Mayne's Irregul
Cavalry took up their position at Gúnah

But these were not the only troops which in the month
July 1858 occupied positions overlooking the ar
Roberts's Rajpútáná field force on which only it was likely Tántiá Topí would a
In a previous page I have recorded how Gener
Roberts, commanding the Rajpútáná field force, h
detached a column under Brigadier Smith to cover and to a
in the operations of Sir Hugh Rose. Roberts's force, diminish
by the departure of that column, still consisted of the 83
Foot, a wing of the 72nd Highlanders, wings of the 12th a
13th Bombay Native Infantry, two squadrons 8th Hussars, t
at Nasirábád of the 1st Bombay Lancers, three hundred Bilúc
Horse, a light field battery, and a siege-train of s
pieces. At the end of June Roberts lay with this force
Nasirábád

Upon him it fell to strike the first blow against the fugiti
leader On the 27th of June Roberts learned fro
Roberts marches to cover Jaipúr Captain Eden, the political agent, that Tánt
Topí had sent emissaries to the disaffected par
in Jaipúr assuring them that he was marching
that place, and begging them to be in readiness to join hi
Roberts took his measures accordingly On the 28th of Ju
he set out from Nasirábád, and marching rapidly, reach
Jaipúr before Tántiá

Tántiá, again foiled, turned southwards, and made a raid
Tonk, followed by a light column under Colonel Holmes * T

* Consisting of cavalry and horse artillery, some native infantry, and t
hundred of the 72nd Highlanders

of this place, Wazir Muhammad Khán, was
means disposed to submit to the dictation
ráthá fugitive with English troops at his
He, therefore, shut himself in his citadel
e men he could depend upon. The remainder
force, with four guns, he left outside with orders to face
els But, instead of facing them, this force
d them as brothren, and made over to them
ir guns With this addition to his army
started off southwards to Madhupúrá and
arh, forty-five miles north-east of Kotá, still pursued by
, and at a longer interval by Roberts
flight and the pursuit were alike retarded by the rains,
fell during this month with remarkable force,
h so that the river Chambal, swollen to a
, barred Tántiá's passage from Indragarh to
th-eastward Changing his course, then, he
south-westerly course to Búndí, capital of the
state of the same name. The Mahárão of
Rám Singh, had more than once displayed a disposition
ke for independence, but even he was not prepared to
s fortunes with those of Tántiá Topí He shut, there-
e gates of Búndí in the face of the fugitives Tántiá,
l, as he thought, by Holmes, had no time to stop to use
but marched a few miles southward, then, making a
tour westward, crossed the Búndí hills by
nah pass, and made for the fertile country
n Nasirábád and Nímach, a country which
eady been the scene of warlike operations,
e larger towns in which had more than once
a disposition to favour the rebellion Tántiá was able
ge his course without fear of being disturbed by Holmes,
leaving Búndi he had loudly asserted his intention to
e his course due south, and he counted that inform-
hus disseminated would deceive his pursuers
ing on, then, Tántiá took up a position between the
of Sánganír and Bhílwárá, both in the Udaipur state,
Nasirábád and Nímach road * Roberts, meanwhile,
en obliged, in consequence of the continuance of the

Tántiá moves on Tonk followed by Holmes's light column

Tántiá takes four guns at Tonk and moves off

Tántiá, baffled by the rise of the Chambal, moves towards Búndí,

then turns to the country between Nímach and Nasirábád

ganír is seventy-four miles north of Nímach, sixty-nine south of Nasirá-
eighty miles south of Ajmir, Bhílwara is more than a mile from it

eavy rain, to halt at Sarwár, an elevated plateau about thirt
ıiles from Ájmır. On the 5th of August, however, the roac
aving been reported passable, Roberts broke up and marche
towards Nímach. On the 7th, when at Dábl
Roberts follows on his track, ten mıles from Sánganír, he received informatio
ıegardıng the posıtıon taken up by Tántıá close t
that place

The town of Sánganír is on the left bank of the little rive
Kotáriá On the other side, and more than a mile up tl
tream, ıs the town of Bhílwárá, ın the front of whıch Tántı
ay encamped.* Roberts was well aware that all hıs cavalr
nd a porıtıon of hıs ınfantry under Holmes weıe followın
on the track of the rebels. He himself was ı
reaches, and determines to attack him. front of them The opportunity was too good ı
be thrown away He resolved, though he had r
cavalry, to attack

The rebel ınfantry and guns had taken up a posıtıon ın fıoı
of Bhílwárá Their horse, however, were throw
Position occupied by Tántiá. forward on the left, across the Kotáriá up to Sáı
ganír, and on the rıght to the otheı sıde of thı
town, the whole formıng a horseshoe figuıe of aboı
, mile and a half, connected by skırmıshers. Theır elephan
nd baggage were ın the rear on the lıne by whıch they mu
etıre ıf beaten

Roberts advanced hıs ınfantıy, covered by skırmisheıs
shoıt dıstance ın front, cleared Sánganír of the fc
Roberts attacks, rebels who had penetıated wıthın ıt, forced tl
rebel horse across the rıver, and, brınging his gu
o the rıver-bank, opened on the enemy's rıght Under th
ıne his ınfantry, played upon by the rebel batteries, crosse
he rıveı, and took up a posıtıon on a rısıng ground, thc
ıght on a vıllage, their left on a small tank The guns thı
were sent across Seeıng thıs, Tántıá attempte
and forces him to retreat, no fuıther resıstance; he wıthdrew hıs guns aı
ınfantıy, massıng hıs cavalry on the ıntervenıı
plaın to cover the retreat. He retired unscathe
xcept by the guns, for Roberts had no cavalry to send aft

* *Blackwood's Magazine*, August 1860 Thıs number contaıns an admıral
vrıtten account of the operatıons of Generals Roberts and Mıchel agaınst Tán
'opí It ıs difficult to exaggerate the obligatıons under whıch the author l
o the wrıter of thıs artıcle, hımself an actor ın the scene.

and proceeded to a village called Kotrá in the Údaipúr
ry.

next day Roberts was joined by his much-required
y, which had made a march of thirty miles.
hen set out in pursuit of the rebels, doing
y miles daily till, on the afternoon of the
he came up with their advanced guard at
ráuli,† a town seventy-nine miles to the north-west of
ch and a hundred and seventy-one to the
-east of Dísá, situated on a lake not far from
rávalí hills. On driving in the rebel outposts,
ts learned from prisoners and villagers that
main force was occupying a position on the Banás river,
miles distant

Roberts is joined by his cavalry, and pursues

and overtakes Tántiá.

ntiá Topí, who was, according to his lights, a religious
had devoted that 13th of August to a visit to
rine of Náthdwárá,‡ reputed one of the most
l in India On his return at midnight he
for the first time of the close vicinity of the
sh. Dreading an attack, he determined to
p at once But his infantry refused to move
said that they were worn out by the long
es, and must rest, that they would march
morning, and the guns should march with
that the cavalry might act as they pleased. Under

Tántia loses an important day in religious exercises.

His infantry refuse to move

ntiá merely records of this action "We were there" (Bhílwárá) "at-
by the English force, and I fled during the night accompanied by my
d guns"

e excellent information obtained by General Roberts enabled him, in
an one instance, to traverse the chord of a circle whilst the rebels had
und by the arc The method employed by Roberts to obtain this accurate
tion is thus succinctly described by the author of the article in *Blackwood*,
referred to "The method which General Roberts adopted for obtaining
tion was to have about twenty cavalry in advance, close to the rebels
ft connecting links of two or three men every few miles, so as to keep up
n of communication The advance party was composed, half of Balúch
who had no sympathy with the rebels, but could not communicate very
th the villagers, and half of horsemen belonging to the Rájah of Jaipúr,
re supposed, as Rájpúts, to be on good terms and able easily to com-
e with the villagers, but not to be very warm partisans of the British
mixed party correct and immediate intelligence was constantly supplied"
thdwárá is a town in the Údaipúr State, situate on the Banás river,
two miles from Údaipúr The shrine there attracts countless multitudes
ims

these circumstances, Tántiá had no other alternative bu fight

At daybreak, then, he ranged his men as skilfully as nature of the ground would allow His position strong In front of him flowed the Banás, wi covering his centre, then made a bend w protected his right, his left rested on some s hills. The ground he occupied was a low, steep ridge, w formed the bank of the river Before him, on the opp bank, was an open plain, eight hundred yards wide, a which his enemy must march

He takes up a strong position.

At 7 o'clock on the morning of the 14th Rol erts mar across it In vain did Tántiá's four guns, well tected by a natural parapet, sweep that plain. spite of the effect they produced—and it was siderable—the British and Native infantry reached the bank, forded the river, and scaled the heights on the ene left and centre The right, where the guns were posted, b thus left unsupported, abandoned the pieces u a volley from the 13th Bombay Native Infa The cavalry, led by Colonel Naylor, then dashed across stream, and came upon the rebels scattered over the p Naylor pursued them for two miles, his men dealing anc ceiving death He then formed up his men, and, under or from the general, kept up a steady and orderly pursuit fifteen miles, killing numbers of stragglers, and capturing t elephants and a quantity of baggage Two r further on, the rebels, having reached a vi surrounded by jungle, determined to make a st Naylor, finding that the number of men whor could then muster amounted only to a hundred and fifty that the country was quite unfit for cavalry, upon this a doned the pursuit.*

Roberts attacks,

defeats

and pu sues him for seventeen miles

Tántiá Topí, having shaken off his pursuers, pressed, without guns, eastward, hoping to find the Cha fordable, and to place that river between hir and the English. Roberts, divining his inten followed in the same direction, and the fourth

Tántiá flees towards the Chambal,

* *Blackwood's Magazine*, August 1860 Tántiá Topí writes thus o action "The next morning we moved towards Patan, and, after proceeding one mile, the English army arrived and an action took place. We left ou guns and fled."

the action reached Puná, a town north of Chitor, not far the high road between Nímach and Nasirábád. Here he Brigadier Parke, commandant of the Nímach ade, who, some days before, had started from place in anticipation of orders to cut off Tántiá the south Roberts now made over to him the 8th sars and the Balúchís, and begged him to continue the uit.

pursued by Parke

ake set out at once, but, some of the horses of the 8th sars being knocked up, he deviated from the t course followed by Tántiá to proceed to Ní- h, where he knew he could obtain about fifty horses. Here he was met by conflicting news rding the fugitives On the one side he was red by experts that it was absolutely impossible that Tántiá d cross the Chambal at that season of the year, and that was bent on pushing southwards, on the other, Captain wers, the political agent at Údaipúr, who was then at ach, had received information from the spot that Tántiá determined to cross the river. Unfortunately, e believed the experts Proceeding to Morásá, en miles from Nímach and thirty from the mbal, he halted there a few hours to obtain e exact information. When it came it told him that the rmant of Captain Showers was right, and that Tántiá was mpting the Chambal. Parke hurried after him, reached river after a hard march, only to find it just fordable, but ng rapidly, to see "a few disabled ponies stand- on the left bank, and the rebels disappearing ng some mango-trees in the west horizon." tiá had escaped. Parke returned to Nímach to *

Parke makes a divergence to Nímach for fresh horses,

and is deceived by false information,

in consequence of which Tántiá escapes.

ántiá, meanwhile, having crossed the Chambal, pushed for lia Patan, thirty miles distant Jhálra Patan is andsome town in the Jhálawar State, ninety es to the east of Nímach and two hundred and een to the north of Ságar, built on the model of úr. The Ráná of that state, Prithi Singh, great- ndson of the famous Zálim Singh, the founder he principality, was loyal to his British over-

Tántiá moves on Jhálra Patan.

The Ráná loyal to the British,

* *Blackwood's Magazine*, August 1860

eserted his troops.

lord. He had no idea of yielding without a struggle, but his troops, when drawn up to repel the Maráthá ader, behaved precisely as Sindhiá's troops had behaved Gwáliár on a similar occasion—they fraternised with the rebels Tántiá at once took possession of the Ráná's guns, more than thirty in number, his ammunition, bullocks and horses, and surrounded the palace. The next morning he visited the Ráná, and demanded a contribution in money. The Ráná offered five lakhs, but, this sum not being deemed sufficient, o Sáhib, acting as representative of the Peshwá, sent for him l demanded twenty-five Ultimately the Ráná agreed to e fifteen Of these he actually paid five, but, having been ulted and ill-treated, he escaped that same night and fled to u, leaving some barrels of powder handy for his wife and nily to blow themselves up if threatened with insult *

ntiá takes session of ilra Patan l levies a vy contri-ion

Tántiá, freed by the rising of the Chambal from all chance of immediate pursuit, halted five days at Jhálra Patan. He states that he employed the money taken to issue three months' pay to his troops, at the monthly rate of thirty rupees to each trooper, and twelve rupees to each foot soldier. Whilst so lting, he and his comrades, Ráo Sáhib and the Nawáb of ndab, conceived a very bold idea This was no less than to rch on Indúr, and summon Holkar's troops to join the re-esentative of the liege lord of the Maráthás Could he ceed in reaching the capital of Holkar before the small body troops which the news of his approach would probably bring the same spot from Máu, the fraternisation would be certain, d the result would spread to all Holkar's subjects Impressed with this idea, Tántiá marched with his army, now reinforced by the Jhaláwar levies and all the Ráná's guns,† nearly direct south to Rájgarh.‡

ntiá nceives e idea of arching on dár,

d tries to ry it out

* This account is taken mainly from Tántiá's memoirs The writer in *Blackod* states that the war contribution amounted to sixty thousand pounds ilst forty thousand pounds more was collected from Government property Jhálra Patan was a very rich town, this was very likely the case.

† Tántiá says eighteen, but as he had no guns when he arrived, and as three re abandoned and twenty-seven captured a few days later at Rájgarh, he ist have taken all.

‡ There are thirteen well-known towns of this name, and probably many re. The Rájgarh referred to in the text is in Málwá.

ut, whilst Tántiá had been resting at Jhálra Patan, the
er commanding in Málwá, Major-General Michel, had, as if
ing his thoughts, despatched from that place a force,* under
nel Lockhart, to cover Ujjén, due north of
ír Lockhart, proceeding further northwards, Lockhart moves on the line on which Tántiá is advancing
hed Súsnír, a place about seventeen miles to the
t of Rajgarh Not believing himself strong
igh to attack Tántiá, he intrenched himself, to
it the arrival of a small reinforcement, under Colonel Hope,
ing from Máu He met this reinforcement at Nálkérah,
it three miles to the south of Súsnír At the very time of
junction Tántiá was marching on Rájgarh, within a few
's of him

t this period, the end of August 1858, a change took place
he *personnel* of the British command Major-
erial Roberts, who had up to that time com- Michel succeeds Roberts
ided in Rajpútáná, was transferred to the military
political control of the Gújrát division His
e was taken by Major-General Michel of the Royal army,
manding in Málwá, a command which he was now to hold
onjunction with that in Rajpútáná Michel was a zealous,
ve, resolute, and capable officer, thoroughly impressed with
necessity of pursuing the fugitive chieftain without
ation.

Michel joined the united columns of Lockhart and Hope at
kérah He had no information regarding Tántiá
pí, but a vague rumour prevailed that he was Takes command at Nálkerah,
ring in a north-easterly direction Marching
, in every sense of the word, difficult Although
month of September had arrived, heavy rain, the precursor
he break-up of the monsoon, was falling, and the saturated
on soil of Málwá resembled a sea of black mud. Still it was
essary to move, and Michel moved in the right direction
th great difficulty he transported his little army to Chápairá,
ut midway to Rajgarh. The following day, the rain having
sed, Michel pursued his march towards that place.
e heat was so great and the sun's rays were so and, pursuing,
rible that some of the artillery horses dropped

* Three hundred and fifty 92nd Highlanders, four hundred and fifty 19th
bay Native Infantry, one squadron Bombay 3rd Light Cavalry, and two
s Le Marchand's battery Bengal Artillery

ad in the traces Still Michel pushed on, and, about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, halting on a rising ground, he had the gratification of beholding Tántiá Topí's army encamped near the walled town of Rájgarh

nds Tántiá t Rájgarh.

To traverse three miles of black soil and then, at the approach f night, to attack with a tired army a fresh body of men in ie position they had chosen, was not for a moment to be ought of. Michel, then, waited for the morning, but, when morning dawned, Tántiá and his men had disappeared Michel at once sent his cavalry on their track. This track was distinguished, first, by the arks of the gunwheels and the elephants, then, more decidedly by three guns lying abandoned on the road A little further on the rebel force was descried, drawn up in two lines, the second on higher ground than the first, and the guns on ground above both. The valry then halted to await the approach of the infantry and ns

Tántiá flees n the night.

Michel tracks im, finds im again,

The infantry and guns did not let Michel wait long As soon as they came up the action began with an artillery fire from both sides. Then the English infantry, deploying, went at the rebels. The latter did not wait the conflict, but gave way and fled etting entangled in intersecting roads, they fell into inextrie- ble confusion. The British horse artillery, galloping forward alternate divisions of two guns, kept up a fire on the retreating asses, whilst the cavalry, threatening their left flank, forced em to incline towards the north.* In the pursuit, twenty- ven guns were taken.

nd ompletely efeats him

Tántiá, driven towards the north, wandered about for some time in the jungly country on both sides of the Betwá, and eventually made for Sironj—in an easterly direction. But, whilst thus seeking a place of security, new enemies were gathering round him.

he ursuers ather round Tántiá.

* Of this action, Tántiá writes. "On reaching Rájgarh the English army me up and attacked us. We left our guns and fled." It would be incredible, re it not true, that a force so large, numbering at least eight thousand, with irty guns, should allow itself to be defeated by less than one-sixth of its mber in men and guns, without drawing a drop of blood. Yet so it was It the more strange, as about half the rebels had been trained and disciplined by ropeans, their guns were effective pieces of larger calibre than the English pounders, their muskets bore the Tower mark, and their swords were excellent, t not one man of the British force was killed or wounded!

rigadier Parke, who had left Nímach on the 5th of Sept-
r, was entrusted the duty of covering Indúr and Bhopál,
leaving Michel's force to follow Tántiá from the west,
it Smith's brigade should advance from the north, and the
sí column under Colonel Liddell from the north-east
ith this disposition opens a new phase of the pursuit. The
t of Tántiá Topí near Rájgarh almost coincided
ne with the conclusion of the rainy season, for,
ugh rain continued for some days to fall, further
itions had become possible We are now
ing upon the cold weather campaign In this new actors
ir upon the scene The Central India field force once more
es the attention of the public It seems fitting, then, that
e describing the events of that cold-weather campaign I
ld trace the operations of General Napier and of Brigadier
h from the period when we left them up to the middle of
ember. Meanwhile we must suppose Tántiá Topí to be
ng the best of his way, by circuitous paths, from Rájgarh
ron]

The story reverts to Napier and Smith

, the beginning of July we left General Napier's division
wáliár and Jhánsí, Brigadier Smith's brigade
íprí, and Mayne's Irregulars at Gúnah, all
ng after the extraordinary fatigues and exposure
ie Central India campaign To the superficial
ce, order had been restored in Sindhiá's dominions The
árájah, grateful to the English, more fervent than at any
ious period in his desire for their success, was doing his
st to forward the views of the army administrators for the
ss of the troops. Sir Robert Hamilton, located at Gwáliár,
engaged in re-establishing political relations with the
r states around. The situation was full of promise, and
all the time, it was hollow and unsound.

The situation at Gwáliár apparently peaceful.

uring the whole of July the European troops had rest.
comparatively trifling matters which required
ition in the districts were easily disposed of by
employment on detached duty of the men of
le's Horse, a regiment daily rising in estimation
on the 2nd of August an incident occurred which led to
serious complications. A chief of Sindhiá's territory,
ed Mán Singh, Rájah of Narwár, had quarrelled with his
lord To avenge the wrong which, he conceived, had
inflicted upon him by Sindhiá, and which will presently

Revolt of Mán Singh, Rájah of Narwár

related, and encouraged possibly by Tántiá's action in the uth, this chieftain, summoning his followers, twelve thousand strong, surprised on the 2nd of August the strong fort of Páuí, eighty-three miles by the Síprí road south-west of Gwáliár, and eighteen to the north-ast of Síprí, but recently supplied with six months' provisions d ammunition Now, Smith's brigade was at Síprí On e 4th he learned of the act of rebellion perpetrated by Mán Singh On the 5th he started from Síprí with a force composed of two squadrons of the 8th Hussars, two of the 1st Bombay Lancers, a wing of the 95th, and three field guns, and, marching as rapidly the roads would permit, reached the vicinity of Páurí early the morning of the 7th. On approaching the place, Mán gh sent a messenger with a flag of truce to the brigadier, to ure him that he had no quarrel with the English, that his ntention was with the Maháráják alone, and to supplicate nestly for an interview. Smith granted the request and saw the chief that day In an earnest manner, totally devoid of pretension, Mán Singh told his story to the brigadier He and his family, he said, had ever been loyal servants to the Maháráják During the time of his father, nothing had occurred to mar the good ling which had previously existed. But, on his father's death, the Maháráják had insulted and robbed him by refusing to recognise his right to succeed to the principality of Narwár* and the estates adjacent. It s to recover these, or, at all events, to avenge himself on the hárájah, that he had drawn the sword and seized Páuí, ich formed a part of his ancestral possessions, but, he added nestly, "I have no connection with the rebels, and no quarrel with the English" The plea, though true, and convincing the listener of its truth, was not of a nature which, in those times, could be accepted by an English commander Smith was responsible for peace of the country near Síprí, that peace had been ated by Mán Singh, and Smith had but one plain duty,

e seizes urí

nith starts om Síprí recover e place

ervlew ween ith and an Singh

evances of latter

ith cts his

Narwár is a very important place, with an interesting history. It lies forty-miles south of Gwáliár In 1844 Narwár, with the lands pertaining to it, assessed by the Gwáliár Government at 2,250,000 rupees annually Little ler, then, that the despotic ruler of the native State in which it lay should it

ɜeo that the violators were punished and that
ɔe was maintained He informed Mán Singh of
necessity. Mán Singh was obstinate, and ex-
ɜsed his determination to ɪesist.

and prepares to besiege Páurí

áurí was strong, well supplied with provisions and ammuni-
ɪ, and its garrison, originally only two thousand,
been increased during the few days since the
ture to nealy double that number Amongst
new-comers was a chief, Ájít Singh by name,
le of Mán Singh Smith's force amounted only to eleven
ɪdred men of all arms, and his thiee pieces were field-pieces
was thus far too weak to undeɪtake a siege, and the place
ɜ too strong to be caɪried by a *coup-de-main*. Under these
ɔumstances he deemed ɪt prudent to maintaɪn his
ɪtion near the place, while he sent to Gwáliár an
nest request for reinforcements. On receiving
ɜ ɪequisition Napieɪ felt the enormous importance
ɜettling the matter with as little delay as possible. Examples
that sort in a country long under Maráthá rule are apt to be
ɪtagious, and there was every probability that, if Mán Singh
ɪe allowed for any length of time to parade his defiance of
ɪ British, chieftains more poweiful than he might follow his
mple. Napieɪ, then, determined to take the matter into his
n hands He started accordingly on the 11th
ɔh five guns and four mortars, escorted by six
ndred hoɪse and foot, reached Síprí on the 17th,
l joined Smith on the 19th of August He began
ɜrations the next day. For twenty-four hours he
ɪred a vertical fiɪe into the fort from his mortaɪs, and then
gan to use his breaching batteries This demonstration quite
ɪsfied Mán Singh. On the night of the 23ɪd he, Ájɪt Singh,
l theɪr followers evacuated Páurí, and made theɪr way
ɪthwards through the jungles. Napier entered
urí, the following morning, then equipped a light
umn undeɪ Robertson, 25th Bombay Native Infantry
an officeɪ whose gallantry and soldieɪlike conduct
ve often been mentioned ɪn these pages—and sent him in
ɪsuɪt of the rebels Napier himself having
stroyed the fortifications of Páurí and burst
e guns, retired to Síprí to make arrangements for
e further pursuit of Mán Singh should Robertson fail to
ptuɪe him.

Strength and garrison of Páurí

Smith sends to Gwáliár for reinforcements

Napier sets out from Gwáliár to reinforce him

Mán Singh evacuates the place

Robertson pursues

'hat zealous officer left Páurí on the 26th of August, on the
:k of Mán Singh He had with him a squadron of the
Hussais, a squadion of Meade's Horse, two 9-pounders, one
)under, one 5½-inch howitzei, a hundied men of the 86th, a
idred and twenty of the 95th, two hundied 10th Bombay
ive Infantry, and two hundred 25th Bombay Native Infantiy
hing on by forced maiches through the jungles, crossing
icult riveis, and conquering every obstacle, Robertson on
the 3rd of Septembei ascertained that the iebels
ertson rtakes weie at Bijápúr, near Gúnah, twenty-three miles
distant His deteimination was instantly taken.
h's ps at púr, Leaving the bulk of his tioops to guaid the camp
and baggage, he mounted on elephants and camels
seventy-five men of the 86th, ninety of the 95th, and
indred each of the 10th and 25th Native Infantry, and with
e and fifty men of the 8th Hussars, and a hundred and fifty
Meade's Horse, he set out that night. At daybieak the
)wing morning he came in sight of the rebels occupying a
ig ground on the opposite bank of the Parbatí riveı. They
had no scouts, and, the light being still grey,
rises a, Robertson was able to cross the river unperceived
and to send his cavalry round to take up a position
ear of the iebel camp These movements were executed
i so much care and precision, that, when the cavalry were
ng up the position indicated, the rebels were actually
)ping to bathe in the river, preparatory to their morning
meal The surprise was complete Of organised
cuts i up resistance there was none; but the casualty list
showed that the rebels, though taken unawares,
nded themselves bravely. Lieutenant Fawcett, 95th, was
d; Captain Poore and Lieutenant Hanbury, 18th Hussais,
Lieutenants Stewart and Page, of Meade's Horse, were
nded. The remaining casualties in killed and wounded
unted to eighteen

was discovered after the action that it was not Mán Singh's
but Ájít Singh's band which had been routed The
position e routed astute Mán Singh, on learning that he was pursued,
had divided his partisans into three divisions, with
instructions to traverse separate roads and to com-
at an appointed place. It was one of these divisions, six
lred strong, and composed, as was ascertained after the
)n, of men from the Mahárájah's bodyguard, from the

Gwáliár contingent, and from the 3rd, 40th, 47th, and . regiments native infantry which had been encountered. T were all dressed in red, and had percussion firelocks A three-fourths of them were killed,* but Ájít Singh escaped

Robertson marched from the scene of action to Gúnah, w he arrived the middle of September With this march may be said to terminate the campaign of the rainy season in the districts to the west and south-west of Gwáliár bordering on Rajpútáná. It is now fit that we should follow the various columns in the weather campaign against Tántiá Topí and his allies Of t that against Tántiá Topí demands precedence

Close o rainy s campai

I left that chieftain making his way about the jungly cou on both sides of the Betwá towards Sironj He duly reached that place about the middle of September, he and his men utterly exhausted. A rest of eight days, made sweeter by the absence of all fear—for the heavy rain that was falling would, they well knew, make the roads impassable to their enemy—set them on their legs again, and even restored to their former audacity On the conclusion of that period rains having ceased, Tántiá led his men, with the four gu had taken at Sironj, against Íságarh, a town with a for longing to Sindhiá, in the hilly and difficult country sou Síprí Here he demanded supplies, but, the townspeople refusing them, Tántiá stormed and plundered the place, and took seven guns He and his associates halted there for a day to consider their further plans Their deliberations then culminated in a d mination to divide their forces, Tántiá proceeding with the of them and five guns to Chandérí, the Ráo Sáhib with guns and fewer followers making his way to Tál Baha Lalatpúr this plan was carried out

The st reverts Tántiá

who re Sironj

Takes and su from Íságarl

What Chandérí was, the reader will recollect who followed the history of Sir Hugh Rose's central Indian campaign † It was now held for Sindhiá by a loyal soldier, a man who had no sympathy with

Tántia repuls Chand

* The number of killed is often exaggerated, but on this occasion b four and five hundred dead bodies were actually counted on both sides river

† Pages 103-5.

rebels He repulsed, then, Tántiá Topí's appeals, and when the Maiáthá chief attempted to storm the place he repulsed his attacks Tántiá wasted three days in an attempt to gain a place the possession of which would have been of incalculable use to him, and then, baffled though not dispirited, made for Mangráulí, on the left bank of the Bétwa, about twenty miles south of Chandérí. He was marching, though he knew it not, on defeat, for the English were to meet him there!

and moves on Mangraulí

I must now return to his pursuers I have already stated the position of the several English columns, how Brigadier Parke was covering Indúr and Bhopál, how Colonel Liddell with the Jhánsí force was covering the country to the north-east. I have now only to add that Brigadier Smith, released by the capture of Táurí, had taken up a position north of Sironj. In the inner part of the circle, the outer rim of which was occupied by these columns, General Michel was acting

Positions of his pursuers.

Enabled at last, towards the end of September, by the cessation of the heavy rains, to act freely, Michel, believing he should find Tántiá in the Betwá valley, went in pursuit of him in a north-easterly direction As he marched, he heard of the various depredations committed by the fugitives, and he felt sure he should find him On the 9th of October, marching towards Mangráulí, information reached him that Tántiá had occupied the high ground near the place, and was waiting for him.

Michel marches on Mangraulí

Tántiá had arrived there that very morning. He had not sought a battle, but as the ground was favourable he resolved to risk one. His position was strong, and the five guns he had placed in the front of his line commanded the ground along which the English must advance When, then, Michel sent his men forward, Tántiá's guns opened a destructive fire. Grown bolder by despair, Tántiá at the same time sent his cavalry to menace both flanks of the few assailants For a moment the position of these seemed critical, the more so as some of the outflanking horsemen penetrated between the main body and the rear-guard. But whilst they still hesitated to come on, to risk a hand-to-hand encounter, the British troops advanced steadily, and, gaining the crest,

Tántiá resolves to risk an action

Possibilities before Tántiá,

ged the guns Then all was over. Tántiá and
aen abandoned their guns and fled The want
ifficient cavalry did not allow Michel to pursue
ı *

who, however, is beaten, and flees

ntiá crossed the Betwá and fled first to Jakláun, and
, next day, to Lálitpúr, where he rejoined Ráo Sáhib, who,
ill be remembered, had six guns Tántiá re-
ied here, but Ráo Sáhib, with the bulk of the
ps and the guns, set off the following day, and
ched in a south-easterly direction Michel mean-
le, ordering Smith to watch the left bank of the
vá, followed Ráo Sáhib, and, making his way with great
culty through the dense Jakláun jungle, came suddenly
n him at Sindwáha, about thirty miles east of the Betwá.
ned by the inopportune sound of a bugle in the British
p, Ráo Sáhib had time to draw up his men on a rising
nd, with the guns in front. Then followed a scene almost
lar to that at Mangiáulí. The English, threatened
both flanks, advance and capture the guns, when
rebels flee. In their flight, however, they were,
this occasion, less fortunate than at Mangiáulí.
hel had his cavalry handy, the ground, too, was unfavour-
e for rapid flight In a pursuit which covered
lve miles, the rebels then suffered severely.
Sáhib, however, escaped. The English lost
officers and twenty men in killed and wounded

Tántiá and Ráo Sáhib join, and then separate.

Michel totally defeats Ráo Sáhib,

who, however, escapes

Ráo Sáhib rejoined Tántiá at Lálitpúr, and again the two
d counsel as to the future. The country north of
Narbadá seemed about to close on them. The
le was gradually lessening, and in a few days
y would be in the folds of the destroyer They
this clearly, saw that their only chance was to
ak through the circle and march to the south,
lting the enemy, if possible, on a false scent This was the
ficult part of the programme, but they laid their plans to
empt it

The rebel chiefs unite and resolve to cross the Narbadá

It is impossible to withhold admiration from the pertinacity
th which this scheme was carried out. Leaving Lálitpúr,

* Of this action Tantiá writes "On our march to Mangráulí we met the
glish army. Shots were fired for a short time, when we left all our guns and
"

ıtiá and the Ráo, whose design was to escape southwards, marched to Kajúria, with the intention of recrossing the Betwá near that place and turning thence southward. But, the ford being guarded by Colonel Liddell, Tántiá turned north-eastward, and made e more for Tál Bahat. There he halted to rest his men The owing day, moving direct southwards, he penetrated into Jakláun jungles, still to the east of the Betwá He halted day at Jakláun, and the next at Itáwah (in the Ságar dist) There he heard that the English army was on his track, e at once broke up and pushed on towards Kurai.*

nt ntiá rds the adá.

Whilst he is making that march I must return to General Michel From the field of Sindwáha that general had marched to Lálitpúr, keeping always to the westward of Tántiá with the view of baulking the intention he believed he might entertain of breaking through to the south. On reaching Lálitpúr, however, a messenger from Brigadier Smith reached him with nformation that Tántiá had been met marching southwards, had probably gained the west side of the general. No time to be lost Michel, sending off an express to warn Parke, pressing southwards by forced marches, came upon Tántiá by a cross road just as that chief was approaching the village of Kurai Instantly the battle joined. The British cavalry separated from one another the two wings of the rebels' forces. But, whilst the British were engaged in annihilating the left wing, the right, with which were Tántiá and Ráo Sáhib, favoured by the jungle, managed to escape westward. Not that the left wing fought to save their comrades, they had fled in the direction from ı they had advanced, and the whole of Michel's force had ɔed upon them, leaving the other wing to escape. Tántiá ráo Sáhib, in fact, purchased their retreat with the sacrifice ɜ-half of their followers †

l learns ántiá hing ards llows suit.

i him ıl

he ates s g, t capes

ıs happened on the 25th of October. Tántiá pushed on to ırh, molested on his way, four miles from Bagrod,‡ by

ıwah lies thirty-eight, Kurai thirty-two, miles to the north-west of Ságar

ıntiá writes of this action "The English force came up in the morning r army became separated, I accompanied the Ráo Sáhib," &c. Not a word he sacrifice of the wing

ıgrod lies thirty-nine miles to the north-west of Ságar

Colonel Charles Becher, one of the most gallant officers of the Indian army, who, at the head of a newly-raised regiment,* did not hesitate to attack his whole force Becher inflicted considerable loss (upwards of forty men killed), but Tántiá pressed on, proceeding *viâ* Rájgarh, crossed the Narbadá into the Nágpúr territory at a point about forty miles above Hoshangábád.

Tántiá, molests the way Becher,

crosses Narbad

Thus in the dying agony of the mutiny was accomplish movement which, carried out twelve months earlier, would have produced an effect fatal for the time to British supremacy; a movement which would have roused the whole of the western Presidency, have kindled revolt in the dominions of the Nizám, and have, in its working, penetrated to southern India. It was the movement to prevent which Lord Elphinstone had adopted the policy of aggressive defence till then so cessful, which Durand had exerted all his energies, had entreaties of the most urgent character with the Governme India, had stretched to the utmost the powers entrusted to to hinder And now it was accomplished! The nephew o man recognised by the Maráthás as the lawful heir of the reigning Peshwá was on Maráthá soil with an army!

Effect w would h been pr duced b at twel months earlier

I have said that, had that event occurred but fifteen mo previously, British authority in western India would, for the time, have succumbed. As it was—the event happening in October 1858, when the sparks of the mutiny in every other part of India, Oudh excepted, had been extinguished, and when, even in Oudh, they were being surely trampled out—the event ca alarm of no ordinary character to the Governments of Bom and Madras Although Lord Elphinstone had shown, to a markable degree, a true appreciation of the character of rebellion and of the manner in which it should be met, even he could not view without grave concern the arrival of Tántiá Topí and Ráo Sáhib in the country of Bhonslás, that country the annexation of which but a few y previously had moved the Maráthá heart to its core. He c not but remember that a large proportion of the populatio the Bombay Presidency was Maráthá, and he could not fores

Alarm it cause even in October 1858,

in Bomb

* Now one of the regiments Central Indian Horse.

, indeed, could foresee?—the effect which might be produced
he easily kindled minds of a susceptible people by the
ence of the representative of the man whom many amongst
a regarded as their rightful ruler
or could Lord Harris, who, throughout the trying times of
1857–58, had shown himself prompt to meet every
dras. difficulty, listen with an indifferent ear to the tidings
the Maráthá leader had crossed the Narbadá True it was
the Madras Presidency was separated from the country now
en by Tántiá as his campaigning-ground by the vast territo-
s of the Nizám True it was that the Nizám, guided by his
and far-seeing minister Sálar Jang, had displayed to the Brit-
loyalty not to be exceeded. But the times were peculiar.
population of the Nizám's territories was to a very consider-
extent Hindu. Instances had occurred before, as in the case
ndhiá, of a people revolting against their sovereign when
sovereign acted in the teeth of the national feeling. It was
ssible not to fear lest the army of Tántiá should rouse to
the entire Maráthá population, and that the spectacle of a
le in arms against the foreigner might act with irresistible
on the people of the Dakhan
nately, these fears were not realised. Six years' ex-
perience of British rule had produced a remarkable
ople effect upon the feelings of the Central Provinces.
Whatever might be the feelings of the landowners,
es of the cultivators, and of those Bráhmans who, by
t a means of their influence in a court where Bráh-
by to manical influence was supreme, were able to live a
and life of luxury, of intrigue, and of pleasure without
owers. having recourse to industry and toil, this at least is
in, that the peasantry had no desire to recur to their old
ns In this respect the Central Provinces presented a re-
able contrast to Oudh and Bundelkhand. With all its
s, the people of this part of India preferred the substantial
e of the rule of their alien lords It is, indeed, a remark-
fact that whilst, in the dominions of Sindhiá and in the
palities governed by Rajpút princes, Tántiá and his
vers enjoyed the sympathy of the villagers, and always
ned from them, without pressure and without payment,
ies in abundance, in the Maráthá country beyond the
adá the peasantry regarded them as pests in whose face
loor was to be closed and the gates were to be barred,

ıo, indeed, could foresee?—the effect which might be produced the easily kindled minds of a susceptible people by the ɜsence of the representative of the man whom many amongst ɜm ıegarded as their ıightful ruler

Nor could Lord Harıis, who, throughout the tryıng times of 1857–58, had shown himself prompt to meet every difficulty, listen with an indifferent ear to the tidings ıt the Maıáthá leadeı had crossed the Narbadá Tıue ıt was ıt the Madras Presidency was separated from the country now ɔsen by Tántiá as his campaigning-gıound by the vast terrı-ıes of the Nizám Tıue it was that the Nizám, guided by his e and far-seeıng mınıstei Salaı Jang, had displayed to the Brıt-a loyalty not to be exceeded. But the times weıe peculiaı. e population of the Nizám's terıitoıies was to a veıy considei-e extent Hindu. Instances had occurred before, as in the ca-e Sindhiá, of a people ıevoltıng against their sovereign when t sovereign acted in the teeth of the national feelıng It was ɔossible not to fear lest the aımy of Tántiá should ıouse to ıs the entıre Maráthá populatıon, and that the spectacle of a ple in arms against the foreigner might act with ırıesistible ɔe on the people of the Dakhan.

Madras.

'ortunately, those feaıs were not realised. Six years' ex-peıience of Britısh ıule had pıoduced a remaıkable effect upon the feelings of the Central Pıovinces Whatevei might be the feelings of the landowneıs, of the courtieıs, and of those Bıáhmans who, by means of theıı influence in a court whoıe Bıáh-manical influence was supreme, were able to live a life of luxury, of intrigue, and of pleasure without havıng recourse to ındustry and toıl, this at least is aın, that the peasantry had no desıe to ıecur to theıı old ters In this ıespect the Central Provinces pıesented a ıe-kable contıast to Oudh and Bundelkhand With all ıts ts, the people of this part of India pıeferred the substantial ce of the ıule of theıı alien lords It is, ındeed, a remaık-fact that whilst, in the dominions of Sindhiá and in the cipalities goveıned by Rajpút princes, Tántiá and his wers enjoyed the sympathy of the villagers, and always ıned from them, without pıessure and without payment, ɔlies in abundance, in the Maráthá country beyond the ɔadá the peasantry ıegaıded them as pests in whose face door was to be closed and the gates were to be barred,

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who were to receive no supplies without payment, and, could be managed without injury to themselves, no sup at all

To return to the story Tántiá, crossing the Narbadá miles above Hoshangábád, proceeded *viâ* Fathpúr to Mu in the direction of Nágpúr, but, learning that a British from that place had anticipated him, he turned sharp west hoping to penetrate to the country southward by an ungu pass in the hills He found this impossible, for Brigadier Hill of the Haidarábád contingent was watching at Melghát and Ásírgarh, further westward, Sir Hugh Rose had made preparations to prevent Tántiá from crossing into Khándesh, and, further westward still, General Roberts was bringing up troops to bar Gujrát against him Nothing could been more tantalising, for south of the Taptí river, the banks of which he was separated only by the narrow Sá range, lay the country to which Náná Sáhib laid claim rightful inheritance † Across this, under the circumst Tántiá dared not venture Shut out, then, from further gress west or south, Tántiá made a turn north-westward Holkar's possessions, south of the Narbadá, hoping to r the Narbadá unperceived and to penetrate thence int territory of the Gáikwár. On the 19th November he re Kargún, a decayed town in Nimár Here was stationed tachment of Holkar's troops, consisting of two troops of ca a company of infantry, and two guns These Tántiá for join him, and then pushed on westward On the 23rd he crossed near Thán, the great high road from Bombay to Ágra, just as it was being traversed by carts laden with mercantile stores for the use of the English Plundering these, taking with him the natives who had been escorting the carts, and destroying the telegraph wires, he pursued his course, feeling confident of success if only he could reach the Narbadá before the English, whom he believed he ha manœuvred, should molest him

Tánti the c to the and w barre again

He t the r west inter recr the J and on E

* Multáí is a town in the Betúl district, twenty-eight miles east of its chief attraction is a large tank which is reverenced by the native source of the river Taptí

† *Blackwood's Magazine*, August 1860

But Fortune did not favour him. Michel, indeed,
Michel, defeating Tántiá at Kurái, had pushed on in pu
though not on the same track, and, with his ca
had reached Hoshangábád on the 7th of November The
joined Parke, whom he had previously ordered to meet
Leaving Parke at Hoshangábád, Michel crosse
left without information, Narbadá and found himself in the wild co
about Betúl, with no accurate maps, no inform
of his own regarding the movements of the rebels, wi
prospect of obtaining any from the local authorities
thus to the resources of his own intelligence, Michel
to the conclusion that the roads to the south
divines, Tántiá's intentions, due west would certainly be barred to Tántia
that, although there was but little prospect c
attempting to recross the Narbadá, yet that it v
not be wise on his part to move too far from that river.
prossed with this idea, he ordered Parke to cro
and takes steps to baffle them Narbadá at Hoshangábád, to march in a dire
south-west by west, and take up a positio
Chárwah, eighty miles south-east from Ind
town forming the angle nearest the Narbadá of a triang
which Malghát and Ásírgarh, both occupied by British t
formed the other angles In that direction, though
slowly, he moved himself

Whilst General Michel was making these preparations
of the Narbadá, the British authorities at Mh
The British authorities at Mán the north of it, were receiving disquieting rum
regarding the continued and persistent moven
of Tántiá westward Dreading lest that chief sh
get possession of the grand trunk road, intercept supplies
destroy the telegraph wires, Sir Robert Hamilton and Brig
Edwards, who commanded at Mán, deemed it advisable, b
Tántiá had pillaged the carts in the manner alr
post parties to watch the fords of the Narbadá related, to post two small infantry detachmen
watch the fords above Akbarpúr. A day or
later, when intelligence was received that
westerly movement was being prolonged, Major Suther
who commanded one of these detachments, consisting
hundred men of the 92nd Highlanders and a hundred o
4th Bombay Rifles, received instructions to cross the riv
Akbarpúr and keep clear the grand trunk road Suther
obeyed his orders, and passing through Thán—the vi

lready spoken of—seventeen miles from Akbarpúr, rocceded to Jílwánah, thirteen miles further on, earer to Bombay. There he was when, on the fternoon of the 23rd of November, Tántiá and is troops passed through Thán, plundered the ar ts and cut the telegraph wires, as already described

Sutherland crosses the Narbadá to a point below that traversed by Tántiá.

Tántiá having taken the precaution to carry off with him al he men accompanying the carts, Sutherland remained for some ours ignorant of this occurrence He had been reinforced on he morning of the 23rd by fifty Europeans, sent on camels rom Mán The evening of that day, the report regarding the lundering reached him The next morning, taking with him hundred and twenty Europeans and eighty natives, iding alternately on camels, Sutherland proceeded o Thán, and inspected as far as possible the damage lone.* Learning there that the rebels had taken a westerly direction, he followed hastily and came in sight of them as they were passing through the town of Rájpúr nearly midway between Thán and the Narbadá Pushing on, hi men in advance still riding camels, disregarding the enemy's stragglers and the quantities of abandoned baggage and baggage-animals, Sutherland, in half an hour, had approached near enough to force a battle. He ordered, then, his men to dismount, but the delay thus caused gave Tántia an opportunity, of which he availed himself, to retire Before Sutherland could set out in pursuit he had the satisfaction of being joined by his rear-guard—th men who had not been mounted, and who, in their desire fo combat, had marched at a great pace Keeping the whol of his force dismounted, Sutherland resumed the pursuit, and after marching two miles came up with the rebels, formed in order of battle on a rocky ridge, thickly wooded, with their two guns, the

Sutherland learns the vicinity of Tántiá and pursues him

Catches him only to see him retire

Resumes the pursuit.

* "The road for eight miles was strewed with articles, taken by the rebe the previous day from some merchants' carts on the main road, several car had been brought on and abandoned when the bullocks got tired The soldie filled their water-bottles with port or sherry, of which there was enough to ha stocked a large cellar, but not a man got intoxicated A cart-load of books h been opened by the rebels during a halt—the contents were torn up and strew in a circle, with a Walker's Pronouncing Dictionary left intact in the middle" *Blackwood*, August 1860

Comes upon them formed in order of battle,

guns of Holkar found at Kaigún, pointing down road. Tántiá had with him from three to thousand men Sutherland had just two hund After a little skirmishing, the smaller number charged larger. Dashing up the road under a shower of grape, t captured the guns, Lieutenant Humfries, adjutant of the 9: receiving a sword-cut from their commandant,

attacks and puts them to flight.

was killed at his post The rebel infantry t fled The casualties on both sides were trifli Sutherland, whose men were too tired to pur encamped on the ground he had gained.

The presence of the two guns with Tántiá's force had ne sitated that slow march over rough ground wl had allowed Sutherland to overtake him Now the guns were lost his men were able to display capacity for rapid marching in which the native India are unsurpassed, I might almost say unequalled, by troops in the world So quickly did they cover the gro that, when at sunset the following day Sutherland reached banks of the Narbadá, he beheld the rebel force comfort encamped on the opposite bank Between him their camp flowed the waters of the Narbadá that point five hundred yards broad, its banks l and difficult To cross it in the face of an en twenty times his strength would have been impossibility even for the troops he commanded

Tántiá, relieved of his guns resumes his flight,

and places the Narbadá between himself and his pursuers

That Tántiá had been able to cross the Narbadá can only accounted for by the fact that he had marched previous afternoon, and the whole of the night, had thus at least twelve hours' start of his pursu It was well for him that he had that start. W he reached the left bank of the Narbadá Tántiá beheld on the bank opposite a party of a hundred sawárs u an officer † Under other circumstances the sight of these might have made him hesitate. But he knew that Sutherl

How it was that Tántiá had been able to cross the Narbadá.

* Regarding this action, Tantiá writes (after referring to the capture o carts) "We then left the high road and proceeded westward. The next we were surprised by the English force, and, leaving our two guns, we flee reached the Narbadá"

† So states Tántiá himself, and I have usually found his statements c borated by other writers But I have been unable to ascertain who were t troopers or who was the officer Probably he was a native officer

as behind him He, therefore, plunged boldly in. The sawár ıen took to flight

At mıdnight Tántıá, havıng plundeıed a vıllage calle hıklá, broke up hıs camp on the Narbadá, and arched ın the dırectıon of Barodah It was hıs ıst chance, but ıt was a great one could he but ııve beforе the Englısh Baıodah was the seat of Maıáthá dynasty, and it was known that a laıge paıty at th ouit sympathısed deeply wıth Náná Sáhıb There were in th ıty only one company of Europeans and two native ıegiment esıdes the troops of the Gáıkwár, who were almost sure to joı he rebels Full of the hope raısed by the prospects ıefoıe hım, Tántıá pushed on ıapıdly, marchıng rom the banks of the Naıbadá thıı ty-four mıles straıght c ınd He halted at Rájpúıá, took three thousand nıne hundıe upees and three horses fıom the chıef of that ɔlace, and marched the next day for Chhotá Údaıpúr,* ɔnly fifty mıles from Barodah and connected wıth t by a ıoad Could he arrıve at and quıt that place unmolested, his future, he thought, would be assured.

Tantia pushe towards Barodah

full of hope

arrives wit fifty miles Barodah.

But hıs pursuers were too many. I left General Michel aı Brıgadıer Parke, ın the second week of November, at Chárwah, south of the Narbadá, confident that Tántıá's progress to the south was barred, and that he would endeavour to seek some means of recrossıng ınto Malwá Some days elapsed before an accurate account hıs movements reached Michel. That able officer displaj then not a moment's hesitatıon as to the course to be followe Recrossıng the Naıbadá at the Barwánı ford, he march hımself on Máu, whıle he despatched Paıke wıth a flyıng column of cavalry, mounted ınfantry, and two guns, to pursue Tántıá wıth the utmost speed that was possible

Michel discovers Tántiá's intentions,

and despatche Parke in suit of hi

Parke carrıed out these ınstructıons to the letter ın nıne days, two hundred and forty-one mıles, for the last twenty of which he was forced to thread hıs way through a dense jungle, he came up with Tántıá on the morning of the 1st of December, at

Marchı

Parke cat Tántiá at Chhotá Údaıpúr

* Chhotu Údaıpúr ıs a state ın the Rewá Kanthá dıstrıct, the chıef of w pays an annual tribute to the Gáıkwár It possesses an area of about hundred and seventy-three square mıles

hhotá Údaipúr, just an hour or two after he had reached
at place Considering the climate, the nature of the country,
d the other difficulties of the route, this march must be con-
dered as rivalling any of which history makes record

The force commanded by Parke consisted of two 9-pounder
ns Bombay Artillery, fifty men 8th Hussars, fifty of the
2nd Bombay Cavalry, a party of the Maráthá horse
under Kerr—which, after having disarmed the
southern Maráthá country, had been sent from the
est to join Michel—Moore's Aden Horse, a hundred of the
nd Highlanders, mounted on camels, and a hundred and
enty-five Gujráti Irregular Horse For the last twenty miles
fore reaching Chhotá Údaipúr, this force had, as I have
ated, threaded its way through a dense jungle, skilfully
piloted by Moore with his Aden Horse. On emerging
from the jungle Moore perceived the rebels He
instantly surprised their outlying picket The
ground beyond the jungle was covered with large
ees, brushwood, and tents still standing,* and was so broken
as to be very difficult for cavalry and artillery As
Parke's troops debouched on to it, he deployed his
force, placing some of the 8th Hussars, of the
Maráthá Horse and the Aden horse on his right,
e rest of the Maráthá Horse, under Kerr, on his left, the
nd Highlanders flanking the two guns in his centre, the
mainder of the cavalry in the rear His whole front scarcely
vered two hundred yards The rebels meanwhile, roused to
tion, had formed up about six hundred yards distant. They
mbered three thousand five hundred men and outflanked the
British force on both sides. Tántiá first endeavoured
to turn the British left, but Kerr, changing his
front, charged with great impetuosity, and, driving
the rebels from the field, pursued them for a con-
lerable distance, laying sixty of them low. A similar attempt
the British right was met with equal success by the cavalry
ntioned there, Bannerman, of the Southern Márátha Horse,
eatly distinguishing himself and killing four men with his
n hands In the pursuit a standard of the 5th Bengal
regulars, borne by the rebels, was captured Whilst the
ngs were thus engaged, the two British guns had kept up

Force under Parke.

Discovery of Tántiá's force.

Parke sets his force in battle array

Tántiá's aggressive action is wrecked

* Tántiá admits that he was surprised on this occasion.

ıvy fıe on the centre. But ıt was not long d With the ıepulse of the flankıng attacks ctıon terminated. A puısuıt along the whole hen followed.

Tántıa defeated and cut off from Barodah

ıs engagement was fatal to Tántıá's hopes ıegardıng lah Leavıng hıs ıoute to the westward, he northwaıds ınto the jungles of Bánswáıá, the ernmost prıncıpalıty of Rajpútáná These es, extremely dense ın theıı character, aıe ɔıted prıncıpally by Bhíls, a wıld and uncıvılısed race, gıven to plunder Hemmed ın on the south by the adá, now for ever abandoned, on the west by Gujrát, completely guaıded by Geneıal Robeıts, and on the ı and east by difficult ranges which separate ıt from púr and Sirohí, and the passes acıoss which are few and ult, Tántiá ınight have been excused ıf he had despaıred ɔapo But he dıd not despaır. Ráo Sáhıb was ıts only companion, the Nawáb of Bandah having ovemıber tıken advantage of the Royal Pro- ıtıon to suııender * But these two men were, ıts houı of supıeme dangeı, as cool, as bold, as feıtile esource, as at any previous perıod of their ıs

Flies to the Banswára jungles

Desperate position of Tántiá and Ráo Sahib.

They remaın undaunted

ıd yet the Bıitish commanders had done theır ıst to hem ın Tantiá They really believed that at last they hım The troops of Roberts's dıvısıon were oned along the roads and paths and passes ng from Bánswárá to the west. On that sıde ɔe wıs ımpossible A force detached from ıch nnder Mujor Rocke guarded the passes to the north and h-west Another columıı sent fıom Máu, undeı Colonel on, commanded at the moment by Colonel Somerset, hed the passes leadıng eastward and south-eastward, whılst ıá was cut off from the south by hıs recent pursuers, tly strengthened by flyıng detachments, from Buıhánpúr from Khándesh To add to hıs difficultıes, the Bhíl bıtants of the jungles of Bánswáıá, far from aıdıng hım, wed hıs track as the vulture follows the wounded hare, ous for the moment when she shall lie down and succumb. ıt, undaunted, Tántiá pressed deeper ınto the jungles On

The cordon about them is apparently complete

* To be hereafter referred to.

ntiá, after ny move- nts in the ngles,

reaching Déogarh Bárá * he found that but a small portion of his force was with him. He halted there two days, to allow h s men to reunite. This result having been obtained, he, on the 10th of December, tered Báuswárá Here he halted a day, his men plundering teen or seventeen camel-loads of cloth from Ahmadábád He obably would have halted here longer but that informan reached him that Colonel Somerset's brigade was closing up from Ratlam.† Disturbed by this information,

rches to prise ilpur,

he marched in a nearly north-westerly direction to Salúmba, an isolated fort belonging to the Ráná of Údaipúr, encircled by hills, in the heart of the valı range It was a strong position, commanding the proaches to Údaipúr Here Tántiá obtained some supplies, vhich he was greatly in need, and set off the following day he hope of surprising Údaipúr But the British had received

discovers ke at nsror,

information of his movements, and Major Rocke's column had taken up a position at Bhánsror, whence it would be easy for him to cover Údaipúr or to fall on Tántiá as he emerged from the northern passes covering this obstacle before he had committed himself too Tántiá turned sharply to the north-east and took up a

es back the gles, and berates rding ender

position at the village of Bhilwárá,‡ in the densest part of the jungle Here, it is said, Tántiá and his followers debated the advisability of surrendering. But the intelligence which reached them during their deliberations that Mán Singh was at hand, and

ides nst it.

that Prince Firuzsháh was advancing to their assistance, induced them to persevere in their resistance, ive one more chance to Fortune

'antiá halted two days at Bhilwárá and then made for Partábgarh, the capital of the Rájah of the state of

English ements ewhat rranged he news ie ap- ch of zsháh

that name. His probable line of route had been well divined by the English general But he, too, had received information of Firuzsháh's movements, and it was necessary to arrange to meet him also. For this purpose, Somerset had been despatched with

Deogarh Bárá is the capital of a state of the same name as Rewá Kantha, province of Gujrát

Ratlam lies fifty miles to the west of Ujjén

Not the town of the same name on the road between Nímach and Nasir-

ht column to Ágra, Rocke had been moved to take his
at Partábgarh, whilst Parke, plunging into the jungles
the westward, was rapidly following on the track of the
ives

thus happened that when, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon of
25th of December, Tántiá and his followers
ged from the jungles close to Partábgarh, he
l himself face to face with Major Rocke That
r, not having a sufficient number of men at his
sal to close the three passes, had taken up a position about
miles from the jungles, whence he could march to any
t at which the rebels might threaten to debouch, provided
ad any information of their movements On this occasion
ad no such information His force, too, was, as I have
small, consisting only of two hundred infantry, two guns,
a handful of native cavalry He had no chance,
ever, of assuming the offensive Tántiá marched
ght at him, and kept him engaged for two
s, a sufficient time to enable his elephants and baggage to
the pass Seeing this result gained, Tántiá,
had thus, in spite of his many foes, escaped
the trap, marched in the direction of Mandesar,
halted for the night within six miles of that
e. Thence he marched very rapidly—in three days—to
púr, a hundred miles east-south-east of Nímach, thus
ning to the part of the country almost directly south of
lhár.

Tántiá emerges from the jungles,

baffles Major Rocke,

and marches towards Mandesar and Zirápúr

ut the English were at his heels Benson, who had resumed
mand of the Máu column, had received excellent inform-
n regarding Tántiá's movements from Captain Hutchinson,
of the assistants to Sir Robert Hamilton He pushed on
r Tántiá, then, marching thirty-five miles a day,
ght him up at Zirápúr the very day he had
ved there Tántiá, completely surprised, fled
hout fighting, leaving six of his elephants
nd him, and pushed northwards to Bárod
re another surprise followed him. Somerset had reached
ápúr the morning after Tántiá had left it. He had two
se artillery guns with him. Taking fresh horses from the
munition wagons, he attached them to Benson's two guns
th these four guns, and the ammunition contained in the
ber, Somerset started at once, and, marching seventy miles

Benson catches him at Zirápúr
Tántiá flies to Barod

aught re by nerset l beaten

in forty-eight hours, came upon Tántiá at Bárod. After an action fought in the usual Tántiá Topí style, the rebels fled to Náhargarh in the Kotá territory Here Tántiá was fired at by the Kiladár * ving out of range, he halted for the night Ráo Sáhib n sent a messenger to summon Mán Sing, the chief to om I have referred in an earlier portion of this chapter as ring rebelled against Sindhiá, who had appointed to meet him at this place On Mán Singh's arrival the rebels moved to Parón, where they halted two days They then pushed northwards towards Indiagarh. reaching the banks of the Chambal, Mán Singh, for some explained reason, left them On the 13th of January they ched Indiagarh,† where Firuzsháh, with his bodyguard and the mutinied 12th Irregulars, met them. To ascertain how this had been possible, I must return to the movements of General Napier and the Central lian force.

ntiá meets n Singh

ruzsháh.

I left General Napier just after he and his lieutenants had, at the end of September, expelled Mán Singh from the Gwáliár territory His detached parties still continued to operate in the districts to the west and south-west of Gwáliár, bordering on Rajpútáná, and work which those parties accomplished was of a most useful aracter. In this manner passed the months of October and vember, but in December Gwáliár was invaded by a new my.

e story erts to neral apier

The pseudo-prince, Firuzsháh, already mentioned in these pages, had, after his expulsion from Mandesar by Durand in November, 1857, proceeded with his lowers to Rohilkhand to try conclusions with the British in st quarter. Expelled from Rohilkhand by Lord Clyde, he entered Oudh, and cast in his lot with the irreconcilables who, to the last, refused submission to the paramount power It was only when the native cause was absolutely lost in that province at Firuzsháh, reading the glowing accounts of his achievements which Tántiá Topí regularly transmitted from the

ruzsháh,

fled in udh and ohilkhand,

* *Kiladár*—the commandant of a fort

† Indragarh is a fort and town in the Bundí state, forty-five miles north-east Kotá.

Chambal and the Narbadá, determined to march to the assistance of one whom he could not but consider as a worthy ally. At the time that he arrived at his resolution he was at a place called Bisúah, not far from Sitápúr Marching rapidly from that place, he crossed the Ganges on the 7th of December, cut the telegraph wire on the grand trunk road, and spread the report that he was about to proceed north-westwards Instead of that, he took the road to Itáwah, baffled a gallant attempt made by Lieutenant Forbes,* accompanied by Mr. Hume and Captain Doyle—who lost his life—to stop him at Harchandpúr, out-marched a column led by Brigadier Ieibert from Kánhpúr to pursue him, crossed the Jamnah on the 9th, and moved off in the direction of Jhánsí. He marched with such speed that on the 7th he had arrived in the vicinity of Ránód, a large town fifty miles north-east of Gúnah It was here he encountered his first check

resolves to join Tántiá Topí,

leaves Oudh baffles pursuit,

and crosses into Sindhia country

General, now become Sir Robert, Napier, had received timely intimation regarding the course pursued by Firuzsháh, and he had sent out detachments to watch the roads which that chieftain would probably follow. On the morning of the 12th of December he received from the commander of one of these, Capt. McMahon, 14th Light Dragoons, located near the confluence of the Jamnah, Chambal, and Sind rivers, information to the effect that the rebels had passed into the Lohar district Kuchwaghar, a tract of country often under water Believing from this, that their course would be up the jungles of the Sind river, Napier marched at 2 o'clock that day with a lightly-equipped force,† intending to proceed to Dábra on the Jhánsí road, thence, according to the information he might receive, to intercept the enemy.

Napier is informed of his movements

and pursues him

* For his services in the Itáwah district Lieutenant Forbes received thanks of the Governor-General, published in General Orders. At the close of the war he was gazetted to be major if as soon as he should attain the rank of captain.

† Two Bombay light field-battery guns, Capt. G G Brown, a hundred and fifty men 14th Light Dragoons, Major Prettijohn, a hundred men 2nd Gwáliár Máráthá Horse, Captain Smith, a hundred and seventeen men 71st Highland Light Infantry, Major Rich, fifty men 25th Bombay Native Infantry, Lieutenant Forbes, four camels, Gwáliár Camel Corps, Captain Templer.

Napier halted that evening at Ántri At 2 o'clock tl following morning, however, he was roused by a express message from the political agent at Gwáliá Charters Macpherson, to the effect that informatic he had received led him to believe that the rebe would pass by Gohad, north of Gwáliár Instea then, of pushing on to Dábra, Napier halted till th post should arrive with letters containing the grounds for th belief expressed by Macpherson He did well not to act upc it without due caution, for at half-past 10 o'clock the tahsilda of Ántri came to him to state that he had just ridden in fro Dábra, and had seen there the smoke of the stagir bungalow which the rebels were then burning, ar that they were taking a south-westerly directio The express from Gwáliár had just come in time baffle the accurate conceptions of Napier's brain, fo had it not arrived, he would have caught them the very spot he had selected.

Napier's accurate conceptions regarding the enemy's movements

are baffled for the moment by a despatch from the political agent.

There was nothing for it now but to march southward Leaving Ántri, then, immediately, Napier proceede with great rapidity in that direction At Bítáu which he reached on the 14th, he learned the rebe were only nine miles in front of him He presse forward, then, and at that place, the Gwáli Maráthá Horse, for the first time under fire, came in conta with the rear-guard of the enemy, and greatly distinguishe themselves.

Napier pursues and approaches the rebels

Napier continued the pursuit through Narwár, and leavir there the greater portion of the infantry and all the artiller who could not keep up with him, took with him only thirt eight men of the 71st Highlanders on camels, all his cavalı including twenty-five of the Balandshahr horse he four halted at Narwái, and, proceeding with the utmo speed, reached Ránód on the morning of the 17t before the rebels had arrived there His divinatic that they would make their way through the jungles of tl Sind river had proved to be perfectly accurate

Catches them at Ránód

Firuzsháh, indeed, had preferred the more circuitous ar difficult road through the jungles to the easier b more open route followed by Napier. Naturally h wished to make his way unseen, and thus to effec with an unbeaten force, the contemplated junctic

Firuzsháh ignorant that Napier is at Ránód,

Tántiá Topí As it was, he had marched on a line almost
lel to that followed by the English leader, and it was only
emptation to leave the jungle cover to sack Ránód which
saved him from an attack the previous day But Napier
ow reached Ránód before him, and the sacking
e place was likely to be more difficult than he
nticipated. Full, however, of confidence, and
ly ignorant of the arrival of the English, Firuzsháh
he l on that eventful morning against Ránód, guided by a
ndái of the locality, his army forming an irregular mass
ided in a front of nearly a mile.

marches on that place

pier had scarcely time to form up the 14th Light
oons, when the rebels were within a few yards
m The Gwáliár Maráthá horse had been
ded in crossing a deep ravine by the riding-
ls, and were a little behind The force actually engaged
sted of a hundred and thirty-three 14th Light Dragoons
r Major Prettijohn, sixty of the Maráthá Horse under
ain F H. Smith, and thirty-eight of the 71st Highlanders
a Captain Smith, mounted on camels, and guided by
ain Templer.

Napier's force

s soon as the rebels had arrived within charging distance,
tijohn and his hundred and thirty-three light
oons dashed into their midst The blow
pletely doubled them up Though individuals
gst them fought bravely, the mass made no
d whatever Their one thought seemed to be to try and
po. They were in full flight before the Maráthá
se could come upon the scene, in time only
participate in the pursuit That pursuit was
inued for seven miles, the rebels losing six elephants,
al horses and ponies, and many arms. They left a hundred
fifty dead bodies on the ground before Ránód, including
e of some native officers of the 12th Irregulars, the murderers
he gallant Holmes Prettijohn having been
rely wounded before the pursuit began, the
mand of the dragoons devolved on Captain
d, and that officer estimated the loss of the rebels in the
suit at three hundred On the British side the wounded
unted to sixteen, one of these died subsequently of his
nds

Prettijohn charges them, and completely defeats, and pursues them

iruzsháh led the fugitives in the direction of Chándérí.

Firuzshâh makes for the Aróni jungles

Learning, however, that one British force * moved towards Ránód from Jhánsí, and anotl from Lálitpúr to Chándérí, he suddenly tu westward, passing Íságarh and Púchar, and n for the jungles of Áróní Passing near Rámpúr, between Gu and Síonj, he came suddenly upon forty men of the 1st Bon Lancers, under Lieutenant Stack, escorting clothing and mounts to Brigadier Smith He at once attac the leading files of those forty men His follo had in fact captured the clothing and made prise of one trooper, when Stack gallantly brought up the rest of men, and, skirmishing with the rebels, carried the remainde his charge to Gúnah The rebels then pushed on to Ar

Gallantry of Stack

Rice marches from Gúnah against Firuzshâh,

Meanwhile, Captain W Rice, 25th Bombay Na Infantry, a noted tiger-slayer, had been orde with a small column ‡ from Gúnah to inter their retreat At Baród, on the 22nd of Decem he learned from a horse-dealer, who had been robbed by th that the rebels were encamped near the village of Sar eleven miles distant Leaving his camp standing under cha of forty-two men, Rice set off that night, and, outmarching guns with his infantry, surprised the enemy 11 P M The surprise was so complete that rebels made no resistance, but ran off at o leaving a hundred horses, several camels, many arms, and m clothing From this point Firuzshâh made the l of his way, unmolested, to Rájgarh, hoping to n there Tántiá Topí He lingered there for a days waiting for his ally, but, learning that Briga Smith was on his track, he made for Indrage where, on the 13th of January, he effected junction in the manner already related §

and drives him off

Firuzshâh then makes for Indragarh, where he joins Tántiá Topí

I left Brigadier Somerset at Baród, having, after his ma of seventy miles in forty-eight hours, driven Tán from that place Brigadier Smith, who had b posted at Síonj, had, after Napier had driven Fi shâh southwards, moved in pursuit of him from t

Disposition of the British columns

* Under Brigadier Ainslie

† Under Colonel Liddell

‡ Two 9-pounders, ninety Royal Engineers, fifty-five 86th Foot, a hun and fifty 25th Native Infantry, a hundred and forty Meade's Horse

§ Page 250

place, and had been near Baród when Somerset beat Tá there. He was now moving on Indragarh in pursui Firuzsháh General Michel was at this time—early in Jan 1859—at Chapiá, ten or twelve miles due north of Bi Thence he directed Colonel Becher to join him with all cavalry under his command. He had previously ord Brigadier Honner, commanding the Nasiráhád brigade, to m in a north-easterly direction towards Indragarh, wate whilst he did so the fords between that place and Kotá complete the investment of the rebels, Brigadier Sho moving with a light column from Ágra, had taken up a pos at Kúshalgarh, north-east of the Banás river

Escape now seemed absolutely impossible Hemmed in Napier on the north and north-east,* Showers on the north-west, Somerset on the east, Smith on the south-east, Michel and Benson on the south, and Honner on the south-west and west, how was it possible for the man who had so long defied pursuit to l through the net closing around him? It did, in very seem impossible It will be seen, nevertheless, that the reso of the rebel leader were not yet entirely exhausted

Desp[er] positio the reb

Tántiá had joined Firuzsháh at Indragarh on the 13 January. But Indragarh was no safe resting-place. He had sure information that two English columns were marching on it. Strange it was, however, that, whilst he received the fullest details regarding the movements of the various columns which had so long pursued him, and of Napier's troops, he had heard word of Showers' movement Believing, then, that a way of escape in a north-westerly direction lay before him, he made a forced march to Dewásá, a large fortified town about midway between Jaipúr and Bharatpúr

Tántid knowl himsel be alm surrou

endeav to cree by a n wester path

Showers heard of Tántiá's arrival at Dewásá as soon a speed of his scouts could convey the news. A message to the same effect was conveyed over a longer distance to Honner Both brigadiers set out

Showe pr[ises] Dewás

* Amongst those who penned him in was a flying column under C Scudamore, consisting of two guns, one squadron 14th Light Dragoon men of Meade's Horse, and a hundred men of the 86th, commanded during Brockman This column scoured the jungles for three weeks, c but never coming up with, Tántia Topí or Mán Singh

immediately, but Showers, starting from Kúshalgarh a having the shorter road to traverse, arrived first. Showe entered the town on the morning of the 16th, just as Tánti Ráo Sáhib, and Firuzsháh were holding a council of wa How they escaped was a miracle—they were completely su prised "The English force surprised us there," writes Tánt in his journal About three hundred of his followers we killed or disabled, the remainder succeeded in escaping.

Whither? Every pass seemed closed to them But t English columns from the south-west closing t

Tántiá avails himself of one loop-hole to escape

rapidly on Dewásá, had just left one opening—t opening which, turning as it were the Jaipúr terr tory, led into Márwár Of this Tántiá and h followers availed themselves, and marched with the speed of which they were capable towards the city which giv its name to the principality Passing by Alwar they turn

to Sikar,

westwards, and reached Sikar on the 21st Th were encamped there that night when Holmes, w had been sent from Nasirábád with a small party of the 83 and the 12th Bombay Native Infantry and four guns, fell up them, after marching fifty-four miles through

where Holmes catches and defeats him

sandy country in twenty-four hours The surpri was complete. The rebels abandoned horses, came and even arms, and fled in the utmost confusion. few days later six hundred of them surrendered the Rájah of Bikánír

This defeat inaugurated the break-up of Tántiá's army. that very day Firuzsháh and the 12th Irregulars separat from him. Since his wanderings in the Bánswárá jungl Tántiá had been on very bad terms with Ráo Sáhib, and t day after the defeat their quarrel came to an issue. "I to him," writes Tántiá, "that I could flee no longer, and th whenever I saw an opportunity for leaving him, I would so" Some Thákurs related to Mán Singh had joined Tánt that morning, and with them Tántiá left the force to proce in the direction of Parón, having as followers only "two pand to cook his food, and one sáís* (groom), two horses and a pony In the Parón jungle Tántiá met Rájah Mán Singh "Why d you leave your force?" asked the Rájah "You have not act right in so doing" Tántiá replied, "I was tired of runni

* "The groom," adds Tántiá, "left me and ran off after coming two stages

r, and I will remain with you whether I have done right rong" In fact, after the long chase, he felt that he was ın.

ɔanwhile, Ráo Sáhib, still with some three or four thousand wers, pushed first westwards, then to the south, and reached ıáuí, west of Ajmír, about eighty miles east of Jodhpúr, on 10th of February. But the avenger was on his track ner, who had arrived too late for the rebels at Dewásá, had, some inevitable delay, discovered the route they had n. He set out in pursuit on the 6th, and, marching very lly, reached Kushálí on the morning of the 10th, having mplished a hundred and forty-five miles in four days. ing Ráo Sáhib there, he attacked and defeated him, killing t two hundred of his followers. Ráo Sáhib fled southwards ıe Chhatarbuj Pass and reached it on the 15th Somerset, ng from the east, arrived within a few miles of it the same

Unfortunately, no one with him knew the country, and y precious hours were spent in reconnoitring, hours which Ráo utilised in threading the pass. Finding, however, that British were still close to him, the Ráo turned down to the swárá jungles, closely pursued Finding the passes leading ıe south and east closed, the Ráo then moved to the north-east passed by Partábgarh, where Tántiá had encountered Major ce only a few weeks before. As he fled before Somerset, followed closely on his track, there occurred a t diminution of his followers. Like Tántiá, e were "tired of running away." The majority ıem fell out of the line during the retreat, threw y their arms, and quietly took the road to their homes. ıe of them, Muhammadans from Kánhpúr and Baréli, about hundred in number, gave themselves up. The chiefs and other irreconcilables made their way to the Síronj jungles, ere, sometimes disguised as mendicants, sometimes acting as anders, they tried to obtain food from the villagers Organised osition to the British Government had disappeared.

The rebels break up and disperse.

f the chiefs of this long campaign, five still remained in ose fate the reader is naturally interested. These were Ráo Sáhib, Firuzsháh, Mán Singh, and , Singh, and last and greatest of all, the leading spirit of drama, the Maráthá Tántiá Topí. Ráo Sáhib wandered n place to place till the year 1862. In that year he was sted in the hills north of the Panjáb, disguised as a pilgrim

Ráo Sáhib

and was sent down to Kánhpúr. There he was tried and fo guilty on four separate charges of instigating, and having l accessory to, the murder of Europeans, and on a fifth of hav been a leader of the rebellion He was hanged on the 20tl August of the same year. Firuzsháh was more successfu eluding the vigilance of his pursuers, for he Firuzsháh in the disguise of a pilgrim, to Kurbehla, where, years ago, he was still living. The fate of the other two diff in some respects from theirs; their case constitutes in itself episode.

The Parón jungles, in which Tántiá Topí and Mán Si were hiding, constituted a portion of the l Mán Singh family estates of Narwár, of which Sindhiá had justly deprived the latter. Here they were safe, safe absolut so long as each should remain true to the other, for no r retainer of Mán Singh would betray his master or his mast friend. The clear and acute intellect of Sir Robert Napier recognised this fact the moment he received Sir Robert Napier endeavours to gain Mán Singh report that the two chiefs in question had separ themselves from their army and taken refuge in jungles He had at once felt certain that to cap Tántiá Topí the preliminary step was to gain Singh No star of lesser magnitude would suffice Now, t were strong grounds for believing that it might be possibl gain Mán Singh He was a chief of ancient lineage, of l birth, born to great possessions To avenge himself on Sin for confiscating a portion of those possessions, he had lost ev thing except the affection of his dependants and the groun which he slept, he had imperilled his head. Thenceforw so long as he remained unreconciled to his liege lord, there no prospect in the present—no hope in the future On suc man, driven to desperation, become from a feudal lord an cast, what might not be the effect of an offer of free and abso pardon, with the prospect of intercession with Sindhiá for restoration of some portion of his property?

Impressed with this idea, Napier resolved to try the exp ment It happened that on the 27th of Febr Napier sends Meade to Sirsinsáo Sir Robert had directed Meade, of Meade's H who then commanded a detachment* at Byráon

* A hundred men 3rd Bombay Europeans, a hundred men 9th Bombay N Infantry, a hundred men 24th Bombay Native Infantry, fifty men Meade's H

finally proceed to Sirsimáo, to dislodge thence any par rebels in the vicinity, to keep open his communications Gúnah, and, in conjunction with Major Little's force at want, to clear the roads to Amroa, Ágar, Thánah, Rájgarh, and Síprí. Napier further instructed him to attack Mán Singh and Tántiá Topí, then wander- ing in the jungles, whenever opportunity should offer. to ope jungle

Meade reached Sirsimáo on the 3rd of March, found the deserted, opened a communication that evening with Little, and, in co-operation with him, was engaged from the 5th to the 8th of March in clearing a road- way up the rugged and densely-wooded pass. But, before leaving Sirsimáo, Meade had ascertained that the old thákur who held that village, Naráiyan Singh by name, was connected with Mán Singh, and possessed influence in the neighbourhood On the morning of th this man and his followers came to a village some four o miles distant from the pass up which the English troops working, and showed an evident desire to communicate Meade. Meade, feeling the great importance of obtainin submission of so influential a personage, proceeded to the vi reassured the old man, who was at first nervous and ala by his tact and kind manner, and induced him to retu Sirsimáo with his followers. He saw the thákur again evening at the village, and drew from him a promise to the díwán or confidental agent of Mán Singh to him within or three days, and to do all in his power to induce Mán S himself to surrender. Meade the co dence influe frie nd Mán S

The old man kept his word. On the 11th Meade had a interview with the díwán. Through him he offered to Mán Singh the conditions he was empowered to offer—a guarantee of life and subsistence. He fur- ther requested the díwán to find out the Rájah's family and household, to invite them to come to his can promise them, should they comply, to do everything i power for their comfort, to assure them that they should n molested by the officials of the Gwáliár Durbár or by an else. With the díwán he likewise sent one letter addressed to the family, reiterating his invitation and his promise, and another addressed to Rájah Mán Singh himself, inviting him to surrender. He impressed, moreover, upon the díwán the primary necess Meade terms Mán S and a him c and h for hi

bringing in the ladies first, feeling sure that the Rájah wc follow

Sir Robert Napier

It is at this point of the story that the action of Sir Rol Napier comes in That officer, acquainted v Meade's proceedings in the matter just descril and fully approving of them, had become natur impatient when day followed day and no result issued fro beginning so promising He waited a week after the interv with the díwán, and when, at the expiration of that time tidings had been received regarding the Ránís or the Rájah determined to put greater pressure upon the latter He wr then, on the 18th of March to Meade, directing him to leave road-work, as "it is of great importance that the pressure u

urges upon Meade

Mán Singh should not be relaxed till he comes Your letter of the 11th inst gave hopes of cer parts of Mán Singh's family coming in, but, as y letter of the 13th makes no allusion to the subject, the Briga General concludes that the proposals have not been renewed

Sir Robert added that, notwithstanding that Meade had information on the subject, he had grounds for believing t Mán Singh had frequently been in the vicinity of the Bri force, that he had frequented places called Gárlá, Hatrí, B wán, and Mahúdiá, that he had been supplied with provisi from the last-named place He accordingly directed Meade

to put pressure on Mán Singh's díwán.

move on Agar, and to make a road up the Músh Pass through the jungles from that place by G and Hatrí to Mahúdrá, and at the same time exercise pressure upon the díwán at Sirsimáo threatening to quarter his force there.

In conformity with these instructions Meade marched to Múshairí Pass He found the people in that part of the coun extremely hostile to the British Not a man would give information His surprise was great, then, when, on the 2

Mán Singh's family surrender to Meade

of March, the Rájah's díwán and his own confider servant conducted into camp the ladies of the Rá household and their attendants, some seventy sons Meade received them kindly, and sent t on to one of the Rájah's villages near Síprí His servant l wise informed him that he had seen Mán Singh four times,

* From Assistant Adjutant-General to Captain Meade, dated 18th M 1859.

he had expressed his intention to give himself up in two
ıree days—a statement which was confirmed by the díwán.
eade continued his march to Mahúdrá, sending a party of
ɔ in front of him with the Rájah's díwán and a
shí,* whom he instructed to open at once a
nunication with Mán Singh On the 31st he
ıved at Mahúdrá the Rájah's final offer to sur-
ɐı on certain conditions. To some of these Meade declined
gree. Finally he induced him to come in on the following
ıtions —1st, that he should be met at some distance from
camp by a native of position—a ceremony the omission of
ɔh is, to a native of rank, an insult, 2nd, that he should
be made over to the Gwáliár Durbár, but should remain in
English camp, 3rdly, that, after staying two or three days
ımp, he should be allowed to proceed to his home at Máuí,
Sípí, whither the females of his family had
ɔ, to re-equip himself in a manner befitting his
ɛ On the 2nd of April Mán Singh entered the
ish camp

Mán Singh agrees to Meade's conditions,

and surrenders

ántiá Topí was still at large; but Tántiá, without Mán
gh, Mán Singh reconciled to his enemies, was
ilable. Now had arrived the time to play upon
more selfish instincts of the Rájah. He had life,
security for his life, but what was life to a
ı feudal chieftain without consideration, without
em, without position? What was life to a vassal lord of
lhiá, disowned and hated by his sovereign? The first
ng of satisfaction at escape from death passed, and life to
ı a man in such a position would become a burden. But
d not the position be ameliorated? Yes—a signal service—
ɔed for which men would be grateful—that would remove
still remaining obstacles to a return to his position among
nobles of his country

Feelings which coursed through the mind of Mán Singh.

n feelings such as these Meade worked with tact and skill.
nany conversations which he had with the Rájah
ing the 2nd and 3rd of April he urged him to
'orm some service which should entitle him to
sideration. His reasoning had so much effect,
t when, at 11 o'clock on the night of the second day—the

Meade works upon those feelings.

A "munshí" is, literally, a writer or secretary It is often used in India
gnify a tutor, an instructor Here it is used in its literal sense

nformation reached Meade that the uncle of Mán Singh,
ngh, already mentioned in these pages, lay, with a band
of men, fifteen miles distant, in the jungle, Mán
gh Singh volunteered to accompany the force of a hun-
rs to dred and fifty men, at the head of which Meade
ny
l an immediately started. The little force reached at
to
his daybreak the place where Ájít Singh had been
marked down, only to discover that he and his band
oved off during the night. Meade pushed on in search of
me seven miles further, to a place where the jungle was
se that cavalry were useless Ájít Singh and his men
ctually in this jungle, but, before Meade could surround
they became aware of the presence of enemies, and suc-
ceeded in getting away * No one was more mortified
le than Mán Singh Ájít Singh was his uncle, Ájít
to
gh's Singh had been his comrade on the battlefield, his
ition
abettor in his revolt against Sindhiá, and, although
fury at Mán Singh's apostasy, as he regarded it, in sur-
ing to the English, he had threatened to take his life,
yet he stood to Mán Singh in a relation than which
, step there can scarcely be a closer between man and man
l de-
it —friend, comrade, uncle,—and yet Mán Singh
grieved bitterly that this man had not been cap-
by his enemies It was a first step in moral debasement
alude to one still lower!
ing the three days which followed, close observation
d Meade that Tántiá Topí was in the Parón jungles, and,
g daily on Mán Singh's longing desire for restoration to
his former position,† he persuaded him to acknow-
nd ledge that he knew where Tántiá was From this
moment he had made up his mind to betray him
ly anxiety now was lest Tántiá should slip through his
I At that very time, to his knowledge, Tántiá was de-
whether or not he should rejoin Firuzsháh. Tántiá had

t Singh and his band were so terrified by their narrow escape, that they seventy or eighty miles on end, not halting till they joined the other ar Sírohj

have done all I could by kind and encouraging counsel to urge him to , by so signal an act of service" (the betrayal of Tántia Topí), "his the consideration of Government, promised him by Sir R Hamilton in gram of the 27th ultimo"—Major Meade to Sir R Napier, the 8th of 859 Sir R Hamilton's telegram was to the effect that, if Mán Singh red, his life would be spared and his claims would receive consideration.

n sent his emissaries to Meade's camp to consult him on subject. Were Tántiá to go, the chance would lost No thought of old comradeship, of the ties honour, weighed with him for a moment He uld at once betray him, if——

He resolves to betray Tantia Topi,

Yes,—if he could himself recover his position. That was his thought "In the course of this forenoon" (the 7th of ril), wrote Meade, "I learnt from Pribhú Lál that he thought n Singh would do as I wished, but that he was desirous of ving Sir R. Hamilton's general assurance of 'consideration' such a service reduced to some specific promise, l that his ambition was to have Sháhábad, Páuri, some other portion of the ancient ráj of Narwar, aranteed to him in the event of his efforts to apprehend ntiá Topí being successful"

for a consideration,

It was quite out of Meade's power to make any such promise, could only assure him that he 'might rely on any claim might establish being faithfully considered by overnment." Unable to extract more, Man Singh itched at the prospect which this vague promise ered, and consented to betray his friend.

even for the chance of a consideration

Then came Meade's difficulty To seize such a man as Tántia opí great caution was required Tántiá had many ies in the British camp, and to have sent a European on such a duty would have been sufficient to arn the victim Eventually Meade decided to send party of the 9th Bombay Native Infantry on the rvice, under an intelligent native officer The orders he gave this native officer were simply to obey the directions of Man ngh, and to apprehend any suspicious characters he might point it The name of Tántiá Topí was not mentioned, and e men had no idea of the actual duty on which they were ceeding

Meade sends a party of Sipahis accompanied by Man Singh

Whilst Meade was thus negotiating with Mán Singh, Tántiá opí had lain quiet in the Parón jungles Shortly ter his arrival there, and some days before Mán ngh had surrendered, Tántiá had, with the approval of that Rájah, sent to obtain information egarding the position of his old comrades The ply brought to him was that to the number of eight or nine ousand men they were in the Síronj jungles, that Ráo Sahib ad left them, but that Firuzsháh, the Ámbapani Nawab, and

Tántiá Topí, all the time, reposes absolute faith in Man Singh

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Tántiá Topí, all the time, reposes absolute faith in Mán Singh

er his arrival there, and some days before Mán ıgh had surrendered, Tántiá had, with the apɔval of that Rájah, sent to obtain information ,arding the position of his old comrades The ɔly brought to him was that to the number of eight or nine ɔusand men they were in the Síronj jungles, that Ráo Sáhib l left them, but that Firuzsháh, the Ámbapání Nawáb, and

Imám Álí, Wírdi-major of the 5th Irregulars, were there. last-named also sent him a letter begging Tántiá to join It was on the receipt of this letter that, on the 5th of Tántiá sent to consult Mán Singh as to the course he s adopt. Tántiá was well aware that Mán Singh had si dered, yet he trusted him implicitly He had placed hi quite in his power, and had chosen his actual hiding-pla the recommendation of the retainer to whose care Mán had consigned him with these words "Stop wherever thi takes you!"

To Tántiá's message Mán Singh replied that he would in three days to see him, and that then they decide on the action to be taken Mán Singh than kept his word. At midnight on the third the 7th of April, he came to the hiding-pl followed at a distance by the Bombay Si Tántiá was asleep. Asleep he was seized, ro awakened, and conveyed to Meade's camp. arrived there by sunrise on the morning of the 8th.

Mán Singh surprises Tántiá asleep, and conveys him to Meade's camp

Meade marched him into Síprí and tried him by court-m He was charged with having been in rebellio having waged war against the British Goverr between June, 1857, and December, 1858, in c specified instances No other charge was br against him

Tántiá is brought to a court-martial

His defence was simple and straightforward. It ran "I only obeyed, in all things that I did, my ma orders, *i e*, the Náná's orders, up to the captu Kalpí, and, afterwards, those of Ráo Sáhib. I nothing to state, except that I have had nothing to do wit murder of any European men, women, or children, neithe I, at any time, given orders for any one to be hanged."

Tántiá's defence.

The defence displayed the existence of a feeling very con among the Maráthás To many of these me descendant of the Peshwá was their real lord knew no other Tántiá Topí was born and br the household of Bájí Ráo, who had been Pesh the Maráthás From his earliest childhood h been taught to regard the adopted son of Bájí Náná Sahib, as his master, his liege lord, v every order he was bound to obey. Of the En he knew nothing, except they were foreigners who had r

Position, in his own eyes and in the eyes of the natives of India, of Tántiá Topí, with respect to the English

ıis earliest master of the country he had ruled, and his so))f the pension guaranteed to his first master in lieu of his an)estral dominions To them he was bound by no ties Th English Government, by depriving the heir of the Peshwá's o .he income that had been allotted to his father by adoption, ha(forced that heir to be a conspirator, and had compelled all hi dependants to be free-lances.

Notwithstanding this reasoning, which was not put befor the court, and which probably did not present itself to the minds of any of its members, Tántiá Topí was sentenced to be hanged. The sentence was carried into effect at Síprí on the 18th of April

Tántiá is sentenced to be hanged, and is hange(

Public opinion at the time ratified the justice of the sentence but it may, I think, be doubted whether posterity will confirm that verdict. Tántiá Topí was no born servant of the English rule. At the time of his birth—about the year 1812—his master was the independen ruler of a large portion of western India He was under n(obligation to serve faithfully and truly the race which ha(robbed his master. When that master, unbound equally b; any tie to the English, saw the opportunity of recovering th territories of the Peshwá, Tántiá Topí, who was his *musáhi* his companion, obeyed his orders and followed his fortunes H declared that he committed no murder He was not charge(with committing any. He, a retainer of the ex-Peshwá's family was charged with fighting against the English * On that charge alone he was convicted and hanged Surely, under the circumstances of the case, the punishment was greater than the offence. The clansman had obeyed his lord, and had fought with fair weapons

Reflections o the sentence

Doubts whether a reflecting posterity will confirm it.

* Since the first edition appeared, Mr G Lance, late Bengal Civil Servic and formerly Magistrate of Kánhpúr—himself a distinguished actor in th mutiny (pages 215–6)—has written to inform me that in the records of th Magistrate's Court at Kánhpúr there exists ample evidence to show that Tánti Topí was one of the most bloodthirsty advisers of Náná Sáhib, and that, if h did not first plan the massacre of the garrison, he assisted in it, by posting h men in ambush at the Satí Chaorá Ghât, or by giving orders to that effect t Jawála Parshád Further, that by his presence on the spot he excited th ardour and fanaticism of the assassins Although the fact stated by Mr Lan(is sufficient to prove that Tántiá Topí fully merited the penalty that was met(out to him, it yet does not justify the sentence referred to in the text. N charge relative to the massacre of the Europeans at Kánhpúr was broug against Tántiá Topí on his trial. He was simply charged with waging w against the British. On that charge alone he was convicted and sentenced to

Tántiá Topí and Hofer

Posterity has condemned Napoleon for causing Hofer to shot There is considerable analogy between t cases of Hofer and Tántiá Topí. Neither was bo under the rule of the nation against which he fougl In both cases the race to which each belonged was subjugat by a foreign race In both cases the insurrection of the subdu race was produced by causes exterior to its own immedia interests In both cases the two men cited rose to be t representatives of the nationality to which each belonged both—Hofer in the one, Tántiá Topí in the other—they resist the dominant race in a manner which necessitated the callin forth of extraordinary exertions. In both cases the leader w a hero to his own countrymen. The one, the European, is stil hero to the world The other, the Maráthá—well—who knov that in the nooks and corners of the valleys of the Chamb the Narbadá and the Parbatí, his name, too, is not often me tioned with respect, with enthusiasm, and with affection?

Tántiá Topí as a general,

One word, before we dismiss him, regarding his character a general For nearly nine months, from his defe at Jáurá Alipúr by Sir Robert Napier, to his captu by an officer serving under that general, Tánt Topí had baffled all the efforts of the British During th period he had more than once or twice made the tour of Ra pútáná and Málwá, two countries possessing jointly an area a hundred and sixty-one thousand seven hundred square mile had crossed the Narbadá, and had threatened the more vu nerable parts of western India. The qualities he had displaye would have been admirable, had he combined with them th

his merits,

capacity of the general and the daring of th aggressive soldier His marches were wonderfu he had a good eye for selecting a position and he had a ma

his demerits.

vellous faculty for localities But, when that h been said, everything has been said. Unable detect the weak points of his adversaries, he never took adva

hanged. And it is this sentence, which, I believe, posterity will not confir But little evidence regarding his participation in the Kánhpúr massacres exist at the time "Though there was some," writes Mr Lance, "more was aft wards elicited by me when trying numerous cases connected with the Kánhp atrocities" That eventually he would have been hanged seems certain But would have been better that he should have been punished for being a murder than that, by a premature and scarcely merited sentence, he should have gain the martyr's crown

ıge of their mistakes or their too great daring; he never ɔposed himself in action, and he was the first to leave the ɜld On many occasions a judicious use of his cavalry, always ıperior in numbers, would have so crippled the English that ıı ther pursuit by them would have been impossible With a ttle more insight and a little more daring he could, whilst ɔtreating before them, have harassed the flanks and the rear ' his pursuers, have captured their baggage, and cut up their ımp-followers But he never attempted anything of the sort. rovided he could escape from one place to harass them in ıother, with the chance of striking at Indúr, at Baıodah, at ɔdhpúr, or at Jaipúr, a blow similar to that which he had ruck successfully at Gwáliár, he was satisfied.

Then, again, the fact that the enemy marching against him ere English sufficed, no matter how small their umbers, to scare him. A striking proof of this ɔcurred when Major Sutherland attacked him with vo hundred men, three-fifths of whom were High- nders Tántiá had a strong position, two guns, and three or ur thousand men Had the natives been well led, their umbers must have prevailed. But fighting was repugnant to ántiá. He did not understand it. He was a guerilla leader, ɔntent to fire at his enemy and then to run away. For the ves of his followers he cared nothing

The fact that his enemies were English scared him

Too much praise, on the other hand, can scarcely be awarded the English generals and officers who conducted ıe pursuit Sir Robert Napier, first defeating ántiá, drove him into Rájpútáná and then shut m out from the north Roberts, then in Rájpútáná, ıd later, Michel, in Rajpútáná and Málwá, pur- ed him in a circle, bounded on the south by the ızám's territory or by Khándesh, and on the west by Gujrát ıs attempts to break the rim of that circle were baffled by eneral Hill, by Sir Hugh Rose, and by Geneıal Roberts ınally, all but surrounded as the circle became smaller, he oke away to the north and penetrated once more into the rritories guarded by Sir Robert Napier. The nglish officers who pursued him showed, on more ıan one occasion, that they could march as quickly he could. Witness the remarkable performances of Brigadier ırke, two hundred and forty miles in nine days, Brigadier Somerset. two hundred and thirty

The English leaders, Napier; Roberts, Michel

Remarkable marches of Parke,

Somerset, Holmes, Honner

miles in nine days, and, again, seventy miles in forty-eight hours; of Holmes, fifty-four miles through a sandy desert in little more than twenty-four hours, and of Honner, a hundred and forty-

e miles

in four days Becher's daring, too, in assailing Tántiá's whole force with a newly-raised regiment

ıring of ·ch-r and ıtherland

of troopers, and driving it before him, was a glorious act, vying in daring with Sutherland's attack above referred to

But these acts, daring as they were, do not stand out ırkedly from the achievements of other officers engaged in s pursuit Where all did nobly it is impossible to draw a ıtrast. The historian, however, is bound to call attention to) skilful strategy which gave to the pursued no rest, which , them off from the great towns, and which forced them to seek the jungles as their hiding-place This result

ıe of lchel's light lumns.

General Michel accomplished in Rajpútáná and Málwá, by distributing his forces in lightly equipped columns at salient points in those two divisions, th orders to pursue the rebels without intermission * It has ən calculated that the whole distance they were pursued tween the 20th of June, 1858, and the 1st of March, 1859, ceeded three thousand miles, that Michel himself marched enteen hundred and Parke two thousand † There can be no ıbt that this system, thoroughly well carried out, was the ıse of the break-up of the rebel army. When Honner beat at Kúsháni on the 10th of February, and the pursuit was en up at once by a fresh force under Somerset, the campaign s virtually over. The rebels lost heart, abandoned their ndards, and crept to their homes. It will be understood t these rapid pursuits were made without tents These lowed in the rear under charge of a small guard They did , often come up for days, during which time the troops had bivouac under trees.

th the sur- der of n Singh ɔquility ırns to country

To return Tranquillity was restored. With the surrender of Mán Singh the rebellion collapsed in Central India So long as he was at large and hostile, the entire population held aloof from the British The rebels could always find security in

Blackwood's Magazine, August 1860.

Captain Flower's troop, 8th Hussars, was with Parke the whole time.

jungles in which they could not be tracked The sense they ha of security was so great, that at one time Tántiá Topí and Má Singh remained for days within five miles of the Englis army, then searching for them, their position known to th natives, not one of whom would betray them But with th surrender of Mán Singh an entire change was inaugurate The people of Central India surrendered with him.*

* For Tántia Topí's diary of the events of the campaign, *vide* Appendix B.

CHAPTER II.

THE TRIAL OF THE KING OF DEHLÍ, AND THE QUEEN'S PROCLAMATION.

apture of Mán Singh and Tántiá Topí produced all over rn and southern India an effect similar to that realised ıe pacification of Oudh in the north-western Provinces nutiny was now stamped out. The daring of the soldier o give place to the sagacity and breadth of view of the man.

ne months before the final blow had been struck, when the rebels had lost every stronghold and been driven to take refuge in the wooded hills and the dense jungles which abound alike on the northern ıer of Oudh and in central India, Her Majesty the Queen leemed it advisable to issue a proclamation to her Indian cts, a message of mercy to those who still continued to , of promise to all Before referring more particularly to proclamation, it will be advisable to refer to some of the s which rendered its issue at the end of 1858 particularly ıble

e titular sovereign of India, the King of Dehlí, had been brought to trial in the Privy Council Chamber of the palace, the Díwáni-Kháss, on the 27th of January, 1858 Four charges were brought against him

The first accused him, when a pensioner of the h Government, of encouraging, aiding, and abetting the ıs in the crimes of mutiny and rebellion against the State, cond, of encouraging, aiding, and abetting his own son and inhabitants of Dehlí and the north-west Provinces of to rebel and wage war against the State, the third, of g proclaimed himself reigning king and sovereign of and of assembling forces at Dehlí, and of encouraging to wage war against the British Government; the , of having, on the 16th of May, feloniously caused, or of g been accessory to, the death of forty-nine people of

ropean and mixed European descent, and of having subse-
ɔntly abetted others in murdering European officers and
er English subjects. After a trial conducted with great
ience, and which extended over forty days, the king was
nd guilty of the main points in the charges, and sentenced
be transported for life. Eventually he was taken to Pegu,
ere he ended his days in peace *

Meanwhile it had been necessary in England to find a scape-
t for all the blood which had been shed in
shing the mutiny—an event, which, though it
med at first to give a shock to the prestige of
gland, had been the means of displaying a power greater and
e concentrated than that with which the world had credited

A scape goat required.

The reconquest of India is, indeed, the most marvellous
itary achievement of any times, ancient or modern. If
ia had at that time been under the rule of the Crown, the
ural scape-goat would have been the Ministry of the day.
it was, the blow fell upon the grand old Company which had
sed the early conquests on the eastern coast of Hindustan
il they had developed into the most magnificent empire
ject to an alien race which the world has ever seen. The
t India Company had not deserved its fate.
rule had been better and purer, more adapted
the circumstances of the great dependency
n would have been possible had its acts and
ers been subject to the fluctuations of party feeling. True,
iad committed some faults, but it is a remarkable fact,
ecially in later years, that it had been driven into the com-
sion of those faults by the Ministry of the day.
s remark especially applies to the "crime," so to
ik, of the mutiny I call it a crime, because the
rt of Directors were summoned before the bar of
lic opinion to answer for it, and were condemned
n it Now, if, as I believe, the mutiny was due
a great measure to the acts of the Government of Lord
housie, to the denial of the right to adopt, to the shock to
lic morality caused by the annexation of Oudh and especially
the manner in which that annexation was carried out, then,
Government of England was equally guilty with the Court

The East India Company,

though the faults she had were more than shared in by the Ministry of the day.

For report of the statement made for the prosecution at the trial and Sir John
ence's report, *vide* Appendix C.

of Directors, for it was that Government which more th sanctioned the annexation and the antecedent acts to which have referred. But in times of excitement justice almost alwa sleeps. The scape-goat was of the very kind which suited t public humour He was old-fashioned, pursy, and defenceles Against him every interest was arrayed The Ministry, whi wanted his patronage, the outsider, who saw an opening the 'covenanted' services, the doctrinaire, on whose mind t idea of a double government grated harshly, the and other classes combined to cast stones at hi The great Company was unable to withstand t pressure It fell, but it fell not without regret a with an honoured name On the 2nd of August 18 the Queen signed the Act which transferred its functions to t Crown.

He is made that scape-goat,

and doomed to death

No sooner had this act been accomplished than it devolv upon the first Minister of the Crown, the late Ea of Derby, to draw up for submission to the Queen proclamation, forthwith to be issued by Her Majes in Council, in which should be set forth the pri ciples on which the administration of India shou in the future be conducted The circumstanc which followed the preparation of the first draught of the pr clamation by Lord Derby have been given to the world on t highest authority in a work which has brought home to eve Englishman and every Englishwoman the enormous loss su tained by the country in the premature death of the illustrio prince whose noble life it so touchingly and so graceful records * There were expressions in that draug which seemed to Her Majesty and to Prince Albe in one case to invert, in another to express feebl the meaning they were anxious to convey In t memorandum with which the objections to the points were conveyed to Lord Derby, Her Majes expressed in noble language the sentiments by which she w animated towards the great people of whom she was about become the Empress, Empress in reality, though not th actually in name. "The Queen would be glad," continued t memorandum, after referring to the objections taken to t original draught of the proclamation, "if Lord Derby would wi

Lord Derby draws up a proclamation for submission to the Queen.

Objections taken to the original draught by the Queen and Prince Albert

* *Life of the Prince Consort*, vol iv page 284

nself in his excellent language, bearing in mind that it is nale sovereign who speaks to more than a hundred millions astern people on assuming the direct government over , and, after a bloody war, giving them pledges which her e reign is to redeem, and explaining the principles of her nment Such a document should breathe feelings of osity, benevolence, and religious toleration, and point out rivileges which the Indians will receive in being placed equality with the subjects of the British Crown, and the erity following in the train of civilisation"

'ore the memorandum containing these noble words had ed Lord Derby, that minister, warned by a am from Lord Malmesbury, then in attendance e Queen, that Her Majesty was not satisfied the proclamation, had turned his attention to raught, and discovering in it instinctively the faults which een noticed by the Queen and Prince Albert, had recast it amended form it met every objection, and corresponded ly to the wishes of the august Lady in whose name it was issued to the people of India.

Those objections anticipated by Lord Derby

) proclamation, as finally approved by Her Majesty, ran as 's —

The Queen's Proclamation.

ictoria, by the Grace of God, of the United lom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the ies and Dependencies thereof in Europe, Asia, , America, and Australasia, Queen, Defender of the Faith hereas, for divers weighty reasons, we have resolved, by ith the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and oral, and Commons in Parliament assembled, to take upon ves the Government of the territories in India, heretofore istered in trust for us by the Honourable East India ny.

ow, therefore, we do by these presents notify and declare by the advice and consent aforesaid, we have taken upon ves the said government, and we hereby call upon all our ts within the said territories to be faithful and to bear llegiance to us, our heirs and successors, and to submit elves to the authority of those whom we may hereafter me to time see fit to appoint to administer the government said territories, in our name and on our behalf

nd we, reposing especial trust and confidence in the loyalty, , and judgment, of our right trusty and well-beloved

usin and Councillor, Charles John Viscount Canning, do ereby constitute and appoint him, the said Viscount Canning, be our First Viceroy and Governor-General in and over our id territories, and to administer the government thereof in u name, and generally to act in our name and on our behalf, ubject to such orders and regulations as he shall, from time to me, receive from us through one of our principal Secretaries of ate

"And we do hereby confirm in their several offices, civil and ilitary, all persons now employed in the service of the onourable East India Company, subject to our future pleasure, id to such laws and regulations as may hereafter be enacted

"We hereby announce to the native princes of India that all eaties and engagements made with them by or under the thority of the Honourable East India Company are by us cepted, and will be scrupulously maintained, and we look for e like observance on their part

"We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions, id, while we will permit no aggressions upon our dominions or ir rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no croachment on those of others We shall respect the rights, gnity, and honour of native princes as our own, and we desire at they, as well as our own subjects, should enjoy that osperity and that social advancement which can only be cured by internal peace and good government.

"We hold ourselves bound to the natives of our Indian rritories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all ir other subjects, and those obligations, by the blessing of lmighty God, we shall faithfully and conscientiously fulfil.

"Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and knowledging with gratitude the solace of religion, we disclaim ke the right and the desire to impose our convictions on any our subjects. We declare it to be our Royal will and easure that none be in anywise favoured, none molested or squieted, by reason of their religious faith or observances, but at all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of e law, and we do strictly charge and enjoin all those who ay be in authority under us that they abstain from all interence with the religious belief or worship of any of our bjects, on pain of our highest displeasure.

'And it is our further will that, so far as may be, our bjects, of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially

nitted to offices in our service, the duties of which they may qualified, by their education, ability, and integrity, duly to charge

'We know and respect the feelings of attachment with which natives of India regard the lands inherited by them from ir ancestors, and we desire to protect them in all rights nected therewith, subject to the equitable demands of the te, and we will that, generally, in framing and administering the law, due regard be paid to the ancient rights, usages, d customs of India

'We deeply lament the evils and misery which have been ught upon India by the acts of ambitious men, who have ceived their countrymen by false reports, and led them into n rebellion Our power has been shown by the suppression that rebellion in the field, we desire to show our mercy by rdoning the offences of those who have been thus misled, but o desire to return to the path of duty

"Already in one province, with a view to stop the further usion of blood, and to hasten the pacification of our Indian minions, our Viceroy and Governor-General has held out the pectation of pardon, on certain terms, to the great majority of ose who, in the late unhappy disturbances, have been guilty offences against our Government, and has declared the nishment which will be inflicted on those whose crimes ace them beyond the reach of forgiveness We approve and nfirm the said act of our Viceroy and Governor-General, and further announce and proclaim as follows —

"Our clemency will be extended to all offenders, save and cept those who have been or shall be convicted of having rectly taken part in the murder of British subjects

"With regard to such, the demands of justice forbid the ercise of mercy

"To those who have willingly given asylum to murderers, owing them to be such, or who may have acted as leaders or stigators in revolt, their lives alone can be guaranteed, but, appointing the penalty due to such persons, full consideration ill be given to the circumstances under which they have been duced to throw off their allegiance, and large indulgence will shown to those whose crimes may appear to have originated a too credulous acceptance of the false reports circulated by esigning men.

"To all others in arms against the Government we hereby

promise unconditional pardon, amnesty, and oblivion of a offences against ourselves, our crown and dignity, on the return to their homes and peaceful pursuits

"It is our Royal pleasure that these terms of grace ar amnesty should be extended to all those who comply with the conditions before the first day of January next

"When, by the blessing of Providence, internal tranquillit shall be restored, it is our earnest desire to stimulate th peaceful industry of India, to promote works of public utilit and improvement, and to administer its Government for th benefit of all our subjects resident therein In their prosperit will be our strength, in their contentment our security, and i their gratitude our best reward And may the God of all pow grant unto us, and to those in authority under us, strength t carry out these our wishes for the good of our people."

The proclamation published throughout India,

On the 1st of November, 1858, this noble proclamation wa published to the princes and people of India. A Calcutta, at Madras, at Bombay, at Láhor, at Ágr at Allaháhád, at Dehlí, at Rángún, at Lakhnao, a Maisúr, at Karáchí, at Nágpúr, and at every civ and military station in India it was publicly rea on that day with every accompaniment of ceremonial splendou which could give importance to the occasion in the eyes of th natives Translated into all the languages and many of th dialects of India, it was, at the same time, trans

and distributed

mitted to all the native princes, and was distributed by thousands for the edification of those of lowe rank and position The first Viceroy of India used all th means in his power to acquaint the native prince and people that, transferred to the suzerainty an rule of the Queen, they might rely upon the strict observance of all engagements entered into wit them by the Company, that her Majesty desired no extensio of her dominions, but would respect the rights, the honour, an the dignity of the princes of her empire, that, while thei religion would not be interfered with, the ancient right customs, and usages of India would be maintained, that neithe caste nor creed should be a bar to employment in her service

Communications made to the native princes,

Lord Canning took every care, at the same time that the rebels still in arms should have cognizanc of the full and gracious terms offered them, term which practically restored life and security to al

and to the rebels still in arms

ıe who had not taken part in the murder of British sub-
s.

'he proclamation was received by all classes throughout
ia with the deepest enthusiasm. The princes
landowners especially regaı ded it as a charter
ch would render their possessions secure, and
ır rights—more especially the right, so precious
them, of adoption—absolutely ınvıolate The
ple ın general welcomed ıt as the document which closed
the wounds of the mutiny, which declared, ın effect, that
ɔones were to be bygones, and that thenceforward there
uld be one Queen and one people Many of the
ols still ın the field—all, ın fact, except those
olutely ırreconcılable—took advantage of ıts provisions to
down their arms and to submıt to ıts easy
ıdıtions In the gıeat towns of Indıa, natıves of
ıry religıon and cıeed, the Hindus, the Muham-
dans, the Párśıs, met ın numbeıs to dıaw up loyal
lıesses expressıve of their deep sense of the
ıeficent feelings which had prompted the procla-
ıtıon, of their gratitude for ıts contents, and of their loyalty
the person of the ıllustrıous Lady to whose rule they had
ɔn transfeıred.

Its reception in India by princes and landowners,

by rebels

The natives draw up loyal addresses expressive of their gratitude

With the ıssue of the proclamation the story of the mutıny
ɔuld fitly close But those who have accompanıed
ı so far will have seen that ın Oudh and ın central
dıa the woık of waıfaıe was pıolonged for sıx
ɔnths after ıts pıomulgation. In this theıe ıs,
wever, only a seemıng mısplacement In the
ngles on the Oudh frontıeı and of central Indıa
ere survıved for that peıiod men who were more maraudeis
an soldıers—men whose contınual rebellıon was but remotely
nnected with the oıiginal cause of the mutıny, who hac
ended too deeply to hope for forgiveness In one notable
stance, ındeed, that of Mán Sıngh, the quarrel was ın no sense
ɔnsequence of the mutıny. It was a quarrel between a baroı
d hıs feudal lord. Yet ıt was that quaırel, not the mutıny
ır any fact connected wıth the mutıny, which kept the
ɔmınıons of Sındhıá ın contınual dıstuıbance for more thaı
x months. When Mán Sıngh surrendered, those dıstuıbance
ased.

The mutiny had really terminated when the proclamation appeared

As far as related, then, to the actual mutineıs, wıth but

v exceptions to the Sipáhis, and to all the landowners in British territories, the proclamation of the Queen was, in very deed, the end and the beginning—the end of a conflict which had deluged the country with blood, the beginning of an era full of hope, ke for the loyal and the misguided, for the prince and the asant, for the owner and for the cultivator, for every class d for every creed.

he proclaation the ginning of new era.

One word more The history of military events has necesily almost entirely monopolised the pages of a work the ject of which was to record the rise, the progress, and the ppression of the Great Mutiny. In the course of the narrative have followed so closely the movements of the military mbatants that I have been unable to devote to occurrences in tricts purely civil the attention which the heroic officers who intained those districts deserved The time has arrived hen this defect should be remedied In the volume which llows this, then, will be found a record of the events which curred, so far as I have been able to ascertain them, in the veral divisions and districts which formed the provinces under rule of the several governors, lieutenant-governors, and ef commissioners who held office in 1857–8.

BOOK XVII.

CHAPTER I.

THE CAUSES OF THE MUTINY.

EVEN before the last embers of the mutiny had been trampl out, the question which had from the first puzzled every man, from the Governor-General in Council to the subaltern in his modest bungalow, the question as to the original cause of the mutiny became t burning question of the day. It was a question which requi a complete and accurate reply, because prompt reorganisat was necessary, and to carry out a complete scheme of organisation a knowledge of the circumstances which l caused the collapse of the system to be reorganised was dispensable.

What cau the mutin

On this question the opinion of no man was looked forw to with so much eagerness, so much anxiety, and, I may add, with so much curiosity, as the opinion of the great Indian official whose daring and unselfish policy had made possible the storming of Dehlí. It was very natural that this should be so. Few men had associated more with the natives than Sir John Lawren few men had more thoroughly pierced to the core the national character, and few men possessed a more complete power of mental analysis. People, for the most part, did not stop to remember that, with all his gifts, Sir John Lawrence had ever been the pari of a school—a school opposed to the tenure of land by great families, that he had favoured Lord Dalhousie's policy of annexation; and that, although he was thoroughly acquainted with the feelings of the e

Anxiety know the opinion o Sir John Lawrenc

Reasons his opini should b

and why might n

ltural class, he contemned those of the large proprietors, and that he knew little of the Sipáhis. Furthermore, and especially, that he possessed no personal nowledge of Oudh and of its people

It will readily be believed, then, that when the opinion of r John Lawrence was published it gave satisfaction only to the heedless many, none at all to the thinking few

e attributes e mutiny the eased car- idges only

After an exhaustive argument, Sir John Lawrence arrived at the conclusion that the mutiny was due to the greased cartridges, and to the greased cartridges only The public applauded a result so ntiful in its simplicity, so easy of comprehension. It med so entirely with the ideas of men who never take the uble to think for themselves, that by the masses, which are inly composed of such men, it was promptly and thankfully accepted With them it remains still the unanswerable reason for the mutiny of the Indian army They did not stop to consider that to declare that the greased cartridges caused the mutiny was all respects similar to the declaration of a man who, if asked at causes a gun to discharge, should reply—the powder ue it is that the powder, when exploded, forces out the let but who ignites the powder? That the greased tridges were the lever used in many instances to excite the áhis is incontestable, they were explosive substances But, ugh explosive, they had been perfectly harmless had the ids of the Sipáhis not been prepared to act upon them in same manner that the percussion-cap acts upon gunpowder

asons why conclu- n cannot accepted

It should never be forgotten that the greased cartridges were not the only instrument employed to create discontent in 1856–7. Before a greased cartridge had been issued the chapátís had been circulated by thousands in many rural districts

greased tridges the only trument loyed to ate dis- tent

The chapátí was, it is true, a weapon far less fect than the greased cartridge It was, nevertheless, iciently adapted to the comprehensions of the class to whom was addressed—the class given to agriculture. To minds, simple, impressionable, suspicious, prompt to receive ideas, the chapátí acted as a warning of an impending calamity A Hindu can conceive nothing e dreadful than a violation of his caste and his religion. conclusion was a foregone one The receipt of the

chá- s

foreshadowed a great attempt to be made to upset
nal religion
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greased cartridges were not in themselves harmless,
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.he leaders of the revolt were ripe the cartridges and
ítís were nothing more than gunpowder stored in a

The cartridges and the chapátís alike a means to an end

When the opportune moment arrived, when the
the Sipáhis and the agricultural classes had been
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d the chapátís were rammed into them, and were

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The real cause of the mutiny

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ıch led up to it, which I am about to place on record

Native opinion as to the cause of the mutiny

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Native opinion as to the cause of the mutiny

the real opinion of thoughtful and educated natives of India at it is their real opinion I, who enjoyed special opportunities conversing with them without restraint, and who possessed eir confidence as far as an Englishman can possess it, know ist certainly And, what is more, there are living men, glishmen, whose opportunities have been even greater, and to have communicated to me impressions absolutely con- ning my views on the subject From one of these gentlemen, erfect linguist, and whose opportunities have been unrivalled, ave received the following reply to my query as to the cause which the educated Hindus with whom he was in the habit associating attributed the mutiny "In the opinion of the ucated natives of India," was his answer, "the gross wrongs licted on Náná Sáhib; the injustice done to Kunwar Singh, injuries inflicted on the Ráni of Jhánsí, the seizure of the gdom of Oudh, the fraudulent embezzlement perpetrated th regard to the Ráo of Kírwí, and the scores of lesser wrongs ne in reckless insolence to the landowners under the adminis- tion of the north-west provinces Were Indians ever to ite their account of the causes of the mutiny, it would astonish ny in this country."

These views may be disputed Indeed, I am confident that t one ex-Indian official among a hundred will read them with ght but a contemptuous smile It requires that a man shall ve lived with the educated natives as intimate friends associate gether in Europe that he should be able to understand it ere is too little of such intercourse in India In fact, it is ly those officers who have enjoyed the opportunity of a long idence at a native court to whom the chance of such inter- rse is available.

In the first edition of this volume I expressed as my own an opinion in entire conformity with the general views I have just quoted as the views of the natives of India as to the origin of the great outbreak I wrote —and I may say that time, and a subsequent visit to India, have confirmed my view—"The real cause of the mutiny may be expressed in a condensed form in two words—bad faith It was bad faith to our páhis which made their minds prone to suspicion, it was policy of annexation, of refusing to Hindu chiefs the per- ssion to adopt, with them, a necessary religious rite, of ldenly bringing a whole people under the operation of complex

d faith, d the empt force stern as on an stern ople.

les to which they were unaccustomed, as in Oudh, in t
gar and Narbadá territory, and in Bundelkhand, and o
eaches of customs more sacred to the natives than laws, whi
used the large landowners and the rural population agair
e British rule" This was my opinion then, and it is,
ssible, more strongly my opinion now. I shall proceed
pport it by examples

The bad faith towards the Sipáhis goes back so far as t
riod immediately succeeding the first Afghán war.
t that war the Sipáhis had behaved splendidly, Bad faith towards th Sipáhis,
ey had fought well, they had suffered privations
ithout a murmur, they had borne with cheerfulness
sence from their country and their families, in a cause whi
as only theirs because it was the cause of their foreign maste
recollect well meeting in 1844 at Allahábád a political offi
hose conduct during his mission at Herát can never be m
oned without admiration—the late D'Arcy Todd Speaking
e of the difficulties of his position at Herát, D'Arcy
odd stated that but for the zeal, the energy, and their devo tion when properly managed
ie fidelity of the few Sipáhis who were with him
s could not have stayed at Herát, he added,
When properly treated the Bengal Sipáhi will go anywh
id do anything" Well, these men returned from Afghánist
nmediately afterwards we annexed Sindh. The Beng
páhis were sent to garrison a country then notoriously u
ealthy. How were they treated? The time-
honoured rule which provided that they should Breach of faith towa them in t double ba question.
ceive a fixed extra food allowance on proceeding
certain localities was rescinded, in one instance
ter the men had reached one of the indicated
calities, in another instance when the regiment was in f
arch to it. Is it to be wondered at that the men grumbl
id then actually refused to march? They committed
olence They simply said, "You are guilty of
id faith, we contracted to enter your service The Gove ment pun the Sipáh for declini to fulfil a contract which the Governm had brok
id to perform all the duties entrusted to us on
rtain conditions, of which the payment to us of
od allowance under certain circumstances was
ie. We have fulfilled our share of the contract,
id now you refuse to fulfil your share We decline
work until you fulfil it" In equity the Sipáhis
ere right, but the Government, instead of soothing th

ed in a high-handed manner, disbanded one regiment and erely punished the men of another

This conduct produced a very bad effect throughout the Indian army It was felt in every regiment that the word of the Government could no longer be depended upon Nevertheless, no open indignation was manifested The Satlaj campaign ensued, and un the Sipáhis fought well. The annexation of the Panjáb owed. Then succeeded a long period of quiescence—a period ing which seeds, sown some time before, took root, sprang and blossomed into regulations fraught with danger to the ipline of the Indian army

d effect duced on Indian ny

The natives of India serve a master well when once he has shown himself capable of wielding authority But should that authority slacken, or, worse still, should they find out that the Government they serve has placed at their disposal the means not only of shaking but even of upsetting it, then the nominal master wielding it ceases to be their real master, the stance of his power vanishes, the shadow only remains e occurrences in the Indian army during the several years nediately preceding 1857 completely illustrate this assertion former days, in the time of Lake, in the time of Hastings, even later, the commanding officer of a native regiment was reme in all matters of discipline Responsible immediately is divisional commander, he could promote, he could reduce, could punish But, as time passed on, men were appointed the general staff of the Indian army whose visions became ided and whose brains became turned by the air of the new ions to which they had been transferred Forgetting their a regimental experience, not caring to know that the routine tem which suits a British regiment formed of men taught to y the law, no matter by whom administered, is not applicable a regiment composed of Asiatics bred to obey the man in ose hands they see authority centred and him only, these began, step by step, to introduce the British system into native army It would take too long to tell how gradually real power of the commanding officer was undermined, how Sipáhi was, by degrees, taught to look upon him, not as a erior who must be obeyed, but as a very fallible mortal, uliarly liable to err, and against whose lightest exercise of hority he had the right to appeal to the one central power,

dual pro- ss of the kening power of mand officers

the Commander-in-Chief Suffice it to say that this process sapping the powers of the commanding officer was carried to great an extent that immediately prior to the mutiny the Sipáhis had lost all respect for the authority he only nominally wielded Nor had the Sipáhi imbibed for the Commander-in-Chief the feeling which he had ceased to entertain towards his commanding officer him the Commander-in-Chief was but a name, he was a figure, living in the clouds of the Himálayas, rarely, often nev seen, but whose interposition enabled him to defy his own colonel and to set discipline at nought! The extent to which this interposition was exercised before the mutiny was dangerous in the extreme It succeeded before 1857 in weakening the influence of all t regimental officers, and in undermining the discipline the army.

Disastrou result of policy

It under-mines the discipline the army

I have said that the refusal of the Government of India 1843 to act up to their contract with regard to the Sipáhis sent to occupy Sindh had been felt throughout the Indian army. Immediately subsequent to that event, the process of undermining the powers of commanding officers had made swift progress. When, then, in 1852, the Government most unadvisedly aga attempted another breach of contract, the Sipáhis, demoralis by the process I have alluded to, were even more inclined resent it.

The progr of demora sation be-tween 184 and 1852

The breach of contract referred to occurred in this manne With the exception of six or seven regiments the Sipáhis of the Bengal army were enlisted for service in India only, they were never to be required to cross the sea But with the view of supplying the necessities of the state in Arakán and the Tenasserim provinces, six or seven regiments had been specially raised for general service, and these regiments were invariably despatched thither by s whenever their services were there required. Lord Dalhousi however, who had ridden roughshod over so many nativ customs, considered that he might set aside this one also A cordingly, when, during the Burmese war, he wanted to ser an additional regiment to Burmah, instead of despatching general service regiment or of inviting a regiment to voluntee he ordered a regiment stationed at Barrackpúr to proce

A proporti of the regi-ments of t Bengal arn alone enlis for service across the sea

hither The men of the regiment refused to go. "You ask us," they said, "to embark upon a service for which we have not enlisted, and which many of us regard as imperilling our caste We will not do it" Lord Dalhousie was forced to submit. He was very angry, but there was no help for it

Lord Dalhousie attempts to break contract with the Sipáhis

But the result on the minds of the Sipáhis was most disastrous For the first time in the history of India the orders of the Governor-General had been successfully resisted It was little to the purpose to argue that the Governor-General had exceeded his powers the blow to the discipline of the native army was not he less deadly

The result most disastrous to discipline.

The minds of the Sipáhis were under the influence of this blow, and by the insane action of the head-quarter staff they were becoming more and more released from the bands of discipline towards their own officers, when the annexation of Oudh took place. How this affected them I shall state as briefly as possible

The annexation of Oudh.

A very large proportion of the army of the Bengal Presidency, and a smaller proportion of the army of the Bombay Presidency, were recruited from the kingdom of Oudh. It is scarcely too much to affirm that there was not a single agricultural family in that country which was not represented by at least one of its members in the Indian army Service in that army, in fact, offered no inconsiderable advantages to the subjects of the king of Oudh It made them clients, and favoured clients, of the paramount power Every Sipáhi was, so to speak, represented at the court of Lakhnao by the British Resident His commanding officer was authorised to rank any petition he might present addressed to the Resident, and the fact that the Resident had received such petition ensured substantial justice to the claims of the petitioner at the hands of the court of Lakhnao Every one familiar with the workings of a native court will at once recognise the value at which service in the Indian army was rated by the natives of Oudh By accepting such service they obtained an all-powerful advocate to plead their cause whenever their property might be threatened, or their civil rights endangered.

Reason why service in the Company's army was popular with the men of Oudh, when Oudh had her own king

The Nawábs and Kings of Oudh had from the time of Warren Hastings shown a loyalty to the British Government not to be

unpassed During the Afghán disasters, the Gwáliár can paign, the battles on the Satlaj and in the Panjáb, Oudh had been the milch-cow of the paramount power She had lent that power money, she had given her her best sons as soldiers, she had done all that she could do to maintain unimpaired the elations between the prince independent only in his own country and the paramount overlord

Persistent loyalty to the paramount pow of the Nawábs an Kings of Oudh

"But," exclaimed the advocates for annexation, "she has mi governed" Misgovernment is a relative term.* There can be no question but that in the English sense of the term there had been no good government in Oudh But a kind of administrative system had, nevertheless, prevailed which induced the Sipáhis, after the term of their service under the British fl had expired, to settle in their native country More than thi after the natives of Oudh had had one year's experience of British government as administered by Mr Coverley Jackson and Mr Martin Gubbins, they, one and all, evinced a strong preference for the native government which had been superseded.

The plea of misgovernment one n to be sustained as a justifi tion for annexation

It is necessary to take all these circumstances into co sideration when one analyses the effect which the annexation of Oudh produced upon the Sipáhis of the Bengal army In my belief that annexation gave them the greatest shock they had felt since the occurrences, already adverted to, of 1843–4 It was the last and the most fatal blow to their belief in British honesty. That belief had been greatly shaken by t proceedings of Lord Dalhousie with respect to Karáulí, t dominions of the Bhonslá, and Jhánsí The annexation of Ou pressed them still more closely. It made them ready to beco the tools of any adventurer

Disastrous eff ct pro duced on t minds of t Sipáhis by that annex ation

It was not only that they beheld in that annexation a low ing of their own position as men represented at their sovereig court by a British Resident, though that was a blow un

* We ask the attention of the reader to the recent exposure of bribery corruption by officials appointed by Government made in the year 1888–9 by Crawfurd Commission If this had occurred under a native administratio would have been called "misgovernment." By what euphonious term Lord I characterises it I have not yet heard.

which the Indian army yet reels, for it accounts for the difficulty of procuring recruits, which subsequently embarrassed the Government They beheld in that act, and in the manner in which it was carried out, a deliberate infringement of promises they had ever looked upon as sacred—a repayment for the good services of nearly a century, such as even the most abandoned amongst their own princes would have hesitated to enforce

They regarded it as another breach of faith

These are not statements made at random I was myself an eye-witness to the effect produced upon the Sipáhis by the order to annex Oudh It devolved upon me as Commissariat Officer of the Kánhpúr division, to supply carriage and provisions for the force which under Outram, crossed the Ganges into Oudh at the end of 1855 Over my house and office, which were in the same compound, was a Sipáhi guard—a háwaldar's party Contrary to custom and to departmental instructions, no written orders were given to me for the requisitions. The expedition was to be a secret, I was told, and must obey verbal orders But, in spite of this mystery, the destination of the force became known before it set out to every Sipáhi in the cantonment—to every native in the town. The effect was alarming The natives had no doubt whatever as to the real meaning of the demonstration. For the first time in the memory of man an English regiment was about to march on Lakhnao, and an English regiment would march on Lakhnao with but one object The agitation of the Sipáhis of my guard was most marked. It was with the greatest difficulty that I was able to control them Had they had any warning of the intended movement they would, I am confident, have broken out then and there The subordinates of the Commissariat Department themselves greatly moved, assured me that a similar feeling was manifesting itself in every regiment in the place. I made no secret of these manifestations I reported them in the proper quarter. I communicated them even to one of the officials, a man of remarkable gifts, who had accepted a high post in Oudh, but my warnings found no more credence than did the warnings of Cassandra The were remembered afterwards

Fury of the Sipáhis stationed at Kánhpúr when Outram crosses into Oudh to annex it.

The authorities are warned,

but in vain.

The annexation of Oudh, keeping in view the way in which it was carried out, was, in very deed, the act which

broke the trust of the Sipáhis in their English masters. T perpetration of that deed prepared their minds to receive and to believe any matter, however absurd in itself, which might betoken English perfidy How their minds were played upon I shall show presently. Meanwhile, it is necessary that I should indicate how it was that the landowners and agricultural classes of India became impressed with the "bad fait of their rulers

The annexation of Oudh removes the last remn of confidei in the Bri

The internal annexation policy inaugurated by Lord D housie was, in many instances, based upon his refusal to recognise a right which the Hindus hold as an essential part of their religion—the right to adopt an heir on the failure of children lawfully begotten In the early part of this volume I have spoken of the disaffection, the terror, the hatred of the English which this policy produced in the southern Maráthá country. Carrying out this principle, Lord Dalhousie h annexed the territory of the Bhonslás, he had annexed t state of Jhánsí, he had endeavoured to annex the state Karáulí, and had only been prevented by the interference the Home Government on a threatened motion in the House Commons Still he continued to hold the principle *in terrorem* over the heads of the princes and chiefs of India, and the fa that the policy of "grab all" was the policy, the paramou power, and might, on the occurrence of death without natur heirs, be applied to any coveted territory, produced, it is n too much to say, "a terror" in the minds of the Hindu princ throughout India.

The mode which the princes, chiefs, and landowner of India lo faith in th British

But in another and a far more guiltless manner the Goverı nent had sown the seeds of hatred in the minds of he representatives of great families whose ancestors hey had deprived of their dominions Two instances of the action of this policy will occur at once o the reader—Náná Sáhib and the Ráo of Kírwí Náná Sáhib was indubitably the lawful representative, according to Hindu law, of the last of the Peshwás Whe 1 June, 1818, Bájí Ráo surrendered to Sir John Malcolm, th Court of Directors considered that an annuity of eighty thousan pounds was more than an adequate compensation for the loss c n empire. Bájí Ráo lived in the enjoyment of this pensio early thirty-five years. When he died, in January 1853, Lo

The principle of granting life annuity in exchange for a kingdom

Dalhousie refused either to recognise his adopted son or t continue the pension

According to European ideas this ruling was perfectly jus It strictly carried out the agreement as understoo by Sir John Malcolm in 1818 But neither Bájí Rá nor his retainers had so understood it. Such a settl ment would have been so repugnant to the ideas an customs of the races of Hindustán, that they could not be ex pected to understand it. As the son of Bájí Ráo would hav succeeded that prince as Peshwá had he remained Peshwá, s would he succeed naturally to all the rights for which Bájí Rá had exchanged the dignity of Peshwá With them it was point of honour to recognise in the son, whether begotten o adopted, the successor to the titles and estates of his fathe Whether the English recognised him or not, Náná Sáhib wa still Peshwá in the eyes of every true Maráthá * The refus to recognise him and the stoppage of the pensio forced the heir of the Peshwá to conspire. It ca easily be conceived how readily such a man, occu pying a fortified palace close to the Oudh frontie would hail and encourage the discontent which th nefarious annexation of Oudh, as the natives considered it, cou not fail to produce

Totally repugnant to Hindú ideas.

That principle made Náná Sáhib a conspirator

The story of the Ráo of Kírwí,† whilst reflecting still mo disadvantageously on the conduct of the British Government, similar in character and in application

We see, then, how many of the princes and the chiefs

* I recollect well, when I was at Banárás in 1851–52, the Governor-Genera agent, Major Stewart, a man of great culture and information, told me that the was living then, in extreme poverty, in the Mirzápúr jungles, near Banárás man recognised by the natives as the lineal descendant of Chéit Singh, Rájah Banárás, expelled by Warren Hastings in 1781, and that to that day the nativ salaamed to him and treated him with the respect due to the ruler of Banárás.

† *Vide* page 138-42, and Appendix A I may be permitted to note he another instance in which the British Government has applied the same unju principle When in 1848–49 a war broke out with the Sikhs, the King of Láh was a minor, under the guardianship of the British Government, and in no respec responsible for the occurrences which led to the war Yet, although his in sponsibility was officially admitted, he, the ward of the British Government, guiltless child, was treated as though he was in all respects the guilty part The British annexed his kingdom and gave him in exchange some kind of pr vision, which up to this day has never been clearly defined The matter h only to be seriously examined for the injustice to become apparent Most of th nobles of the Panjáb, who secretly fomented the wars of 1845 and 1848, we

India in possession, and all the chiefs not in possession, were predisposed to view with at least indifference any troubles which might assail their British over-lord. Incidents like that of the Rájah of Dilhérí,* of Kúnwar Singh of Jugdíspúr, driven into revolt by the action of a revenue system which he did not understand, came at uncertain intervals to add to t general mistrust Such incidents affected alike chieftain a retainer, noble and peasant, for, in almost every part of t country, the retainers considered their interests as bound with those of the former.

The West principle pushed to logical extreme alienates a Eastern ra

It was when the minds of all were thus distrustful that t annexation of Oudh—of Oudh which had ever been faithful, always true and loyal—came to startle them still more It is just within the bounds of possibility that, if the system introduced by the English into Oudh had been administered in a conciliatory manner, t result might have been similar to that which was produced i few years in the central provinces But the Englishmen whom the administration of the newly-annexed province was intrusted were men with fixed ideas, which they rode to death, the slaves of a system which had sown disaffection all over the North-Western provinces and in Bundelkhand, and which they carried out without regard to the feelings and previous habits of those with whose lands and property th were dealing. In less than twelve months the result was d affection and dismay, the new settlement made every man Oudh an enemy to British rule.

The annex ation of Ou is made doubly odi

by the pri ciple of forcing Western notions on an Easter people

With Oudh thus disaffected, the chiefs and the territorial interest doubting and trembling, with the Sipáhis alienated and mistrustful, there needed but one other element to produce insurrection. The country, the army, the newly-annexed province were alike ready for the machinations of conspirators.

At the clo of 1856 all classes are ready for machinati of con- spirators

secured in the possession of their estates, and their position, under English r has become trebly secure But Maháráj.ah Dhulíp Singh, who was, I repea mere child, innocent of intrigue, and the ward of the British Government, granted in exchange for his kingdom and its princely revenues, and for his la private estates, a life annuity only Can we wonder that treatment of this s when fully realised by him, should upset the equilibrium of his mind to extent recently witnessed by the world?

* Page 63–4

The conspiratois, too, were ieady Who all those conspiratoi were may never certainly be known. Most of thei died and made no sign. It is, however, a fact b beyond question that the Maulaví of Faizábád—tl man who was killed at Powáin—was one of then I have already given a sketch of the previous caieer of th iemarkable man * I have shown how, after the annexation Oudh, he travelled over the north-westein piovinc on a mission which was a mystery to the Euiopean how he was suspected even then of conspiiing Abundant pioofs were subsequently obtained that a conspirac had been formed by some influential people in Oudh in tl interval between the annexation and the outbreak of tl mutiny Of this conspiiacy the Mauiaví was undoubtedly leader It had its ramifications all over India—ceitainly Ágra, where the Maulaví stayed some time—and almost ce tainly at Dehlí, at Míiath, at Patná, and at Calcutta wheie tl ex-King of Oudh and a large following were residing.

The authors of the mutiny

The Maulavi of Oudh

For some time there was one thing wanting to the conspirato —the means, the instrument—with which to kind to action the great body of their countryme Especially were they at a loss how to devise scheme by which the minds of the Sipáhis servii throughout the Bengal Presidency should be simu taneously affected They were in this perplexi when they heard of the new cartridge—a cai tiid smeaied with animal fat and which they were to was to be bitten.

The one thing wanting to the success of the conspiracy

is found in the greased cartridge

It was easy for them to make this discovery. Their spi were everywhere. The cartridges were open manufactured at Damdamah Eageily looking o for a novelty to be introduced from Euiope into t native army, they were the most likely men of t to detect the instrument they required in the greased cai tiid They had no sooner found it than they realised that it cc responded exactly to their hopes It was the weapon th wanted Instantly the chapátis were distiibut by thousands to the rural population, whilst mea were employed to disseminate in every milita station in Bengal suspicion regarding the cartridg

When the cartridge is found

the chapátis are circulated.

* Vol IV p 379.

To tell a body of Hindús, already suspicious of their forei master, that they would be required to bite a cai t- ridge smeared with the fat of their sacied animal, and to tell Muhammadans that they would be ie- quired to bite a cartridge smeared with the fat of an animal whose flesh was forbidden to them, was tantamount to tell them that their foreign master intended to make them break with their religion. Certain that result was produced. When the new cartridges we ssued, suspicion and calumny had done their work T Sipáhis even believed that cartridges made of paper had be feloniously tampered with; and, when they were issued them, they broke into revolt

Natural effect on t minds of Hindú and Muhamma dan Sipahi

In this lesser sense, then, and in this only, did the cartridg produce the mutiny. They were the instruments used by conspirators, and those conspirators were successful in their use of the instruments only be- cause, in the manner I have endeavoured to point out, the minds of the Sipáhis and of certain sections of t population had been prepared to believe every act testifying bad faith on the part of their foreign masters

The car- tridge only the instru ment

I have said that the mistrust of the British faith had, towar the year 1857, become as great in the minds of the princes and chiefs and landowners of India as in the minds of the Sipáhis. There were, however, a few exceptions, and, when the country rose, those ex- ceptions saved us I will briefly refer to the most promino amongst them.

The excep tions w hic proved the rule

In four great provinces of our empire—in Oudh, in E hilkhand, in Bundelkhand, and in the Ságar and Narbadá territory—the great bulk of the people ose against British rule. In western Bihár, using that geographical expression as inclusive of the districts subordinate to the Commissioner of Patná, in mai districts of the Allahábád division, of the Ágra division, and many parts of the Mírath division, the risings of the people ai the Sipáhis were almost simultaneous in point of time. H. the revolt been universal, had the chiefs, the people, and t Sipáhis risen at one and the same moment, India could not have been held. Fortunately for British interests, the great prince who occupied the most central position in India, and whose action, had he risc

The pro vinces w hic rose agains us

The loyal of Sindhia

would have been felt to the extremities of western India, wa throughout the crisis, loyal to his suzerain Throughout th period between the 12th of May and the 1st of September, 185' Sindhiá held the fate of India in his hands.

In another volume * I have described very briefly how was that, in an unexampled crisis in the fortunes of the peopl with whom his ancestors had contended for empire, Sindhiá di remain loyal I have shown that the loyalty di not proceed from affection towards the English His minister and confidant, Dinkar Ráo, had no lov for our nation. Sindhiá's people were, almost to man, against us. Yet Dinkar Ráo used all hi great influence in favour of a loyal policy, and hi representations, backed by the solid arguments of the able re presentative of the British power at the court of Sindhia Major Charters Macpherson, prevailed over national sentimen the solicitations of other courtiers, and the boisterous demonstra tions of the people. The importance of the result to Englis interests cannot be over-estimated Sindhiá's loyalty alon made possible Havelock's march on, and the retention o Kánhpúr. It acted at the same time on the rebel like a wedge which pierces the centre of an army dividing the wings, and preventing concentrate action Nor, when, after the back of the rebellion had bee broken, Sindhiá's army revolted against himself, was the effec much lessened. Sindhiá's great influence was still used for th English

His loyalty was not based upon affection for the British as a people

Yet it saved us.

In considering Sindhiá's loyalty in connection with the rising of others—of all, or almost all, the rájahs an tálúkdárs, of Oudh, of the chiefs in Bundelkhand in the Ságar and Narbadá territory, in the southern Maráthá country, and in western Bihár—it is im possible to shut our eyes to the fact that there ha been a marked difference in the behaviour of th British Government towards Sindhiá on the on side, and towards the rájahs and landowners of the countrie mentioned on the other Under circumstances of a peculiarly tempting character, Lord Ellenborough had behaved with th greatest generosity and forbearance towards Sindhiá in 1844 The Government had kept faith with him ever since. The

The loyalty really based on the fact that we had dealt faithfully and generously with him

* Vol. III pp 100-1

reader of this volume will see that towards the rájahs a landowners of the other provinces mentioned the Brit Government had shown neither generosity nor forbearance some instances they had not even kept faith. It is scarc necessary to point the moral.

It is, indeed, a very remarkable fact, and one which rulers of India at the present moment would do well to bear in mind, that in the several provinces and districts traversed by our troops in 1857–8–9, the behaviour of the people corresponded to the character of our rule. Thus, in the central provinces, to which the regulation system had never penetrated, the people were loyal and contented, and refused all aid to Tántiá Topí. In the Ságar and Narbadá territories, in Oudh and in the districts bordering on that province, in the Ágra division—in all of which the Brit hand had been heavy, and the British acts opposed to national sentiment—the people showed a spirit of opposit a resolution to fight to the last, and in many cases a testation of their masters, such as no one would before h credited. Cases similar to that of the Rájah of Dilhérí, refer to in the earlier part * of this volume, had sown far and w the seed of disaffection and revolt.

The rem able in- stances h which th behavio the peopl India cor sponded the faith had kept with the

If these facts are, as I believe them to be, correct, we h not to go far to seek the conclusion. The mutiny of the army and the insurrection in the provinces I have named were the natural consequences of an attempt to govern a great Eastern empire according to purely Western ideas.

The mut the resul a rude attempt

The civilisation, over-refined though it might be, of thousa of years was ridiculed by the rougher race which, scorning sentiment, regarded utilitarianism as its foundation-stone. The governing members of that race failed to recognise the great truth upon which their forefathers had built their Indian empire, that the Western race can gain the confidence of the Eastern only when it scrupulously respects the long-cherish customs of the latter, and impresses upon it the conviction that word is better than its bond This is just the conviction wh during the thirty years immediately antecedent to 1856,

to govern Eastern people according pure We ideas

* Page 63

majority of the Hindús and Muhammadans of India had be gradually losing, and which in 1857 they had lost.

Lord Canning.

If Lord Canning had had any idea in the early part of 18 that the isolated outbreaks which then disturbed t general serenity were part of an organised plot, would, I believe, have at once taken measures meet the difficulty. Not that, at any time in 1857, he cou have prevented a mutiny, but he could easily have made bett arrangements to meet one I am far, however, from imputi any blame to Lord Canning in this respect. He had b recently arrived in India His predecessor, when making ov to him charge of the empire, had expressed his conviction th never had the country been in so satisfactory condition All the time the ground was undermine the train was being laid, the miners were at work But ho was Lord Canning to know this? He inherit Lord Dalhousie's councillors They were as satisfie and as ignorant of the real state of the country, was Lord Dalhousie Lord Dalhousie had quitte India in a blaze of glory, and the new Governor-General, u used to the currents of Indian thought, could for some montl only steer the vessel by the advice of the officers who had helpe to bring to Lord Dalhousie a renown far-reaching and seeming well deserved

new to India.

Inherits Lord Dalhousie's councillors

But, in fact, upon no men did the news of the mutiny descer with so startling a surprise as upon the councillo of Lord Canning They could not comprehend i Weeks and weeks elapsed before they could brin themselves to believe that it was anything mor than a fortuitous explosion at various points, each having n concert and no connection with the other The Home Secre tary's assurances that the apprehensions expressed regarding it nature were "a passing and groundless panic," that "there i every hope that in a few days tranquillity will be restore throughout the presidency," testify to the ideas that filled th minds of these men The admission at least is due to them tha they were honest—they believed what they said But those sayings betrayed a complete ignorance of the country and of the situation. This ignorance this blindness to the fact that it was more even than a mutiny of the Bengal army, and not merely a series of isolated revolts, with which they had to cope, wa

The councillors of Lord Canning

Their utter ignorance of the India outside Calcutta.

llustrated in a thousand ways, but in none more strongly tha
n the refusal to disarm regiments which were known to b
nutinous The consequences of this refusal were most serious
n the case of the regiments at Dánápúr, the reader will hav
een that it brought revolt into western Bihár, added enor
nously to the dangers of Havelock, and even imperille
Calcutta

How great Lord Canning really was, how small were h
ouncillors, was shown when, having completely
haken off their influence, he stood alone and un-
hackled at Allahábád in the early part of 1858 A
ifferent man was he then from the Lord Canning
f April and May 1857. His nature then displayed
ts real nobility His grasp of affairs, at Calcutta ap-
parently so small, excited at Allahábád the admiration of all wh
ame in contact with him He showed a truer insight into th
nilitary position than the Commander-in-Chief himself. It wa
ntirely owing to Lord Canning's insistance that the campaign i
Rohilkhand followed close upon the capture of Lakhnao. S
John Campbell would have postponed it But Lord Canning wa
oo convinced of the danger of allowing a province to continu
o flaunt rebellion, unchecked, in the face of the Government, t
permit the delay. He insisted with all the determina-
ion of a man whose resolution, based on the logic
f facts, was not to be shaken. It was Lord Can-
ning at Allahábád who sent Lord Mark Kerr to Ázamgarh
who gave his fullest support to Sir Hugh Rose, and to th
generals engaged against Tántiá Topí, and if, in one respec
o which I have adverted, his judgment was faulty, his com
panion in error was the Commander-in-Chief, and the error wa
solitary one.

Lord Canning's real greatness evident when he stood unshackled at Allahábád

His military acumen

Nor is lesser praise due to him for the measures inaugurate
t Allahábád to heal the wounds caused—he must
hen have seen—in a great measure by the mistakes
f his predecessor His Oudh proclamation, despite
f the apparently harsh terms which it promulgated,
was intended as a message of mercy, and, in its application
was a message of mercy. It gave every landowner in Oud
a title better, safer, more valid, than the title he had lost I
nsured mercy to all except to those who by their crimes ha
orfeited all right to it Interpreted, as Lord Canning mean
t to be interpreted, by one of the ablest administrators i

His legislation in regard to Oudh

India, it became the charter upon which the position no occupied by the people of Oudh has been built up ar secured.

His reception of Lord Ellenborough's strictures

Never was the real greatness of Lord Canning's charact more completely displayed than when the gallin strictures of Lord Ellenborough's despatch wer published to the world At the moment the insul the breach of etiquette, were lost sight of in th fear lest the condemnation of his policy proceeding from a high a quarter should afford encouragement to the rebels a weaken the attachment of the native tributaries As soon a he ascertained that the despatch had not produced that result h was calm He could not help seeing that it was designedly in pertinent, that it was intended to provoke him to resign. Con scious of the rectitude of his motives and of the soundness o his views, he laughed at the pettiness of the display. In h calm and statesmanlike answer he sought neither revenge nc triumph But both soon came to him The news that Lor Ellenborough had been hoisted with his own petard, the receip of Lord Derby's almost imploring letter not to resign, followe the insulting missive with a rapidity almost startling

His conduct towards his colleagues and subordinates.

Towards the men who served under him, Lord Canning dis played generosity, kindness, and forbearance H knew that in many departments he had been badl served, yet he would rather bear the burden himse than dismiss the incapable minister. But so lo did he rate the abilities of the men about him, the when he had resolved to appoint Mr. Edmonstone, till then h Foreign Secretary, to be Lieutenant-Governor of the North West Provinces, he cast his eyes far from the men surroundin him to select a successor to that official. He had actually re solved to offer the post to Herbert Edwardes when the publica tion by that officer of a letter, violently polemical, caused hi to reconsider his resolve For the moment he was cast bac upon the clique about him, but finally he made an admirabl choice in Colonel Durand

The lofty-minded English gentleman, the trained statesman

Judging Lord Canning's conduct after his arrival at Allah ábád, it is difficult to find a fault in it He wa then the lofty-minded English gentleman, the traine and skilful statesman Every day made it mor clear that the mistakes of the Calcutta perio mistakes which have been fully recorded in thes

volumes, were due to the inexperience of a generous natu guided by men whom he had been told to look upon as maste of the situation, but who were in fact hopelessly ignora and incapable. That Lord Canning came to know this hi self was evidenced by the generosity he displayed, after t mutiny had been quelled, to those who had ventured to expr very boldly their disagreement with his policy of 1857

But, if Lord Canning was to be admired from the time of l arrival at Allahábád, Lord Elphinstone deserves the fullest meed of praise that can be accorded to him from the very first Lord Elphinstone possessed this advantage over Lord Canning—his previous experience India had given him a thorough knowledge of the country a the people When the mutiny broke out at Mírath he saw it as it really was, he saw that it was no isolated outbreak, no local discontent, but part and parcel of an organised rebellion which had its main roots, indeed, in the North West Provinces, but the development of which, especially in the direction of Bombay, was certain, unless it could be promptly stopp The Bombay Presidency, in fact, with an army partly recruit from Oudh, and composed mainly of a conglomeration Maráthá states, was in a peculiar degree susceptible Lo Elphinstone understood the situation at once He dealt wi it in a manner possible only to a statesman of high and lof courage, of clear intellect, and of far-seeing views The id of waiting for the mutiny within his own borders, if, indeed, ever occurred to him, came only to be promptly rejected. mass the greatest number of men on the decisive point of t scene of action—that Napoleonic motto became at once l guiding principle For that purpose he denuded his own Presidency, highly sensitive as it was, of European troops, and despatched them, as fast as he could force them to move, to the threatened points outside of it He, too, like Lord Canning, had colleagues his government, but here again his previous experience sav him from the mistakes which marred Lord Canning's admin tration during the first seven months of the mutiny Know his counsellors thoroughly, he listened to them with courtesy but he acted on his own convictions. To the men who w the instruments of his policy he gave the most complete a generous confidence. How large was his trust when he o

Lord Elphinston

comprehended the full extent the mutin from the very outse

His policy offensive defence

gave it Mr. Forjett is a living evidence. Mr. Frere in Sindh Mr Seton-Karr and afterwards Colonel Le G Jacob in the southern Maráthá country, Mr. John Ross in Satárah, and Colonel Malcolm, are instances of a similar import When, in spite of all his measures to keep the mutiny from Bombay by a policy of offensive defence, the poison crept in and infected the regiments of the regular army in the southern Maráthá country, how vigorous how decided is his policy! We see here none of the hesitation, of the half-heartedness, the halting between two extremes, which enabled the mutinous regiments of Dánápúr to disturb all the plans of the Government and to imperil the safety of the empire Promptly without an hour's delay, Lord Elphinstone sent for the fittest man at his disposal and told him to go to Kolhapúr and at all costs quell the mutiny Le Grand Jacob went and disarmed the rebellious Sipáhis How Lord Elphinstone was occasionally thwarted by men not immediately under his orders has been shown in the case of Woodburn But his firmness was proof even against opposition of this description, and, after some vexatious delay, he carried out his policy

The generous confidence he placed in his subordinates

His quick decision

Only those who have enjoyed the privilege of reading his voluminous correspondence during 1857–58 can form an idea of the remarkable perspicacity which characterised Lord Elphinstone's views on every point connected with the stirring events of those years. The strong and the weak points of a case, the true policy to be pursued, the proper time for putting it in action when to withhold the blow, when to strike, the reasons for withholding or for striking, are laid down in clear and vigorous language in his letters Reading them after the event, it seems marvellous how a man standing alone should have judged so clearly, so truly. Many of the military movements which tended to the pacification of the country had their first inspiration from Lord Elphinstone, and the smallest of the tardy tributes that can be paid him is this—that no man in India contributed so much as he contributed to check the mutiny at its outset, no man contributed more to dominate it after it had risen to its greatest height.

His correspondence evidences his foresight.

In the glory of the victory, amid the bestowal of well-merited rewards for military services, the great deserts of Lord Elphinstone received but small notice from the public But it is a

remarkable fact that after the death of Sir Henry Lawre he was nominated by three successive Secretaries of State—by Mr Vernon Smith, by Lord Ellenborough, and by Lord Stanley—to be successor to Lord Canning in the event of a vacancy occurring in the office of Governor-General It now becomes the duty of the historian to place him on the lofty pedestal to which his great services and his pure and noble character entitle him.

Lord Elp stone is appointec three suc sive Secr ries of St. to succee Lord Canning

The southern Presidency was never invaded by the mutin spirit But not the less is a large share of credit due to its governor, Lord Harris. The responsibility which weighed upon this nobleman was very great inde The immunity of Madras depended upon the loyalty of Nizám, and, at the outset, the Nizám had much to appreh from his own people. It was in the height of the crisis t Lord Harris denuded his own Presidency to send troops Haidarábád, and it cannot be doubted but that their opport arrival tended greatly to the pacification of the Nizá dominions The formation of the Kamthí column, of Whitlo force, of the brigade which fought under Carthew at Kánhp the despatch to Bengal of the regiments which kept open the grand trunk road in western Bihár and which afterwards co-operated against Kúnwar Singh, of the troops who rendered good service in Chutiá Nágpúr, testify to the energy, the foresight, the devotion of Governor of Madras He used all the resources of his Preside to crush outside the rebellion which never penetrated wit his own borders.

Lord Har

displays sight, ene and devo

Of other actors in the rise, progress, and suppression of rebellion I have written in the body of this history, not always, perhaps, in as full detail as their splendid services demanded, but, I would fain hope, in full proportion to the scope and requirements of the work intrusted to me It may be that some incidents have escaped me. I shall regret it much should s prove to be so, for my chief anxiety has been to render justice to every man. This, at least, I may say, that, howe ineffectively the History of the suppression of the Indian Mut may have been told, the character of our countrymen must be s to emerge from the terrible ordeal of 1857–58 in a form that wc gratify the most exacting people. We are, fortunately, as a nat

The dese of Englis men in t crisis of 1857–8–9

accustomed to success in the field, but on no occasion in or history has the nerve and fibre of our troops, the fortitude an manliness of our countrymen of all ranks, been more cor spicuous—often in the face of death itself, and under circun stances which would have seemed to justify despair. But wit life they never despaired. They endured all that had to b endured, with a patience and cheerfulness never to be surpasse and sought victory when it was possible with a determinatio before which the strongest opposition had to yield. And in a this they were sustained and animated by our countrywomer who, in positions and under trials to which few gently-nurture women have been subjected, showed all the noblest and mos lovable aspects of woman's character The History of th Indian Mutiny is, in fact, a record of the display of all th qualities for which Englishmen have been famous—of th qualities which have enabled the inhabitants of a small islan in the Atlantic to accumulate the noblest and largest empir in the world, and which, so long as they remain unimpaired i their descendants, will enable them still to maintain it.

APPENDIX A.

(Pages 138–42)

In addition to the fact stated at page 138 that Mádhava Ráo, Ráo Kirwí, was only nine years old when the mutiny broke out, and that t money paid for the maintenance of the Banáras Temples had been alienat before he sat on the gadí, and therefore never formed part of his estate a could not be liable to seizure, whatever he might do, it may be added th at the time of the Mutiny the Government of India appointe l a Speci Commissioner, Mr F O Mayne, to inquire into the conduct of Mádha Ráo, and that that Commissioner fully absolved him from all blan (*vide* his report, dated September 8, 1858)

Not only so, but the same gentleman gave a special certificate to t Regent of Kírwí (who was also trustee of the Banaras Temples), dat February 4, 1859 A copy of that document, now before me, state "Rám Chandrá Rám, Paindsay, has always borne a high character f loyalty and respectability during the Mutiny of 1857 Being a relati of the Kírwí Peshwá, he was placed in a difficult position, and discharg his duty both towards the British Government and towards his mast most faithfully, at the risk of his life, and with frank and open loyalty Government. It was he who saved the life of Mr. Cockerell, joi magistrate of Kírwí Though he has at present frankly refused a reward for his loyal and faithful services, yet he must be well pa whenever he stands in need" This was signed by Mr F O Mayne Y the reward Rám Chandrá Rám received was the pillage of the Banár Temples of which he was trustee.

There is thus complete evidence that a Special Commissioner exonerat Mádhava Ráo from all blame, and gave a certificate of loyalty to h adviser we have the non-age of the Ráo, and the fact that the Temp money had been seized by the Government two years before the Mutin and yet we are asked to believe that all these seizures took place in co sequence of the Ráo's rebellion.

With reference to the statement made in the first edition that Gener Whitlock found in the palace-yard of Kírwí more than forty pieces cannon, an immense quantity of shot, shell, and powder, &c, a friend, w has investigated the subject of the Kírwí tragedy, writes me as follow "As to the statement made by Whitlock and repeated by you about t active gun factories and powder mills and stands of arms, the whole is shameless lie put forward to warrant the grant of prize money Th 'lucky' column had a keen scent for booty Listen to a few words

truth On the death of Venáyak Ráo, the 6th July, 1853, Mr. Ellis, tl Resident, went to Kírwí, disbanded all the forces there, and carried awa all the weapons of war A prudent, though despotic, use was made of tl change of *ráj* to disarm this petty native State. The agent to tl Government of India had full information of all that was going on Kírwí up to the outbreak of the Mutiny Is it consistent with comm sense to suppose that a petty State like Kírwí could establish gu foundries and powder manufactories during the short period of the Mutiny No money, however vast, and no hatred, however bitter, could possib create such things, without the time necessary for their establishmer Your military knowledge will make the monstrous impudence Whitlock's assertion more apparent to you than it can be to me I probably scraped together a few old relics and curiosities, with a fe mutineers' guns and belts—hundreds of which must have been available such a time—and on the like trumpery the lie must have been built up '

I give this statement for what it is worth To me it seems that the was, at least, great exaggeration in Whitlock's narrative, and that the were no grounds whatever for treating the Ráo of Kírwí as an enemy be plundered.

APPENDIX B.

(Page 269)

Translation of Tántiá Topí's Voluntary Deposition or Statement taken Camp Múshairí on the 10th of April, 1859, in presence of Ma Meade, commanding Field Force.

My name is Tántiá Topí, my father's name is Pándurang, inhabitant Jolá-Paiganah, Patoda-Zillah, Nagar I am a resident of Bithúr I a about forty-five years of age, in the service of Náná Sáhib in the grade companion or aide-de-camp

In the month of May 1857 the collector of Kánhpúr sent a note of t following purport to the Náná Sáhib at Bithúr, viz that he begged h (the Náná) to forward his wife and children to England. The Ná consented to do so, and four days afterwards the collector wrote to him bring his troops and guns with him from Bithúr (to Kánhpúr). I we with the Naná and about one hundred Sipáhis and three hundred matc lockmen and two guns to the collector's house at Kánhpúr. The collec was then in the intrenchment, and not in his house. He sent us word remain, and we stopped at his house during the night. The collec came in the morning and told the Náná to occupy his own house, whi was in Kánhpúr We accordingly did so, we remained there four da and the gentleman said it was fortunate we had come to his aid, as t Sipáhis had become disobedient, and that he would apply to the gene

in our behalf He did so, and the general wrote to Ágra, whence a re came that arrangements would be made for the pay of our men T days afterwards the three regiments of infantry and the 2nd light cava surrounded us and imprisoned the Náná and myself in the Treasury, a plundered the magazine and Treasury of everything they contain leaving nothing in either. Of the treasure the Sipáhis made over t lakhs and eleven thousand rupees to the Náná, keeping their own sentr over it The Náná was also under charge of these sentries, and the Sipal who were with us also joined the rebels After this the whole arr marched from that place, and the rebels took the Náná Sáhib and mys and all our attendants along with them, and said, "Come along to Dehl Having gone three coss from Kánhpúr, the Náná Sáhib said that, as t day was far spent, it was better to halt there then, and to march on t following day. They agreed to this and halted. In the morning t whole army told him (the Náná) to go with them towards Dehlí T Náná refused, and the army then said, "Come with us to Kánhpúr, a fight there" The Náná objected to this, but they would not attend to hi and so, taking him with them as a prisoner, they went towards Kánhpı and fighting commenced there The fighting continued for twenty-fo days, and on the twenty-fourth day the general raised the flag of pea and the fighting ceased The Náná got a female who had been captur before to write a note to General Wheeler to this effect, that the Sipál would not obey his orders, and that, if he wished, he (the Náná) wou get boats and convey him and those with him in the intrenchment as f as Allahábád An answer came from the general that he approved of th arrangement, and the same evening the general sent the Náná somethi over one lakh of rupees, and authorised him to keep the amount T following day I went and got ready forty boats, and, having caused all t gentlemen, ladies, and children to get into the boats, I started them to Allahábád In the meanwhile the whole army, artillery include having got ready, arrived at the river Ganges. The Sipáhis jumped in the water and commenced a massacre of all the men, women, and childr and set the boats on fire They destroyed thirty-nine boats One, ho ever, escaped as far as Kolá Kankar, but was there caught and broug back to Kánhpúr, and all on board of it destroyed Four days after th the Náná said he was going to Bithúr to keep the anniversary of l mother's death, they (the Sipáhis) allowed him to go, and some of the also accompanied him. Having kept the anniversary, they brought h back to Kánhpúr, and they took for their pay the money they had fi made over to the Náná's charge, and made arrangements to fight agai Husan Fathpur, where they heard some Europeans had arrived fr Allahábád, and they told the Náná to accompany them there The Ná refused. I and the Náná remained at Kánhpúr, and sent Jawála Parsh his (the Náná's) agent, along with them to Fathpúr Having arri there and been defeated, they retreated to Kánhpúr, and the afores European force pressed them the whole way to Kánhpúr, when there w a battle for about two hours, and the rebel army was again defeated, r

ran away from Káuhpúr. Under these circumstances the Náná and I fl
to Bithur, arriving there at midnight, and the rebel army followed
The next morning the Náná, taking some cash, &c, with him, went
Fathpúr The rebel army followed, and looted the place The Ná
Bála Sáhib, Rao Sáhib, and myself, with all our wives, crossed the Gan
in boats, and arrived at Fathpúr in the Lakhnao territory, and put up w
the Chaudri Bhopal Singh Some days passed, when the 42nd Nat
Infantry arrived at Sheorájpúr, and wrote to the Náná to send them so
one to take them to him I went and told them that the Nána had se
for them In the meanwhile the English army arrived, and the s
42nd regiment Native Infantry went to Bithúr, and fought there I
companied the said regiment, and, having been defeated, we fled fr
Bithúr and crossed the Ganges, and came to the Náná Some days aft
I received orders from the Náná to go to Gwáliár, and to bring back w
me to fight the English such of the contingent as were at Morár Acco
ing to his order, I went to Morár, and brought back the contingent w
me to Kalpí The Náná had sent his brother, the Bálá Sáhib, to Kal
and, according to his order, I went with the army to fight against Káuhp
leaving a small force and magazine at Kalpí Having arrived at Káuhp
there was a battle which lasted eleven days. After eleven days the re
army was defeated, and we all ran away The next day after this
fought at Sheorájpúr, and there also, having been defeated, we ran aw
having with us fifteen guns (including one horse-artillery gun) I and
Bála Sáhib and the Ráo Sáhib, who had been sent by the Náná to Káuhp
all crossed the Ganges at Náná Máu-ki-Ghát. We remained at a pl
called Kherá for the night I got orders from the Rao Sáhib to go a
take charge of the small force and magazine left at Kalpí, in obedience
which I went there After my arrival at Kalpí, I received orders fr
the Naná to go and attack Chirkhárí, and that the Ráo Sahib should
sent after me Accordingly I, with nine hundred Sipáhis, two hund
cavalry, and four guns, went to Chirkhárí, and fighting commenced F
days afterwards the Ráo Sáhib came to Kalpí I fought at Chirkhárí
eleven days, and took it I took twenty-four guns and three lakhs
rupees from the Rajah The Rájahs of Bánpúr and Sháhgarh, and Dew
Despat and Dáolat Singh, the Kuchwáyá Kharwálá, and a great gather
of people joined me there at this time I received a note from the Qu
of Jhánsí to the effect that she was waging war with the Europeans, a
begging me to come to her a d. I reported the news to the Ráo Sahib
Kalpí The Ráo came to Jaipúr, and gave me permission to go to
assistance of the Queen of Jhánsí Accordingly I went to Jhánsí, a
halted at Barua Ságar There Rájah Mán Singh came and joined
The next day, about a mile from Jhánsí, the whole of our army ha
fight with the English army At this time we had twenty-two thousa
men and twenty-eight guns In this battle we were defeated A part
the rebel army, with four or five guns, fled to Kalpí, and I went to t
same place, *viâ* Bhánderí and Kúnch, with two hundred Sipáhis T
Queen of Jhánsí arrived there the same evening as myself, and beg

the Ráo Sáhib to give her an army that she might go and fight. T
following morning the Ráo Sáhib ordered a parade of all the troops, .
told me to accompany the Queen to battle Accordingly I, with a fo
accompanied the Queen, and there was a battle at Kúnch which las
till noon. We were again defeated, and fled, and I fled to "Chirl
which is about four miles from Jaláur, and where my parents were
Queen of Jhánsí and the force which fled with her arrived at Kalpí
Ráo had a battle afterwards at Kalpí and was defeated, and he
his whole army arrived at Gopálpúr, we all marched thence towa
Gwáliár We had one day's fight with Maháráájah Sindhiá, and defea
him. Three days afterwards all Sindhiá's army joined the Ráo Sáhib,
having procured from the Gwáliár treasury, through Amarchand Batiá (
Mahárájah's treasurer), the requisite funds, pay was distributed to
army. Rám Ráo Govind was also with us. Some days afterwards
English army arrived at Gwáliár from Kalpí, and a force also came fr
Sirpúr. Fighting again took place, and continued for four or five da
during which the Jhánsí Rání was killed Rám Ráo Govind had
corpse burnt, and we were all defeated and fled, taking twenty-five gu
with us We reached Jáurá-Alipúr and remained there during the nig
The next morning we were attacked, and fought for an hour and a h.
We fired five shots, the English army fired four shots, and we then
off, leaving all our guns We crossed the Chambal, and reached Tonk
Sirmuthia. The Nawáb of Tonk fought with us, and we took four gu
from him With these guns we proceeded to Bhilwárá *viâ* Mahdípúr a
Indiagarh. We were there attacked by the English force, and I f
during the night, accompanied by my army and guns At that time
had eight or nine thousand men and four guns with me. We all p
ceeded to a village called Kotrá (about four miles from Náthduwará) a
halted there for one night The next morning we moved towards Patan, a
after proceeding about one mile, the English army arrived, and an acti
took place. We left our four guns and fled, reaching Patan as fugitiv
(The Nawáb of Bandah, who had come with us from Kalpí, and the Naw
of Kumona, who had joined us at Indúrkí, were both with us) On
arrival at Patan fighting commenced between us and the Rájah of th
place, we conquered, and got possession of all the Rájah's guns a
magazines, and surrounded his palace, in which he was The next day
went and told the Rájah to give some money to pay the expenses of
army He said he could give me five lakhs of rupees, but not more
returned and told the Ráo Sáhib this The next day the Ráo Sáhib s
for the Rájah and demanded twenty-five lakhs from him The Rá
declared he could not give more than five lakhs, but, after some discussi
it was settled that he should pay fifteen lakhs The Rájah said he wo
go to his palace and send this sum He went accordingly, and sent t
and a quarter lakhs in cash, and promised that the rest should follow
the next day he had paid up five lakhs

Imám Alí, Wirdi-major 5th Irregular Cavalry, ill-treated the Rá
very much, and the latter fled during the night We remained there

days, and issued three months' pay to our troops at the rate of thir rupees each sawár, and twelve rupees to each foot-soldier per mensem

We then marched for Sironj, taking eighteen guns with us On reac ing Rájgarh the English army came up and attacked us We left o guns and fled, and reached Sironj *viâ* Nija Kil We halted at Siro eight days, and, having taken four guns from the Tonk Nawáb's agent Sironj, we proceeded thence to Ísághar. On arrival there we demand supplies, but the Íságarh people would not give them. We therefo attacked Íságarh, and plundered it The following day we halted, a the Ráo Sáhib told me to go to Chandérí, and that he would come rou by Tál Bahat I accordingly went to Chandérí, and the Ráo Sáh came to Lálitpúr from (or by) Tál Bahat On my reaching Chandé four shots were first fired on us from the fort, which we attacked a fought with Sindhiá's agent After three days we marched fro Chandéri towards Mangráulí, taking with us eleven guns, viz, sev which we had brought from Íságarh and the four we had got from Siro On our march to Mangráulí, we met the English army Shots were fir for a short time, when we left all our guns and fled. (Of the eleven gu five were with me and six with the Rao Sáhib I lost my five in t fight, but the Ráo kept his six)

(NOTE —It would appear that the Ráo was not in this action)

I reached Jakláun, and the next day went to Sultanpúr, where the R Sáhib also arrived After three days the English force arrived, and t Ráo Sahib took his army to Jaklaun (about five miles from Lalatpúr), a some firing took place there I was not present in this fight The R Sáhib returned to Lálitpúr, and the following day proceeded to Kajúr (ten miles from Sultanpúr) and halted there The next day the Engli army came up just as we were going to march, and an action commenc which lasted an hour and a half We then left all our guns and fled, a reached Tál Bahat We halted there, and the following day went Jaklaun, and thence to a village called Itáwah, twelve miles distant, whe we stopped We there heard that the English army was coming to su prise us, and marched at night. The English force came up in the mor ing, and our army became separated I accompanied the Ráo Sáhib, a we proceeded, *viâ* Rájgarh, and crossed the Narbadá, and got to Kagá Batís *viâ* Kandulá The troops who were with us burned the Gover ment thánâ * and bungalow at Kandulá The Ráo Sáhib forbad their doi so, but they would not obey him This was about four months ago Kaugáon Bátis there were some of Holkar's troops—one hundred and for sawars, one company of infantry, and two guns These we forced to jo us, and took them with us when we marched the following day towar Gujrát, crossing the high road where the telegraph-wire ran The Sipál broke the wire and plundered seven hackeries which were on the ro proceeding with Government property towards Gwáliár, and seized t

* "Thánâ," a station —G B M

haprásís and chaukídárs * who were with the hackeries, and took them with them Some of the chaukídárs belonging to the chauki were hanged by them We there left the high road and proceeded westward The next day we were surprised by the English force, and leaving our two guns, we fled, and reached the Narbadá. An officer, with a hundred men was on the opposite bank Our force commenced to cross, and this officer and party of sawárs ran off We plundered a village there called Chikli and marched thence at midnight After proceeding thirty-four miles, we halted at Rájpúrá The next day we took three thousand nine hundred rupees and three horses from the Rájah of that place, and from it went on to Chotá Udaipúr The following day the English force surprised us, some of them were killed, and some of ours From Chotá Udaipúr we went on to Déogarh Bári, and our army became separated There was jungle at that place, and I halted there two days Our troops having been collected again, we started, and went to Bánswárá Our men plundered there sixteen or seventeen camel-loads of cloth (some of Ahmadábád) belonging to a mahájan † which they found there We thence went to Salomar, and I called on Kaisar Singh, agent for the Udaipúr Rájah, to furnish us with supplies. He sent us some, and the following day we again started with the intention of going to Udaipúr However, *en route* we received tidings of the English force, and retraced our steps to Bhílwárá We remained there two days, and then proceeded to Partábgarh, where we fought for two hours with a body of English troops which had come from Nímach About 8 o'clock P M we ran off, and proceeded about six miles to the east of Mandesar, and halted there We then went on to Zirápúr, making three stages *en route* An English force surprised us there, and we were again surprised by another force at Chapirá Baród. We fled thence to Nahargarh, the agent of the Kotá Rájah, at which place nine shots were fired at us from guns We moved out of range, and halted there during the night; and the Ráo Sáhib sent Risáldár Nannú Khán to call Rája Mán Singh. The Rájah came and accompanied us—*i e* the Ráo Sáhib myself, and our force—to a place about two miles from Parón, where we halted. We remained there two days, and on the third went on to a place about eight miles beyond Kilwárí, whose name I do not remember. Rájah Mán Singh accompanied us as far as a river which we crossed *en route*, and then left us We made two stages thence to Indragarh. At Firuzsháh, with the Khás Risálá (bodyguard) and 12th Irregulars, met us there The next day we went on, making two stages to Dewás, which is fourteen miles from Jaipúr The English force surprised us there, some men on both sides were killed, and, flying thence towards Márwár, we reached a village about thirty koss from Márwár, whose name I do not remember. At 4 o'clock that night we were surprised by the English force, and the 12th irregular cavalry separated from the Ráo Sáhib's army

* "Chaprási," a belted attendant or messenger "Chaukidar," a watchman "Chaukí," a post, in this sense, also a chair

† "Mahájan," banker, merchant—G B M.

The next day Thákur Naráyan Singh, Ajít Singh, uncle of Rájah M Singh, and Thákur Gangá Singh joined us at that place (? to which t Ráo's army had fled). They were coming in this (the Parón) directi I had been quarrelling with the Ráo Sáhib all the way from Déogarh B and told him I could flee no longer, and that, whenever I saw an opp tunity for doing so, I should leave him The opportunity for doing so h offered, and I left him and accompanied the (three) above-named part in this (the Parón) direction When I left the Ráo Sáhib he had abc six thousand men with him But three men (two Pandits to cook r food and one sáís) and three horses and one tattú accompanied me. T names of the two Pandits were Rám Ráo and Naráyan The sáís's nar was Gobind, but he left me and ran off after coming two stages W reached the Parón jungle and met Rájah Mán Singh. Ajít Singh to leave of Rájah Mán Singh, and went to his home. Naráyan Singh and remained with Rájah Mán Singh The Rájah said, "Why did you lea your force? You have not acted right in so doing." I replied that I w tired of running away, and that I would remain with him whether I h done right or wrong I heard after this that the Ráo Sáhib's army h gone to Patan, and thence towards Sironj I told Rájah Mán Singh would send a man to get intelligence of them, and he approved of my doi so. I sent accordingly, and got information that the Ráo Sáhib was r there; but Imám Alí, Wirdí-major, Firuzsháh, and the Ambapání-wa Nawáb, Adíl Muhammad, were there with eight or nine thousand me Imám Alí, Wírdí-major of the 5th Irregular Cavalry, wrote to me to cor and join them I had lost my master's (the Nana's) seal, and had anoth made up at Parón

When I heard, as above, from the Wírdí-major, I sent a man to Ráj Mán Singh, who was at Mahúdiá in Major Meade's camp (he had then be there three days), to inform him that I had received a note of this purpo and to ask him if I should go or remain. Rájah Mán Singh had consult me before giving himself up to Major Meade, and had left one of his m with me, saying, "Stop wherever this man takes you" Rájah Mán Sing replied to my message that he would come in three days to see me, and w should then settle what to do.

He came accordingly on the third day, at night, and spoke a great de to me, and told me that he had met Major Meade, and that his disposition was good When I asked him what he advised—whether I should go remain—he said he would reply in the morning. I then went to slee and during the night some of the Sipáhis of the Government came an seized me, and took me to Major Meade's camp

Signature of Tántiá Topí,
Agent of the Náná Sáhib

Question by Major Meade—Have you made this statement of your ow free will and without compulsion? and has any promise been made, or hop held out to you, to induce you to give it?

Answer.—I have, of my own free will, caused this statement to l

ritten; and no one has forced me to do so, or held out hope or promise o
ny sort to induce me to do so.

Signature of Tántiá Topi,
Agent of the Náná Sahib

Signature of Witnesses,

(Signed) Gangá-Parshád Múnshí, Meade's Horse.
Rubhúlál Náib-Kaindár of Sipri

The above deposition or statement was made by the prisoner Tántiá To
in my presence on the 10th of April, 1859, at Camp Múshairí, of his ow
voluntary act and without compulsion of any sort, or promise made, or ho
held out to him as an inducement to make it

(Signed) R J. MEADE, Major,
Commanding Field Force.

Certified that the above is a true and correct translation of the origin
deposition or confession of Tántia Topí appended hereto.

(Signed) J J. M. GIBBON, Lieutenant,
Adjutant Meade's Horse.

(True copy)
(Signed) R MEADE.

APPENDIX C.

(Page 271)

TRIAL OF THE EX-KING OF DEHLÍ

THE Judge-Advocate-General then addressed the Court as follows:—

GENTLEMEN,—It will be my object, in the present address, to coll
the different facts which have been elicited in the course of these proce
ings, and to furnish them to you, as far as possible, in the order in wh
they originally occurred Our investigation has involved inquiry ove
period of several months, when rebellion was rampant in this city; an
trust we have succeeded in tracing, with considerable minuteness, man
the different events as they evolved themselves during the time to wh
I have referred. Our labours, indeed, have not had this limit, or
should only have accomplished what might, I think, be termed the l
important part of our duties In immediate connection with the fi
elicited are the charges on which the prisoner has been arraigned, a
though his former rank and royalty will doubtless add somewhat of t
porary importance to the verdict which you will this day be called upo
record, yet whether it be one of acquittal or conviction, it must, I imag

prove light in the balance when weighed against those more monstro points to which so much attention has been, and for a long time will st be, directed I, of course, allude to the causes, either remote immediate, which gave rise to a revolt unparalleled in the annals history, either for the savagery which has been its distinguishing featur or for the suddenness with which elements, hitherto deemed utterly di cordant on the score of religion, have united themselves in a commc crusade against a faith which, as regards the inhabitants of this counti whether Muhammadan or Hindu, was certainly a most unaggressive one fear, however, the subject is still but imperfectly elucidated, and I ma perhaps, be in error in attributing to a religious influence a movemer which, after all, may prove to have been merely a political one, a strugg of the natives for power and place, by the expulsion from the country of people alien in religion, in blood, in colour, in habits, in feelings and every thing Whatever the final opinion on this subject may be, tl questions which, as far as I am aware of, have not as yet found a satisfa tory solution, are, by what circumstances was this most atrocious revol with its series of massacres, brought about, and who were its prin original instigators? I feel sure the members of this Court will join wit me in deeming that our proceedings do not furnish a full and comple answer to such questions; and why do they not? I believe it is simpl owing to the circumstance that any merely local investigation must be in adequate to collect evidence from the different quarters and sources, whic are no doubt available elsewhere. We may still, however, hope that ou efforts on this point have not been fruitless or unavailing, if we cann congratulate ourselves on an entire success, we may perhaps be allowe credit for a near approach to it Few, I imagine, will peruse these volu minous proceedings without coming to the conclusion that intrigues an conspiracy have long been rife at this fostering court of Dehlí Insignif cant and contemptible as to any outward show of power, it would appe that this possessor of mere nominal royalty has ever been looked upon b Muhammadan fanaticism as the head and culminating star of its faith I him have still been centred the hopes and aspirations of millions The have looked up to him as the source of honour, and, more than this, h has proved the rallying point not only to Muhammadans, but to thousan of others with whom it was supposed no bond of fanatical union coul possibly be established. To throw the fullest light on a subject like th is not the work of a day or of a month Time, the great revealer c secrets, will doubtless, sooner or later, lay bare the springs from which stream of so much evil and misery has flowed, but, till then, we must b content with such views as our present investigation affords That w have been able to unravel many of the secret workings of the conspirator will, I believe, be conceded, but let me not anticipate. This is a point c our inquiry on which I purpose to offer some observations hereafter, bu a concise narrative of events will perhaps best suit the commencement o this address.

I may state, then, that 85 men, non-commissioned officers and trooper

of the 3rd Light Cavalry, who were tried by general court-martial Mírath in May last, for refusing their cartridges, had their sentence re to them and were ironed on the parade-ground early on the morning of t 9th of May, and that the mutiny of the three native regiments at Míra first openly developed itself at about half-past six o'clock on the evening the 10th of May, during which interval of nearly 36 hours there were, course, plenty of opportunities for interchange of communications betwe the native troops who first rebelled at Mírath, and those who joined the at this station To travel from one place to another by coach us ordinarily to take about five hours, and that the mutineers availed thei selves of this facility of mutual intercourse has, I think, been clear established by the evidence of Captain Tytler It appears, from his stat ment, that a coach full of these Mírath mutineers, came on Sund evening to the lines of the 38th Native Infantry, doubtless to prepare t Sipáhis of this station for the arrival and suitable reception, on Mond morning, of their rebel comrades, and, although we may not poss positive evidence to the fact, yet it may fairly be presumed that Sund evening was not the first occasion that these plotters of evil held th secret and sinister councils together Indeed we have it on record th even before the Court, which tried the mutinous cavalry at Mirath, h come to any decision on their case, a compact had been entered into to t effect that, if the use of greased cartridges was persisted in, the troops Mírath and Dehlí would unite, and at once unfurl the standard of revo and so fully had this arrangement been perfected and agreed on, that it related that the Sipáhi guards at the gate of the palace on Sunday even made no secret of their intentions, but spoke openly among themselves what they expected to occur on the morrow. To understand the mer and demerits of the whole transaction, it must be recollected that, at t time when these resolutions were arrived at, there was not a single greas cartridge in the magazines of either of the three native regiments Mírath, nor, as far as I have been informed, of those at Dehli either. must be further borne in mind that the native soldiers themselves were t persons who were perhaps the best informed on these points, that t cartridges for practice had, from time immemorial, been manufactured the regimental magazines by persons of their own colour, creed, a religious persuasion, that it was absolutely impossible to palm off on the a spurious article, that the regimental khálásis, who were employed making these cartridges, must have at once discovered their impurity such had really existed, that, in fact, objectionable cartridges (I me such as would affect the religious prejudices of either Musalmán Hindu), could not possibly have been made in their regimental magazin as in such case the very men to be employed in their manufacture wo have refused their work, but, more than this, let it be remembered th the Muhammadan has no caste, that even the hybrid such as the Muha madan of Central India has become, half Musalmán and half Hindu, d not pretend to a loss of religion, even from touching pork Who is th amongst us that has not and does not almost daily witness these Muhamm

dans, in the capacity of table servants, carrying plates and dishes whic openly contain the very substance which, in reference to the cartridge has been made the pretence and the stumbling block of their offence Even if we were to admit that all the cartridges were thoroughly saturate with pig's and with cow's fat, still what real valid objection on the score their religion could the Muhammadan Sipáhis have had in using them Their brothers and other relatives in the private service of officers neve hesitate to handle or cook the dishes which they are required to bring i our tables The objections of the Muhammadan Sipáhis on this head a so transparently false, that it can hardly be a matter of wonder that not o man of sense or respectability among them appears ever to have come fo ward to seek information or satisfy himself as to the truth or falsity rumours so industriously circulated about these cartridges that were to the means of depriving them of their faith Some few—very few- honourable exceptions have certainly held aloof from and openly repudiat the conduct of their brethren, but such men have wanted neith guarantees nor explanations in regard to a matter which was patent to a but have come to their own conclusions on a subject where error had abiding place and mistake is incredible. That neither Musalmán n Hindu had any honest objection to the use of any of the cartridges Mírath or at Dehlí is sufficiently proved by the eagerness with which th sought possession of them, and the alacrity with which they used the when their aim and object was the murder of their European officers, when, united under the banners of the prisoner at your bar, they months constantly went forth to fight against the power to which th owed fealty and allegiance. Among the very numerous petitions whi have been brought under your notice during these proceedings, it m have struck the Court as very strange that there is not a single one which the slightest allusion is made to what the Sipáhis would have believe to be their great and particular grievance. We have had upwa of 180 petitions before the Court, written on all possible subjects, from tinkering of a cooking pot to the recovery of a mule or a crack in a hors hoofs, and each thought worthy of the sign manual of royalty, but in free indulgence of such correspondence, when they evidently unburthe their minds to their adopted sovereign, and were certainly not restrained any delicacy of language or of feeling from venting their acerbity aga their quondam European masters, we can find no trace of the original no grease spot staining these effusions of disloyalty. How instructive i that, among themselves, and when applying to us such language "damnable, hell-doomed infidels," they apparently forego the first spe offence, which they would have us believe has led them to mutiny rebellion, and the perpetration of crimes at which humanity shudd When with each other, and, as they conceived, safe from the intrusion inquiries of British officers, that insurmountable obstacle to their fide and allegiance, the greased cartridge, is apparently altogether lost sigh Not a whisper is heard of a grievance which, if a substantial one, n ever have been uppermost in the memories of all; must have been c

mually rankling in their minds and embittering their thoughts, mu
ave influenced them in their blood-thirstiness, and to themselves ha
een their only extenuation for crimes such as may well exclude them fro
ıercy. What a contrast this to their speeches when uttered with
rospect of reaching European ears Greased cartridges are then alwa
rought forward, the use of them forms the one continuous night-mare
he Sipáhi's existence Really, if we reflect seriously on this—if w
emember that in reality there was not a single greased cartridge amor
ither of the three regiments which first broke out into mutiny, murderi
ot only men, but unoffending women and children, and that the Sipáh
vere perfectly aware of this; when we call to mind that, even if greas
artridges had existed, and the use of them been required at the hands
hese miscreants, not one of the Muhammadans at any rate could possib
ıave been injured thereby in any caste prejudice, or placed even in ter
ıorary difficulty with regard to his religious tenets—when to this we ad
vhat is well known to every one in India, whether Hindu, Muhammadan,
European, viz, that the native soldier has but to ask for his discharge, a
hat in time of peace it is at once granted to him, without inquiry or dif
ulty of any kind, it seems beyond the bounds of reason to imagine th
hese men were drawn into acts of such revolting atrocity by a
grievances either real or imagined Let the chimeras, the disturbed drear
of fanaticism, of wickedness, or of folly have been what they may; let t
nstigations to evil have been as industrious as possible, and then all
hat the Sipáhis to be worked upon were as credulous as the grosse
gnorance could make them, still, if the greased cartridge had been the or
veapon the tamperer had to work with, but the one envenomed sh ift
heir quiver, how easy was the remedy. It required no depth of kno
edge, no philosopher to inform them that they could at once escape fr
every possible perplexity by simply applying for their discharge I kn
ıot, gentlemen, what conclusion you may arrive at on this much-vex
question, but, after pondering it in every way in which my reason has p
sented it to me, I am obliged to infer that something deeper and m
powerful than the use of greased cartridges has been resorted to

The machinery that has set in motion such an amount of mutiny a
murder, that has made its vibrations felt almost at one and the sa
moment from one end of India to the other, must have been prepared
not with foreseeing wisdom, yet with awful craft, and most successful a
commanding subtlety. We must recollect, too, in considering this subj
that in many of the places where the native troops have risen against th
European officers there was no pretext even in reference to cartridges
all, numbers of these mutinied, apparently, because they thought th
was a favourable opportunity of doing so, because they were a hundre
one against those in authority, and fancied that they might pillage, plun
and massacre, not only with impunity, but with advantage Is it possi
that such fearful results as these could have at once developed themsel
had the native army, previous to the cartridge question, been in a so
and well-affected state? Can any one imagine that that rancorous, wi

pread enmity, of which we have lately had such terrible proofs, has bee
he result of feelings suddenly and accidentally irritated? Does it appe
onsistent with the natural order of events that such intense malignit
hould start into existence on one single provocation? Or can it be reco
iled with the instincts, the traditions, or the idiosyncrasies of the Hindu
hat they should recklessly, without inquiry, and without thought, desi
o imbrue their hands in human blood, casting aside the pecuniary an
ther advantages that bound them to the cause of order and of the Gover
nent? Or, more than this, can it be imagined that the three regiments
Mirath, even when joined by those at Dehlí, could have conceived an id
o daring as that of overthrowing, by themselves, the British Governme
n India?

I think, gentlemen, every one must allow that if we had no oth
vidence of a plot, no testimony indicative of a previous conspiracy, t
very nature of the outbreak itself must have convinced us of the existen
f one. In the moral, as in the physical world, there must be cause a
effect, and the horrible butcheries of the past year would remain
nomaly and a mystery for ever, could we trace them to nothing mo
ccult and baneful than a cartridge of any kind. It will be observed, th
this point of the cartridges, so openly and frequently insisted on, at Mira
nd elsewhere, before the 10th of May, gradually becomes more and mo
indistinct as the plot gathers strength and matures itself, and, after turnin
ing the mutineers with their first war cry at Dehlí, it seems to ha
nswered its purpose, and thenceforward was allowed to sink into disu
nd neglect With little or no vitality at starting, it soon died a natur
leath, and was succeeded by a reality of purpose, and a fixedness of resol
hat would have been worthy of a better cause If we review the actio
nd whole conduct of these mutineers, we shall soon see that, from the ve
ommencement, they bear the impress of cunning and of secret combin
ion For instance, 85 of their comrades were ironed before them and se
ff to jail in their presence on the morning of the 9th of May, but th
ccasioned no outbreak of fury Not a sound or tone of dissatisfactio
scaped from the men, who, then and long before, must have had rebellio
n their hearts, no gesture indicative of sympathy with the culprits w
xhibited by any, in fact, as far as appearances could be trusted, t
nfantry regiments at Mirath, and the remaining portion of the 3rd Cavalr
were as obedient and loyal as could possibly be desired and this deceptio
was successfully resorted to till their plans were matured, and the mome
for open revolt had arrived The night of the 9th of May, twelve hou
after the imprisonment of the 3rd Cavalry mutineers had taken place, w
s favourable an opportunity as the night following, for a march upon t
nearest magazine, but there had not then been time for preparing t
Dehlí Sipahis for a movement which the progress of events at Mirath h
doubtless precipitated sooner than their first calculations had led them
expect. Hence the necessity for communicating afresh with Dehlí, a
acquainting the Sipáhis there with the drama that was to be enacted o
Monday the 11th. That such was done is established by the evidence

ptain Tytler, for it would be difficult to assign any other motive for
riage full of Sipáhis coming over from Mírath on Sunday evening, and
ving straight into the lines of the 38th Native Infantry
Again, we can perceive, in the very hour chosen for the outbreak a
irath, the same evidence of cunning and of craft. The plan, too, of th
irath cantonments gave considerable facilities for carrying out their plot
ie native lines are so completely separated from that portion of the can
nments where the European troops reside, that the disturbance an
roar attendant even upon open mutiny could not be heard, or ever
own, from one to the other until specially communicated Officers may
turally have been too intent on quelling the rebellion of their men t
ink of officially reporting it Be this as it may, there would be som
lay in turning out and supplying the Europeans with cartridges
sembling their officers, and marching down a distance of not less than
o miles: so that, taking one delay with another, the mutineers migh
ily calculate, considering it was an utter surprise to all, on 1½ hours o
fe and uninterrupted progress, and, as the outbreak commenced at half
st six, this would have secured them darkness and comparative securit
r their further operations This was what, in effect, actually took place
n the Europeans reaching the native lines, it was already dark, no Sipáhi
ere to be seen, and no one could tell whither they had gone Subsequen
quiry revealed that, guided by the instinct of cunning, the rebels had not
first, taken the direct or main road to Dehli, neither had they lef
irath in military formation, but, as dusk set in, had gone forth in partie
five, six or ten, to their fixed place of assembly This was judicious fo
eir departure from Mírath, but would have been highly impolitic fo
eir entry into Dehlí, where there were no European troops to avoi
omething more imposing and demonstrative was required here, an
ccordingly we find them crossing the bridge simultaneously massed i
olumns, and in complete military array, with a portion of the cavalry sen
rward as a regular advanced guard.
It is on this occasion that we first prove the mutineers in immediat
onnection with the prisoner at your bar The first point to which the
irn, the first person to whom they address themselves, is the titula
ajesty of Dehlí. This circumstance has much significance, and, at an
ate, tends to show that previous concert existed between them Th
isoner's complicity, however, was, immediately after, openly to con
ience. Scarcely had the very serious nature of the outbreak had time t
evelop itself, than his own special servants—in the very precincts of h
alace—and almost, as it were, before his own eyes, rush to imbrue the
ands in the blood of every European they can meet with, and, when w
emember that two of these were young and delicate women, who cou
ave given no offence, whose sex and age might have tamed any hear
ess pitiless than those of the human demons who destroyed them, we a
ble to realise some slight portion of the horribly unnatural influences th
ppear innate to Muhammadan treachery. How otherwise was it possib
hat education, the pride of royal ancestry, a life of tranquil ease and cor

parative refinement should not have exempted this old and grey-headed man from all connection with deeds which seem too barbarous for the very outcasts of humanity, or even for the untamed but less savage denizens of the jungle?

We stop to inquire whether it has been proved in this court, and will be repeated in after years, that the last king of the imperial house of Taimur was an accomplice in this villany. The circumstances shall now be fairly stated. These murders were committed in the broad glare of day, before dozens of witnesses, and without the slightest attempt at concealment. They were perpetrated, as has been already stated, by the prisoner's own retainers and within the limits of his palace, where, be it remembered ever, under the Company's Government, his jurisdiction was paramount. I shall not, however, attempt to infer that these murders must have been previously sanctioned by the prisoner, mere inferences on such a point cannot be accepted in a court of justice. I prefer to quote from the evidence. It is Ahsan Ulla Khán, the physician, who is speaking, and who says, that at the time referred to, he and Ghulám Abbas, the attorney in court, were with the king, when it was told them that the troopers had killed Mr Fraser, and had gone up to Captain Douglas to kill him, and that this was instantly confirmed by the return of the palki bearers, who told them that they had witnessed Mr Fraser's murder, that his body was in the gateway, and that the troopers had ascended to the upper building for the purpose of murdering those there. Why the witness suppresses all mention of the prominent part the king's own servants took in these massacres can easily be imagined. In a subsequent part of his examination he even asserts that he never heard that any of the king's servants joined in these murders, nay, more, that it was not generally known who committed them. Such is the evasion of the king's own physician, who doubtless was aware of the importance that would necessarily attach to this point. It was not generally known who committed these murders, and yet, at this lapse of time, we have had no difficulty in tracing the individuals, and ascertaining their names. It was not generally known that the king's own servants were the murderers, and yet we find this very circumstance prominently and specifically mentioned at the time in the native newspapers of the city. I need not, after this, recapitulate the evidence of all those who have clearly and satisfactorily proved that the king's servants were the murderers, for their testimony stands unshaken and unrefuted. It will amply suffice if I quote the statement of one of them, and which is as follows. "At this time Mr Fraser remained below trying to suppress the disturbance, and while thus engaged, I noticed that Haji, lapidary, cut him down with a talwar, and almost at the same instant, some of the king's servants cut at him with swords till he was dead. One of Mr Fraser's murderers was an Abyssinian. After this they made a rush to the upper apartments, when I immediately ran round by another door and closed the door at the top of the stairs. I was engaged in shutting all the doors when the crowd found entrance by the southern stair, and, having forced one of the doors on that side, came and gave admission to the men who

had assisted in murdering Mr Fraser These immediately rushed into t apartments where the gentlemen, viz, Captain Douglas, Mr. Hutchins and Mr Jennings, had retired, and attacking them with swords, at on murdered them and the two young ladies. On this I ran down the sta case As I got to the bottom, I was laid hold of by one Mundoh, a bear in the service of the king, who said, 'Tell me where Captain Douglas i you have concealed him' He forced me upstairs with him, I said, 'Y have yourselves killed all the gentlemen already,' but, on reaching t room where Captain Douglas was, I saw that he was not quite dea Mondoh, perceiving this also, hit him with a bludgeon on the forehead, a killed him immediately" Having now established that the murderers these ladies were the special servants of the prisoner, it will be well revert to the testimony of the physician, Ahsan Ulla Khán, and to asce tain from him the steps the prisoner took on the murders being reported him. The only order he gave on this occasion appears to have been close the gates of his palace, and we naturally inquire whether this w for the purpose of preventing the escape of the murderers. The eviden distinctly proves that it was not. The physician, being further interr gated, is obliged to confess that the prisoner took no steps whatever eith to discover, to secure, or to punish the guilty, and attributes it to the being much confusion at the time, but if the king's authority had actual been set aside, and by his own servants too, this would have been the mo forcible of all reasons for immediately re-establishing it, by at once bri ing the offenders to justice That this was not done we have been alrea informed, and we can only account for it on the supposition that these ac of the prisoner's servants, if not instigated by himself, had yet actual anticipated his wishes. We are thus perfectly prepared for what is follow, viz, that no servant was ever dismissed, and not the slighte investigation or inquiry was ever instituted, in fact, in the words of t question put to the witness, the king continued these murderers both his pay and in employment, and this too, as we have seen, when the ve newspapers of the day gave information against them After this, is necessary to question whether he adopted these deeds as his own or no I need not quote what may be the law of the land on such a point, t there is a yet higher law which must acquit or condemn him, the law conscience and of sense, that law which every one who hears me c apply, and which carries with it a verdict more terrible than that which pronounced in mere conformity to legal codes or military legislation it a law that does not depend upon local constitutions, upon human institutes, or religious creeds it is a law fixed in the heart of man by h Maker, and can it now here be set aside?

Perhaps it may now be time to turn our attention to what was doing the magazine, and to trace the further steps of the mutineers in that dir tion Captain Forrest has told us that it was about 9 o'clock in the mor ing when the main body of the native troops from Mirath was passing o the bridge in military formation (that is, in subdivisions of companie with fixed bayonets and sloped arms, the cavalry being in front. It v

actually in less than one hour after this that a subahdar of the 38th Nati Infantry, who was commanding the magazine guard outside the gate, formed them that the King of Dehlí had sent a guard to take possession the magazine, and to bring all the Europeans there up to his palace, a that, if they did not consent to this, none of them were to be allowed leave the magazine. Captain Forrest adds that he did not see the guard this time, but that he saw the man who had brought this message, and was a well-dressed Musalmán Nor was this all, for, shortly after t above, a native officer in the king's service arrived with a strong guard the king's own soldiers in their uniform, and told the above-mentior subadar and the non-commissioned officers that he was sent down by t king to relieve them of duty

We thus see with what alertness and despatch this most importa object, the seizure of the magazine, was attempted Is it, however, to believed that such was the ready, immediate, and, as it were, impuls decision of the king, or of those who formed the court? To attribute them anything of this nature would be to give them credit for a cooln of calculation, combined with a quickness of apprehension, such as perta only to the more gifted of mankind The scope and entire progress of scheme speak loudly of a plan previously arranged, and of deliberati long matured by the counsels of many. Indeed, it is difficult to conce that any one, not previously initiated in the secret, could, on the mome so promptly and so effectually have entered upon and adopted the det necessary for carrying it out. You will recollect the extreme importa of the decision, the magnitude of the interests at stake You will call mind the cogent reasons and the numerous arguments that would natur arrray themselves against adopting so headlong and precipitate a measu It was, in fact, an invitation to a king to league himself with ruffians a with cut-throats. Any inducement or prospective advantage that t could hold out to him was faint and almost imperceptible, compared w the open risk which he was to encounter By embarking in so forlorn cause he imperilled everything, his own life, and those of all belonging him, and for what? The distant glimmer of a crown, which comm reason, or the slightest consideration, would have convinced him wa mere *ignis fatuus*—a mockery of a sceptre, that would evade his gra Are we to imagine that it was under such circumstances that this we and tremulous old man seized and improved his occasion, and with all t rapid instinct of determination directed his own troops upon the magazi to establish himself there as the one point of primary and most vital i portance and this too in the first moment of a surprise when nothing l riot and disorder reigned supreme? Or are we to suppose that there w a secret and a deeper knowledge of what the other portions of the ar were already ripe for, and that the five or six regiments to commence w were but the instalments of those that were to follow? Or, if such p vious understanding and collusion did not exist either with the king or a of those immediately about him, are we to attribute to superstition and pretended revelation of dreams, circumstances which scarcely admit

satisfactory solution by any more sober process? We have all heard, this court, of the vision of a hurricane that was to arise from the west w a great flood of water, devastating the whole country, but bearing up its surges this descendant of ancient royalty, and that this vision, as int preted by Hasan Askari, the priest, signified annihilation to the Engl infidels by the power of the King of Persia, who was to restore sovereigi to the heirs of the throne of Hindustan Was it a reliance upon this t expedited the otherwise tardy movements of these Asiatics, and g breadth and boldness to their decisions? I am aware that under ot circumstances, and in any but an eastern land, such unmeaning flights bewildered imagination would be too trivial to dwell upon, too unsubst tial for the gravity of comment, but here, in seriously considering nature and progress of an extensive military revolt, they obtrude the selves on the mind as subjects capable of influencing for evil the destir of thousands.

These observations have been elicited by the marked and unusual ener displayed in making the magazine the point of instant attack It seem me that such cannot be accounted for by conspiracy among the Sipá alone, for it was the king's own troops who were the first to seek poss sion, and the military and systematic way in which this was done betr the authority by which the orders were issued There was no confus here, no attempt at pillage non-commissioned officers were appointed the separate guards for the different gates of the magazine, while anot guard superintended the labourers who were removing the stores that h pened to be outside. How could such decision, such instant transformat from chaos to system and to order, have resulted had not the king or so of his officials been intrusted with a sort of programme of events? H in fact, could the king's troops have been in readiness and preparation such work without warning of some kind?


If I have not succeeded in tracing to the king himself a foreknowledg the leading events that were to take place on Monday the 11th of May trust it has been made obvious that the secret was in the possession some influential inmates of the palace The babbling garrulity of prince Jawan Bakht sufficiently indicates this, for such is his joy at anticipation of murdering the English, that he is unable to restrain expressions of it. My chief object, however, has been to render clear w I believe to be the truth, viz, that the conspiracy, from the very co mencement, was not confined to the Sipáhis, and did not even origin with them, but had its ramifications throughout the palace and the ci and do not the murders which we have already adverted to tend corroborate this fact? We have evidence that the mutineers of the 1 and 20th regiments of Native Infantry, before the magazine was explod proceeded to attack and escalade it, and it is then, for the first time, t we find the king, through his troops, acting in open alliance with th traitors to their government From that moment there is no further guise, and no attempt at concealment Fairly launched into the strean sedition, he is hurried onward by the swollen flood, which was not, howev

to bear him, as he imagined, to the throne of Hindustan, but to leave him in its ebb a mere helpless wreck upon the sands

I would here pause for a second, to refer to Lieutenant Willoughby, and to the brave men under him, who for so long a time held, against unnumbered odds, the magazine intrusted to them One hardly knows which to admire most, the penetration and sagacity which, at a glance, foresaw the possible necessity for its destruction, and made arrangements accordingly or the undaunted resolution with which the final sacrifice was accomplished To do justice to such heroism will be the pleasing duty of the historian I can merely give it a passing notice, having to dilate on other matters more immediately connected with the proceedings before us

With the explosion of the magazine at Dehlí, every hope of stemming the torrent of rebellion seems to have vanished, resistance had been thereprotracted to its utmost possible extent, the sacrifice was a final one, and thenceforward the European community, if, in isolated spots, still preserving the appearance of government authority, were left without one vestige of real power, so that it soon became a duty to the state and to themselves to save their lives by a timely retreat. Dehlí was consequently abandoned to the miscreants who had, in the short space of 24 hours, stained themselves with crimes which can scarcely be equalled in all the catalogues of bygone iniquity It is now that we find the king coming personally forward as the chief actor in that great drama which had more than England and Europe for its spectators, the progress of which was watched with such absorbing interest everywhere by the antagonistic powers of civilisation and of barbarism. The evidence shows that on the afternoon of the 11th of May, the king, having entered the hall of special audience, seated himself in a chair, when the soldiery, officers and all, came forward one by one and bowed their heads before him, asking him to place his hands on them The king did so, and each then withdrew, saying whatever came into his mind The witness, viz, Ghulam Abbas, the prisoner's attorney in court, informs us that this ceremony of the king putting his hands on the heads of the soldiery was equivalent to accepting their allegiance and services, and he further states, that though he is not aware of any regular proclamation having been made in Dehlí in reference to the king assuming the reins of government, yet that such may have been done without his hearing of it, but that on the very day of the outbreak the king's authority was established, and that night a royal salute was fired of about 21 guns.

These matters bring us to the charges against the prisoner, and it may perhaps be as well now to consider them, not so much in regard to date as the sequence in which they have been drawn up The first charge against Muhammad Bahádur Sháh, ex-king of Dehlí, is: "For that he, being a pensioner of the British Government in India, did, at Dehlí, at various times between the 10th of May and 1st of October, 1857, encourage, aid and abet Muhammad Bakht Khán, subahdar of the regiment of artillery and divers others, native commissioned officers and soldiers unknown, of the East India Company's Army, in the crimes of mutiny and rebellion


MAP SHOWING
TRACK of REBEL
UNDER
TANTIA TOPI
From their Defeat at Gudlurjane?
to Final Dispersion in March ?
English Miles
Fatehpúr
Kót
Alwar
Didwanah
Nágor
Kato
JAIPUR
JAIPÚRO
KISHANGARH
AJMIR
MADHURAJPÚR
Digi
Lalsót
Koshan
JODHPUR
Nimaj
Sarwár
TONK
Indargarh
Pálí
BUNDI
Shahabad
Chitor
Sangod
Ratangarh
Chápra
Jhálrá Pátan
Nimach
Morása
Banerá
Dongarpur
Partábgarh
Rajgarh
Biaora
Rebels dispersed March
Ahgar
Balrasa
Jaorá
Mahidpur
Ratlam
Shujáwalpur
Shahjahánpur
BHOPAL
Jábuá
Jhábúa
INDUR
Gaora
Chhotá
Kúkrí
Narbada R.
Rajpur
Thán
Borgaun
Chárwah
Mail-hát
Taptí R.
KHANDESH
NIZAM
Mahi R.
Banswára
Mahi Kántha
GUJARAT
MALWA
Vindhya Range

against the State" I am not going to weary the Court by repeating eve a tenth part of the evidence which has been brought forward to establi these charges, but it is perhaps necessary to show that proof of them h been recorded. Mr Saunders, Officiating Commissioner and Agent to t Lieutenant-Governor, has explained under what circumstances the prison became a pensioner of the British Government in India, viz, that h grandfather, Sháh Alam, after having been kept in rigorous confinemer by the Marátl ás, on their defeat by the English in 1803, applied to t British Government for protection This was accorded, and from th moment the titular kings of Dehli became pensioned subjects of the Britis It will be seen, then, that, as far as this family is concerned, there was i wrong to be complained of, and nothing but benefits to be remembere The prisoner's grandfather, Sháh Âlam, had not only lost his throne, b had his eyes put out, and been subjected to every species of indignity, a was still kept in most rigorous confinement, when the English, under Lo Lake, appeared as his deliverers, and, with generous sympathy for his mi fortunes, bestowed on him rank and pension which, continued to h successors, have maintained them in honour and in influence, till, like t snake in the fable, they have turned their fangs upon those to whom th owed the very means of their existence The evidence that connects t prisoner with Muhammad Bakht Khan, subahdar of the artillery, and wh of itself will be sufficient to establish the charge, is a document fr beginning to end in the prisoner's own handwriting:

"To the especial Slave, the Lord Governor, *Muhammad Bakht Khán Bahádur.*

"Receive our favour, and understand that, whilst the Nímach for have reached Alapur, its baggage is still here, and that you are therefo directed to take 200 troopers and five or seven companies of infantry, a have all the baggage alluded to, such as tents, &c, together with comm sariat supplies, conveyed by the gharis to Alapur You are further direct not to allow the infidels staying near the Idgah to advance Be it kno to you further, that if the army returns without victory, and divested its appliances of war, the consequence must be disastrous. You have be premonished, and you are to consider these orders stringent"

It is true there is no date to this communication, but the allusions in leave no possible doubt as to its having been written within the period e braced by the terms of the first charge.

Perhaps this will be the best place for the few observations I have offer on the defence The prisoner, like every other that we have tri has, according to his own showing, been the mere victim of circumstanc declares that he had no intelligence on the subject previous to the o break, that the mutinous soldiery surrounded him completely, and pla sentries on all sides; and that, fearing for his life, he kept quiet, and w

to his own private apartments, that the mutinous soldiery kept the men women, and children prisoners, that he twice saved their lives by entreat and persuasion, and that the third time he did all in his power to save them but that the rebellious soldiery would not heed him, and eventually carrie out their purpose of slaying those poor people against his orders Now th chief objection to all this is, that it is not only unsupported by evidenc but is directly in the teeth of all the testimony, whether oral or writte and whether given by his own servants or by others The entire defenc indeed is a mere tissue of denials of guilt, assertions of his not having bee a free agent, and an endeavour to put the onus of his misconduct upo others. He cannot challenge the authenticity of the documents again him, or the evidence of his own handwriting, or his own seal, and his on expedient consists in asserting, that what he wrote was by compulsio and that his seal was affixed in the same way The only dilemma that l appears unable to extricate himself from, to his own satisfaction, in th way, is the going out to Humáyun's tomb, and coming in again It wa of course, necessary to state that the last was by his own choice and fr will; and this would scarcely have been possible had his going out be represented as compulsory, for, if the Sipáhis had forcibly taken him ou they would hardly allow him voluntarily to return, so we are treated wi the following curious account —"When the revolted and rebellious troo prepared to abscond, finding an opportunity, I got away secretly under t palace windows, and went and stayed in Humáyun's mausoleum." O would have thought that if he wished to separate himself from t rebellious troops, his best plan would have been to have stayed Dehlí, when they were preparing to abscond, instead of secretly planni to go out with them However, I do not mean to take the defen paragraph by paragraph, and thus refute it. My best reply to it, I belie will be by showing how fully and completely the charges have been prov and to this task I now again address myself, and proceed to the conside tion of the second count, which is, if possible, still more fully establish than the first. It runs as follows:—"For having at Dehlí, at vari times between the 10th of May and 1st of October, 1857, encouraged, ai and abetted Mirzá Mughul, his own son, a subject of the British Gove ment in India, and divers others unknown, inhabitants of Dehlí, and of North West provinces of India, also subjects of the said British Gove ment, to rebel and wage war against the State" The documents a other evidence in support of this charge are so numerous that it would tedious even to reckon them The newspapers speak of the appointm of Mirzá Mughul to the office of commander-in-chief, of his investit with a dress of honour, and other matters relating thereto. The c testimony is very strong on the same subject, while the discove correspondence shows that Mirzá Mughul, the son, was perhaps, next to father, the leading chief of the rebels in Dehlí I shall for form's sake g a short extract from a petition of Maulaví Muhammad Zohar Alí, pol officer of Najafgarh. It is as follows:—

"To the King! Shelter of the World!

"Respectfully sheweth,—That the orders of the royal missive have be fully explained to all the Thakurs, Chaudhárís, Kanúngos, and Patwá of this township of Najafgarh, and that the best arrangements have be established Further, that, agreeably to your Majesty's injunctions, stc are being taken to collect horsemen and footmen, and it is explained them, that their allowances will be paid from the revenue of this divisi of the district Your slave's assurances on this point, however, will r be believed till some Gházis, recently engaged, shall have arrived regards Nagli, Kakraula, Dachau Kalan and other adjacent villag your slave has to represent that, unrestrained by the dread of consequenc and bent on all sorts of excesses, the inhabitants have commenc plundering travellers"

This might, I think, be sufficiently conclusive as to the words of t charge in reference to "aiding and abetting in rebellion Mirzá Mughul, own son, and divers other unknown inhabitants of Delhi, and of the No Western Provinces of India, inasmuch as the petition from which I quoting bears the autograph order of the prisoner referring it to his Mirzá Mughul, and directing him quickly to send a regiment of infan with its officers to Najafgarh, in accordance with the wishes, and for purpose of aiding and abetting the petitioner's schemes of raising horsem and footmen to fight against the English. But there is another petiti which has not yet been submitted to the Court, having only lately come hand, and which may appropriately be introduced here It is from Ai Ali Khan, son of the Nawáb of Khurajpura, and is dated 12th of July runs as follows —

"To the King! Shelter of the World!

"Respectfully sheweth,—That your petitioner has come to your re court, at which Darius might have served as a doorkeeper, having left house animated by the ambition to stake his life in your Majesty's cau and laments that he has lived to see the day when the accursed Engl have presumed to direct their cannon against your royal dwelling, guardians of which are the angels of heaven From the first dawn the powers of discernment, your petitioner has been trained, like the h to conflicts and war, and has not, like the fox, been concerned for life—

"Leopards destroy their prey on the summits of mountains,
Crocodiles devour theirs on the banks of rivers"

"Your petitioner submits that if his prayer is accepted, and the p and stratagems necessary in this war are entrusted to his judgment, an by your Majesty's august auspices, he will, in three days, totally exter nate these people with white skins and dark fortunes. It was necess

d I have therefore submitted it. (Prayers for the prosperity of the ıg.., and curses in bitter and filthy language against those who may wish harm) Petition of the slave Amir Alı Khán, son of Nawáb Dulél Khán, n of Nawáb Najábat Khán, chief of Khurajpura"

Autograph Order of the King, in Pencil.

"Mirzá Zohuruddin will make inquiries, and will give the petitioner service."

The third charge is—"For that he, being a subject of the British Govnment in India, and not regarding the duty of his allegiance, did at ehlí, on the 11th May, 1857, or thereabouts, as a false traitor against the ate, proclaim and declare himself the reigning king and sovereign of idia, and did, then and there, traitorously seize and take unlawful ssession of the city of Dehlí, and did moreover at various times between e 10th of May and 1st of October, 1857, as such false traitor aforesaid, easonably conspire, consult, and agree with Mirzá Mughul, his own son, id with Muhammad Bakht Khán, subahdar of the regiment of artillery, id divers other false traitors unknown, to raise, levy, and make insurrecon, rebellion, and war against the State, and, further to fulfil and perfect is treasonable design of overthrowing and destroying the British Governent in India, did assemble armed forces at Dehlí, and send them forth to ght and wage war against the said British Government

That the prisoner was a pensioned subject of the British Government in ndia has been already shown in treating of the first charge, and as the ritish Government neither deprived him nor any member of his family of ny sovereignty whatever, but, on the contrary, relieving them from misery nd oppression, bestowed on them largesses and pensions aggregating many illions of pounds sterling, the duty of their allegiance will, I think, be eadily admitted, yet, as we have already seen, this traitor rushes to seize he first possible opportunity of overthrowing and destroying the government of his benefactors On the afternoon of the very first day of the utbreak in the hall of special audience, he receives the obeisances of the evolted Sipáhis and by laying his hands on their heads unites with them n a common brotherhood of infamy It is perhaps difficult to realise such scene. An enfeebled tremulous old man striving with palsied hand to each a sceptre far too powerful for his puny grasp, and, while bent by age nd infirmity, inducting a monarch's garb, to give, as it were, a benison nd a blessing to the cause of the foulest treachery and murder! Dead to very feeling that falls honourably on the heart of man, this shrivelled mpersonation of malignity must have formed no inapt centre-piece to the group of ruffians that surrounded him!

There are several witnesses who speak to the circumstance of the risoner having been proclaimed. It is variously stated as occurring on lifferent days, and it is more than probable that such was actually the ase. One or two proclamations would hardly be sufficient to carry the

information through all the suburbs of so large a city as Dehlí. T
prisoner's attorney allows that the king's authority was established on
11th of May, and Guláb, messenger, being asked, "Was the king p
claimed as the reigning sovereign immediately after the outbreak
answered, "Yes, the proclamation was made by beat of drum on the v
day of the outbreak, about three in the afternoon, to the effect that it
now the king's Government," while Chuni, pedlar, another witne
declares that, "On the 11th of May, about midnight, some 20 guns w
fired in the palace I heard the reports at my house, and next day,
about noon, a proclamation was made by beat of drum that the coun
had reverted to the possession of the king" The next paragraph in
charge is in reference to traitorously seizing and taking unlawful possess
of the city of Dehlí, but this is a point that I need not quote evidence
establish. It is difficult to turn our eyes in any direction without hav
convincing proofs of it The charge then goes on to assert that
prisoner "did at various times, between the 10th of May and 1st
October, 1857, treasonably conspire, consult, and agree with Mirzá Mugh
his son, and with Muhammad Bakht Khán, subahdar of the regiment
artillery, and divers other false traitors unknown, to raise, levy, and m
insurrection and war against the State' Mirzá Mughul was publ
appointed commander-in-chief, and a special state procession in honou
his being so took place a few days after the outbreak The witness w
deposes to this is Chuni Lál, pedlar, but he is unable to specify the ex
date on which he witnessed it. Mirzá Mughul's authority after this see
to have been uncontrolled, at any rate in all matters immediately relat
to the army, until Subahdar Bakht Khán, of the artillery, arrived, and
appointed both Lord Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief
date of his arrival was the 1st of July, and after that some jealousy
clashing of authority between the two Commanders-in-Chief is observa
for, on the 17th of July, Mirzá Mughul writes and informs his father, t
on that day he had formed up the army and taken it outside the city
attack the English, when General Bakht Khán interfered, and for a
time kept the whole force standing inactive, wanting to know by wh
orders it had gone out, and, saying it was not to proceed without
permission, caused it to return Mirzá Mughul adds, "that having
orders reversed cannot but cause vexation to any officer, high or low,
begs that definite instructions may be given as to whom the real autho
over the army belongs" There is no order on this letter, nor have
any intimation what decision was come to, but that some better arran
ment was the consequence is evident, for on the very next day, the
of July, we find Mirzá Mughul and General Bakht Khán acting in conc
as the following letter from Mirzá Mughul to his father will show
dated the 19th of July, and runs as follows:—"Since yesterday
arrangements have been completed for carrying on active offensive op
tions both by night and day If aid could be afforded now from
direction of Alapur, with the divine blessing, and through the influen
your Majesty's ever-during prestige, a final and decisive victory, it is t

xpected, would soon be obtained. I therefore pray that positive orde
nay be issued from the throne to the Bareli general to afford the aid
[uestion, that is, that he be directed to proceed with troops to Alapu
.nd to make an attack on the infidels from that direction, while yo
lave, with his division of the army, makes another on this side, so that t
wo forces co-operating in the fight may in one or two days consign all t
lamnable hell-doomed infidels to hell Moreover, it is to be expected th
.he force going to Alapur will cut off the enemies' supplies. It w
ecessary, and has therefore been submitted" On this letter there is
utograph order of the king to the following effect "That Mirzá Mugh
vill make whatever arrangements may be proper," and also an after orde
pparently by Mirzá Mughul,—"That an order be written to the Bar
eneral." I think this is conclusive of the three conspiring, consultin
nd agreeing together, but it may be as well to enter here two documen
vhich have not as yet been submitted to the Court One is a proclamatic
'rom General Muhammad Bakht Khán, dated 12th of July, and is to t
ollowing effect. It has, I should observe, been extracted from the "Deh
Urdu News" —"Let it be generally known to the persons living in t
ity and country, such as chiefs of freeholds, pensioners, landholders
-ent-free estates, &c, that if, from anxiety for their incomes, they ha
hitherto continued on the side of the English, and have in any way collud
with them by conveying intelligence or furnishing them with supplie
their having done so will not be considered inexcusable It is according
now proclaimed, that all those who have been alluded to are to cher
full confidence that when final and complete victory shall have be
obtained, provided their title-deeds, former and recent, shall on inspecti
be fully verified, they will have the present provisions in their favo
continued to them, and that they will also receive compensation in full f
the entire period during which their incomes may have been suspend
owing to the present disturbances, but if, after receiving knowledge
these orders, any person shall, notwithstanding, forward intelligence
furnish supplies, &c, to the English, he will be severely punished in t
way Government may determine The chief police officer of the city
therefore, ordered to have the signatures of all chiefs of freeholds, of rent-fr
estates, and pensioners residing in his jurisdiction, written on the rever
of this notification to them in this matter, in acknowledgment of the
having been duly informed, and then to send the notification immediatel
to his Excellency" The other document is an order from the king, date
the 6th of September 1857, and is addressed to the chief police officer
the city It runs as follows.—"You are directed to have proclaime
throughout the city by beat of drum, that this is a religious war, and
being prosecuted on account of the faith, and that it behoves all Hind
and Musalmán residents of the imperial city, or of the villages out in th
country, as well as those natives of Hindustan who are arrayed against u
on the ridge, or are anywhere employed on the side of the armies of th
English, whether they be men of the eastern provinces, or Sikhs o
foreigners, or natives of the Himaláya Hills or Nipálís, to continu

ıe to their faith and creeds, and to slay the English and their servants, l you are directed to have it further proclaimed, that those who are w present with the English force on the ridge, whether they be people Hindustan, or foreigners, or hillmen, or Sikhs, or whatever country ɔy may be natives of, or whether they be Muhammadans, or Hindus born Hindustan, they are not to entertain any fears or dread of the enemy. henever they come over to this side, kind provision will be made for ɔm, and they will be allowed to continue in their own creed and religions ɔu are directed to have it proclaimed further, that all who will join in ɜ attacks on the enemy, whether they be or be not servants, will be owed to keep themselves whatever property they may take from the ıglish in plunder, and that they will beside receive additional rewards ɔm his Majesty, and will be amply provided for" This paper, which I ve just perused, is an office copy, and was found recently among other cuments in the office of the king's chief police station It bears the ıl of that office, and is actually attested as a true copy by the signature Bháo Singh, assistant to the King's chief police officer. A more trustɔrthy and convincing document could hardly be laid before a Court seems to me fully to complete the proof of the third charge, and render further quotation from the numerous other documents ınecessary It also tends to establish the latter portion of the fourth arge

To this charge I will now turn my attention. It accuses the prisoner ɔf having, at Dehlí, on the 16th of May, 1857, or thereabouts, within ɜ precincts of the palace at Dehlí, feloniously caused and become cessory to the murder of 49 persons, chiefly women and children of ıropean and mixed European descent" As far as the murder of these ɔr victims is concerned, I have nothing to allege, the facts have been ıtailed before the Court in all their horrid minuteness, and they are not ch as to be easily forgotten The cold-blooded, hardened villany that ıuld revel in leading women and young children to the shambles, and ıs, too, without the miserable apology of imagined wrong, or to the ıstaken zeal of religious frenzy, is something so inhuman that the mind ıght well refuse to accept it as truth, did not all the force of concurrent eas, of direct testimony, of circumstantial proof, and elsewhere repeated actings of the same dreadful tragedies, enforce it upon our convictions is not, then, such admitted facts as the above that I am here called upor ı establish They are unhappily but too prominently and painfully ıaped forth to require further illustration It remains, however, to show ɔw deeply the prisoner stands implicated in this revolting butchery, and hether, as averred in the indictment, he did "feloniously cause and ɔcome accessory to the murder of these 49 persons" I shall not, in sc ɔing, attempt to avail myself of that law which makes all persons joining ı insurrection and sedition individually responsible for every act of violence ıat may be committed by those with whom they stand leagued in illici ɔmbination, even though such acts may have been against their wishe without their cognisance. I mean, however, separately to consider eacl

fact connecting the prisoner with the deaths of these women and childre
I will revert to the evidence of their capture, the place of their impriso
ment, the fearful privations to which they were subjected, and the mc
than cruel treatment which they experienced from the commencement
their confinement, all of which were but too prophetic of the ultima
doom that awaited them The first person whose testimony I shall ha
to quote is Ahsan Ulla Khán, the physician When asked—"How was
that so many English women and children were brought to the palace a
placed in confinement?" he replied—"The mutineers took them in a
about the city, and, having established their own quarters in the pala
they brought their prisoners in with them too" Being further interrogate
he declares that the mutineers did not retain the custody of th
prisoners, but, as each successive one was brought in, reported the circu
stance to the prisoner, and were told to take the Europeans to the kitche
and keep them confined there. Being again questioned, he asserts that t
king himself appointed the kitchen as the place of their confinement, a
observed at the time that it was a large, capacious building; so that
appears that the prisoner not only fixed upon the building himself as t
place for herding indiscriminately together men, women and children, b
from its being in his own palace, and from his volunteering a description
it, it is evident that he had some personal knowledge of what it was hi
He terms it a large, capacious building, but these are not very defin
terms, and when used in reference to different objects may relatively ha
widely different meanings To obviate any misconception on such a poi
I have, since Ahsan Ulla Khán gave this evidence, visited the pla
myself, and taken its measurements and description. The building
40 feet long, 12 broad, and about 10 high It is old, dirty, and dilapidate
and without the vestige of plaster, but it is worse than this, for it is dar
has no made flooring, no windows, and is entirely without the means
ventilation or of light There is but one aperture to it, a miserab
small wooden door, but I will now let Mrs Aldwell describe it in her ov
words —"We were all confined in one room, very dark, with only o
door, and no windows or other opening. It was not fit for the residence
any human being, much less for the number of us that were there W
were very much crowded together, and in consequence of the Sípáhis, a
every one who took a fancy to do so, coming and frightening the childre
we were obliged frequently to close the one door that we had, which th
left us without light or air The Sípáhís used to come with their muske
loaded, and bayonets fixed, and ask us whether we would consent
become Muhammadans and also slaves, if the king granted us our live
but the king's special armed retainers, from whom the guard over us w
always furnished, incited the Sipáhis to be content with nothing short
our lives, saying we should be cut up in small pieces, and given as food
the kites and crows We were very indifferently fed, but on two occasio
the king sent us better food" Such was the return made by this trait
for the millions of pounds sterling bestowed by the English on himself a
on his family! Having, as one of the witnesses has specifically state

ıbundance of room where these English women and children would hav
en safe in the apartments occupied by the females of his own establisl
ent," where, it is said, "there are secret recesses in which 500 peop
ight be concealed, and where, even had the rebels dared to violate th
nctity of the zenana, all search would have been fruitless," and the
ing, according to another witness, no scarcity of vacant buildings in th
lace in which the ladies and children could have been kept in confin
ent, and in which they might have had every comfort, this minion
nglish generosity preferred to select for them the very den set apart fo
lprits and for felons, and where they even received far worse than
lon's treatment, for they were crowded into a small space, and were dail
posed to the insult and cruelty of all who chose to molest them Suc
is the requital to the English for a princely pension and an imperi
lace! It will be observed, from the statements of Ahsan Ulla Khán ar
is Aldwell, that both agree in attributing these measures personally t
e king; and when we recollect the trifling matters which were, on ever
casion, referred to him, and which, as has been fully demonstrated i
is Court, received not only his attention but were endorsed by his ow
ıtograph instructions, is there any room left for doubt, that the mo
ıportant concerns were under his special control also? Indeed, the co
ırrent testimony of many witnesses, and the irrefutable evidence of h
vn handwriting, incontestably prove that such was the case. It is thi
e find the king appointing the prison, that the king's special arme
tainers were always on guard over the prisoners, that it is the kir
ho supplies them with their very indifferent food, and on two occasio
nds them some of better quality, and thus, too, the Sipáhis asked the
hether they would consent to become Muhammadans and slaves if th
ng granted them their lives, and who, on perusing even thus much
e evidence, can doubt that he had the power of doing so? Has the
en one single circumstance elicited that shows that the prisoner eve
ished to save them, or that he even extended to them one act of comm
urtesy or kindness? Very far from it, for, whilst no check was give
those who showed the prisoners every species of unmanly brutality, th
dinary charity of giving food and water to a Christian was severe
nished, and a Muhammadan woman, simply on this account, was actual
ımured with the prisoners Can the bitterness of rancour go furth
ıan this? Or is it possible to contemplate the place and nature of th
ınfinement fixed for these tender women and children, without coming
ie conclusion that a cruel death was from the first moment reserved f
ıem, and that, in the words of the witness, Mukund Lál, "they were b
ing collected?" Indeed the edge of the sword seems to have been bu
erciful deliverance from the lingering death which confinement in
athsome a den, at such a season of the year, must eventually ha
flicted on all exposed to it.

Might I not here stop, and confidently on this point await the decisi
the Court against the prisoner? The proof, however, swells in volu
, it proceeds, and I mean to leave no portion of it untraced Gulab

haprásí or messenger, has distinctly stated that, a couple of days before he massacre took place, it was known that the Europeans would be killed n two days, and that, on the day fixed for the slaughter arriving, great rowds of people were flocking to the palace Every witness to the scene vho has spoken of it in Court has alluded to the crowds assembled, both is spectators and actors, on the morning in question, and, as this was at he early hour of between eight and nine, there seems no doubt that previous information of what was to take place must have been given. Nothing indicates that an outburst of fury, either on the part of the populace or military, in any way led to a catastrophe so awful On the contrary, the witness distinctly says that without orders it could not have happened, and that there were but two sources from which such an order could have emanated, viz, the king and his son, Mirzá Mughul, adding that he does not know which of them gave the order He, however distinctly states that he was present at the murder of these European prisoners, and that he saw them all standing together, surrounded on all sides by the king's special armed retainers, or what you may term his body-guard, and some of the infantry mutineers, and that, though he did not observe any signal or order given, yet, on a sudden, the men just mentioned drew their swords, simultaneously attacked the prisoners, and continued cutting at them till they had killed them all A second witness viz, Chuni Lál, the news-writer, when asked by whose orders these Europeans were murdered, distinctly replies that "it was done by the king's order who else could have given such an order?" He and other witnesses concur in stating that Mirzá Mughul, the king's son, from the top of his house which overlooked the court-yard, was a spectator on the occasion, this Mirzá Mughul being at that time second only to the king himself in authority Is it credible, then, under such circumstances, that the king's own body-guard, his special armed retainers, could have dared to perpetrate this frightful butchery without his order and against his wishes? If a doubt could be entertained on such a subject, it would, think, be speedily dissipated on a perusal of the writings evidently approved by the prisoner, in which bloodthirstiness and sanguinary ferocity against the English are so glaringly conspicuous In reference to the presence of Mirzá Mughul, and in further proof that it was by the king's own order that these unhappy women and children were massacred, I shall quote the testimony of the king's own secretary, Mukund Lál To the question "By whose order were the ladies and children that were prisoners in the palace murdered?" he replies, "These people were being collected for three days, on the fourth day, the infantry and cavalry soldiers, accompanied by Mirzá Mughul, came to the entrance of the king's private apartments and requested the king's permission to kill them The king was at the time in his own apartments Mirzá Mughul and Basant Ali Khán were inside, while the soldiery remained without. They returned in about 2 minutes, when Basant Ali Khán publicly, and in a loud voice, proclaimed that the king had given his permission for the slaughter of the prisoners and that they could take them away Accordingly, the king's armed

ıtaıners, ın whose custody the prisoners had been, took them from th ace of confinement, and, in connexion with some of the mutinous soldiery ılled them" It appears, then, Mirzá Mughul had just come from th ısoner's presence, and was armed with his authority for carrying out thı ıost hideous deed of blood. It may seem almost superfluous to add any ıng to the above, but the proof furnished by the extract from th ısoner's diary is so important and convincing that I feel bound to quot

The evidence of the physician, Ashan Ulla Khán, regarding it, is a ıllows: "Was a Court diary of occurrences at the palace kept by orde the king during the rebellion?"—*Answer* "The Court diary wa ept up as usual, according to the custom which had long preceded th ıtbreak." *Question.* "Look at this leaf, and see whether you ca cognise the handwriting on it?"—*Answer* "Yes, it is in the hand ıtıng of the man who kept the Court diary, and this leaf is a portio f it."

TRANSLATION of an Extract from the Court diary, for the 16th of May, 1857.

"The king held his court in the Hall of Special Audience, 49 Englis ere prisoners, and the army demanded that they should be given ove) them for slaughter. The king delivered them up, saying, 'The arm ıay do as they please,' and the prisoners were consequently put to th word. There was a large attendance, and all the chiefs, nobles, officer nd writers presented themselves at court, and had the honour of payin ıeir respects."

Here, then, we have oral as well as most unimpeachable written test ıony, all concurring on this point, and it would seem nearly impossibl) make the proof clearer, had we not the prisoner's written confession (he crime. I do not mean in his defence, which is simply a documer amed for this Court, and is but a mere tissue of false denials, without a ffort at refuting what stands so prominently against him. I allude, (ourse, to his long letter to his son, Mirzá Mughul, in which he actuall ıakes merit of the slaughter of his Christian prisoners, and urges it as eason why the soldiery should be more attentive to his commands Afte his, to prolong any argument on the subject would be improper. Ther ı, then, but the last portion of the fourth charge uncommented on, an) establish it we have copies of circulars addressed from the King to Rá Bhara, the Ruler of Kach Bhuj, to Ranjit Singh, Chief of Jasalmír, an) Rájah Guláb Singh, of Jammu. The following extracts will b ufficient, viz .—

To *Rao Bhara*, Ruler of Kach.

"It has been reported that you, ever-faithful one, have put the whol f the infidels to the sword, and have thoroughly cleansed and purifie ıur dominions of their unclean presence. We have been extremel ratified to hear of such conduct on your part, and you are therefo

honoured with this address, to the intent that you will institute suc arrangements through your territory as that none of the creatures of Go may in any way be aggrieved or oppressed. Further, should any numbe of the infidels reach your dominions by sea, you will have them slain In doing this you will act entirely in accordance with our pleasure an wishes"

To *Ranjit Singh*, Chief of Jasalmír.

"It is clear to our belief that throughout your dominions the nam and trace of these ill-omened infidels, the English, must not have remained if, however, by any chance or possibility some have escaped till now b keeping hidden and concealed, first slay them, and after that, having mad arrangements for the administration of your territory, present yourself a our court with your whole military following Considerations and friend liness a thousand-fold will be bestowed on you, and you will be distr guished by elevation to dignities and places which the compass of you qualifications will not have capacity to contain"

To *Rájah Gulab Singh*, Ruler of Jammu.

"I have been made acquainted, by your petition, with all the particular of the slaughter throughout your territory of the accursed unbelievin English. You are considered worthy of a hundred commendations Yo have acted in this matter as all brave men ever acquit themselves, ma you live and prosper" Again. "Come to the royal presence, and slay th accursed, unbelieving English, and all other enemies, wherever you ma find them on the way Whatever may be your hopes and expectations the dignity and elevation to which you will be promoted amongst you equals will surpass all that you may be able to imagine, and you wil further be rewarded and dignified with the title of Rájah" On one of th petitions to the king from a duffadar of the 4th Irregular Cavalry, boastin of having murdered his officers at Mazaffarnagar, the order for an appoint ment in return is in the prisoner's own handwriting

"I herewith conclude my observations on the charges, and it will now remain, gentlemen, for you by your verdict to determine whether th prisoner at your bar, in retirement and seclusion, may yet claim the respec due to deposed majesty, or whether he must henceforth rank merely as one of the great criminals of history It will be for you to pronounce whethe his last king of the imperial house of Taimur shall this day depart from his ancestral palace, bent down by age and by misfortune, but elevated perhaps, by the dignity of his sufferings and the long-borne calamities o his race, or whether this magnificent hall of audience, this shrine of the higher majesty of justice, shall this day achieve its crowning triumph in a verdict which shall record to this and to all ages that kings by crime are degraded to felons, and that the long glories of a dynasty may be for ever effaced in a day

"The consideration of the specific charges against the prisoner being now

closed, I trust it may not be thought presumptuous if I offer some obser
ations on the evidence elicited as to the cause of the late rebellion, and
he existence of previous conspiracy I have, in a former part of th
ddress, argued that if the native regiments, previous to the cartridg
question being mooted, had been in a sound and well-affected state, suc
a frightful and all but universal revolt could not have occurred, that the
nust have been some other and more latent power at work to have thr
perated on a whole army scattered in different cantonments from Calcut
o Peshawur I think that such could not have been accomplished witho
some secret mutual understanding, and some previous preparation, th
establishment of which may appropriately be termed conspiracy I hav
stated also that it seems as if it was not owing to a cartridge of any kir
that such an amount of mutiny and murder has solely to be attribute
but I should be more than blind to all that has appeared on these proce
ngs and elsewhere if I failed to recognise in the cartridge question th
mmediate means or instrument adopted for bringing about a much-desir
end It seems to have been the spark, not accidentally shot forth, bu
deliberately chosen to explode a mine previously prepared In alludir
then, to the existence of a conspiracy, I do not mean to imply that w
have come upon traces of a particular gang of men, specially bande
together for the fixed definite object of causing the late rebellion in th
native army, in any manner similar to that in which we have seen
developed, but such evidence as we have been able to obtain does appe
to me to point out that, for a considerable time antecedent to the 10th
May, agitation and disaffection to British rule among the Muhammadan
was more than ordinarily prevalent, and that such disaffection had be
stimulated by active and designing men, who have most craftily take
advantage of every circumstance that could be made suitable for such
purpose. The annexation of Oudh to British rule was, perhaps, one
these. It seems to have been particularly displeasing to the Muhammadan
as annihilating the last throne left to them in India, and, for some oth
reasons, it would appear to have been almost equally unpalatable to th
Hindu Sipáhi. It may, perhaps, have interfered with his position there a
a privileged servant of the Company for, instead of having to rely on th
influence and prestige of the British Government in dealings or disput
with the native landholders of that province, he found himself brought
once under direct European control One of the witnesses, Jat Ma
draws a marked distinction between the Hindu Sipáhí and the Hinc
tradesman in reference to their feelings for the British Government, an
perhaps the annexation of Oudh, with other causes, may tend to accou
for it. Being asked whether there was any difference between t
Muhammadans and Hindus in this respect, he replies, "Yes, certainly, th
Muhammadans as a body were all pleased at the overthrow of the Britis
Government, while the merchants and respectable tradesmen among t
Hindus regretted it." He, however, says that the general feeling throughc
the army was the same both among the Hindus and Muhammedans, an
that they were both equally bitter, and this view of the case is, I thin

supported by our experiences of both. The great bulk of the infantr portion of the native army was undoubtedly Hindu, but we have not foun this any check or restraint upon their revolting barbarity, and, as far a the army has been concerned, Hindus and Muhammadans appear to hav vied with each other only in the enormity of their crimes. But, apart fro the army, the revolt has perhaps assumed many of the features of a Musa mán conspiracy, and it is, I think, probable that to Musalmán intrigu may eventually be traced those false and fabricated rumours whicl adroitly mixed up with some small portion of truth, have been so instru mental in effacing the last vestiges of fidelity in an army whose faithfu ness was at one time perhaps its very chiefest pride and boast It do not belong to such an occasion as this to revert to past years, and step b step to trace the causes which have combined to destroy the reliance onc placed upon those who are now so notorious for their perfidy Some c these causes doubtless have been beyond Government control, and wer perhaps, inherent to a state of continued progress on the one side, and a inveterate priestly opposition to it on the other It will be sufficient if here merely allude to several previous occasions, not of very distant dat when some regiments of the native army showed how little they were be depended on. On those occasions also it was evident that a unity purpose and a singleness of feeling were in a short time organised by son process not immediately patent to their European officers, a mutu correspondence either by emissaries or letters was perhaps then initiate and the lesson thus learnt was not easily forgotten I do not mean argue that from that time the native Indian army became one lar debating society, very far from it, I believe that in their own fashi most of the Sipáhis were good and well-meaning servants of the Gover ment I say, in their own fashion, because it appears to me they a always deficient in natural firmness, and have no idea of strong mor rectitude, their fidelity, as long as it exists, is more of a habit than a principle, upheld by superstition, but wanting the sustaining power true religion Among such a body as this there must always be son discontented intriguers; and who that knows anything of Asiatic charact will not readily admit, especially with reference to Hindus, that the fe are more potent for evil than the many for good? Let but three or fo leaders come forth in all the open audacity of crime, or mix themselves i in the secret intrigues of sedition, and the rest, if not immediately pani struck, never think it their duty to check or oppose them They m excuse themselves for a time, by holding aloof from what they do n approve, but active interference, even in prevention of mutiny and murd seems to form no part of their creed, either religious or political. Tl most serious crimes are thus passively encouraged, and, temporary ir munity securing proselytes, all are eventually engulfed in the same depth of infamy: thus the crimes of a few lead to the ruin of many. Th these influences have been vigorously at work in extending the late rebe lion I think few will be inclined to deny. I am aware that no correspon ence, and perhaps little direct evidence to such a point has been broug

before the Court, indeed, in reference to the Sipáhis, we have not been
a position to obtain either one or the other, still, if, as has been current
and, I believe, truly reported, that the number of letters passing amor
our native soldiers, for a month or two prior to the outbreak was ver
considerably larger than usual, this circumstance, combined with suc
acts as have come under our notice, would lead almost irresistibly to th
conclusion that some sinister agitation had been extensively at work, an
hat increased disaffection and subordination would necessarily be th
esult, moreover, that in such a state revolt would reduce itself to
nere calculation of time. In the above remarks I have attributed muc
of what has occurred to the pernicious influence of evil intriguers, and
nay naturally be inquired why these should have had greater effect at th
present juncture than at any former one. Some of the causes I hav
already hinted at, such as the annexation of Oudh and the progress o
European civilisation, outstriding, and in its natural course threatening
sweep away the puny barriers upraised by priestly cunning for the preserv
ation of the grossest ignorance, and thus commencing the subversion
religions that are unable to bear the lights of even natural science.
believe, too, that the propagandists of sedition may artfully have avail
themselves of some recent acts of the Government to spread panic an
alarm in reference to future forcible interference with caste prejudices
allude to the agitation about the remarriage of Hindu widows, the enlis
nent for general service, the cartridges, &c I do not mean in this
offer the slightest apology for men whose conduct excites nothing bu
loathing and disgust. Pampered in their pride and besotted in the
gnorance, they had as a body become too self-sufficient for militar
subordination and unhesitating obedience. Experienced, as they were,
mutual combination, they appear again easily to have entered into schem
or dictating to the Government their views in reference to imagin
grievances, but that open, defiant mutiny had been generally resolv
upon by the army—or, at any rate, by the Hindu portion of it, prior
he trial of the 3rd Light Cavalry troopers—is more, I think, than h
been established. Up to that time there was, no doubt, a feeling
uneasiness, a restless apprehension, and an air of respectful mutiny pe
vading the native ranks. The Sipáhis in many instances appeared
magine that disobedience to military command was scarcely criminal
accompanied by a salute and a submissive demeanour Habituated
combination, and well aware of the strength of numbers, they latterly ha
seldom lost an opportunity of bringing forward their grievances, n
individually, but in mass s On such points there was no differen
between Musalmán and Hindu, they could both readily unite, and ha
already done so, for the purposes of insolent dictation Indeed, if w
search back into history, I believe we shall find that this has ever be
what I may term the normal condition of Asiatic armies, and it
perhaps, the necessary result of giving unity and power to large bodies
men without the checks furnished by education, loyalty, and religio
principle to control them : military discipline without these auxiliaries

ut a dangerous weapon, and one that has frequently been turned agains hose who have sharpened and prepared it As a corollary to this, it ma e observed that rebellion and insurrection among the unarmed an ntutored people of Asia is rare indeed; even the forcible conversion o he Hindus to Muhammadanism under former emperors of India seems t ave been insufficient to rouse them to resistance It is, then, the attemp t domination by the Sipáhi alone that has to be guarded against. Th listinctions of caste may, to a certain extent, at former periods hav roved serious obstacles to any very extensive combination of men o lifferent sects, either for political or other purposes, but we shoul emember that this very circumstance of caste companionship has neces itated the existence of a number of distinct self-governing societies, ha habituated the people of Hindustan to meetings among themselves wher publicity is avoided, and thus, giving them their primary lessons in unitin for particular objects, has endowed them with a natural facility for mor extended combinations, of a secret and sinister character Under thes circumstances, there wanted but the means and the occasion for carryin them out, and who does not perceive that the native army afforded th one, and a variety of incidents have favoured the other? Brahman an Musalmán here met, as it were, upon neutral ground, they have had i the army one common brotherhood of profession, the same dress, the sam rewards, the same objects to be arrived at by the same means. The frequently joined each other in their separate festivals, and the unio encouraged by the favour of the Government was finally resorted to as measure to subvert it. I do not, however, intend to dwell on all of th many influences which may have assisted in bringing about the recer catastrophe, such a discussion in this place might not be approved of.

It seems to me, however, apparent that it was not and could not hav been the greased cartridges alone that effected it. There was previou preparation among the Sipáhis, and there was also a general unsettli of men's minds throughout the country, and among the Muhammadans i particular. I believe, indeed, that the facts elicited on this point may l ranged appropriately under the head of "Muhammadan conspiracy," th chief object of which seems to have been to spread disaffection and distru of British rule, and, by the dissemination of false and evil reports, and l fabrications of the most insidious kind, to prepare all the people for chan and insurrection As far as can be traced, the commencement of th must have originated with the prisoner, or with some of those such Hasan Askarí and others, who were admitted to his most secret an confidential councils Be this as it may, there cannot, I imagine, be doubt that in sending Sidi Kambar to Persia and Constantinople as a ambassador with letters to the sovereign of that country, soliciting aid an elevation to a throne, the prisoner became the principal in a conspira which indirectly, at any rate, must have been auxiliary to the rece frightful outbreak and its attendant horrors. It is worthy of particul notice, as connecting the two together, that this Sidi Kambar's departu took place, according to the most reliable account, just two years befo

ıy 1857, and that his promised return, with the aid sought for, wa
ed for the time when the outbreak actually took place. Coupling thi
ıh the prophecy among the Muhammadans that English sovereignty ı
dia was to cease 100 years after its first establishment by the battle o
assey in 1757, we are able to form something more than conjecture a
the causes which have given to Muhammadan fanaticism its delusiv
pe of recovering all its former prestige. I have already alluded to th
eam of Hasan Askari the priest, and its interpretation so plausibl
ntrived to correspond with the wishes of the king, and of those abou
n. The circumstance may seem trivial to us, but it was doubtless
eans well calculated to make a deep impression upon the superstitiou
nds of those to whom it was addressed, and to cause expectation an
lief in what was predicted by one said to be possessed of miraculou
wers, and accredited with holding direct communication with Heaven
e learn too from the petition of Muhammad Darwesh to Mr. Colvin
e Lieutenant-Governor, dated 27th of March, 1857, that Hasan Askar
d, at this time, assured the King of Dehlí that he had certain informa
on that the prince royal of Persia had fully taken possession of an
cupied Bushir, and that he had entirely expelled the Christians, or
ther, had not left one alive there, and had taken away many of them
isoners, and that, very soon indeed, the Persian army would advance b
e way of Kandahar and Kabul towards Dehlí. He, moreover, adds
That in the palace, but more especially in that portion of it constitutin
e personal apartments of the king, the subject of the conversatio
ght and day was the early arrival of the Persians. Hasan Askarí ha
oreover, impressed the king with the belief that he has learned, throug
divine revelation, that the dominion of the King of Persia will to
rtainty extend to Dehlí, or rather over the whole of Hindustan, an
at the splendour of the sovereignty of Dehli will again revive as th
vereign of Persia will bestow the crown on the king." The write
es on to say that throughout the palace, but particularly to the kin
is belief has been the cause of great rejoicing, so much so that prayer
e offered and vows are made, while, at the same time, Hasan Askarí ha
ntered upon the daily performance, at an hour and a half before sunse
a course of propitiatory ceremonies to expedite the arrival of the Persian
id the expulsion of the Christians. It has been arranged that ever
hursday several trays of victuals, wheat-meal, oil, copper money an
oth should be sent by the king in aid of these ceremonies, and they a
ccordingly brought to Hasan Askarí"

We thus see how early and how deeply the priesthood interested an
ngaged themselves in this matter, and how completely and exclusivel
Muhammadan in character was this conspiracy. If we could but hav
epped behind the scenes, and witnessed these ceremonies at which supe
ition presided, and have heard these prayers and vows offered up for th
rival of the Persians and the expulsion of the Christians, we shou
oubtless have had depicted to us the foreshadowings of those dreadf
agedies which, to all time, will render the past year so painfully mem

rable. We may imagine and faintly conceive to ourselves some portion of the rancour of these Muhammadans, when we recollect not only their deeds but the concentrated hatred which breathes through their petitions, and does not stop with this world, but rejoices in the idea of eternal torments for us hereafter One cannot help inquiring whether there are really many millions of human beings in Hindustan imbued with these feelings for Europeans. I will leave those who hear me to form their own opinions on this subject without venturing to proffer mine. We learn, however from Mrs Aldwell that during the Muharram festival she heard the Muhammadan women praying and teaching their children to pray for the success of their faith, and these prayers were generally accompanied by execrations against the English. Nor did even accomplishing the cruel death and sufferings of helpless women and children tend in any way to abate the ferocity of their malignity, or to waken one chord of mercy or commiseration in their breasts, for we find from the local newspapers that at the time this most hideous massacre was being perpetrated 'about 200 Musalmán were standing at the reservoir, uttering the coarsest abuse against the prisoners. Were it not too well attested, such demoniac malignity would scarcely be credible

The next point to which I shall advert, is the circulation of the chapaties, in the form of ship biscuits. Now, whether they were sent round under the fiction of a Government order, signifying that in future there should be but one food and one faith, or whether, according to another interpretation, they were meant to sound a note of alarm and preparation, giving warning to the people to stand by one another on any danger menacing them, the contrivance was a most insidious one, and calculated to breed distrust and suspicion in the hearts of many who were strangers to such feelings before That it created no stronger impression on the native mind than it did, is perhaps attributable only to the early check it received at the hands of authority, and it would doubtless be both interesting and important if we could discover how and by whom such a proceeding was initiated. This and the false rumour about mixing ground bones with the flour had doubtless one common origin, and it is not going beyond the bounds of fair indication or reasonable inference to attribute both one and the other to the unceasing wiles of Muhammadan conspiracy We perceive that the Hindu Sipáhis, under the impulse of a first reaction in their feelings, reproached the Muhammadans with misleading them, and it is a most significant fact on these proceedings, that though we come upon traces of Musalmán intrigue wherever our investigation has carried us, yet not one paper has been found to show that the Hindus, as a body, had been conspiring against us, or that their Brahmans and priests had been preaching a crusade against Christians In their case there has been no king to set up, no religion to be propagated by the sword. To attribute to them, under such circumstances, the circulation of these chapaties or the fabrications about ground bones in the flour would be to ascribe to them acts without a meaning, and a criminal deception without any adequate motive. A very marked feature in this

[uhammadan conspiracy is the activity and persistence with which it has ɔen carried out, the circulation of the chapaties having been early pro-ibited by authority, and thus rendered non-effective for the purpose of ɹtensive sedition, some other expedient was necessary to replace it, and e at once find the tale of the "bone-dust mingled with flour" very lroitly selected as the substitute It was, in fact, still adhering to the aterial of chapaties, and continuing the symbol of "one food, one faith." was indeed the chapaty without its form, and without its inconveniences he schemers had apparently learnt that the chapaty was too specific and o tangibly open to European interference to be largely availed of as an ɡent for evil, and hence its transformation into flour, the bone-dust being lded to the one as the equivalent of the form of the ship biscuit to the her To give out, then, that such was the nature of the flour stored at l the depots of supplies along the Grand Trunk Road, for from them, fring their marches, the Sipáhis are in a manner compelled to get their ɒd, was to attain the very object the conspirators must have most ɜsired If true, the Government had already commenced what would be ɜemed forcible conversion to Christianity. If they could, then, but tablish a firm and general belief in this, their game was in their own ɪnds, and that they did succeed in doing this to a very great extent is, imagine, undeniable. I must own that to me this apparently natural ɪnsition from the chapaties to its component parts seems a master stroke cu·ning, and evidenced most able leadership in the cause the con-ɪrators were embarked in.

To prove, moreover, that no mean order of talent was at work, and that l the appliances that craft and treachery could avail themselves of were sorted to, we have only to refer to the extracts from the "Authentic ɜws," and also to the other native publications of that period, and we shall rceive with what steadfast consistency the ulterior aim is always kept view The chapaties, the bone-dust in the flour, the greased cartridges, ɜre all most appropriate for the Hindus, but a different pabulum was ɹuisite for the Musalmáns, and we shall now see with what subtlety it ɯs administered. The first paper commences by announcing that the ng of Persia had ordered a concentration of most of his troops at heran, and then, declaring it to be currently reported that such a demon-ɑtion against Dost Muhammad Khán was only a strategic move to cloak e King of Persia's real design of fighting against and conquering the ɪglish, the editor makes certain that, at any rate, some change of feeling s taken place amongst the three powers. The next extract is dated the th of January, 1857, and commences by asserting that all the news-pers agree in declaring that the King of France and the Emperor of ɪrkey had not as yet openly avowed themselves the allies of either the ɪglish or the Persians, but that their ambassadors were secretly visiting d presenting their gifts to both belligerents. "Some people," says the ɪtor, "think that the King of France and the Emperor of Turkey will t mix themselves up in the quarrels between the Persians and the ɪglish, but most people," he adds, "say that they will both side with

the Persians. As for the Russians, however, they make no secret of th readiness with which they are assisting, and will continue to assist, th Persians, whether it be with funds or with forces It may be said thi virtually the Russians are the cause of the war, and that, using the Pe sians as a cloak, they intend to consummate their own designs regardir the conquest of Hindustan. It is to be believed that the Russians wi soon take the field in great force" Here, then, we have not only Pers and Russia advancing immediately upon India with immense armies, bi France and Turkey to assist them, while the forsaken and devote English are represented as by no means sure even of the alliance of th Afghans under Dost Muhammad. Well might the editor, after announ ing such formidable coalitions, somewhat dramatically exclaim, "Let th readers of the 'Authentic News' be prepared to see what the veil futurity will disclose" Accordingly, in the next extract, we perceiv that "the King of Persia had solemnly promised to his courtiers th governorships of the different presidencies and places· one is to g Bombay, another Calcutta, and a third Puná, "while the crown Hindustan is plainly spoken of as reserved for bestowal on the King Dehlí, this very prisoner before us You will recollect, gentlemen, th several copies of this paper, the "Authentic News," used to be sent the palace, and one can imagine the joy and exultation with which su passages must have been perused, especially when added thereto is t assertion that the Emperor of Russia had sent an effective and thorough appointed army of 400,000 men with abundant munitions, to assist t King of Persia in his hostile designs upon India. But it was not in t palace, and by the princes alone, that such paragraphs were read wi avidity, the whole population was intent on them Sir Theophil Metcalfe has told us that the subject of the advance of the Persia upon Herát was much discussed among the natives, and frequently connexion with the idea of Russian aggression upon India, every new paper having at this time its correspondent in Kabul. Nor indeed c the discussion and interest excited by these concocted hostile movemei cease here, for the same witness declares that agitation about this tu prevailed among the Sipáhis and that about five or six weeks before t outbreak it was currently reported in their lines, and much discus among them, that 100,000 Russians were coming from the north, and th the Company's government would be destroyed, and in fact that the ic of a Russian invasion was universally prevalent. The venom and vi of these false publications were then taking their intended effect, and would seem a mere perversion of reason longer to blind ourselves with t idea that the outbreak was fortuitous, or that a greased cartridge oc sioned it. In a former article of the "Authentic News," we have se Dost Muhammad alluded to as but a doubtful ally of the English this one, however, as events progress, he is spoken of as being secre in league with the King of Persia, and, that superstitious aid may not lost sight of, it is remarked how wonderfully four distinct unexpec coincidences had impelled the King of Persia to declar war against t

glish. The first was that Herát, in another place described as the key India, had so easily fallen into his possession; the second, the unforen coming of the Russians to assist him; the third, the nobles of Persia unimously counselling an advance on India, and predicting that God uld bestow victory; and the fourth, the simultaneous rising and asbling of the whole of Persia for the prosecution of a religious war tents and miracles were likewise brought forward still further to excite Muhammadan mind, as the following extract from the "Authentic wa," dated 15th of September, 1856, will sufficiently prove. It is ided—

"Local News from the Hánsí District.

'A man just come from the country tells the editor that, unlike other ces, the Huli is being burnt there at this season of the year, and the rnalia attending the festival are now going on. The man who states is ascertained, on inquiry, that the reason for the unseasonable observce of this festival is, that three girls were born at a birth, and the ree spoke immediately. The first said: 'The coming year will be one great calamities, various calamitous visitations will afflict the nation' e second said: 'Those who live will see,' and the third, in an impresve and forcible tone, said: 'If the Hindus burn the Huli in the present ason, they will escape all these evils. God alone is omniscient'"

It is too much, I am afraid, the case, with persons accustomed to Europan habits of thinking to view such statements and articles as these erely in reference to the impression they would be likely to make on emselves The taking of Herát, the predictions of the nobles, &c., and e fabulous prophecies of these girls would, in that case, receive hardly ssing attention. But we should commit a grievous and most fatal error we were to gauge Asiatic thoughts and understandings by the same easure that would be applicable to our own. If, avoiding this mistake e proceed to consider the above editorials in relation to the people they ere written for, we shall find that they are not only most insidiously orked up to meet their peculiar prejudices, but are also made to bear a riking affinity to the fulfilment of their prophecies, to the dreams o asan Askarí, to the negotiations of Sidi Kambar, and to the ancient aditions of Muhammadanism. Are we, then, to suppose that in all this ere was no connexion between the palace and the press? Were l these concurrences fortuitous? Can it be that the dreams of the priests e plots of the court, and the fabrications of the newspapers worked cidentally together? We have already seen the decoys by which the indu Sipáhis were to be gained, and is it not the same spirit of evil at we can recognise here? Are the circumstances appealing to Muhamadan pride, to their superstitious bigotry, to their lust for religious war nd to their hatred for the English, dwelt upon with a less perfect knowdge of their peculiar inherences? In an extract from the 'Authentic ews,' dated the 19th of March, it is stated that 900 Persian soldiers ith some officers of high rank, had entered India, and that 500 mo

e then staying in Dehlí itself in various disguises It is true that this iven out on the authority of one Sadik Khán, a person whose identity being established, was evidently in disguise even to his name, but s very circumstance was no doubt a part of the scheme. It gave an of greater mystery to the announcement of the paper, and seems to re been purposely contrived to let the imagination of the readers supply exaggerated idea of his real rank and importance How, it may be ed, even under this cloak of a false name, could such a statement be en forth in the leading newspaper of the city without some deep and erior object? It not only assigns deep conspiracy to the Persians, but, alse, as we know it to have been, is proof of conspiracy in the editor l those who employed him. This name of Sadik Khán, be it remem-ed, was the one attached to the proclamation purporting to be from sia, and put up in the Jammi Masjid The proclamation, then, and the ortion about these 900 Persian soldiers, were evidently parts of one and same scheme, and seem to have been thus linked together that the might, in a measure, support the other If, for instance, any ques-ied the authority of the proclamation, there was the answer ready that bringer of it was actually in the city with 500 other Persians also in guise, and *vice versâ* If the advent of the Persians was disbelieved, s not the proclamation a voucher for its reality? The same depth of ifice is apparent everywhere, and the more we consider the subject the re fully convinced we shall be of the wiles and stratagems so system-ally resorted to For instance, what would such a proclamation as t attributed to the King of Persia have been without some demonstra-n, feigned or real, to support it? The sword depicted on one side, and shield on the other, would have been equally meaningless but for the ry of the men in disguise, and the officers of high rank who evidently st have been deputed to carry it through. The proclamation, so evi-itly false, is, for that very reason, one of our truest and most reliable ositors of conspiracy, and of Musalmán conspiracy too It is, in fact, ossible to account for it under any other hypothesis Who, then, was that designed and wrote the proclamation? This question, I believe, ld be answered in every detail by the editor of the paper, who has urred to it so frequently. It is evidently a pet subject of his, one on ich he seems to be thoroughly at home. He has the exact transcript it, is able to epitomise it, and no doubt was equally well informed as he preparation of it.

do not mean to wade through and to quote all the extracts from the spapers that bear out the fact of a Muhammadan conspiracy That ears to me unnecessary, for I believe I shall have no difficulty in esta-shing it by other testimony. However, there is one other extract, which would be wrong to leave unnoticed. It bears date the 13th of April, t must have been the origin of the report that Sir Theophilus Met-e alludes to, when he says that, about fifteen days before the outbreak, was currently reported that an anonymous petition had been pre-ted to the magistrate, stating, "that the Kashmir gate would be

ken from the English. This being the chief stronghold in the city and ain connexion with the cantonments of Dehlí, it would naturally be the st point seized in any attempt at insurrection in the city, and, being the ily gate at which there was any military guard, the importance of it, in strategical point of view, must have been obvious to all" Sir Theoilus Metcalfe proceeds to say, "that this petition was never received, it that the current report about it was indicative of what was then occuring the thoughts of many of the natives" So, no doubt, it was, but was also much more than this, for it was the real exposition of an ticle which the editor dare not, without disguising it, put into print ith what ingenuity and craft the idea is worked out, so as to become telligible only to those who were meant to understand it, must now be vious to all The editor says several petitions have been given into e magistrate's court, and in these it is also mentioned that "a month nce from this date an overwhelming attack will be made on Kashmir, the salubrity and beauty of which a poet has said, 'that should a rched and burnt-up soul reach Kashmir, though he might be a roasted wl, he would recover his wings and feathers,' and that this cool and avenly country will come into the possession of the writers of the tition" How, it may be asked, were the writers of the petitions given to the magistrate's court at Dehlí to take Kashmir, and who does not w perceive that the Kashmir gate of the city of Dehlí was thus dicated by the country from which it derives its name, and that the lubrity and beauty of the former were to represent the importance, and fitness for their objects, of the latter? I shall not here pause to conler whether, under the simile of a parched and burnt-up fowl, the isoner before us was intended - He no doubt expected to recover some his lost plumage by seizing the gate, and with it was meditating a ght to a higher elevation. In declaring, on the 13th of April, that in e month from that date, an overwhelming attack would be made on is very point—for it was here the officers were shot down—the editor of e "Authentic News" was either the confidant and accomplice of conpiracy, or had soared into the regions of actual prophecy

The coincidence of the above cautiously worded announcement of the itor, and the indiscreet revelations of Jawan Bakht, are certainly startg The doubly foretold attack took place on the 11th of May, and, after at has been proved in regard to Muhammadan treachery, is there any e who hears me that can believe that a deep-planned and well-concerted spiracy had nothing to do with it?

The proofs of the intimate connexion of the prisoner with it do not, wever, rest here, for Mujud, the Abyssinian, who was not merely in the vice of the king, but was his private special attendant, and was always ar his person, takes Mr. Everett aside and tells him that he had better ve the Company's service, and, with his troop, go over to the king, as s hot weather the Russians would be all over the place Mr Everett ems to have laughed at this, and to have thought it but the man's olishness, but we have now direct proof that it was something far

keeper than that; for at their next meeting, which occurred about a month after the outbreak had been accomplished, Mujud says to him, "Did not tell you to come away?" And then, as it were in explanation of the warning, proceeds to reveal to him the whole of the Sidi Kambar transaction how, two years before, he had been sent to Constantinople as ambassador from the King of Dehlí; how he had started on the pretence of going to Mekka, and how he had promised that he would return when the two years had expired. This explanation seems to be a very remarkable one It shows clearly that it was not merely on the basis of an expected disturbance at Mírath that such a proposal was made, but that a far wider web of sedition was weaving. Who can now believe that none of the Muhammadan native officers and men of the regiments at Dehlí and Mírath had been tampered with? Mr. Everett, as a Christian, was surely one of the last the conspirators would apply to It should be remembered likewise, that Mr. Everett had none of his regiment with him at Dehlí, and that, had there been any Musalmán officers of the corps present, they would doubtless have been preferred to a Christian At the time too when the application was made to him the sentence of the Mírath court-martial must have been unknown in Dehlí. It was not then, as a consequence of, but as an addition and an adjunct to, what was anticipated at Mírath, that preparation was being made here, and by whom was this being done? Could a mere private servant and personal attendant, however great and favourite he might be, offer service to a risaldar and a whole troop of cavalry, withdrawing their allegiance from the Government, without any authority for so doing from his master? Who could have given the king's service to so large a body but the king himself? I would beg those who hear me, seriously to consider these questions, and then determine whether the answers to them do not bring home personal complicity in compassing the rebellion, to the prisoner Court. We have been informed, too, by Mukund Lál, the secretary, that it is now about three years since some infantry soldiers stationed at Dehlí became disciples of the king, and that, on that occasion, the king gave each of them a document detailing the names and order of those who had preceded him in the direct line of disciples to each other, himself included, together with a napkin dyed pink as an emblem of his blessing. Now, three years ago from the present date is about the time of Sidi Kambar's embassy to Persia, and of the apparent first commencement of Muhammadan conspiracy, and it certainly is a somewhat instructive fact to find that the occasion chosen for such an unwonted manifestation of piety on the one hand, and such an unusual display of kingly condescension on the other, was precisely that in which intimate relations between them of a more political character were beginning to be thought of. The Agent of the Lieutenant-Governor, of course, put a stop to these exhibitions but from that day, adds the witness, it may be said that a sort of understanding was established between the army and the king. I think it will be conceded, that in addition to the charges five facts have been established, viz., the concerted dreams and predictions of Hasan Askarí, the pre-

mission to Persia and Constantinople of Sidi Kambar, the Abyssinian, leliberate continuous plan of exciting distrust and revolt among the ıdus; a similar plan, by the fabrications of the native press, for incit- the Musalmáns to a religious war, and lastly, by these means and ers, an indirect, and also a personal, tampering with the fidelity of the ıdus and Musalmáns of the native army. Has or has not a guilty ticipation in all these five points been traced to the prisoner? If the stion (as I believe it will be) should be answered in the affirmative, re will still remain another to be responded to, of perhaps still greater portance, viz, Has he in these transactions been the leader, or the led? i he been the original mover, the head and front of the undertaking, or i he been but the consenting tool, the willing instrument in the hands others; the forward, unscrupulous, but still pliant puppet, tutored by stly craft for the advancement of religious bigotry? Many persons, I ieve, will incline to the latter. The known restless spirit of Muhammadan aticism has been the first aggressor, the vindictive intolerance of that ulıar faith has been struggling for mastery, seditious conspiracy has in its means, the prisoner its active accomplice, and every possible ne the frightful result. It was, however, rather as the head of the ıhammadan religion in India than as the descendant of a line of kings it I believe the prisoner's influences were desired, the one indeed is so eparable from the other that it is difficult to say where the difference mmences It was the union of the two, the religious and the political, it gave such importance to the prisoner as one of the abettors of ıspiracy

Thus the bitter zeal of Muhammadanism meets us everywhere It is ıspicuous in the papers, flagrant in the petitions, and perfectly demoniac its actions. There seems, indeed, scarce any exemption from its contaus touch The Prince Mirzá Abdulla, robbing his confiding visitor l former friend, and then sending his uncle to compass her death, ms no exaggerated instance of it It is again represented by the ıhammadan officer Mirza Taki Beg, at Pasháwar, who, while in high ployment and pay by the British Government, complacently quotes from books that a change will take place, and that the British rule will in be overthrown. It finds a still more unmistakable disciple in Karim ksh, of the Dehli Magazine, who, while drawing English pay, avails nself of his scholarship and knowledge of Persian to send circulars to native regiments to the effect that the cartridges prepared in the gazine had been smeared with a composition of fat, and that the Sipáhis re not to believe their European officers if they said anything in conıdiction of it. It will be recollected how active in his enmity this man oved when the king's troops were attacking the magazine, how he kept a secret communication with them, and how completely he identified nself, from the commencement, with the conspirators. Can there be a ubt that he was one of those who had been successfully tampered with; it, while ostensibly serving the English, he was, in reality, in the pay d confidence of those seeking their destruction?

But why multiply instances of this sort? I would gladly cite some of a different tendency, and the petition of Muhammad Darwesh, in his admirable letter to Mr Colvin, must not be passed over It is one noble instance of faithfulness from a Muhammadan to the British. I am sorry I cannot class with it the petition purporting to be from Nabi Baksh Khan to the king, pronouncing it unlawful to slay women, and calling for a decree to that effect from the doctors of the Muhammadan religion, for since I delivered the paper into Court considerable doubt has been thrown on its having been written at the time indicated, and it seems by no means improbable that it was fabricated after the capture of Dehlí, for the purpose of obtaining rewards and other advantages Indeed, a further attentive perusal of it has convinced me that it is so; for no one in the situation of Nabi Baksh Khán would have dared to advise or propose to the king to let the soldiery first wreak their rage on his own royal person as Nabi Baksh Khán pretends to have done. There are certainly a few instances in which the Muhammadans have behaved with kindness to the English, and not the less pleasing on account of the humble grades in which these instances occur. We may, perhaps, deduce from this, that the teachings such as are prescribed by their prophet have no softening effects on the hearts of his followers, nay, more, that education in such doctrines leads to ferocity and revolting crime, and is utterly incompatible with feelings of even ordinary humanity.

In the course of this address I have dwelt, long and frequently, upon those circumstances which appear to demonstrate that to Musalmán intrigue and Muhammadan conspiracy we may attribute the dreadful calamities of the year 1857. I have endeavoured to point out how intimately the prisoner, as the head of the Muhammadan faith in India, has been connected with the organisation of that conspiracy, either as its leader or its unscrupulous accomplice. I have alluded to the part taken by the native press and Muhammadans, in general, as preparing the Hindus for insurrection, and the native army, in particular, for revolt, and perhaps in further corroboration of such facts, it may be as well to advert to the share that may be assigned to the Muhammadans in getting the cartridges refused on the parade ground of the 3rd Light Cavalry Out of these 85 troopers the far larger moiety was Muhammadan These men had no caste and to them it could not possibly have mattered whether pig's and cow's fat was smeared on the cartridges or not Captain Martineau tells us that at the Ambálah depot, as far as the cartridge question was concerned, the Muhammadan Sipáhis laughed at it, and we thus perceive that these men initiated open mutiny without one pretext for so doing, or the shadow of an excuse. They had not even the extenuation of a pretended grievance yet they at once leagued themselves in rebellion against us, and induced the Hindus to join them, by speciously exciting them on that most vulnerable of points, the fear of being forcibly deprived of their caste. say, induced the Hindus to join them, for such is the evidence before us and this too on a pretext in which the Muhammadans could have had no possible sympathy with them. Nor indeed were the Hindus long in dis

ring this, for as a witness, who has been frequently quoted, inform
immediately after the battle of the Hindan they spoke with much
ɔt of the turn that affairs had taken, reproached the Muhammadans
iaving deceived them, and seemed to doubt greatly that the English
ernment had really had any intention of interfering with their caste
t numbers of the Hindu Sipahis at this time declared that, if they
ł be sure their lives would be spared, they would gladly go back to
service of the Government, but the Muhammadans, on the contrary
to assert that the king's service was much better than that of the
lish; that the nawabs and rajahs would supply the king with large
s, and that they must eventually conquer." If we now take a re-
ɔective view of the various circumstances which we have been able
ɪcit during our extended inquiries, we shall perceive how exclusively
ammadan are all the prominent points that attach to it A Muhammadan
ſ, with pretended visions and assumed miraculous powers— a Muham
an King his dupe and his accomplice—a Muhammadan clandestine
ıssy to the Muhammadan powers of Persia and Turkey resulting—
ammadan prophecies as to the downfall of our power—Muhammadan
as the successor of our own—the most cold-blooded murders by Muham
an assassins—a religious war for Muhammadan ascendancy—a Muham
an press unscrupulously abetting—and Muhammadan Sipáhis initiating
nutiny. Hinduism, I may say, is nowhere either reflected or represented
be brought forward at all, it is only in subservience to its ever-aggres
neighbour

ie arguments in reference to a Muhammadan conspiracy are now closed
i not mean that many others might not be deduced from the pro-
ings before us, for I have selected only those that appeared to me the
, prominent. I would wish, however, before sitting down, to quote
question and answer from Captain Martineau's evidence. "Did you
hear any of the Sipáhis speak complainingly of the efforts of English
ionaries to convert natives to Christianity?" *Answer*—"No, never
ıy life, I don't think they cared one bit about it." I believe there is
officer whose duties have given him much experience of the Sipáh
ıcter or any insight into his feelings and prejudices but will readily
rm the correctness of this opinion. There is no dread of an open
ed missionary in India. It is not the rightful conversion to Chris-
ty that either Sipáhis or natives are alarmed at. If it be done by the
ls of persuasion, of teaching, or of example—the only means by
h it can be done—it offends no caste prejudice, excites no fanatical
sation A candid, undisguised endeavour to gain followers to Christ
never, that I am aware of, been viewed with the slightest sign o
ɔprobation by any portion of the natives, and, were it more constantly
e their eyes, who can doubt that it would remove this present dark
debasing error that Christianity is itself a caste, and its only distin
ıing tenet the privilege of eating everything? If this degrading idea
removed, the chief fear of the Hindus would vanish with it. Let
ı see that it is impossible to make converts to Christianity by force

ınd you deprive the seditious of their most potent weapon of mischief. Christianity, when seen in its own, pure light, has no terrors for the natives t is only when kept in the shade that its name can be perverted to an nstrument of evil But I may, if I proceed further, be trenching on uestions of State policy I beg, then, to tender my thanks to the Court or the patient hearing they have given me, and to Mr. Murphy, the nterpreter, for the able assistance he has, in that capacity, afforded me on his and the other State trials His very high attainments as an Oriental scholar have been most conspicuous In the fluency of *vivâ voce* examinations, in the quick readiness with which all kinds of papers, in different ıands, have been deciphered and read, and in the correctness and spirit of the written translations of documents of no ordinary difficulty his complete knowledge both of Urdu and Persian has been thoroughly attested. The notes appended to many of these papers are valuable in themselves ınd speak more forcibly than I can do of Mr. Murphy's very high proficiency as an interpreter I should be wanting, both to him and myself f I did not thus record my obligations to him

FINDING.—The Court, on the evidence before them, are of opinion that the prisoner Muhammad Bahádur Sháh, ex-King of Dehlí, is guilty of al and every part of the charges preferred against him.

M. DAWES, Lieut.-Colonel, President.

Dehlí, 9th March, 1858. F. J HARRIOTT, Major, Deputy Judge Advocate-General.

Approved and confirmed.

N. PENNY, Major-General, Commanding Meerut Division

Camp Saháran, 2nd April, 1858.

COPY of a LETTER of the CHIEF COMMISSIONER of the PANJÁB FORWARDING to the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA the PROCEEDINGS of the TRIAL of the KING of DEHLÍ.

From R TEMPLE, Esq, Secretary to Chief Commissioner of the Panjáb t G. F. EDMONSTONE, Esq, Secretary to Government of India with th Governor-General

Láhor, 29 April, 1858

SIR,—I am now directed to forward for submission to the Right Honourabl the Governor-General, the proceedings* and papers in the trial o

* See Parliamentary Paper, No 162 of Session 1859.

[uhammad Bahádur Shah, ex-King of Dehli. As a supplement to ti
ove, I am also to transmit translation of evidence of Ahsun ul
hán, late confidential physician of the ex-King, taken before tl
ecretary to the Chief Commissioner. It will be in the recollection of h
ordship that the physician's life was guaranteed on the condition of h
swering satisfactorily such questions as might be put to him

2. The trial was commenced on the 27th January, 1858, and wa
ncluded on the 9th of March, 1858. The proceedings are very voluminou
id have only recently been received from the General commandin
irath division. The evidence relates not only to the specific charges o
hich the prisoner was arraigned, but also to the origin and character
e outbreak, and it lays bare the policy of the king's government an
e internal economy of the rebel army during the siege of Dehlí On th
hole, it is deeply interesting and instructive, whether viewed practicall
litically, or historically.

3. In brief terms, it may be said that the documentary evidence con
ises the system in which the general government was conducted, th
sing of loans, military arrangements, the communication with foreig
wers and neighbouring chiefs, the passages in the native newspaper
lating to the war between the English and the Persians There are als
course, many papers of a miscellaneous character The oral evidenc
scribes the occurrences of the outbreak, and the sad circumstance
nnected with the massacre of the Christians in the palace, it also throw
me light on the origin of the mutiny and the rebellion. The genera
ect of the evidence, documentary and oral, is to present to the mind
nderfully vivid picture of all that happened at Dehlí during the eventfu
nths between the 12th May and 20th September, 1857

4. The papers referring to the system of the king's government exhib
a remarkable manner the active personal share which the king himse
k in the conduct of affairs However wrongly he had assumed hi
sition, it must be admitted that his orders were not unworthy of th
uation. He did make some effort to preserve order in the city, t
press rapine and murder in the villages, to check malversation, to restrai
e excesses of the soldiery; but it is clear, from first to last, he wa
able to establish an administration either within or without the city
the tracts nominally ruled by the king there was scarcely the semblanc
authority; nor was there any protection for life or property. In bu
v cases did the king's agents succeed in collecting revenue from th
tricts. From its own records, the Mughul rule, while it lasted, seems t
ve been a reign of terror, and a period of intolerable anarchy to th
ple. Then the papers show the financial straits to which the king wa
ven, and the numerous forced loans and other contributions exacte
m the moneyed classes in Dehlí. The military papers do not materiall
cidate the plan of the operations, but they show that the mutinous arm
s utterly insubordinate to the government it had set up, and that it
cipline was entirely relaxed. The papers comprising the correspondenc
h other powers indicate the deputations despatched by the King c

lí to the Sháh of Persia; but they do not show an actual connexion
een these intrigues and the Bengal mutinies. Whether, in the
nce of any proof, there is reason to infer such connexion will be con-
ed presently. The correspondence with Indian chiefs proves that the
fs round Delhi were in subjection to the king, but there is nothing to
v that any considerable number of princes gave in their adhesion, nor
any sovereign or powerful prince intrigued with the king The
acts from the native newspapers at Dehlí certainly breathe a hostile
it to the British, and abound with absurd stories of the successes of
Persians in the war then waging, and their probable advance upon
a

The oral evidence goes far to show, that while the troops at Dehlí
e prepared for the outbreak, and the palace retainers were in some
sure ready for mischief, yet the king himself and his counsellors had
contemplated taking the lead in so serious a movement Consequently,
n the mutineers first arrived, the king's conduct was most vacillating.
asked them why they had come to him, for he had no means of
ntaining them. They replied that, unless he joined them, they could
make head against the English. He immediately yielded, however,
by his subsequent behaviour he identified himself with the cause of
rebels, and made their acts his own As regards the massacre of forty-
e Christians within the palace walls, it is probable that the king
iself was not a prime mover in that dreadful deed, and that, if left to
own devices, he would not have had the prisoners murdered. There is
le doubt that he could have saved them had he been so minded It is
te certain that he made no effort to do so, and, from his own subsequent
ers, it is clear that he was a consenting party to the murder

Upon all this evidence, the Court have found the prisoner guilty of
charges, which may be thus epitomised:

1st Aiding and abetting the mutinies of the troops

2nd Encouraging and assisting divers persons to wage war against the British Government.

3rd Assuming the sovereignty of Hindustan.

4th. Causing and being accessory to the murder of the Christians.

Concurring in the justice of the verdict, and considering the prisoner to
re been guilty of these grave felonies, the Chief Commissioner has to
ommend, that the said prisoner shall be dealt with as a felon, regard
y being had to the guarantee of his life, which was granted to him at
time of his capture. And the Chief Commissioner has arrived at the
iberate opinion of the prisoner's guilt, after having carefully examined
evidence adduced at the trial, and after having tested it by all the
ormation which he has obtained since the commencement of the
tbreak, and by his personal knowledge of the character both of the
soner and of the Muhammadan population of Dehlí

7 After the above brief analysis of the proceedings in this most re-
rkable trial, I am now to submit the Chief Commissioner's opinions on
real causes and origin of the mutiny and rebellion A right under-

nding of this matter is of the last importance to the future stabili the empire

8. In the first place, it is to be observed that the prisoner was n arged with any offence previous to the 11th May, 1857. Whatever mi ve been the king's participation in the events subsequent to that dai thing has transpired on the trial, or on any other occasion, to show th was engaged in a previous conspiracy to excite a mutiny in the Beng ny. Indeed, it is Sir John Lawrence's very decided impression th is mutiny had its origin in the army itself; that it is not attributable y external or any antecedent conspiracy whatever, although it was afte irds taken advantage of by disaffected persons to compass their ov ds; and that its proximate cause was the cartridge affair, and nothi e Sir John Lawrence has examined many hundreds of letters on th bject from natives, both soldiers and civilians He has, moreov conversed constantly on the matter with natives of all classes, and he isfied that the general, and indeed almost the universal, opinion in th rt of India is to the above effect.

9 It may be true that discontented Sipáhis worked upon the minds eir less guileless comrades, and persuaded them that a sinister bi stematic attempt was about to be made on their ceremonial religion, ar it in many regiments the majority was misled by designing individual t, as a body, the native army did really believe that the univers roduction of cartridges destructive of their caste was a matter only e. They heard (and believed as they heard) that the measure he en resolved on, and that some Sipáhis had been punished even by deat refusing to use the objectionable cartridges They thought, therefor it their only chance of escape was to band together, to refuse th tridges, and to resist if force should be attempted by the Government l the incendiary fires at the different stations were intended by th páhis as a warning to their officers and to their Government of th lings which had taken possession of the native army. Such truly wa e origin of the mutiny; and this, I am to repeat, is the one circumstanc ich has forced itself upon the Chief Commissioner's conviction in a at he has seen and heard. This is the one fact which stands ou ominently in all the native letters which he has examined, in all th tements of the natives whom he has cross-questioned, and in all th nversations between the natives themselves which have been reported b r spies in Dehlí and elsewhere

10 As against the above conclusion, it might perhaps be urged tha e mutiny first broke out at Mírath, where the new cartridges had neve en used; and it is no doubt true that the men of the 3rd Light Cavalr d never been asked to use the new cartridges, and were imprisoned fo using cartridges of the old description, and perfectly unobjectionabl t the Chief Commissioner has always understood that the cartridg ich these men did refuse happened to be enveloped in paper of a colou ferent from that generally used before, and he believes that this un tunate circumstance would account for the bitter mistrust which w.

excited in their minds. Indeed, a similar circumstance produced same effect upon the 19th Native Infantry and other regiments Bengal Any person conversant with native character can unders how easily such a thing might be misinterpreted by men whose imag tion and feelings had been wrought up to the belief that an attempt in contemplation to injure them in so vital a point as that of caste religion. Again, it has been said that the Sipáhis after the mutiny i off some of these impure cartridges against our loyal troops during siege of Dehlí, but it is very doubtful whether this really took place it did, however, still the men might have escaped the fancied pollu by the refraining from biting the cartridges, or they might have had cartridges remade in a manner which would obviate the supposed purity, or the cartridges might have been used only when the mutir were becoming desperate, as their final defeat drew near On the wl the Chief Commissioner considers that neither of the above argumen at all sufficient to weaken a conclusion so strong upon other grounds.

11. As an instance of the evidence which might be produced in fa of the above conclusions, I am to mention an important and interes conversation which the Chief Commissioner and Brigadier Ger Chamberlain recently held at Ambálah with a jámadar of the 3rd Pa Native Infantry. This man, a Bhajpuria Rajput by caste, and a na of Hindustan, was at Gházípur on furlough when the mutiny broke he and his two brothers joined an English indigo planter, and during s months were of great use to that gentleman on several occasion difficulty and disturbance He was on his way thence to rejoin regiment in the Panjáb when he met the Chief Commissioner's cam Ambálah Though holding a certificate of his good conduct and ser at Gházipur, he still, even at Ambalah, seemed doubtful of the recep he would meet with He was reserved at first, and it was only durii lengthened examination that he by degrees described what he had h and seen In this conversation he affirmed that there was a general b among the Hindustáni Sipáhis that the destruction of their caste religion had been finally resolved on by the English. "So strong this belief" he said, "that when I talked with the relations and frien Sipáhis, and endeavoured to combat their views, I ended in al believing that they were right. Then, again, when I talk to you and what you say, I see how foolish such ideas were." He added that English officers little knew how strong this impression had become in native army, that more than five years ago the belief had existed, had nearly brought on an *émeute*, that the caravansarais for travellers the supply depots (saráis and bardáshtkhánas) erected by Governmen the Grand Trunk Road were said to be devised with the object of stroying castes, and that before long impure kinds of food would prepared in them which the people would be forced to buy and eat

12 Such was the prevalent belief in the native army before outbreak The first excitement, according to the Chief Commissio belief, the first feeling of disaffection, arose among the high caste Hin

ahmans, and Rajputs of both the infantry and the cavalry; this affection then spread to the Muhammadans of the same regiments With m also the feeling was at first a desire to resist the infringement of ir caste and religion. Then, when they saw that the mutiny, which d now settled deep in the minds and hearts of the Hindu, might be oanded into a political movement calculated to subserve Musalmán erests, they sedulously fanned the flame. But, while thus the Hindus d Muhammadans of the line had united to mutiny, the Chief Commssioner's impression is, that in the first instance the Hindustáni egular Cavalry did not join in the combination While the regular ny chiefly came from Oudh and the districts surrounding it, the egular troopers were drawn from the districts within a circle of a ndred miles round Dehlí They had, therefore, no personal connexion th the line, and, except the mutual bond of religion, they had little or thing in common even with the Muhammadans of the regular cavalry

the many native letters which he examined at the outset of the isturbances the Chief Commissioner found nothing to implicate the egulars, though the misconduct of the 10th Irregular Regiment a túsháhrá is a grave exception to what has been said above in regard to is branch of the service. But, of course, when Dehlí had been seized by e mutineers, and when rebellion spread to the very districts whence e irregulars came, then very many of them also joined the movement om that time the Muhammadan soldiers and the Muhammadan populatio came more actively hostile than the Hindus. This, indeed, it is eas understand, fanaticism and ferocity being especially inculcated by th nets of their religion.

13. But although stories against the British were fabricated and circu ed by persons with ulterior designs, although individual intrigues wer e within and without the army; though the Muhammadans ver equently breathed a spirit of fanatic ferocity against the British, yet al eir influences could not could not have drawn our native army from it legiance, if it had not been already penetrated by that unfortunate belie out the cartridges. Nor would such an ill-feeling have so speedil isen, nor would it have produced such a desperate disaffection, if th my had not been in an unsound and unsatisfactory state for some year ist That this state of things actually existed can now be ascertaine om the natives themselves. At the time it would have been extremel fficult to discover as much from them, owing to their extraordinar ticence on matters which they fear to reveal. It is only by attentiv bservation, by study of their character and their conduct, and by th illating of their casual remarks, that their real opinions and feelings o ich subjects can be discerned. It were needless to allude to the severa auses which brought about this condition There is, however, on sential and original cause which cannot be too prominently mentioned or too attentively considered This cause was, that the Sipáhis wer abued with a sense of their own strength and of our weakness, and the ir system consequently placed in their way temptations which ei

ouraged them to revolt They were, as they themselves said in their wn phrase, the right arm, the hands and feet of the British Government. 'heir strength consisted in their great numbers, in their unexampled ower of combination from their being one vast brotherhood, with ommon fatherland, language, religion, caste, and associations; and their ossession of most of our magazines, many of our forts, and all our reasuries, while our weakness consisted in the paucity of European troops. loreover, while the native regiments were kept up to their full strength, hile our already overgrown native army was being gradually increased, it o happened that we had not been so weak for many years past in uropean troops as we were in 1857. Some regiments had been sub- racted from our complement during the Russian war, two regiments ere in Persia Those regiments we had were numerically weak, some orps had not received any fresh draughts for two years. These and all the ther weak points of our system were patent to a native army, having any intelligent men in its ranks, employed promiscuously from Calcutta o Pesháwar, and consequently well acquainted with our military arrange- ents. In short, it was a sense of overwhelming power acting upon men xasperated by a fancied wrong that led the Bengal army to mutiny. In e face of this grand motive cause for the mutiny existing in the army, hy need we look abroad for foreign causes?

14 The real causes of the outbreak having been discussed, I am now to dvert to certain circumstances which are sometimes said to be causes, ut which in the Chief Commissioner's judgment were probably not so.

15. In the first place, with reference to conspiracies, which have been o frequently adduced as proximate causes of the outbreak, I am to state at, in the Chief Commissioner's belief, there was not any conspiracy in e army irrespective of the cartridge affair, and no really organised onspiracy even in respect to that. The Sipáhis had corresponded in order o unite in refusing the cartridges, they had probably engaged to stand y one another in resistance to the supposed oppression, and being a aternity with hopes, fears, prejudices, feelings, all in common, they all elt that such an engagement would be acted up to by the whole body lo doubt the course of affairs at Mírath precipitated the outbreak, and , is vain to speculate as to what could have been designed if that utbreak had been postponed But it seems certain that no regular rising ad up to that time been planned. A mass of Sipáhi correspondence has een inspected, the common talk of the mutineers in Dehlí has been eported, the records of the palace have been ransacked, and yet no trace f any such detailed plan has been found To show how little the ourse to be followed had been pre-arranged at the time of the Mírath utbreak, one or two significant circumstances may be cited. The well- nown moonshee, Mohan Lal, who was at Dehlí, stated that some men of e 3rd Light Cavalry told him that when the regiment broke out at lírath they had scarcely left the cantonments when they held a council f war as to what should be done next The general voice at first was for aking refuge in Rohilkhand, but one of the men pointed out that Dehlí

i the proper place to make for. There, he said, were the magazine and treasury; there the strong fortifications, there a large city population, re the king for a fitting instrument, and there, above all, an important nt without European troops. This account of what took place on that asion was corroborated by minute and extensive inquiries made by gadier-General Chamberlain after the fall of Dehlí Again, it is ascer- ied from Mr Ford, Magistrate of Gurgáon, that a large party of the Cavalry troopers actually fled through Dehlí onward to the Gurgáon rict on the very next day after the outbreak, and that 10 men of this ty and 20 of the horses were seized by the magistrate. At the same ie there is no doubt that the troops at Dehlí were prepared for the urrence of an outbreak at Mírath, and were fully resolved to stand by ir comrades

6. It was when the native army at large saw the immense success of Mírath and Dehlí mutineers, and the disasters of the British in the t instance, that they resolved to convert what had been a combination inst supposed oppression into a struggle for empire and for a general itary domination The Sipáhis had the command of all the public asuries; no attempt was made to secure the treasure at out-stations, temptation to plunder was too great for the virtue even of our best posed regiments, each corps acquired great wealth as it mutinied, as iment after regiment fell away the power of resistance on the part of Government lessened, in short, so manifold were the inducements, so tain the spread of infection, so powerful the effect of example, that no n acquainted with India could fail to see that such a mutiny and ellion, unless trampled out at once, unless quenched in the blood of the liers who first revolted, must extend everywhere like wild-fire

7. Next I am to state that Sir John Lawrence does not believe that re was any previous conspiracy, Muhammadan or other, extending first ough the influential classes in the country, and then to the native army. here were such a thing, how comes it that no trace has been discovered this part of India, the very quarter where any such conspiracy must ve been hatched? How can it reasonably be explained, why none of se who have adhered to our cause were acquainted with such a con- racy? The number of those who were with us in Hindustan may ve been small, as compared with the number of those who were against , but still the number of our adherents was considerable Of these, ny remained true to us under all trials, others again died fighting on side, yet not one of these has ever been able to speak of any general spiracy previous to the outbreak Again, none of the mutineers and els who paid for their guilt the forfeit of their lives ever confessed in ir last moments a knowledge of any such conspiracy, though they ew that any revelations on this subject would have saved them from th. Again, many papers of various kinds have come to hand, revealing portant secrets, implicating many persons, jeopardising many lives, yet all these there has been no allusion to such a conspiracy In all his uiries the Chief Commissioner has never heard a word from a native

ıth, nor seen anything in any native document, that could convey even impression that any general plot had existed.

8 Furthermore, the Chief Commissioner considers that the conduct of people generally negatives the supposition of a general conspiracy If people had conspired with the army, why was not the first outbreak nediately followed by a general insurrection? If there was concert and meditation, then, why did not the population obey the first signals of olt, such remarkable and encouraging signals as they were? Why did all Hindustan rebel directly that Dehlí had fallen to the mutineers, en the English there had been massacred, when the troops had raised bad characters of the city, and with their aid had seized the treasure, gazines, and fortifications; when the king's sons, courtiers, and re- ıers had joined, and when the king himself had consented to head the vement? Why had not the population everywhere taken advantage nediately of our weakness? Our power in a large portion of Hindostan was ıporarily paralysed Our means were small, and those means we had re so placed as not to be capable of being at once brought to bear ainst the insurgents And the Mírath force did nothing The fact is, ıt at first our enemies were not prepared to profit by such unforeseen and mendous events It was not till afterwards that the Muhammadans of ndustan perceived that the re-establishment of the throne of Dehlí, ə gradual rising of the Muhammadan population, and the losses of the ıtish at so many stations, presented an opportunity when they might aın strike for empire with some prospect of success. The fact that erwards in many districts the people threw off or ignored our authority, d that many individuals, and some classes openly ıose against us, will no means prove a preconcerted conspiracy, but, on the contrary, will mit of much explanation. In no case did popular tumult precede the litary outbreak, but, invariably where it occurred at all, it ensued upon mutiny, like cause following effect. The population generally were ssive at first. Then, as it appeared that the British were being swept the face of the land, every village began to follow its own course In ost districts there was, of course, more or less misconduct. But through e whole time the people, even in the worst districts, never embarrassed half as much as they would have done had they been rebels at heart ırge masses of people were coerced by the mutineers into insurrection, it surrection it could be called; where, again, the mutineers were beaten d expelled, the country rapidly settled down to peace and order. herever our officers were able to hold their own, the people remained ıolly or partially tranquil, when British rule ceased, utter disorder cessarily followed And certainly the common belief in Hindustan was at the British dominion had been extinguished. Furthermore, it is to remembered that in India, as indeed in almost every other country, ere exists a discontented class ready for any change, in the hope of its ıproving their condition. Moreover, in India especially, there are tribes ' nature predatory, who before our rule subsisted on plunder and rapine ıese were subdued more than half a century ago by our arms and our

. But the characteristics of those people survive in their descendants. existing generation cling to the predatory traditions of their fore- s They long for a return of the days of misrule—the good old when those might take who had the power, and those might keep ould Most of them had indeed never seen a shot fired, and, living the shadow of a strong Government, had become unwarlike. But, our power became eclipsed and our prestige dimmed, the old instinct, nate love of plunder revived, and the strong began to prey upon the

Then, again, a considerable section of the people, and especially uhammadans, are fanatical This fanaticism, loosed from the bands of century, became a powerful engine against us. Whatever may be trinsic merits of our rule, the people of India can never forget that e an alien race, in respect of colour, religion, habits, sympathies, we, on the other hand, practically forgetting this, and wrapping ves up in our pride, self-reliance, and feeling of superiority, neglect ost ordinary precautions for our own security, and throw off even ightest restraints on our freedom of action, though our very safety lepend upon such precautions.

The preceding observations convey, in the Chief Commissioner's ient, a fair idea of the condition of the people after the outbreak in Dehlí territory, the Duáb, of the Ganges and the Jamnah, and khand In Oudh, however, the case was different, there the popu- had been long inured to danger and warfare; their martial pride had ostered by constant success in resistance to their own rulers, and by ist numbers employed in foreign military service under the British. had always lived free from civil restraint, and they had never felt eight of our military power. After the province was annexed, we ot at all a strong military position. We were virtually attempting ld the province by troops drawn from itself, we had but one ean regiment, and some European artillery, while we had upwards ,000 indigenous troops, and while we had no European troops ready nd in adjacent provinces Yet, notwithstanding all this, we did, acting with the best intentions, carry out some measures which had ffect of irritating various influential classes As a counterpoise to lisaffection, we might have produced contentment and loyalty among classes, but our tenure of dominion had been too short to effect this the outbreak burst upon us When the influential classes, whom olicy had provoked, found that the native army were ripe for revolt, added fuel to a rising fire; and, when the crisis arrived, mutiny was liately followed by insurrection Had we been able at once to march ean or other reliable troops into Oudh in sufficient numbers, we might then have beaten down opposition But this we could not do, and months passed away During that interval our enemies consolidated power, and even those most friendly to our rule were, from sheer ity, driven to swell the ranks of our opponents

It may be that the Supreme Government have received information other parts of India, but the foregoing conclusions regarding the

absence of any conspiracy, and the general conduct of the peopl
based upon Sir John Lawrence's knowledge and experience of
countries from the Jamnah to the borders of Afghanistan, a tract c
100,000 square miles, with a population of 30,000,000, and compris
very centre and focus of rebellion, the place of all others where s
conspiracy, if it had existed at all, would have been most likely
discovered

21 It will be seen that in the Deputy Judge Advocate Ge
summing up at the trial much stress is laid on the overtures made
king to the Shah of Persia, but, as already remarked, nothing was e
at the trial to show that these referred to a revolt either of the
army or the people of Hindustan. The physician Ahsan Ullah de
that these communications were indeed treasonable; that the kin
dissatisfied chiefly because he was not allowed to set aside his
son in the succession to the title, and that he had an idea of obt
help from Persia and from Oudh, to which latter Court also h
patched an emissary, but the physician adds, that although the subv
of the British Government was mentioned in these despatches, yet a
of the Sipáhi army was never referred to as a means of accomplishir
During the Persian war there is reason to know that intrigues were
on between the Courts of Persia and Dehlí, but it were hardly rea
to suppose that if the Shah had really intended to give the King of
any aid, or had even believed that a violent attempt would be m
subvert the British power in India, he would have made peace with
at the critical time of our fortunes, thereby releasing, for the suc
India, the troops which would otherwise be locked up in Persia
if the Shah had really been cognisant of such an attempt, would
have sent his emissaries to Peshawar and into the Panjáb? Had
this, some signs of intrigue would have certainly been perceptil
none whatever were discovered, in fact, all that we have learnt re
the intrigues of the king and his party show that that he did not
any conspiracy or combination in India itself, but rather to fore
from beyond the frontier, from Persia or from Russia Indeed, the
developed are generally so absurd as to show that these intrigu
destitute of any reasonable plan, and were conceived by persons in
measure ignorant of the subject

22. The Chief Commissioner's opinions and conclusions on t
portant subject have now been stated without reserve The
experience of Hindustan during 1857 must ever be applicable to
provinces of the empire, it should command attention in the
especially. The Chief Commissioner has every reason to speak wc
Panjábí troops, and indeed it would be difficult to praise too hig
services during the present war, they have resisted sore temptati
undergone severe trials. Nevertheless, there was a time when it
doubtful what course they would ultimately adopt, and the Chi
missioner fully believes that, had we failed to take Dehli last
even their fidelity would not have remained proof against the bad

them. At that juncture the Chief Commissioner himself could not pprehending the day when, besides the British soldiers, there would nan on our side That such a day did not arrive is due only, in the Commissioner's eyes, to the infinite mercy of the Almighty The ,unes and calamities which we experienced in Afghanistan in 1842 enewed and surpassed in Hindustan during 1857 The issue has ess disastrous, because in the last instance the country was less the people less formidable, and our resources less distant, but, all, because the Almighty Disposer of Events, though apparently ined to humble, had not resolved to destroy us. Many thoughtful .perienced men now in India believe that we have been extricated lestruction only by a series of miracles. It is no exaggeration to that in many instances the mutineers acted as if a curse rested on ause Had a single leader of ability risen amongst them, nay, had ollowed any other course but the infatuated course which they ly did pursue in many instances, we must have been lost beyond ption, but such a destruction was not decreed; it was a struggle en Christianity and civilisation on the one side and barbarism and nism on the other That we escaped from destruction, and even ed success, can be accounted for in no other way than by attributing o the operation of the Divine Will And now, having been preserved ovidence thus far victorious, it urgently behoves us to strive to gain it understanding of the real circumstances which brought on this If we can but acquire this, then there is hope that we may profit .nowledge of the past, and in future avoid those errors which had igh led to our ruin

In conclusion, I am to submit the Chief Commissioner's recom- ıtion in regard to the future disposal of the prisoner Muhammad lar Shah, ex-King of Dehlí The Chief Commissioner suggests, then, he said prisoner be transported beyond the seas as a felon, and be n some island or settlement, where he will be entirely isolated from ther Muhammadans As regards the prisoner's wife, Zinat-Mahal, is son, Jawán Bakht, no charges having been exhibited against them, he latter being only 17 years of age, but they both having been it at Dehli, the Chief Commissioner suggests that they be allowed the ı of accompanying the prisoner to his place of transportation; and in the event of their declining to do so, they be confined as State iers somewhere in the Lower Provinces of the Bengal Presidency

While forwarding these proceedings, I am to state that the Chief nissioner commends to the favourable consideration of the Supreme nment the able exertions of Major J. F Harriott, of 3rd Light ry, the Deputy Judge Advocate General, in conducting this pro- ıl trial The Chief Commissioner also desires to bring to notice the ble services of Mr James Murphy, Collector of Customs, who acted terpreter to the Court This gentleman, unaided by any munshi, lated all the numerous and difficult documents adduced at the trial; so read the originals before the Court, and conducted the examination

of the native witnesses. The translations are believed to be excee faithful, and the circumstance that he was able to dispense with assistance in the work ensured secrecy and other advantages, and e his eminent attainments as an Urdu and Persian scholar. The Commissioner, I am to add, contemplates shortly proposing some rew behalf of this meritorious officer.

I have, &c.

(signed) R TEMI

(True copy)

(signed) J. W. KAYE,
Secretary in the Political and Secret Departr

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